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ABSTRACT
Radiotelephony between air traffic controllers and pilots utilises standard
phraseology as the medium of communications. Standard phraseology
employs specific structure, terminology and pronunciation to ensure
effectiveness and accuracy. On occasions when standard phraseology is found
insufficient, plain language is used to efficiently relay vital information. By
default, English is the designated language of communication between
controllers and pilots of international flights. Deviations from the usage of
standard phraseology and lack of language proficiency had been identified as
one of the causal factors in safety occurrences. Language deficiencies,
specifically of the non-native speakers of the English language, had raised
much concern but there is limited information in the area.
This research attempted to fill a small segment of this knowledge gap. It was
focussed on the usage of standard phraseology and English language in an air
traffic control environment involving English Second Language users. Audio
data was sourced from routine radiotelephony recordings of ‘live’ air traffic
control facilities in Malaysia to capture realistic communications between
controllers and pilots in the Terminal Approach Radar, Area Radar and
Aerodrome Control environments. A detailed cross sectional investigation of
the radiotelephony characteristics, deficiencies and errors of transmitted
messages revealed the radiotelephony performances of controllers and pilots in
the environments. The recurrence of deviations from standards and occurrence
of errors implied the likelihood of such deficiencies taking place. Demographic
groups’ descriptions complemented the radiotelephony analyses as background
information on language related training. The results were comparative to other
similar studies and offered new information on English Second Language
speakers in the Air Traffic Control environment.
Keywords: Air Traffic Control radiotelephony, standard phraseology, English
language proficiency.
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1
1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis examined the characteristics of routine radiotelephony in an air
traffic control (ATC) environment where the controllers were English Second
Language (ESL) users. The research had involved the transcription of 4,400
minutes of ATC radiotelephony audio into text, encoding and analysing over
20,500 messages containing more than 210,000 words as well as analysis of
the Malaysian controllers’ demographic data.
1.1 Motivational Factors
Non-native users of the English language had often been associated with poor
usage of the language that led to misunderstandings and error in ATC
operations. The lack of proficiency had been highlighted as a factor contributing
to safety occurrences. A cross sectional analysis of routine radiotelephony was
considered the most appropriate method to best identify and quantify these
language related problems. The messages in routine radiotelephony are
considered a valuable source of information about the real communicative
practises and needs of pilots and controllers as it would show consistent
language and terminology usage patterns, message structure formulation and
how the dialogue is organised (Mell, 1991c). Monitoring of routine operations
is also a practise recommended by ICAO for safety assessment (ICAO, 2005;
Maurino, 2004; ICAO, 2006).
Research into ATC radiotelephony, language or communication problems and
safety occurrences are not new. However, the previous researches had mostly
been carried out in native English speaking countries. What this research has
to offer are findings from primary data from an ESL user country in a region
seldom visited by researchers. As no known data have been collected from the
Asian region before, nor any ATC radiotelephony related research carried out
there, this research could be a beginning to more data being collected and more
information gathered on the communication characteristics of the aviation
community in this region.
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As Malaysia’s air traffic controllers presumably fall into the ESL category, the
Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) Malaysia, being an ATC service provider,
was totally supportive of this research. The researcher being a licensed and
qualified air traffic controller; with experience in training, personnel licensing and
ATC examination had been an advantage to the undertaking of this task. ATC
radiotelephony exchanges are not similar to daily conversation and an in depth
knowledge of the subject matter had assisted in data processing and analyses.
The findings should motivate the ESL controllers and pilots to maintain and
improve their commendable radiotelephony performance shown through this
research. Deficiencies that were identified could be repaired through training
and awareness programmes.
1.2 Limitations
Malaysia was chosen due to the ESL status of the controllers and data source
accessibility, but using a real-time ATC environment had dismissed the
possibility of getting participation only from ESL pilots. It was not practical and
time consuming to determine the first languages of all the pilots flying in
Malaysian airspace. To filter out the radiotelephony involving native English
speaker pilots would also render the communications flow inaccurate and
valuable data may be lost. As the controllers are all non-native English
speakers, it could be established that the ATC radiotelephony does involve an
ESL user at all times.
There were two types of data collected in this research; the recorded ATC
radiotelephony and questionnaire responses. However, these two sources
were independent of each other. No individual respondent could be linked to
specific recording as the information was not disclosed for privacy reasons.
The conclusion however, had been derived as grouped categories where
applicable. It would have been ideal to analyse data from various countries in
the region to represent a wider ESL population, but that may be something to
look forward to in future.
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The audio data transcribed and analysed do not include messages between
ATC and other ground units. These were filtered out as the research focus was
on controller-pilot communications. The taxonomy chosen for encoding the
controllers’ and pilots’ transmission exchanges was not suited for ground
communications. Those communications rightfully require a separate
classification and analyses.
1.3 Research Objectives
The main objectives of this research were:
1. To identify and quantify the ATC radiotelephony characteristics in an
ESL environment.
2. To determine types and recurrence of, language and standard
phraseology associated errors.
In relations to the ESL status and usage of the English language among the
controllers in the ATC system, sub-objectives relevant to the research focus
were added as follows:
i. To summarise the demographics of the Malaysian controllers
ii. To determine if English is a dominant language among the
controllers in daily communication
iii. To examine the attendees’ perception of the Aviation English and
ATC communication related training’s value.
iv. To examine the controllers’ perception of non-adherence to
standard practises recurrences in routine ATC operations.
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1.4 Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this research stemmed from the need to scientifically and
factually establish how efficient the ESL controllers (and pilots) perform in their
daily radiotelephony.
This research hypothesis is that the characteristics of ATC
Radiotelephony involving ESL controllers will show frequent evidence of
non-proficiency and language related errors that are commonly
associated with safety occurrences.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The thesis is presented in 7 chapters. Chapter 2 briefly explains about ATC
operations, radiotelephony and its related problems. Chapter 3 approaches the
research area from the language perspective and also discuss ESL related
problems. Research methodology is explained in Chapter 4, detailing the
methods, the data collection program, data processing and encoding phase. As
there were two data sources, data analyses results are presented in two
separate chapters. Demographics and respondents’ perception of language
training and usage is presented in Chapter 5 while ATC radiotelephony analysis
in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents the conclusion, summarising the knowledge
contributed by this research, commenting on the overall undertaking of the task
and possible areas for related researches to widen the knowledge map of this
subject matter. For a detailed research work flowchart refer to Figure 4-2 on
page 89.
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2 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
This research is specifically focussed on verbal communications involving air
traffic controllers and pilots within the ATC environment. The importance of
ATC communications as a feature of the overall system is summed up by Linter
and Buckles (1993) as,
“Regardless of the level of sophistication that the air traffic system achieves by the
turn of the century, the effectiveness of our system will always come down to how
successfully we communicate”
The definition of communication is constantly connected to keywords such as
imparting, exchange, transmission, sharing, interchange, sending and
conveying of information, ideas, feelings, thoughts, data, opinion or views by
means of speech, writing or signs. Other than verbal, there are a number of
mediums through which information is relayed, such as the auditory Morse
Codes, Braille writing for the blind, visual signalling by hands, flags, or lights,
writings, encryption and symbols or simply by signage.
In ATC, communications take place between controllers of the same and other
stations, with pilots on the ground, pilots in the air, meteorology office, ground
operators, airlines and other relevant organisations. Ground based stations
such as ATC units and meteorology office communicate through telephone
land-lines while controller-pilot communication utilises radio frequencies.
Controller-pilot communication differs from our daily speech and is closely
related to aircraft operations and safety.
It is therefore useful to understand the overall function of the ATC system, the
rules that govern ATC communication, the role of International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) as the advisory body and the airspace structure where
flights operate. This chapter will introduce briefly these topics as well as explain
in greater detail about ATC radiotelephony and problems related to this type of
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communication. It will additionally explore the records and information from
various safety occurrences databases in terms of statistics, data availability and
contents relevance to this research.
2.1 The Air Traffic Control System
An ATC system coordinates movement of aircraft operations at an airport and in
the air to ensure that each and every aircraft is kept a safe distance apart from
another. The system would require accurate delineation of routes and airspace
segments, special rules and regulations, presence of qualified personnel to
provide directives and advice, a reliable communication and information
network and technical facilities for navigation (Field, 1980). Air traffic controllers
are the people monitoring these movements and with pilots’ cooperation and
compliance, realises the objectives of the system (US Labor Department, 2006).
An important feature of the ATC system is that movement of air traffic involves a
four dimensional management of the situation. The position of an aircraft at any
one time is three dimensional in nature, described in lateral, longitudinal and
vertical displacement, but the projection of time need to be taken into account to
ensure safety.
2.1.1 ATC Objectives
An aircraft provided with ATC services is ensured of its safety by issuance of
necessary instructions, in line with the standards and recommended practices
of the ICAO and in accordance with the Air Navigation Order and Rules of the
Air. The ATC function is collectively defined by five objectives (ICAO, 2001b):
i. Preventing collisions between aircraft in flight,
ii. Preventing collisions between aircraft on the manoeuvring area of
an airport and obstructions on that area,
iii. Expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic,
iv. Providing advice and information useful for the safe and efficient
conduct of flights, and
v. Notifying appropriate organisations regarding aircraft in need of
search and rescue aid, and assisting such organisations as
required.
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Air Traffic Service is a collective broad term and may include positive ATC,
advisory, information and/or alerting service, depending on the classification of
airspace. When positive ATC service is provided, the controller is primarily
responsible for collision avoidance between aircraft. The advisory and
information services partly delegates the maintaining of safety function to the
pilots as they are kept well informed of possible traffic confliction and are
expected to be visually alert. The alerting service is meant for rendering all
possible assistance to aircraft in difficulties or emergencies. All these services
are made available for most parts through ATC communications between
controllers and pilots.
ATC plays an important role in ensuring the safety of an aircraft in flight. It is
involved in the safety of flight operations from the time an aircraft is pushed-
back from the parking gate while the engines are started-up until the aircraft
reaches its destination and is parked safely at the arrival gate. The pilot does
the actual flying of the aircraft, but the air traffic controller is responsible for
ensuring the safe disposition of the aircraft in relation to other aircraft in the
airspace system. The controller sits at the centre of an ATC system making
safety-critical decisions based on information acquired from the system.
In the vicinity of an aerodrome, flights are provided with aerodrome control
service where the controllers visually monitor aircraft movements from a control
tower. Aerodrome controllers are primarily responsible for manoeuvring areas
and runway safety (Field, 1980). These controllers ensure separation between
departing and landing aircraft, manage surface movements of aircraft and
vehicles, monitor local weather conditions and designate the most suitable
runway-in-use (Nolan, 1998).
After takeoff or prior to landing, when flights are in the air within the terminal
control area (TMA), approach control service is provided. Busy and congested
TMAs near international and major airports are usually controlled under terminal
approach radar (TAR) service. TAR controllers are responsible for sequencing
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arriving aircraft for landing, positioning departing aircraft to join designated
airways and controlling other aircraft operating within the TMA. A concept
known as Flow Control is sometimes utilised to avoid unnecessary congestion,
fuel wastage and system overload (Field, 1980). These airspaces are the
busiest and require highly trained controllers, efficient controlling techniques
and effective communications.
Beyond the TMA, flights in en-route phase are provided with area radar control
service as they travel towards their intended destinations. The area controllers
deal with aircraft climbing to cruising phase, descending in preparation for
arrival, standard holding patterns and en-route weather deviations that may
disrupt aircraft routing. These controllers do not have visual contact with aircraft
at all. Each aircraft is represented in the form of flight progress strips or radar
responses and these displays are used for managing, controlling and co-
ordinating aircraft movements. Controllers apply an extensive degree of
projection and visualisation to understand the traffic scenario and use the
information communicated by the display for conflict detection and resolution
(Nunes and Mogford, 2003).
Area controllers’ workload may be perceived as less hectic than approach
radar’s but each controller handles a larger chunk of airspace and planning for
traffic confliction is projected over a longer period of time. An essential part of
Area control is in prior planning and imposing restrictions, sometimes well
before a flight actually takes off to avoid bottlenecks and confliction points along
the intended flight route and cruising altitude. A continuous flow of verbal,
electronic and computerised data assist real time adjustments to ensure aircraft
safety (Field, 1980).
Outside controlled airspace the flight information service officers provide traffic
information to participating pilots. Position reports, estimates of arrival and
aircraft flight altitude are advised to those in potential conflict. It is up to the
pilots to look out for traffic and keep clear of each other. However, the
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controllers are required to provide correct and complete information to assist the
pilots.
An alerting service is provided in all airspace together with other ATC services.
The controller monitors all aircraft operating within the controlling frequency and
provides assistance to aircraft in difficulty. In the event that rescue services are
required, assistance would be rendered to agencies involved in the operations.
In emergency situations, the controller has to ensure that the situation is best
managed in the interest of the distressed aircraft without putting into second
place, the safety of other aircraft operating in the vicinity.
All the objectives of ATC as explained above involve communication, largely
with pilots and other ATC units. Controllers communicate with pilots mainly
through verbal radiotelephony from the departure point until destination. As
more aircraft operates in the sky, further afield and at higher altitudes, there is a
higher demand for ATC services. This also means ATC communications need
to be more reliable and efficient in all aspects.
2.1.2 Airspace Structure
The establishment of airspace and corresponding ATC units and services are
considered necessary to promote a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air
traffic. Annex 11 (ICAO, 2001b) to the Convention of International Civil Aviation
describes standards and guidelines for establishing these features of the ATC
and airspace system. The type of ATC service provided depends on airway
configuration and classification as well as types of air traffic involved, traffic
density and meteorological conditions.
A country’s Flight Information Region (FIR) is the designated airspace within
which the country provides flight information and alerting services. Malaysia for
instance has 2 FIRs, the Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu FIR. The delineation
of FIRs is based on the nature of route structure efficiency rather than national
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boundaries or any country’s territory and territorial waters. Provision of ATC
services will abide by ICAO-approved procedures (Nolan, 1998).
Figure 2-1 illustrates an aircraft passage through a simplified airspace structure
with the relevant ATC units having jurisdiction of the airspace portions. The
flight will begin and end at an aerodrome where the tower/ aerodrome controller
is responsible for flight movements. In the TMA the approach radar control
directs and positions a flight onto the en-route phase. Once joining the intended
airways, the area control takes charge of an aircraft flight until descend phase in
preparation for arrival. At this point, the flight once again enters the TAR control
airspace. Landing and gate-in at the end of a flight will be under the
responsibility of the aerodrome controller.
Figure 2-1: ATC Airspace Structure
Airways are similar to motorways, roads and railways in that it maps the
intended and designated routes. Airways designated aerial routes for flight
paths of an aircraft from one airport to another, in the form of a 3 dimensional
corridor, delineated by navigational aids (ICAO, 2001e). These airways have
an identification and classification system similar to the motorways network on
the ground. However, motorways are two dimensional in nature while airways
have an additional vertical dimension known as altitude or flight levels. As there
are no landmarks or roads in the sky, the structure of airways are dependent on
radio beacons and other electronic devices. Airways are connected between
adjacent FIRs, allowing global air travel within controlled airspaces.
Aerodrome Control
(CTZ)
TAR Control
(TMA)
Area Control (Airways)
TAR Control
(TMA)
Aerodrome Control
(CTZ)
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Terminal Control Area (TMA) which could be compared to city areas, are more
congested as many airways confluence here for traffic movements into and out
of an airport. The airspace surrounding an airport is known as the control zone
(CTZ). These segments of control areas, control zones, airways, terminal areas
and aerodrome traffic zones are structured for the efficient and smooth control
of traffic flow.
The airspace segments are designated identity names in relations to the ATC
service provider having jurisdiction over the airspace, for example Lumpur TMA
or Melaka Control Zone. The ATC units having authority within classes of
airspace are also assigned unique identification names which are used as
addressees in communication. An aerodrome control tower unit is identified by
the location of the aerodrome, for example Lumpur Tower, Changi Tower and
Cranfield Tower. Designation of the approach control or terminal approach
radar unit would be in the same manner. An area control unit is usually
identified by the name of the town or geographical feature nearest to it, but the
designation would use the word control, as in Lumpur Control, Kuching Control
and Kinabalu Control.
2.1.3 The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
The International Civil Aviation Organisation is a specialised agency of the
United Nations and presently consists of 190 contracting states. ICAO was
formed at the Chicago Convention in 1944, more than 30 years after the first
attempt towards a globally represented civil aviation body.
Table 2-1 lists in chronological order, other conventions related to civil aviation
from 1909 leading towards the Chicago Convention in 1944 (US centennial of
flight commission, 2004b). Participation of interested countries was initially
lacking as there were questions of airspace sovereignty and authority. Even
United States, one of the major influences in the industry, chose to be excluded
from the International Commission on Air Navigation (ICAN) agreement in 1919
that serves as a forum to discuss foreign aircraft operations in sovereign
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airspace. The US developed bilateral agreements with individual countries for
landing rights.
Table 2-1: Convention related to civil aviation between 1909 and 1944
YEAR CONVENTION ACHIEVEMENTS
1909 Conference of Diplomats
 failed to reach an agreement on whether the
air is free for the use of all
1919 International Commission
on Air Navigation (ICAN)
 26 countries signed agreement that each
nation has “complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory”.
 United States and Russia excluded
1928 Havana Convention
 21 Western Hemisphere countries agreed to
guarantee innocent passage of aircraft
 formulate rules for aircraft identification,
landing facilities, pilot standards and setting
of air routes through a country’s territories.
1929 Warsaw Convention
 limits of passenger compensation for loss of
property or bodily harm
1944 Chicago Convention
(Convention on
International Civil Aviation)
 signed on 7th December by 52 nations
 basic principles that international civil
aviation may be developed in a safe and
orderly manner and that international air
transport services may be established on the
basis of equality of opportunity and operated
soundly and economically.
ICAO’s function is more advisory than regulatory, through which member
countries may work together towards a safe, secure and sustainable
development of civil aviation. It’s principal target would be a “commonality of
operating rules, navigating procedures, language and phraseology” with safety
being the paramount issue (Illman, 1993).
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ICAO is made up of an Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat. The Assembly
is the sovereign body of ICAO, made up of a representative from each state and
36 out of these are elected as The Council. Selection is based on states
importance in air transport, contribution to the provision of facilities for air
navigation and whose designation will ensure that major areas in the world are
represented. The chief officers are the President of the Council and the
Secretary General. Four Commissions assist the Council in its work. The
Secretary General heads the secretariat, which is divided into 5 main Divisions;
air navigation, air transport, technical cooperation, legal and administration and
services (ICAO, 2004b). The members of the secretariat reflect an international
approach by recruitment of professional personnel on a broad geographical
basis.
The Council, as the governing body of ICAO, provides continuing direction to
the development of civil aviation, adopts Standard and Recommended
Practices and incorporates them as Annexes to the convention (ICAO, 2004b).
It is responsible for the establishment of International standards, recommended
practices and procedures; for personnel licensing, rules of the air, aeronautical
meteorology, aeronautical charts, units of measurements, aircraft operations,
aircraft markings, airworthiness, air traffic services, aeronautical
telecommunications, search and rescue, aircraft accident investigation,
aerodromes, aeronautical information services, noise and engine emissions,
security and safe transport of dangerous goods.
2.1.4 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS)
A Standard is defined as,
“any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material,
performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognised as
necessary for the safety or regularity of international air navigation and to which
Contracting States will conform in accordance with the Convention; in the event of
impossibility of compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory under Article 38 of
the Convention” (ICAO, 2004c).
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A Recommended Practice is,
“any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material,
performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as
desirable in the interest of safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation,
and to which Contracting States will endeavour to conform in accordance with the
Convention.” States are invited to inform the Council of non-compliance (ICAO, 2004c).
These specification or rules are formulated for the safety of aircraft operations,
initially developed as the General Rules for Air Traffic at the International
Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN), consisting of brief and basic rules
applicable in most countries where aircraft operated. A recommended practice
is similar to standards, recognised as desirable but not mandatory, in the
interest of safety. ICAO’s standards and recommended practices are organised
into 18 annexes (listed in Table 2-2) which are subject specific and used as
references by member states
Table 2-2 : ICAO Annexes
Annex 1 Personnel Licensing
Annex 2 Rules of the Air
Annex 3 Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation
Annex 4 Aeronautical Charts
Annex 5 Units of Measurement to be Used in Air and Ground Operations
Annex 6 Operation of Aircraft - Aeroplanes
Annex 7 Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks
Annex 8 Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9 Facilitation
Annex 10 Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 11 Air Traffic Services
Annex 12 Search and Rescue
Annex 13 Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Annex 14 Aerodromes - Aerodrome Design and Operations, Heliports
Annex 15 Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16 Environmental Protection - Aircraft Noise and Emissions
Annex 17 Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts ofUnlawful Interference
Annex 18 The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
One of the earliest rules of air traffic control was about runway incursion and
separation, explaining when it is considered safe for a pilot to begin his take-off
roll. The rule takes into account the position of aircraft that had just landed
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and/or taken-off before so as to prevent a collision. The United States who did
not sign the ICAN Convention has its own set of similar rules in the Air
Commerce Act of 1926.
In view of ATC radiotelephony communications, selected parts of Annexes 2, 6,
10 and 11 are relevant. States with different practices to the SARPS are
required to notify these differences in the interest of safe flight operations by
submitting a “Note on the Notification of Differences” and a “Form of
Notification”. These forms are dispatched to member states after Annex
amendments are adopted. States are invited to notify their differences before
the provisions become applicable (ICAO, 1999). All notified differences are
listed as part of individual Annexes for easy reference. For example, there are
19 states who filed differences to various paragraphs in Annex 2.
In addition to the Annexes, other documents and manuals are also published by
ICAO to assist member countries manage certain aspects of civil aviation.
Documents directly relevant to ATC communications are:
 The Procedures for Air Navigation Services (DOC 4444),
 Manual of Radiotelephony (DOC 9432)
 Manual of Radiotelephony Regional Supplementary Procedures (DOC 7030),
 Manual on the Implementation of ICAO Language Proficiency Requirements (DOC
9835)
Of more localised nature is the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) which
contains aeronautical information of a lasting character essential to air
navigation within a state’s airspace. This document is published by individual
contracting states for the benefit of those planning to operate within the states
airspace. Local guidance materials for controllers are usually published in the
Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS).
The ICAO DOC 4444, Annexes 11 and 10 Volume II, Malaysia’s AIP and
Manual of Air Traffic Services will be used as the main references for identifying
discrepancies in radiotelephony data in this research.
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2.2 ATC Radiotelephony
ATC radiotelephony (also known as Air-Ground communications) refers to pilot-
controller messages exchange, inclusive of communications when the aircraft is
on ground at an airport. Before auditory signals existed, controller and pilot
communications were conducted using flags as visual signals. Archie League
was arguably the first air traffic controller, then known as a flagman, providing
services to flights at the St. Louis Airfield, Missouri in 1920s.
Air to ground communications began in 1926 using Morse Code, to assist pilots
in navigating their airplanes and also in broadcasting weather information (US
centennial of flight commission, 2004a). In this era, simple devices such as
liquid bubble was used to keep wings level, the altimeter to indicate altitude
above ground and a magnetic compass installed in the airplane cockpit panel to
show direction.
The first radio equipped ATC tower was completed in 1930 at the Cleveland
Municipal Airport. By 1935, twenty five ATC towers with radio facilities were
operating. In December that year, an Airway Traffic Control Centre started
operations at Newark, New Jersey, handling traffic operating between Chicago,
Cleveland and Newark using radio facilities. However, pilots and controllers do
not communicate directly with each other then. Position information and
instructions were relayed by radio operators, airline dispatchers and airport
traffic controllers. The en-route controllers displayed the traffic situation using
maps and blackboards, with boat-shaped weights called ‘shrimp boats’ to
represent aircraft.
Aviation communications further developed from low frequency radio before
World War II to very high frequency (VHF) radio after. The first communication
satellite was launched in 1956 and improved the range and coverage of air-
ground communications (US centennial of flight commission, 2004a). To date,
ATC communications use narrower VHF bandwidth and amplitude modulations.
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2.2.1 The Frequency
ATC radiotelephony is a form of telecommunications, where transmissions and
receptions of signals and sounds take place between controllers and pilots
using radio frequencies. Generally, aviation communication is designated
frequencies between 108 MHz and 137 MHz, within the Very High Frequency
(VHF) band. High Frequency (HF) band is used by aeronautical mobile service
(AMS) radio operator for long range communications with aircraft.
Radiotelephony communication uses 118.0 to 136.975 MHz, with amplitude
modulation. The lower band between 108 and 117.975MHz are used for
navigational aids coding purposes (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007). Figure 2-2
shows the 8 frequency bands in the radio frequency spectrum and some
common usage of each band. Presently, increasing congestion and demand for
more radiotelephony frequencies had resulted in channel spacing being
reduced from 25 to 8.33 kHz in some areas.
Figure 2-2: Frequency Spectrum Bands Usage
In the near future, digital radios, bandwidth reduction and international
coordination are contemplated to increase the number of available bandwidth
for communications.
Pilot-controller verbal communication on two-way radio uses an open frequency
(party line) shared between the controller and all the aircraft operating within the
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designated area. Only one party could be transmitting at any one time, so each
has to take turns in transmitting on this frequency. More parties attempting to
relay their messages could mean congestion, interruption or simultaneous
transmissions, which may result in loss of information.
2.2.2 The Messages
The number of messages exchanged in ATC radiotelephony depends on the
traffic scenario and airspace. Davis et. al. (1963) state that the time spent
communicating with aircraft is contributory to total workload of a controller.
Pawlak et. al. (1996) however, emphasised that physical evidence of traffic
presence and communications does not necessarily reflect the amount of
cognitive activity of the controller. Other than the number of traffic handled by
the controller, ATC workload generated in the system is also affected by
complexity and traffic mix which cause increased communication (Corker, Gore,
Fleming, and Lane, 2000). This research will adopt the simplistic approach that
if a controller need to communicate more, it indirectly reflects that the traffic is
more complex and there are additional tasks to be completed.
Table 2-3 show the stages of aircraft operations with the corresponding ATC
communications required between pilot and controller. Some of the instructions
shown could be issued by the controller without prior request from the pilot.
Theoretically, in a very idealistic ‘no conflicting traffic’ conditions, this half an
hour flight from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore would collectively transmit and
receive not less than forty messages from departure to arrival gates. Longer
flights and busier ATC environment will require more transmissions between
pilots and controller. In reality however, there will be additional transmissions
for weather information request, advisory on fuel endurance and persons on
board, diversionary tracking for weather avoidance, track shortening to save
fuel and in busier traffic environment, ATC instructions for traffic management.
Congested airspace with more conflicting traffic would translate into ‘interrupted’
aircraft movements and more messages to manage the traffic flow.
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Table 2-3 : Example of messages exchange for Kuala Lumpur-Singapore flight
Aircraft operations Messages
Start engine (1) Request + Gate and aircraft information / (2) approval /(3) readback / (4) acknowledgement
Pushback from gate (5) Request / (6) approval + instructions / (7) readback /(8) acknowledgement
Taxying (9) Request / (10) taxy route + holding point instructions /(11) readback / (12) acknowledgement
Lining up (13) Advisory ‘ready’ / (14) line up instructions / (15)readback / (16) acknowledgement
Takeoff (17) Takeoff clearance (+transfer to approach)/(18) readback
Initial climb (19) Contact approach control / (20) initial level + airwaysinstructions / (21) readback / (22) acknowledgement
Transfer to Area Control (23) Instruction / (24) readback / (25) acknowledgement
Cruising (26) Contact area control / (27) level + route instructions /(28) readback / (29) acknowledgement
Descend (30) Request / (31) level instructions / (32) readback /(33) acknowledgement
Transfer to Approach (34) Instruction / (35) readback / (36) acknowledgement
Final approach (37) Contact approach / (38) instructions for approach torunway in-use / (39) readback / (40) acknowledgement
Transfer to Tower (41) Instruction / (42) readback / (43) acknowledgement
Landing (44) Contact tower / (45) landing clearance / (46)readback/ (47) acknowledgement
Taxying to Gate (48) Taxy route + gate instructions / (49) readback /(50) acknowledgement
Cardosi and DiFiore (2004) analysed data from studies by Cardosi (1993;
1994), Burki-Cohen (1995) and Cardosi, Brett and Han (1996). This analysis
found that in terminal approach radar control, the average controller-pilot
transmission was 4.5 messages per minute while tower control averaged 3.8,
ground movements 3.5 and en-route control was about 2. These transmissions
were however, not all clearances, but included requests for information,
salutations, position reports or acknowledgements. In an analysis of a corpus
of 7000 messages of routine radiotelephony, Mell (1991c) found that 33% were
related to management of aircraft, 33% for speaker turn management, 26% to
manage the means of communications and 5% for clarification and correction of
messages. Other significant metrics in how ATC voice communications could
be analysed include the characteristics of pilots’ responses to clearances, type
of readback error and percentages, hearback errors, requested repetition of
messages and presence of fillers, hesitations and false starts within
transmissions.
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The message format of ATC radiotelephony is generally standardised. A pilot’s
initial contact message is in the form of “recipient callsign + speaker callsign +
information / request”. For example,
“Melaka Tower, Academy 335 on frequency One One Eight decimal Zero,
request clearance for circuit and landing”.
Messages from pilots must include the callsign of the aircraft making the
request or advising the information. Messages from controllers must be
preceded by the callsign of the aircraft that the instructions or request is
intended for. For example,
Pilot: “Malaysian One One Four Niner requesting descend”
Controller: “Malaysian One One Four Niner descend to flight level One Five Zero”
Detailed explanation, formats and keywords used in radiotelephony messages
are contained in The Procedures for Air Navigation-Air Traffic Management
(ICAO, 2001e), Annex 10 Volume II – Aeronautical Communications (ICAO,
2001a) and Manual of Radiotelephony (ICAO, 2001f).
2.2.3 The Dialogue
Controllers and pilots benefit from the radiotelephony dialogue as information
could be ascertained on:
i. speaker and intended recipient’s identities,
ii. accurate disposition of aircraft at present and in future,
iii. instructions required to ensure safety,
iv. flight conditions and requirements,
v. intended actions,
vi. hazardous weather warnings and turbulence, and
vii. conflicting traffic (Hopkin, 1995).
The dialogue consists of advisories, requests, instructions, acknowledgements
and courtesies. Pilots may initiate communications to gain permission, for
example to pushback aircraft from the parking gate, to start aircraft engines or
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requesting information, such as temperature and wind velocity. A controller
initiates communication to issue instructions, for example to change altitude, or
to request for information pertaining to the flight, such as the speed and
heading. Factors that lend conversation its depth and flexibility such as
formality, politeness, social class, culture, age and gender references are
intentionally removed, resulting in a brief, “straight to the point” and quite rigid
dialogue.
All the parties involved in the controller-pilots dialogue are not visible to each
other. Only the voice can be heard and only words can convey the meaning of
a message. Body language cues are not available to assist in understanding a
message and tonal or pitch difference do not transmit very well over long
distances. For instance, it is not good ATC practice to ask a pilot for the
aircraft’s speed by using the word “speed” with a questioning lilt in the voice, as
it may not be obviously evident on radiotelephony. Proper phraseology and
keywords must be used to avoid any ambiguities.
The controller-pilot information exchanges may be used by other aircraft on the
same frequency to maintain situational awareness. Pilots are able to visualise
the traffic pattern, altitudes, position and direction of other aircraft in the vicinity.
This information is especially important for visual environments such as
aerodrome traffic zone as it enhanced safety and efficiency of airspace usage.
ATC radiotelephony is also important for controllers to coordinate progress of
flight in relation to other flights. The most updated information received from
pilots assists in visualising the current traffic situation. Pilots’ and controller’s
situational awareness of past, present and future events evolved with
successful communications. Any discrepancies in communication may result in
incorrect or incomplete visualisation and situational awareness which pose a
risk to safety.
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Readback is a stringent requirement in radiotelephony. In the interest of safety,
these instructions must always be readback:
a) ATC route clearances;
b) clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take off from, hold short of,
cross and backtrack on any runway; and
c) runway-in-use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level instructions, heading and
speed instructions and, whether issued by the controller or contained in ATlS
broadcasts, transition levels (ICAO, 2001f).
Pilots must comply at all times with instructions issued by controllers and not
deviate from the provisions of a clearance. If an instruction is in any way
unacceptable, it is the responsibility of the pilot to advise the controller and
request an alternate clearance (DCA Malaysia, 1999; ICAO, 2001e). Within the
cockpit, the substance of pilot-controller communication has to be shared
between both pilots, accepted as understood and acted upon. These
instructions and negotiations between pilot and controller are carried out to
achieve optimum flight operations and ensure safety. The most essential
information flow between controller and pilot is intended for the controller to
issue instructions and for the pilot to receive the correct instructions and
conform to them.
ATC communications is described as highly formulated and standardised
(Orasanu, Fischer, and Davison, 1997). As in other aspects of ATC,
radiotelephony has strict procedures and guidelines on how it should be carried
out and managed, to avoid misunderstanding and ambiguities. These
guidelines are documented to ensure that message is received intelligibly and
without ambiguity. There are guidelines for the identification of speaker and
addressee, message format, speech rate, voice tone, readback, and equipment
handling techniques. A voice with a slightly higher pitch is known to transmit
clearer than a low pitch mumbling voice. Controllers and pilots are supposed to
enunciate words clearly and distinctly while maintaining an even speech rate
not exceeding 100 words per minute with a constant speaking volume.
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Numbers and phonetic spellings are to be spoken at a slower rate, preferably
with slight pauses to ease understanding and to allow the writing process
(ICAO, 2001f).
The language used for communication is mainly English. The designated
glossary of standard words and phrases used are limited and devoid of
contextual influences. The message structure and construction differs from
general English, in that it lacks grammar and tenses, persisting on brevity and
accuracy. More will be discussed on ATC related vocabulary in Chapter 3.
Globally, the same guidelines are used by every country that provides air traffic
control services. Pilots and controllers are trained to communicate as standards
and recommended practices prescribe. On the other hand, it is necessary to
maintain a certain degree of proficiency in general English when none of the
standard phraseologies are suitable to address such scenarios. As other air
traffic related technologies advanced and improved, ATC radiotelephony has to
accommodate the increased demand of more users on the frequency as well as
enhanced efficiency of traffic management. ATC radiotelephony has been an
area of interest for its significant role in ensuring safety of flights. Errors in
radiotelephony which contributed to aviation incidents and accidents are usually
categorised under communication problems, some of which will be discussed
next.
2.3 Communications Problems in Radiotelephony
Verbal communication involves the transmission and receipt of a message
through an auditory medium. Errors could originate from various processes in
relation to the message relay such as,
i. messages may have failed to be transmitted, or
ii. transmitted but not received, or
iii. received yet not understood or wrongly understood, or
iv. received and understood but wrongly actioned upon.
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In a study of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), which is one of
Federal Aviation Authority’s (FAA) safety databases, to identify factors
contributing to error, Cardosi, Falzarano and Han (1999) had classified pilot-
controller communication errors into three types:
i. Readback/ Hearback errors,
ii. A lack of readback, and
iii. Hearback Errors Type II.
In hearback/ readback error, the controller fails to notice the incorrect readback
by the pilot while the Type II is where an incorrect clearance was actually issued
by the controller, but the pilot’s ‘correct’ reply fail to alert the controller of the
original error.
There are many factors such as workload, speech, hardware, software and
interference that affect verbal communications between pilots and controllers.
Communication errors such as ambiguous language, memory failures, cross
cultural expectations and misunderstandings are also not uncommon in the
aviation environment (Redelmeier, Schull, Hux, Tu, and Ferris, 2001). Voice
tape analyses of pilot-controller communications (Cardosi, 1993; Cardosi, 1994;
Cardosi et al, 1996) found that about one percent of transmissions were
erroneous. However, in these analyses, ‘error’ was confined to readback error
types, which is when the pilot wrongly acknowledges any information in the
controller’s message.
Language proficiency has also been given some attention as lack of it had been
identified as contributory to degradation of safety in air traffic control. ICAO
Assembly in 1997 had urged that the issue be considered high priority
(Mathews, 2004). Non-native English speakers are foreseen to face additional
problems due to limited knowledge of the language itself. Semantic barriers
such as differences in word meanings, cultural filtering, ambiguity and social
rank could add to risk of errors. All these factors, individually or collectively,
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could contribute towards the partial or total failure of ATC communications in
which safety could be jeopardised.
This research concentrated on problems closely related to the usage of
language and phraseology in radiotelephony communications between pilots
and controllers. The following sub-paragraphs are some aspects of language
problems that are common in radiotelephony communication.
2.3.1 Great Expectations
Expectations of common and frequent practices are known to trigger actions
that may be usually correct, but nevertheless, not the required one at some
particular time. Auditory communication errors due expectations happen not
only to humans. Even the neo-tropical frogs in a complex acoustics
environment faced the possibility of errors in recognising mating calls. These
calls made by the frogs during mating season are vocalised to promote
accurate identification of possible mates but expectations (and excitement?)
during the season sometimes result in wrong pursuit (Wollerman and Wiley,
2002). Similar errors could and have occurred in ATC environment. An ASRS
analysis found pilot’s expectation a contributing factor in 36% of communication
error that resulted in runway transgression and 28% in altitude deviation
(Cardosi et al, 1999).
A recipient’s wrong perception of the message contents and thus wrong
response may also cause failure in verbal communications. One research
study concluded that people at work spend 32.7% of their time listening, as
opposed to 25.8% writing, and 18.8% for reading (Adler, 1992). These
percentages may prove to be inaccurate for controllers and pilots who need to
maintain a continuous listening watch while performing other duties pertaining
to aircraft safety. Controllers and pilots have to speak intelligibly in order to be
heard distinctively. Both native and non-native English speaker controllers and
pilots will have to deal with unfamiliar pronunciation or accent, local terms/
phrases and usage of non-standard phraseology in their line of work.
Misunderstanding and communication difficulties due to unclear articulation of
messages could be avoided only if all parties concerned adhere to a strict
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standard of communication discipline in terms of wordings, pronunciation and
terminology.
2.3.2 Your Code or Mine?
A pre-requisite of any verbal communication is that you must have a ‘thought’
that you want to share with or convey to someone. This ‘thought’ needs to be
encoded into a form that could be understood by the intended recipient. This
encoding process changes thoughts or ideas into symbols and organises them
into a message. An effective communicator ensures that the recipient will be
able to decode the conveyed message without unnecessary difficulties.
However what should be pointed out is the need of the sender and recipient of a
message to share an understanding of the coding system of the message. ATC
being global in nature, should ideally have one common global code for users of
the system. The present establishment where differences from ICAO’s
standard and recommended practices exist run the risk of misunderstanding
and confusion as there could be more than one meaning to a terminology.
Communications require a common ‘language’ between the parties involved.
This common language, either plain, coded or in symbols should be understood
by all parties without ambiguity for the communications to be effective. Whether
it is self-interpreted or involving two or more parties, without a common code,
misunderstanding could occur. In medicine, clinical judgement by doctors
suffers communication errors due to heavy reliance on patients’ self reports in
evaluating pain and symptoms (Woolf, 2004). In aviation, controllers rely on
pilots to provide accurate and timely information while complying with
instructions. Pilots on the other hand rely on controllers to issue correct
instructions to ensure the safety of flight. This inter-dependence spells the
importance of speaking the same language and using the same terminology
with specific meanings mutually understood.
Cushing (1994) discussed that ambiguity arises when a word, phrase, sentence
or passage could have multiple meanings, either from a language perspective
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or cultural context. It relates to a clash between individual cognitive and social
interactive factors of language use. The intended meaning of a verbal
expression may be distorted by misplaced punctuation or pauses, voice
intonation and pitching or stressing, causing difficulties in determining whether
the statement is a question, request, promise or others. Using pronoun such as
‘you’ or ‘we’ instead of proper callsigns as identification or reference could be
problematic as it is sometimes unclear about whom or what is referred to. This
problem is common in hand-over situations, but also evident in radiotelephony
between pilots and controllers.
Accurate derivation of message meanings could also be hampered by unclear/
unfamiliar words, presuppositions or grammar as well as interference. For
example, misunderstandings could easily arise from words such as ‘to’ and
‘from’ when reporting a distance in relations to a navigational aid. A pilot
reporting ‘five miles from Kayell VOR’ could linguistically mean the aircraft is still
flying towards the navigational aid. But the report is also technically applicable
if the flight had actually passed over Kayell VOR and is moving away from it. In
ATC, especially under non-radar environment, it is of utmost importance that
position reports be given accurately as the visualisation of traffic scenario
depends on them. The above mentioned report would be more accurate if
given as ‘five miles north of Kayell VOR’. The awareness of language
ambiguities is important to non-native English speakers with limited in-depth
knowledge of the language. Mell (2004) suggests that ‘language awareness’
needs to be created to enhance the effectiveness of foreign language learning
while training and testing in aviation communication needs to focus on job
specific competencies.
Variations in language and standard phraseology usage are a hindrance to total
global understanding and standardisation. For example, the ICAO phraseology
"TAXI TO HOLDING POSITION [designation]" means an authorisation to taxi
only as far as the designated holding position. It does not include an
authorisation to enter the runway. But the FAA has a slightly different phrase
which uses almost the same words but with a different meaning. "TAXI INTO
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POSITION AND HOLD" as used by FAA means an authorisation inclusive of a
taxiing clearance and an authorisation to enter the runway. This is equivalent to
ICAO phraseology "LINE UP AND WAIT" which is used to instruct an aircraft to
taxi onto the runway and await takeoff clearance. Due to reservations on the
ICAO phraseology which uses the word ‘POSITION’ as above, UK still uses
"TAXI HOLDING POINT [designation] for RUNWAY [designation]" (CAA, 2006).
2.3.3 Tendjewberrymud
The efficiency of verbal communication is very much affected by the speaker’s
pronunciation, voice tone, loudness, speech rate and fluency, which determine
how one is heard by others. ‘Tendjewberrymud’ (ahajokes, 2005) looks fairly
alien and unlike an English word at all. But when uttered out loud, at a slower
rate, you will then ‘hear’ what it is meant to be. The pronunciation is distorted
and there are no pauses between words, but the speaker did attempt to say
‘thank you very much’. Messages in ATC radiotelephony are supposed to be
transmitted at a rate of about one hundred words per minute (ICAO, 2001f),
disallowing the words to merge together and become incomprehensible to the
recipient. Technically there are short pauses between spoken words to
differentiate one word from another. The faster one speaks, the closer word
syllables would be ‘accordioned’ together, as well as all the words in the whole
message. On radiotelephony, a higher pitch female voice usually transmits
better than a throaty low toned voice. A continuous and fluent transmission is
easier to understand than one strewn with distracting pauses and fillers such as
‘er’, ‘uhm’ and ‘ah’.
Homophony is confusion of similar word sounds, which could also cause
misunderstanding (Cushing, 1994). ICAO had published guidelines on how
numbers and particular words shall be pronounced (ICAO, 2001a) to overcome
this problem. In ATC, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) spelling
alphabet (Table 2-4) is used to spell out any unfamiliar words. Rome for
instance would be spelled out as ‘Romeo Oscar Mike Echo’. The pronunciation
of alphabets and numbers are specified to avoid any misunderstandings
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(Federal Aviation Authorithy, 2003). For example, the number nine shall be
pronounced in two syllables as ‘nin-er’ and the number eight’s pronunciation
starts with an ‘a’ as in ‘’car’ sound instead of the usual ‘e’ sound.
Table 2-4 : The NATO Spelling Alphabet
Character Word Pronunciation
0 Zero ZE-RO
1 One WUN
2 Two TOO
3 Three TREE
4 Four FOW-ER
5 Five FIFE
6 Six SIX
7 Seven SEV-EN
8 Eight AIT
9 Nine NIN-ER
A Alfa ALFAH
B Bravo BRAHVOH
C Charlie CHARLEE
D Delta DELLTAH
E Echo ECKOH
F Foxtrot FOKSTROT
G Golf GOLF
H Hotel HOHTELL
I India INDEE AH
J Juliet JEWLEE ETT
K Kilo KEYLOH
L Lima LEEMAH
M Mike MIKE
N November NOVEMBER
O Oscar OSSCAH
P Papa PAHPAH
Q Quebec KEHBECK
R Romeo ROWME OH
S Sierra SEEAIRAH
T Tango TANGGO
U Uniform YOUNEE FORM
V Victor VIKTAH
W Whiskey WISSKEY
X X-ray ECKSRAY
Y Yankee YANGKEY
Z Zulu ZOOLOO
NOTE- Syllables to be emphasized in pronunciation are in bold face.
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A controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident near Kuala Lumpur in 1989 (Flight
Safety Foundation, 1990) was caused by confusion of the word ‘two’, meant to
be a number but understood as ‘to’. In the accident, a Boeing 747 from
Singapore to Kuala Lumpur was on a ‘straight in’ for runway 33 and was cleared
for a ‘Kay-ell’ non-directional beacon (NDB) approach with descent clearance
issued as,
“[callsign], descend two four zero zero cleared for approach...".
Minimum descent height was 2,400 feet but the aircraft descended lower; for
four hundred feet; and impacted a hillside at 600 feet AMSL.
Another problem related to homophony is word endings, especially operators
name in aircraft callsigns. Broadcasted over the radio, words such as Asian,
Malaysian, Indonesian, Indian and Australian may cause misunderstanding,
especially when pronounced very fast. Aircraft operators’ name, or ‘callsign’
should not be truncated and should be pronounced clearly, in full.
Similarities of flight number could also cause confusion. For example, one TAR
radiotelephony sample had Malaysian 193, Malaysian 91, Malaysian 31 and
Malaysian 3 on the same frequency. ATC and pilots have to be extra vigilant
and cautious to ensure the right messages goes to the right aircraft.
2.3.4 Contents Rich Messages
An ATC clearance may contain up to six or seven items, for example:
“Malaysian Seven Eight Four / cleared to Bangkok / on Airways Alfa Four Six
Four / cruise Flight Level Two Eight Zero / AGOSA Alfa Departure / transponder Three
Four Six Seven”
Transmission of such messages must be clear, precise and not too fast, so as
to allow the pilot sufficient time to write down the details. Remember that the
pilot needs to read back important details to verify that the instruction is
received correctly and understood. Longer messages were found to overload
pilot’s working memory, increasing risks of incorrect or partial readbacks
(Morrow and Rodvolt, 1993). Complexity of a message will also affect the
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pilot’s recall of its contents. Burki-Cohen (1995) analysed responses by types
of information, recall errors, miscommunications and request for repeats in a
part-task simulation, with complexity ranging from three to five information
items. Responses differ for number of items and message presentation,
whether in grouped or sequential format.
The combined use of numbers and alphabets in aviation has been a common
source of misunderstanding. Similarities in arrangements and repetition of
alphanumeric often cause confusion. Problems with using numbers also
include digital confusion and reversals on equipment settings. The overlapping
numbers range for flight levels, speed and headings could also result in
misunderstanding if they are not succeeded by the respective units of
measurements. The phrase ‘maintain two two zero’ could mean speed, FL or
heading. Altimeter settings between inches of mercury and millibars are
sometimes confused and can cause aircraft to be flown at the ‘wrong’ altitude
(Cushing, 1994). Altitudes could also be mistaken if not paired with the proper
unit or pronunced in hundreds and thousands as required.
Copying accuracy however, could not solely be predicted by the number of
elements in the message as other factors could be involved (Rantanen and
Kokayeff, 2002). Error could occur due to a combination of factors. Callsign
confusion is an example of signal recognition error that has resulted in unsafe
situations. Mell (1991b) found that ‘incoming’ messages in emergency calls are
structurally abnormal and lengthy, which does hamper ease of understanding
and timely rectifying action by the controllers.
2.3.5 Native Language versus English
Code switching is a language-related problem when communicating in a foreign
language under a significant amount of stress. The speaker tends to revert to
native language words, phrases or syntax which is familiar to the speaker, but
may be meaningless to the recipient.
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The worst aviation accident in which two Boeing 747s collided on the runway at
Los Rodeos Airport, Tenerife in 1977 is an example of a non-English syntax
being used. The phrase “WE ARE AT TAKE-OFF” as used by the KLM pilot in
the Tenerife accident was Dutch in syntax, referring to the actual action of a
takeoff roll. The pilot was concluded to have misunderstood the phrase ‘after
takeoff’ used by the controller in issuing the departure instructions as an actual
takeoff clearance. Meanwhile the phrase ‘at takeoff’ as used by the pilot in his
readback didn’t alert the controller that it meant a takeoff roll is in progress. It
was also unfortunate that the controller has a habit of starting his transmissions
with the word ‘OK’ which had been taken as an agreement to the takeoff roll.
Unfortunately, a pause after ‘OK’ and a clash with another transmission had
obliterated the controller’s ‘standby’ instruction (meaning not to takeoff yet) and
the additional information that another aircraft was still on the runway. There
were other contributing factors; however, communications and language played
an important if tragic part in the accident (Secretary of Aviation, 1978).
Another example of code switching was noted prior to the midair collision over
Zagreb in 1976 between an Inex Adria DC-9-31 and a BEA Trident at 33000
feet. Although the error was attributed to traffic planning and coordination
rather than a controller-pilot misunderstanding, the controller had switched from
English to Serbo-Croat at the critical moment of attempting to recover from an
unsafe situation. Taken by surprise when the Inex Adria reported “passing flight
level 325” the controller responded - rather ambiguously - with an instruction to
“maintain present altitude”. Essential traffic information next passed by the
controller was also in Serbo-Croat, understood by the Inex Adria crew but
meaningless to the BEA crew who lost situation awareness of the pending
collision and was unable to take avoiding action (Air Disaster.Com, 1997).
2.3.6 About Ozone, Zillion and Apple-sauce
Colloquially, ozone does not refer to the tri-oxygen-atom gas. On the contrary, it
means nice, fresh air. Similarly zillion is not a definite number and apple-sauce
has nothing to do with apples at all. These are examples of colloquial
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expressions, which are usually not utilised in formal discourse or writing (The
American Heritage, 2004; Wikipedia, 2007). Colloquialism may be single
words, phrases or complete aphorism (Oxford University Press, 2004).
Common examples are “gonna”, “dead as a doornail” and “there’s more than
one way to skin a cat”. Overuse of colloquial words by native speakers may be
regarded as an indication of sub-standard proficiency with the language. On
the other hand, usage by a non-native speaker could be regarded as an
unusual competence with the language. Sometimes, a formal word may also
have a colloquial meaning that, while technically incorrect, is recognizable due
to common usage by a group of people sharing common knowledge of the
subject matter. Colloquialism presents a comprehension problem to those with
a more restricted knowledge of the language and to introduce it into ATC
radiotelephony may have unacceptable consequences.
2.3.7 Interference and Distraction
In an ATC environment, messages are very time sensitive and any delayed
response may have significant safety implications. Interruptions, interference
and congestion may cause loss of information, misunderstanding and increased
overall workload. Any interruptions or interference during the transmission or
receipt of a verbal message could result in message distortion such that the
messages received are not the same as those transmitted.
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Generally, decisions to act are based on recognition of signals. If signal
recognition by the receiver is not absolutely distinct, errors could occur,
resulting in missed detection or false alarm. The message in itself could be a
source of distraction (Eurocontrol , 2003). Pilots on the takeoff roll or landing
sequence are far too busy to handle requests, queries or any form of distracting
comments. At those moments, only pertinent safety instructions should be
relayed.
An electronically modulated voice is very much reduced in tonal expression and
is also devoid of any body language or visual cues. The recipient of a message
depends on the entire message to gain full understanding. Other types of
external interferences include sights, sounds, and any stimuli in the
environment that divert attention from communication. Internal interference is
associated with attitude or ‘feelings’ that interferes with encoding so transmitted
messages do not represent the original intended ideas or thoughts. Message
delivery by a confident individual will be smooth and articulate while negative
attitudes and emotions can result in ineffective communications.
ATC radiotelephony is conducted on an open frequency and only one party on
that frequency could transmit a message at any one time. This allows everyone
on the frequency to monitor all transmissions and be aware of others in the
vicinity. However, two or more parties trying to transmit simultaneously will
result in messages being blanked-out, producing a high pitch noise or squeal on
the radio. Interrupted transmissions or those not clearly understood will require
repetitions and clarifications, adding to airtime occupancy and frequency
congestion. Careless handling of press-to-talk switches brings a risk of
message loss at the beginning or end of transmission if the switch is not
engaged fully. Radiotelephony frequency transmitter and receiver performance
and reliability are important for continuous, crystal clear transfer of messages.
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2.3.8 More Than One Can Handle
Efficiency of ATC communication depends on the amount and complexity of
related taskload that the controller or aircrew have to accomplish and be able to
manage at the material time. Stein (1985) defined workload as the amount of
effort, both physical and psychological, expended in response to system
demands (taskload) and also in accordance with the operator’s internal
standard of performance. He developed the Air Traffic Workload Input
Technique (ATWIT) ratings to evaluate workload and taskload. Using these
ratings, Manning et. al., (2001) concluded that the number of communication
events within an ATC environment is significantly correlated to air traffic
workload and taskload. However, the average time for individual
communication was found to be negatively related to workload and taskload, as
messages are shortened and delivered faster. Taskload overload could result
in interference of tasks that subsequently may have an impact on memory of
words heard or read as well as the ability to execute commands (Risser,
Scerbo, Baldwin, and McNamara, 2002; Risser, McNamara, Baldwin, Scerbo,
and Barshi, 2004).
A busy environment or when traffic is bunching would require more important
safety-critical tasks to be attended to. Tasks may not be paced out easily, so
prioritising and taskload management should consider each task’s importance
and relevance to ensuring safety. Using a foreign language in which the
controller has limited proficiency could add to mental anxiety. Brooker (2003)
suggested that workload is a concept which is not easy to define and may not
be ‘objectively scientific’ because it includes subjective elements such as
‘internal performance standards’ and ‘feels’. Where ATC is concerned,
although the operational concepts and procedures are highly regulated, the
ease of carrying out a task, as well as total task that could be managed safely
does depend on the mental well being of the human controller.
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2.3.9 By the Book
Day (2002) emphasised that safe radiotelephony demands good discipline from
pilots and controllers as communication of operational information is critical and
requires accuracy of content and exact delivery. Phrases or word meanings
could sometimes be relative, as in suggesting a pilot to ‘slow down’ without
actually clarifying the present speed and the new speed required. The concept
is to reduce speed, but it is relative to the original speed and still has to be
quantified by how many knots to be reduced.
As plain language is not ideally suited for ATC communications due to cultural
acquaintances, subjective concepts and knowledge depth, conformity to the
applicable standards is essential. Pilots and controllers undergo hundreds of
hours of training to perform their job efficiently. Standard phraseology usage
and strict adherence to radiotelephony procedure does not come naturally
(Tajima, 2004). It is a skill that has to be learned and practised. Tajima further
suggests that training of aviation-ESL be developed with specific regions in
mind. This region-specific training program could address any idiosyncratic
usage and local difficulties of using standard phraseology in parallel to plain
English. This research may contribute information which could be classified as
region and type specific that will be useful for training development and
enhancement.
2.4 ATC Safety Reporting
In ATC, it is mandatory for safety reports to be submitted whenever safety of
flight operations had been jeopardised (ICAO, 2001e). Occurrences could be
very minor, where no bodily injury and structural damage is involved or could be
extremely tragic with loss of lives and aircraft as in a crash or collision.
2.4.1 Concept and Objective
The concept of safety may generally vary in perspective but in ATC it is
considered as a state beyond which the risk of harm to persons or of aircraft
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damage is unacceptable (ICAO, 2006). It is relative to a state of affairs where
inherent risks in the system are tolerable.
ATC is a dynamic environment with ever-changing situations and the personnel
should be well equipped and highly trained to maintain safety levels at its best.
Enhancement of service and improvements to safety could only be carried out if
problematic areas are clearly identified, acknowledged and improved. It may be
realistic to say that to achieve a zero accident system is near impossible as
every system has its weaknesses.
The logical solution to identify language and communication related factors that
had caused aircraft incident and accidents would be to analyse the existing
records that include such information. Databases that are available on the web
or by search request are especially valuable sources of secondary data for
safety analysis. ATC safety occurrences data are kept by a number of
organisations. Specifications, set-up, details and formatting of data are
determined by the initiating organisation to suit its purposes.
As part of the standard and recommended practices governing the provision of
ATC services, contracting states are required by ICAO to establish a mandatory
incident reporting system to facilitate the collection of safety deficiencies
information. Analyses of all types of incidents are important for early detection
of declining safety levels and unsafe, non-standard practices. The changes in
policies and approaches to managing safety now include analyses of day to day
routine ATC and flight operations either at the ATC units or in the cockpit, to
reduce human error.
Ideally, a voluntary and non-punitive incident reporting system which affords
protection to the sources of safety information should be established. A
reporting system should be a simple process, include a broad reporting base
and a well documented format with details of what, where and when to report.
Form design and layout should facilitate the report writing, using simple
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everyday language, non-directive questions and focussed on the detection of
and recovery from, an unsafe situation. These safety reports are filed in a
manner suitable for easy retrieval and analysis.
2.4.2 Safety Occurrences Databases
The databases normally contain safety occurrence narration by reporting parties
described as accurate as possible in chronological order. Very mature and
advanced databases allow for multiple key words search and provide a more
accurate picture where certain criteria overlapped and are linked. It is a quick
and simple way of roughly assessing the magnitude of a problem if the
database has the keywords relevant to an intended research. The records kept
include details of occurrences that give an insight to the problems or issues
being investigated. As an initial investigation into the ATC communication
problems, various databases had been accessed for records that relates to
keywords such as English, language, language problem, language barrier,
miscommunications, ATC, phraseology and a combination of those. The
following are descriptions of some relevant safety databases.
2.4.2.1 FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS)
Formerly known as the National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Centre
(NASDAC) this site contains a number of databases of different categories, four
of which are considered relevant to the research area;
i. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) - a voluntary reporting
scheme consisting of any unsafe occurrences and hazardous situation reports
since 1988. The ASRS receives, processes, and analyses reports of unsafe
occurrences and hazardous situations that are voluntarily submitted by pilots,
air traffic controllers, and other aviation personnel. Information collected by the
ASRS is used to identify hazards and safety discrepancies in the National
Airspace System.
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ii. The FAA Aircraft Incident Data System (FAIDS) - records since 1978 on
incidents involving general aviation and commercial aircraft. The FAIDS
database contains data records for general aviation and commercial air carrier
incidents since 1978. This database contains incidents only, as ASIAS uses the
National Transportation Safety Bureau (NTSB) accident database as the
primary source for accident information. The information contained in FAIDS is
gathered from several sources including incident reports submitted on FAA
Form 8020-5.
iii. The National Transportation Safety Bureau (NTSB) - consists of accident
and incident information of civil aircraft since 1983. The NTSB Aviation
Accident and Incident Data System contains information collected during an
NTSB investigation of an accident or incident involving civil aircraft within the
United States, its territories and possessions, and in international waters. The
NTSB is an independent Federal agency that investigates every civil aviation
accident in the United States and significant accidents in the other modes of
transportation, conducts special investigations and safety studies, and issues
safety recommendations to prevent future accidents.
iv. Near Mid-Air Collision System (NMACS) - near misses reports from
1992. The Near Midair Collision System (NMACS) database is used to record
reports of in flight incidents where two aircraft have closed to an unsafe
distance and avoided an actual collision.
2.4.2.2 ICAO’s Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP)
ICAO as the governing body of civil aviation keeps a record of aircraft accidents
involving any aircraft with a maximum takeoff mass of over 2250 kg and serious
incidents involving aircraft over 5700 kg. These reports are submitted by
contracting states worldwide, in a predetermined and coded format and
electronically stored in the ADREP database. Reports in this database are
confidential and the details are only made available to contracting states. The
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ADREP search request submitted to ICAO resulted in 11 occurrences on
‘language’, 8 on ‘phraseology’ and 1 on ‘miscommunication’.
2.4.2.3 The Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme (MORS)
This scheme is used in the UK to ensure that the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
is advised of hazardous or potentially hazardous incidents and defects referred
to as occurrences. Knowledge of these occurrences is disseminated for
learning purposes by other persons and organisations. MORS allows
independent assessment to be made by those concerned; whether inside or
outside the CAA; of the safety implications of each occurrence, both in itself and
in relation to previous similar occurrences, so that any necessary, appropriate
action could be initiated. The overall objective of the CAA in operating the
occurrence reporting scheme is to use the reported information to improve the
level of flight safety and not to attribute blame (CAA, 2005). Requests for
reports can be submitted to the CAA’s Safety Regulation Group, quoting
relevant word categories required.
2.4.2.4 The Aviation Safety Network
This online source of information at Aviation Safety Network database consists
of descriptions of aviation accidents around the world. A search could be
undertaken by year of occurrence, airline, aircraft type, resulting events,
country, region and causal factors. Links to official investigation reports and
cockpit or ATC transcripts are sometimes available. These reports had been
read as background information on past accidents related to language and
communication problems faced by pilots and controllers. The Aviation Safety
Network database contains about 12,200 aircraft safety occurrences since
1943. However, this source of information may be limited to serious incidents
and accidents that involved structural damage to aircraft. The majority of
reports include a description of incident, details of aircraft involved and photos.
Voice transcripts are also sometimes available.
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2.4.2.5 The United Kingdom Airprox Board (UKAB) Reports
‘An Airprox is defined as a situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or a
controller, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and
speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved was, or may have
been, compromised’. (DOC 4444, Part I).
The UKAB was formerly the Joint Airprox Assessment Panel (JAAP) and then
Joint Airprox Working Group (JAWG). The UKAB Reports contain details of
Airproxes in the UK airspace since 1998 with a summarised investigation report
by CAA-SRG. The Board discuss and deliberate on all the available information
regarding the incident, after which a risk category is assigned.
A Risk of Collision An actual risk of collision existed
B Safety not assured The safety of the aircraft was compromised
C No risk of collision No risk of collision existed
D Risk not determined Insufficient information to determine the risk
involved, or inconclusive or conflicting evidence
preclude such determination
Risk level assessments of Airprox are made on the basis of what actually took
place and not on what may or may not have happened (UKAB, 1999).
The UKAB reports are published biannually with the purpose of promoting air
safety awareness and understanding, by sharing the lessons to be learned.
These reports were chosen to look into ATC incidents and occurrences related
to communication and language. Occurrences recorded in this database
included military and all type of civil aircraft movements operating in controlled
and uncontrolled airspace. The aircraft details, traffic situation and causal
factors are explained in detail but the actual radiotelephony transcripts are not
included.
Other sources of information are the European Co-ordination Centre for
Aviation Incident Reporting System (ECCAIRS) developed by the Aviation
authorities in Europe and United Kingdom’s Confidential Human Factors
Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) which complements its Mandatory
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Occurrence Reporting System (MORS). ECCAIRS facilitates the pooling of
safety information and early detection of potentially hazardous situations and
improves initial problems of incompatible data storage formats between
European countries as well as the insufficient number of significant occurrences
in individual states for a safety analyses by using common classification
taxonomies compatible to ADREP. CHIRP is independent from the aviation
regulatory authority and is a confidential system. A newsletter is periodically
distributed to share safety information and improve safety standards.
For the purpose of this research, the above mentioned databases have a
limitation in that they do not contain the words and phraseology exactly as were
used in radiotelephony. From a language perspective, it is not possible to
analyse linguistic features such as syntax, structure, pronunciation, words
usage, numbers usage, wording choice and speech rate. These analyses could
be possible if the actual transcripts were available and a taxonomy be used to
classify words and phrases usage as well as classification of language errors.
Audio data would be advantageous in studying aspects of pronunciation, accent
and voice pitch or tone.
In some cases the national legal system may restrict the possibility of data
collating and analysis. Major impediments are civil litigation, violation
proceedings, criminal proceedings and public disclosure. There are difficulties in
sharing incident data because of differing definitions, for example, in the
classification of occurrences severity and categorisation of aircraft. The ICAO
and Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) are combining efforts to promote
work in developing common taxonomies and definitions for phase of flight,
occurrence categories and aircraft categorisation, developing work already
started by the FAA and NASA.
The Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) in 2001 has also identified 24
major collection and sharing programmes, but covering only 9 countries and
excluding the ICAO’s ADREP which collects global data. GAIN is aiming to
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improve collection and dissemination of safety information worldwide by
promoting voluntary collection and sharing of safety information, with
participation by airlines, manufacturers, employee groups, governments and
other aviation organisations (Hart, 2002; Ferris, 2003).
Malaysia is still developing a comprehensive and easily accessible database of
safety occurrences. Presently, the information is still classified as confidential
and not available to the public. This may change in future in the interest of
safety enhancement and improvements to ATC service.
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces air traffic control as a system that provides a service of
global nature. The system utilises verbal communications as the prime mode of
operations and delivers safety as the commodity. The chapter briefly explains
the standardisation, the governing body, general airspace structure, ATC
communications, characteristics and metrics of pilot-controller radiotelephony,
as well as the problems related to this type of verbal interactions.
Ideally, the application of ATC regulations should be identical throughout the
world as flights travel from one part of the globe to another. However, in reality,
there are differences, even in the utilisation of phrases or words for air traffic
control radiotelephony, which had been technically designed for brevity and
accuracy. The issue of non-native English speakers being involved in more
safety-related occurrences strongly suggests an ESL perspective be considered
for this research. Previous researches had mostly sourced data from United
States1 where presumably the majority of users are native English speakers.
An ESL approach to the subject will complement present knowledge and more
importantly, is a step forward towards understanding the problems faced by
ESL controllers and pilots. ICAO has recognised language deficiencies as a
threat to aviation safety and produced the ICAO’s Guidelines on Language
Proficiency Requirements.
1 Radiotelephony Data Sources: Baltimore-Washington, Albuquerque, Atlanta, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Dulles,
Seattle, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, Miami and Boston (Cardosi, 1993, 1994, 1996).
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Several ATC safety reports databases explored confirmed the existence of
language and phraseology usage problems. Such phrases as ‘language
problems’, ‘poor English’ and ‘non-standard phraseology’ often appear in safety
databases as keywords for classifying safety occurrences. These records of
incidences when safety had been jeopardised, however, do not always have
information on actual radiotelephony between pilot and air traffic controllers.
Routine radiotelephony could be analysed for deficiencies and language usage
characteristics. Real-time routine radiotelephony from an existing ATC facility is
possibly the most suitable source of data as it could be randomly selected,
spontaneous and represent real life ATC scenarios. This data type would
contain routine language and phraseology usage patterns, including non-
adherence to standard practices. A detail classification of errors and
discrepancies needs to be identified in relevance to the language aspect of ATC
radiotelephony. The next chapter will discuss the research subject area from
this perspective.
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3 LANGUAGE USE IN ATC RADIOTELEPHONY
Dietrich (2004) considers language as the most efficient method of human
communication, specifically verbal communications as it is fast, doesn’t require
technical equipment, adaptable and could be carried out in parallel with other
actions. It is this efficiency that renders verbal communication most suitable for
air traffic control communication, especially over long distances, which is made
possible with radio technology. Controllers could issue instructions to pilots
while scanning the flight progress strip display and assessing traffic situation.
Pilots could similarly listen and respond to ATC while flying the aircraft and
making sure all the switches and displays are in order. Messages and
responses are almost instantly transmitted and received. However, language in
itself has other imperfections that could contribute to misunderstandings and
errors. This chapter looks at the general characteristics of language, the ESL
users’ perspectives, standard phraseology and what type of deficiencies impact
on ATC operations’ safety.
3.1 Language is …
3.1.1 The Paradigms
A common entity used by many (Sapir, 1921; Trager, 1949; Chomsky, 1957;
Hall, 1964) to describe language is the use of symbols. These vocal symbols
are voluntarily produced and systematically arranged to communicate ideas,
emotions and desires, thus allowing for cultural interactions. Clark & Clark,
(1977) relates rudimentary properties of language to being learnable by
children, spoken and understood by adults, able to capture ideas that are
normally communicated and must enable interactions of people in a social and
cultural context. In an earlier study, Hockett (1960) compared human language
usage to animal communication and listed 13 Linguistic Universals which
distinguishes human language. Hockett and Altmann (1968) add three more
linguistic universals to the earlier list, making the total sixteen. These are listed
in Table 3-1, the last three denoted with * were the later additions.
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Table 3-1: Linguistic Universals
Vocal-auditory channel the speaker produced sounds that could be heard by
others
Broadcast transmission
and directional reception
the signal is sent out in all directions but perceived in a
limited direction and within hearing distance
Rapid-fading
(Transitoriness)
the signal does not continue over time, it fades rapidly
and cannot be heard after fading
Interchangeability signals are not gender specific, users can both receive
and broadcast any signals
Total feedback speaker can hear and monitor themselves
Specialization special organs (lips, tongue, throat) are adapted for
production of speech
Semanticity specific signals can be matched with specific meanings.
Arbitrariness there is no crucial connection between the signal and the
physical properties of the object referred to
Discreteness the basic units of speech (such as sounds) belong to
distinct categories with no gradual, continuous shading
from one sound to another in the linguistics system.
Displacement a speaker can talk about things which are not present, or
non-existent, allowing conversation about the past,
present and the future
Productivity human languages allow speakers to create novel, never-
before-heard utterances that are linguistically and
grammatically correct
Traditional Transmission a native language is not inborn and need to be learnt
Duality of patterning the small discrete parts of a language can be recombined
in a different order but systematic way to create new
forms
*Prevarication Intentionally make utterances that are false or
meaningless
*Reflexibility Can use language to talk about language
*Learnability Able to speak any of a wide variety of language
(source: Hockett, 1960; *Hockett and Altmann, 1968)
In general spoken languages, one symbol or word does not necessarily stand
for only one meaning. Spoken language is also imperfect in that it sometimes is
insufficient to describe sensations, goodness and emotions. Understanding of
such feelings is achieved through shared human experiences in the form of
images, concepts and impressions. The set of rules that determines the
systematic and meaningful arrangement of symbols which express thoughts in
a language is grammar. All languages have grammar, consisting of phonology,
syntax and semantics. Phonology is the study of sounds and how it is used to
produce words. Syntax refers to rules that indicate how words are joined
together to form phrases and sentences. Semantics are rules governing the
meaning of words and sentences. Accent is about differences of pronunciation
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for the same word. For example, tomatoes may be pronounced with all
alphabet sounds intact, or it may also be pronounced as ‘toma(t)oes’ with a
silent second ‘t’. Dialect on the other hand, is a variety of the same language
that says things a different way, encompassing syntactic, morphology and
semantic properties of speech (Oxford University Press, 2004).
Krauss (2002) also identified three properties of language which are important
for human interactions; semanticity, generativity and displacement. Semanticity
allows for accurate meanings to be understood while generativity is the
possibility to rearrange symbols to produce an infinite number of message
varieties. Displacement is the property that offers a dimension of remote space
and time for events and experiences. While semanticity and displacement may
be useful in ATC communications, generativity may not be favourable as
messages could be transmitted in many non-standard arrangements, possibly
causing confusion.
Krauss further described four paradigms related to language use in verbal
communications. The Encoding – Decoding paradigm described the simplest
kind of coding which involves one-to-one mapping, where for every signal there
is one and only one meaning and for every meaning there is one and only one
signal. Speakers will encode their ideas into words, phrases and sentences;
and listeners decode these signals in order to recover the underlying ideas.
Ideally, the ATC standard phraseologies should fit this one-to-one mapping and
misunderstandings could be avoided.
The Communicative Intentions paradigm considers the possibility and potential
of multiple meanings, conveyed by even the simplest utterance. Identifying a
speaker’s communicative intention is not always a simple or straightforward
matter as perception may differ and this obviously is not needed in ATC
communications.
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Perspective-Taking paradigm discusses speaker’s experience of the world from
different vantage point that the speaker occupies. Krauss suggests that
discrepancies in perception should be accommodated. However, in ATC,
perspective taking is always referred to the addressee, not the addressor. For
example, in giving directional instructions for navigation, the determination of
displacement; either left or right is always referred to the pilot’s view, not the
controller’s. It should be noted nevertheless, that neglect of addressees'
perspectives could happen under time pressure or when preoccupied (Keysar,
Bar, and Horton, 1998). Such errors may render ATC verbal communication
considerably less effective than it should be, and in some situations, unsafe.
The safety net of perspectives lost is the fact that language allows for
collaborative communications as the normal practice in ATC.
The fourth paradigm is Dialogism, which focussed on the collective activity of
language use in communications, coordinating both the contents and roles of
speaker or listener. Spontaneous speech requires the speaker to conceptualise
the information to be conveyed and formulating a verbal message that is
capable of conveying it. Resources of immediate knowledge and perspectives
make this process effortless but not necessarily orderly. Sentences may trail off
inconclusively, phrases left dangling, listeners interrupt to ask questions or
interject comments; and abrupt topic changes are quite normal. What is left
unsaid may convey more than what is explicitly stated. These irregularities in
language use reflect a communicative process, representing a joint
accomplishment by the participants who have collaborated to achieve a
common understanding of a subject. Similar interruptive and interjecting
communication in ATC is not favourable as it increases the communication
channel occupancy. ATC communications requires efficient delivery of
messages and clarity of readback to indicate understanding.
Speech is different to writing, which is premeditated and usually read without
the presence of the author. Speech in conversation is composed during the
course of speaking, requiring immediate and irreversible exchanges. It is a
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social phenomenon between individuals and could convey politeness,
brusqueness, formality, humour, pleasantness and intimidation. In ATC it is
imperative that messages convey the correct meaning and contents as each
and every detail is equally important to ensure safety. Conveyances of
courtesy, humour, pleasantries and grammar are of little importance.
As more and more flights cross international boundaries, cross-cultural
communication will be the norm; a phenomenon experienced worldwide as
more and more businesses take on a global dimension (Rifkind, 1996). It is
important that language use in ATC communications be globally regulated as
flights cross international boundaries more often, engaging pilots and controllers
of different nationalities in conversations which use a language other than their
mother tongue.
3.1.2 Language Measures
Based on information theory, language usage could be measured by the
amount of information it conveys per unit of time, proportionate to the amount of
symbols needed to efficiently encode it. Transmission of information could be
through radio waves, optical fibre or sound waves, in a linear fashion, one
symbol after another. Changes in sequence of symbol may have a direct effect
on meanings. Symbols are also not equally used. Zipf’s Law states that each
word is not spoken equally often. The second most frequent word is used about
half as frequent as the most frequently used word, the third most frequent word
is used about one third as frequent as the most frequently used word and so on
(Crystal, 1987). If this concept is true for standard phraseology and aviation
terms, then ATC communication training should design the training format to
emphasise on a curriculum based on usage needs.
3.1.3 Language Comprehension
Any sounds above the auditory acuity threshold are heard and distinguished as
either speech or none-speech. Spoken words are decoded either by synthesis
analysis or by template matching. In perceiving normal continuous speech,
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words are recognised by their acoustic and prosodic differences (Crystal, 1987).
Language in spontaneous speech is usually imprecise, with no complex preset
theme and planning. Non-fluency is quite normal as speakers cope with
attention, perception and memory difficulties. Words are produced rapidly,
pronounced rather informally and more often than not, speckled with emotional
prosodic effects. Sentences are loosely constructed, often rephrased or
repeated and divided into manageable chunks by fillers, pauses or intonations.
Social conversations are also rich with courtesy expressions. This is the norm
expected due to traditions, culture or social standing. Many theories explain the
process of comprehending language from different perspectives.
Chomsky’s Transformational-Generative Grammar theory in 1950s claimed that
all sentences are generated from a phase structure skeleton that is modified to
suit any situation. It was also found that modifications render sentences more
complex, into the negative or become ambiguous, thus slowing down
comprehension time. However, understanding verbal language is not a linear
process of recognising a string of linguistic symbols which are pre arranged to
depict a meaning (Scovel, 1998).
Comprehension is highly affected by context and the knowledge the listener
possesses for each logogen within a message. Logogen is a recognition unit
introduced by Morton (1969) containing information about the sounds of a word,
its syntactic and semantic characteristics, and information about the word type.
Words that fit into a familiar, known and expected context are comprehended
more quickly and remembered more readily. High frequency words are said to
be easily and immediately understood while uncommon words have a higher
threshold for comprehension.
Morton’s (1969) and Scovel’s (1998) theory implied that long ATC instructions
with many transformations will actually confuse pilots and slows down
comprehension while at the same time occupies more working memory and
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reduces the recall of important keywords and information. Words with multiple
meaning are also proven to delay comprehension.
The phoneme restoration effect theory suggests that language comprehension
is a highly active process. Missing or deformed sounds in a sentence are
‘heard’ by the listener based on the expected or normal context of the subject
matter (Warren, 1970; Warren and Warren, 1970). For example, consider two
descend clearances in which one (a) is commonly issued for terrain clearance:
a. descend five thousand five hundred feet, and
b. descend niner thousand five hundred feet.
Issuance of clearance (b) which is uncommon, with a phoneme missing at the
end of the word ‘niner’ may cause it to be ‘restored’ as ‘five’. Though restoring
missing phoneme is useful in daily conversation, second guessing an uncertain
number in an ATC clearance is not a safe practice. Any uncertainty in ATC has
to be clarified, not guessed. The safety net to these possible errors is the
stringent readback, hearback and acknowledgement procedures.
Bell (1991) introduced the ‘Gestalt Imagery’ phenomenon in that a listener will
create a visualisation of what is heard as a whole mental model in the process
of language comprehension. It is noted that subjects with good imaging are
good comprehenders while those with weak imaging are poor comprehenders.
From this clinical perspective, successful comprehension of language is linked
to the ability to create an image whole, relates to the ability to recall facts,
understand ideas, project a prediction, evaluate a situation and draw a
conclusion. It is the ability to connect to and interpret both the oral and written
language and encompasses the ability to reason and of cognition.
Cutler (2000) suggests that listeners of spoken language will segment
continuous speech into its component words. The recognition of spoken
utterances is highly native language-specific. A listener’s native language’s
lexicon and grammar constrain the expectations and recognition of phonemes
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or word sounds. This limitation leads to inefficiency when listening to non-
native languages unless the listener acquires multiple proficiencies. Controllers
and pilots exposed to various different sounds of English without doubt will
initially face difficulty in matching phonemes and logogens, as spoken utterance
of a word may differ quite frequently. However, continuous exposure or
introduction to such varieties will assist in building a stronger and bigger
resource of phonemes and logogens, enabling recognition and understanding.
Linking understanding with how the mind ‘hears’ is a relevant idea in the context
of air traffic control. The study of semantics is related to mental imagery;
argued as the best method of understanding meaning. Mental images are
considered as representations in the mind that resemble the objects or events
being represented while thinking is the manipulation of these mental
representation. In ATC, controllers are trained to mentally visualise traffic
situations, drawing an accurate disposition of each and every aircraft in a
controller’s area of responsibility and continuously adjusting this visualisation as
situation changes or projecting a future scenario for planning purposes. The
pilots on the other hand would have a similar ‘mental picture’ of his aircraft
disposition in relation to its phase of flight, with additional expectations of what
should happen next. Ideally, a flight should push-out from the gate, taxi to the
runway, take-off, climb to its cruise level, track by the most economical route,
descend, land and gate-in without any interruption in its operations. Pilots and
controllers ‘share’ this imagery and information to ensure safety of all flights
operating in the vicinity.
Simple, straightforward and positive sentences are easier to understand
compared to complex sentences. The negative, passive and interrogative
transformations add complications to a sentence and take longer to be
understood. The number of transformations in a sentence is inversely
correlated to the number of words remembered at the end of the sentence.
Adherence to standard phraseology which is familiar in structure and sound will
enable efficient comprehension of messages.
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From the speakers’ perspective, involvement in spontaneous speech would
require language accommodation in cases when social and linguistic
backgrounds differ. This convergence alter a person’s language style to
accommodate the other party and become more ‘alike’ in terms of grammar,
vocabulary, speech rate and pronunciation (Siegel, 2003). Convergence
facilitates interaction and to some extent, social approval. This is obvious when
a proficient language user converse with a foreigner or a young child.
Sentences are constructed simpler, with careful choice of wordings and may
include usage of catch phrases familiar to the other party. Convergence could
also involve slang words and colloquial terms to identify with social or linguistic
group.
3.1.4 Second Language Acquisition (SLA) Theories
Language acquisition necessitates the learning of words and how these words
should be put together into a sentence to convey the idea it is meant to.
Theories of second language learning have to take into account who, what,
when and how much needs to be learnt (Spolsky, 1989). Each learner may
differ in such factors as age, intelligence, aptitude, personality and motivation.
The ‘who’ factor will influence the process of learning itself as some will
appreciate explicit learning while others may prefer implicit learning (Dekeyser,
2003). The benchmark for minimum amount of language knowledge to be
learnt is set by the requirements of language function itself in terms of
importance; for example phonology versus grammar versus semantics versus
culture. Language function may also be relevant to dialect and accent. Other
important factors are the best teachers to learn from and the kind of exposure
needed, if at all, that may contribute to learning.
The cognitive development theory on language acquisition claims that the
human brain is programmed in such a way that it can learn any language to
which it is exposed. This innate language acquisition device, assisted by
instinct, imitation, reinforcement and conditioning will enable anyone to learn a
new language (Pinker, 1994). Exposure will allow collection of data, its
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processing and utilisation to build up a grammar for the target language. The
theory of active grammar construction is much preferred than the imitation or
reinforcement theory as it explains that acquiring a language goes beyond
memorising, imitating and being corrected for mistakes. Over generalisation
and under-extension of rules supports the notion that learners build up
vocabulary, grammar and semantic knowledge from what has been previously
learned.
Language learners need not unlearn their first language to learn a second
language. The learning strategies are similar to the ones used by them when
they acquired their first language. While internalising rules and responding to
external stimuli of the new language, it is considered natural for any second
language learner to commit errors. The errors are an indication as to what
strategies are being used to learn the new language. Corder (1967) believes
that the processes of first and second language acquisition are fundamentally
the same. Differences in utterances between first and second language
learners are contributed to maturational development, learning motivation and
the circumstances of learning. An analysis of learners’ errors would show
learning progress and strategies. Learners proceed from a beginner status
towards a competent user by gradually building up their own grammar and
vocabulary to suit the new language. These bits and pieces of information of
the new language are organised into meaningful wholes; as suggested by the
Gestalt Law of Organisation2 (Feldman, 1998).
Selinker (1972; 1974; 1992) uses the term Inter-language as a working model,
an adaptive strategy that uses simplification, reduction, over generalisation,
transfer, formulaic language, omissions, substitutions and restructuring. It
describes the intermediate stage language, emphasising a status between the
learner’s mother tongue and a target language. Inter-language implies a
halfway position between knowing and not knowing the target language when
2 Gestalt is a psychology term meaning “unified whole”, referring to theories of visual perception
originally developed by German psychologists in 1920s. It describes people’s tendency to organise
elements into groups when principles of similarity, continuation, closure and proximity are applied.
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habits from the first language are transferred onto the foreign language being
learned.
Corder (1971) uses the phrase ‘learners’ idiosyncratic dialect’ to describe the
transitional language and the phrase ‘performance analysis’ (Corder, 1975) to
describe the learner’s set of target language-oriented repertoires. Corder
(1981) defined the structural properties of learner’s Inter-language as having a
simple morphological system with a more or less fixed word order. The
pronoun system will be simple with a small number of grammatical function
words, little or no use of the copula and the absence of an article system. As a
language, it may be inaccurate in various respects but it does enable the
learner to use the target language to some degree of competence.
Based on those theories, the second language users are said to share a distinct
system to that of a native speaker. This system is an accumulation of
deviations of performance which are the result of language knowledge
incompetence, but also correspond to first language backgrounds. If the inter-
language is an approximation of the learners’ current knowledge of the target
language, then total competence could only be achieved when the learner could
perform as well as a native speaker. Lenneberg (1967) concluded that only 5%
of second language learners achieve mastery of the target language by
acquiring the latent language structure. The other 95% only rely on latent
psychological structure and never quite achieve mastery of the target language.
In the case of ATC and standard phraseology, or Aviation English for that
matter, the notion of a ‘native user’ may not apply as all aviation personnel start
learning from a ‘layman’ level to being experts in the field. Factors such as
exposure, integrative motivation and the willingness to adapt may be more
influential in Aviation English and standard phraseology learning as the
language is learned more as a tool rather than a language in the true aspect.
Each language has its own rules, vocabulary and pronunciation which differ
from another. Vocabulary is culture specific and sometimes no direct
translations exist from one language to another. In the study of language
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acquisition, the influence of mother tongue (MT), interlanguage (IL) and target
language (TL) are given much attention. Comparison analysis yields other term
such as Contrastive Analysis (CA), Error Analysis (EA) and Transfer Analysis
(TA). Nemser (1971) uses the term ‘approximate systems’ while Corder (1967)
favours the term ‘transitional competence’ for similar studies involving MT/TL
comparison and learners usage of TL. Error Analysis is a process to determine
the incidence, nature, cause and consequences of unsuccessful attempt to use
a target language, focussing more on erroneous utterances produced by groups
of learners. It is a study of linguistic ignorance, of what people do not know
about a language and how they cope with it. While these paradigms may not
be exactly suited to analysing radiotelephony in terms of language usage, the
principle of Error Analysis is applicable to detect degree of adherence to
required standards.
Code-switching relates to the use of two languages simultaneously and/or
interchangeably (Valdes Fallis, 1976). Even if bilingual fluency is not
completely achieved yet, the code-switching allows for filling-up of linguistic or
conceptual gaps and multiple communicative purposes. Switching may also be
needed when particular words in one language could not be translated into
another. Depending on communities and local culture, code-switching could
be a norm or an exception. Code-switching could be for isolated words,
phrases or whole clauses, but limited by the free morpheme and equivalence
constraints. The switched words or phrase must ‘sound’ and be grammatically
correct in both languages. Language switches does not necessarily indicate
incompetence in the target language but could be serving purposes such as
reporting or quoting a speech, interjections, changing or qualifying a topic,
highlighting an issue, emphasising speaker’s role and singling out a person.
However, switching from one language to another while issuing ATC instruction
is not an ideal and safe practice. Terms which may be acceptable and
understood by the speaker may not be familiar to the person addressed. It is
even more risky when the switching involves a totally different language for
whole sentences.
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3.1.5 English Language’s Dominance
The English language is widely used for conducting businesses, in science and
technology development, in pursuit for knowledge, as well as for communication
medium. There are approximately 350 million native English speakers around
the world. United States alone has more than 215 million native English
speakers, equivalent to 67.2 percent of the total. Even though no single
language is declared as the national language in United States, English is
spoken by the majority. Figure 3-1 shows percentages in other major countries
where English is the mother tongue.
Figure 3-1: Major Countries of Native English Speakers
(Source: Crystal, 1997)
Country Native speakers
USA 215,423,557
UK 58,200,000
Canada 17,694,830
Australia 15,013,965
Republic Of Ireland 3,750,000
South Africa 3,673,203
New Zealand 3,500,000+ (approx)
The English language dominance is further emphasised by the number of
people speaking it as a second or foreign language out of necessity or choice.
There are about three times as many non-native English speakers as the native
users of the language, making the total number of people speaking the
language over a billion. Due historical reasons English sometimes co-exists in
some countries as the national or official language and lingua franca, as in
India, Pakistan, Samoa and Papua New Guinea. These countries use English
in official Government business and for legislative purposes. Language policies
enforced in some countries promote the usage of some languages while
discouraging others, in the effort to cultivate and protect the national ethnic
language. Figure 3-2 shows the countries where English is a native language
(darker blue) and countries that declare English as a national language (lighter
blue).
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Figure 3-2: ‘English Native Language’ and ‘English National Language’ Map
(Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Anglospeak.png)
English is declared as the single official language in 23 countries and as one of
two official languages in another 11 countries. 50 countries declare English as
one of 5 leading daily languages spoken. Extraordinarily, 8 countries (Malawi,
Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Pakistan, Philippines) even proclaim
English as the official language but not listing it among the 5 most spoken
languages locally (UNESCO, 2005).
Many countries now include English in school curriculum as the foreign
language to learn (Kushner, 2003). The English language also has the world’s
largest vocabulary as it originated from various language sources. It is an
inclusive language with many words borrowed and adapted from other
languages. This is humorously best epigramed (origin not confirmed) by Nicoll
(1990) at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/,
"We don't just borrow words. On occasion, English has pursued other
languages down alleyways to beat them unconscious and rifle their pockets for
new vocabulary".
Some of these contributing languages are shown in Figure 3-3. French, Latin
and German have the most influence in words used in the English language.
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Figure 3-3: Foreign Languages Influence in English Vocabulary
French
Latin
Germanic languages and predecessors of modern
English
Greek
All other languages
Derived from proper names
No etymology given
(Source: http://www.jgames.co.uk/title/English_language)
The existence of comparable words, irregularities and a variety of pronunciation
complicates the learning of English as a second or foreign language. Learning
English spelling and pronunciation is not exactly a straightforward exercise.
There are many variations to how an arrangement of alphabets could sound.
There are also alphabets within a spelling which is ‘silent’ and do not contribute
to the pronunciation of the words. Syntax, grammar and tenses add to the
complexity of learning the language. However, these difficulties are common to
learning any language that is foreign. The advantage of learning standard
phraseology and ‘ATC English’ is that one does not need to be grammatically
correct at all times. Delivered in the correct standard format, messages
exchanged between controllers and pilots make absolute sense even if
linguistically wrong. Standard Phraseology is designed in such a way that the
subjects within a message are sequenced in the order of importance and
priority with safety as the prime objective.
3.1.6 Language Proficiency Tests
Acquiring an English language proficiency rating is typical for academic and
career purposes. Internationally recognised language proficiency tests are
available worldwide and used by many organisations. Two of the most popular
and globally recognised tests are the International English Language Testing
System (IELTS) and Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). In
Malaysia, the Examinations Council run the Malaysian Universities English Test
(MUET) for admission into universities in Malaysia and Singapore.
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TOEFL results are given as scores and not describe in any specific bands. A
speaking test module which was not part of the earlier TOEFL was added in
2005 in the internet based test module. Score ranges differ for paper-based,
computer-based and internet-based tests (ETS, 2005). Proficiency is gauged
by scores acquired but no specific description is provided.
IELTS offers an academic module for international universities enrolment and a
general training module for other purposes. Test results are set in band scores
for each sub-skill tested (speaking, listening, reading and writing), as well as an
overall band score. The band scores are described in Table 3-2. The level of
mastery of the language is explained in terms of command, inaccuracies,
familiarity and understanding of complex language structure.
Table 3-2: IELTS Score Bands Description
Band Description
9 Expert User Has fully operational command of the language: appropriate,
accurate and fluent with complete understanding.
8 Very Good User Has fully operational command of the language with only
occasional unsystematic inaccuracies and inappropriacies.
Misunderstandings may occur in unfamiliar situations. Handles
complex detailed argumentation well.
7 Good User Has operational command of the language, though with
occasional inaccuracies, inappropriacies and
misunderstandings in some situations. Generally handles
complex language well and understands detailed reasoning.
6 Competent User Has generally effective command of the language despite some
inaccuracies, inappropriacies and misunderstandings. Can use
and understand fairly complex language, particularly in familiar
situations.
5 Modest User Has partial command of the language, coping with overall
meaning in most situations, though is likely to make many
mistakes. Should be able to handle basic communication in
own field.
4 Limited User Basic competence is limited to familiar situations. Have frequent
problems in understanding and expression. Is not able to use
complex language.
3 Extremely Limited
User
Conveys and understands only general meaning in very familiar
situations. Frequent breakdowns in communication occur.
2 Intermittent User No real communication is possible except for the most basic
information using isolated words or short formulae in familiar
situations and to meet immediate needs. Has great difficulty
understanding spoken and written English.
1 Non User Essentially has no ability to use the language beyond possibly a
few isolated words.
Source: IELTS (2006)
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Table 3-3 show the statistics of IELTS test takers of East Asian region.
Malaysian candidates’ average overall rating is 6.64. Higher rating was
recorded for listening and reading but scores for writing skill was lower.
Germany was recorded as the country with the best overall rating of 7.23.
Table 3-3: IELTS Mean Band Score (Academic) 2006 – East Asian Countries
Country Listening Reading Writing Speaking Overall
China 5.47 5.80 5.23 5.39 5.53
Hong Kong 6.70 6.75 5.91 6.06 6.42
Indonesia 6.10 6.27 5.43 5.83 5.97
Japan 5.87 5.86 5.33 5.80 5.78
Korea 5.87 5.87 5.36 5.72 5.77
Malaysia 6.93 6.85 6.13 6.41 6.64
Philippines 6.68 6.27 6.18 6.74 6.53
Taiwan 5.52 5.81 5.23 5.66 5.62
Thailand 5.82 5.89 5.28 5.70 5.74
Vietnam 5.59 6.01 5.56 5.70 5.78
(Source: http://www.ielts.org)
The MUET score bands are described in Table 3-4, similarly outlining the
command of the language, fluency and inaccuracies expected. Scaling ranged
from poor to limited, modest, satisfactory, good and very good.
Table 3-4: MUET Score Bands Description
Band / Score Description
6 Very good user
260-300
Very good command, highly expressive, fluent, accurate and
appropriate, hardly any inaccuracies. Very good understanding.
Functions extremely well in the language.
5 Good user
220-259
Good command, expressive, fluent, accurate and appropriate
with minor inaccuracies. Good understanding. Functions well.
4 Competent user
180-219
Satisfactory command of the language.
Satisfactory expressive and fluent, appropriate language but with
occasional inaccuracies. Satisfactory understanding of language
and contexts. Functions satisfactorily in the language.
3 Modest user
140-179
Modest command, modestly expressive and fluent, appropriate
with noticeable inaccuracies. Modest understanding. Function
modestly.
2 Limited user
101-139
Limited command. Lacks expressiveness, fluency and
appropriacy: Inaccurate, breakdown in communication. Limited
understanding. Limited ability to function.
1 Extremely limited
user
Below 100
Poor command. Unable to use language to express ideas,
inaccurate, frequent breakdowns in communication. Little or poor
understanding. Hardly able to function in the language.
Source : MPM (2004)
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The proficiency scores in IELTS and MUET both described the competencies in
terms of comprehension, usage and recurrence of errors and inaccuracies. The
general level accepted as competent is associated with occasional inaccuracies
and satisfactory usage of the language. Similar strategies are applied in the
establishment of ICAO’s proficiency ratings which will be discussed in
paragraph 3.2.
3.2 Designated ATC Languages
ICAO as the advisory body of civil aviation recommends that pilots and air traffic
controllers be proficient in languages that has been designated for use in the
provision of air traffic services. Officially, any language could be designated by
a country as the language for ATC communications. However, English has
become firmly accepted as the common language for international aviation
communication, being the only practical choice at this time for designation as
the official first language of radiotelephony communications (Mathews, 2001).
Designation of the ATC communication language is on a country by country
basis. Russia and South Africa designated local languages, but Taiwan,
Germany, France and Malaysia for example, implement an ‘all English’ policy
for ATC communications.
3.2.1 English by Default
The English language gained its status in aviation by default, not by official
policy (Crystal, 1997). States that designate a language other than English for
air-ground communication shall ensure that communications with international
flights could be conducted in English whenever requested. All controller-pilot
communications for international flights shall then be carried out in English
unless the ATC unit and the pilot of an aircraft mutually agree to use another
language (ICAO, 2001a). France for example, used to designate French as the
communication language for domestic flights.
There are relevant amendments to ICAO Annex 1, Annex 6, Annex 11 and
Annex 10 Volume II, adopted since March 2003. Previously, an ATC and pilots’
English language proficiency requirements are very discreetly described.
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These current amendments clarify and extend existing provisions, consistently
emphasising the need for adequate language proficiency for pilots and air traffic
controllers. The responsibility to ensure that controllers are able to speak and
understand the language(s) used for radiotelephony communications lies with
the air traffic service provider (ICAO, 2001b). Operators bear the same
responsibility for flight crews (ICAO, 2001c). The new ICAO Language
Proficiency Requirements are applicable standard phraseology and to the
designated language used for ATC communication. The requirements were
adopted in 2003 and are to be enforced in March 2008. These new standards
should deal with fundamental aviation language issues (Mitsutomi and O'Brien,
2004). There is also concern regarding language of documents used on board
aircraft by aviation personnel, especially if it is different from the language used
by inspection authorities. ICAO is also adopting a proposal to get all documents
used on board aircraft translated into English (Verhaegen, 2001).
Other researches by Sexton and Helmrich (2000), Varantola (1989), Nordwall
(1997), Feldman (1998), Mathews (2001) and Verhaegen (2001) concluded that
ATC communications deviate from standard phraseologies towards usage of
plain English as workload increases or when abnormal events developed.
These studies support the need for controllers and pilots to adhere to the
prescribed standards but pointed out that maintaining a certain level of
proficiency in the usage of general plain English is absolutely necessary in
handling unusual situations.
Aviation English as the term suggests consists of terms and vocabulary that are
aviation specific. People not related to the industry may be unfamiliar with
some of the terms which are not used in daily conversations, but this holds true
for any given specialised subject matter such as medicine, rocket science or
geology. Aviation English is also technically oriented, grammatically simple and
concise in structure. Standard phraseology is even more constrained as
grammatical structure and tenses are ruled out. The exchanges in routine
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communications are disjunctive, abbreviated and predictable, carried out by a
prescribed protocol.
The model of Aviation English (Figure 3-4) as introduced by Mitsutomi and
O’Brien (2003) suggests that the components include ATC Standard
Phraseology (SP), English for Specific Purposes (ESP) and English for General
Purposes (EGP). These three areas combined together form the basis for
proficient and safe communications. The SP is considered as the central
component but it is very concise and brief, without grammatical markers,
determinants or verbs. It has to be supported by ESP and EGP when no
prescribed phrases are available to achieve mutual understanding.
Figure 3-4: Aviation English Model
(Mitsutomi & O’Brien, 2003, page 119)
Although rooted in the general language, ESP contains specialty terms of which
literacy and fluency will be enhanced by experience and practice. This model
shows that without knowledge of general purpose and plain English, the
standard phraseology alone may not be sufficient to manage unusual situations.
3.2.2 The ICAO’s Language Proficiency Requirements
The ICAO’s Annex 1 latest amendments regarding language proficiency are
aimed to boost, explain and strengthen the requirements that should be
applicable to pilots, air traffic controllers and flight engineers (Mathews, 2003).
Improving language proficiency among pilots and controllers will expectedly
improve aviation safety (Mathews, 2004) as well as improve awareness of
communication pitfalls (Day, 2004). These guidelines clarify the areas and
General Purpose English
Special Purpose English
ATC Standard
Phraseology
Controller Pilot
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skills that must be acquired before any personnel are considered proficient to
handle safety related communications.
The ICAO Annex 1 paragraph 1.2.9.5 (ICAO , 2001d) states that,
“Aeroplane and helicopter pilots, flight navigators required to use the radio
telephone aboard an aircraft, air traffic controllers and aeronautical station operators
should demonstrate the ability to speak and understand the language used for
radiotelephony communications to the level specified in the language proficiency
requirements”
The responsibility of the operators to ensure crew members’ language
proficiency is stated in Annex 6 paragraph 3.1.6. These amendments
emphasise the need to train and certify personnel of the air traffic industry to be
proficient in English. The recently published ICAO DOC 9835 – ‘Manual on the
Implementation of ICAO Language Proficiency Requirement’, explains these
requirements in detail (ICAO, 2004a). In addition, each aviation authority has
the option to publish its own supporting documents for local use. FAA details
the English language skill standards in the circular 60-28 CFR Parts 61, 63 and
65 while CAA UK outlines the performance objectives and conditions to
determine proficiency levels in English in document CAP 624 Part O. ICAO
offers DOC 9835 as guidance material to member states to determine their own
training and testing metrics for language proficiency. Eurocontrol, for example
had developed a Proficiency in English Language (PELA) Test for controllers
that satisfies the previous requirements for English language proficiency. The
test had recently been updated and enhanced to meet new requirements to
demonstrate language proficiency which reflects a range of tasks undertaken in
ATC, but with specific focus on language use rather than operational
procedures (Enright, 2004).
ICAO’s Proficiency Rating Scale is divided into Levels of 1 to 6 and explained
by six ‘holistic’ descriptors of proficiency;
i. Pronunciation – describes dialect/accent as influence by first language or
regional variations,
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ii. Structure - grammatical structure and sentence pattern appropriate for
function and task,
iii. Vocabulary – range, choice of words, paraphrasing ability,
iv. Fluency – speech tempo, presence of fillers, use of discourse markers,
v. Comprehension – cultural variations, and
vi. Interactions – responses, manage discourse relationship.
Level 4 (Operational) is the minimum required proficiency level for
radiotelephony communication. At Level 4, the influence of first language or
regional variation on pronunciation should not frequently interfere with ease of
understanding. There should be creative but well controlled, use of
grammatical structures and sentence patterns. Errors may occur, particularly in
unusual or unexpected circumstances, but should rarely interfere with meaning.
Vocabulary range and accuracy at Level 4 are usually sufficient to communicate
effectively on common, concrete, and work-related topics. Speakers should be
able to paraphrase successfully when lacking specific terms, could produce
stretches of language at an appropriate tempo without noticeable pauses,
distracting fillers and hesitations, and able to make limited use of discourse
markers. There may be occasional loss of fluency on transition from rehearsed
or formulaic speech to spontaneous interaction, but should not prevent effective
communication.
Comprehension on common, concrete, and work-related topics is expected to
be mostly accurate when the accent or variety used is sufficiently intelligible for
an international community of users. However, the speaker’s comprehension
may be slower or require clarification strategies when dealing with linguistic or
situational complication or an unexpected outcome. Responses are usually
immediate, appropriate, and informative. A Level 4 speaker could initiate and
maintain exchanges even when dealing with an unexpected turn of events. Any
apparent misunderstandings are adequately dealt with by checking, confirming,
or clarifying (ICAO , 2001d).
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
67
When a speaker’s capability falls below the expectations of level 4 proficiency,
he/ she should be refrained from conducting radiotelephony. The personnel
should undergo further training for improvement and be re-evaluated.
Recurrent evaluation will also be required for proficiency levels below 6 at
specified intervals. Proficiency at Level 4 requires re-evaluation every 3 years
and level 5 every 6 years. Personnel with Level 6 proficiency will not require
any re-evaluation at all.
Levels 1 through 3 described as Pre-elementary, Elementary, and
Pre-operational, are all below the minimum ICAO language proficiency
requirement. Levels 5 and 6 describe Extended and Expert levels, in which
levels of proficiency are more advanced than the minimum required standard.
As a whole, the scales will serve as benchmarks for training and testing, and in
assisting candidates to attain the ICAO Operational Level. The detailed holistic
description of all ICAO proficiency levels are shown in Appendix B.
3.3 ATC Standard Phraseology
The standard phraseology was established for the purpose of ensuring
uniformity in ATC radiotelephony communications. If standard phrases are
adhered to when composing a message, any possible ambiguities are expected
to be reduced to a minimum (ICAO, 2001f).
3.3.1 Is it a language?
Philips (1991) taxonomised and coded 541 phraseological utterances and 36
structural modifications of the official ICAO’s standard phraseology. He
observed that there is a special purpose sub-grammar and the speech
community is context and domain dependent. By design, standard phraseology
is a non-grammatical form of simplified and specialised sub-language as a
derivative of the natural language. It should be characterised by its concision,
clarity and non-ambiguity, intended to be used without variations throughout the
world (Mell, 1991c). For example, a normally spoken question of ‘where are
you going?’ in everyday conversation would be reduced to a two-word phrase of
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‘request destination’ by phraseology design. Ragan (2002) described
phraseology as unnatural, idiosyncratic, predictable, disjunctive and
abbreviated. It has a prescribed phonetic and grammatical structure. These
context specific terms have prescribed meanings with predetermined structures
and are self-contained. It also has a lexical limitation that, sometimes, the
usage of plain English would be required.
ATC standard phraseology attempts to obliterate the ambiguities of using
multiple meaning words and phrases. It also tries to regulate some word
sounds so as to be globally identical, given the universal and international
nature of aviation. The exchange of information in ATC should strictly follow the
prescribed phonetics and phraseology structure without any additional linguistic
style and creativity. It is the character of being internationally recognised, with a
restricted number of topics and an expectant, predictable and repetitive nature
that should contribute to the success of ATC communication. However, as
statistics show, expectancy and assumption have on numerous occasions,
caused misunderstandings as well. As standard phraseology is not a language
in the true sense, it should be used according to strict protocol and procedures.
Any deviation from the proper and prescribed protocol of standard phraseology
could alter meaning or lead to ambiguity and possibly cause confusion and
misunderstanding.
The very nature of being concise and specific, standard phraseology becomes a
challenge to memorise, master and use with ease and accuracy (Mitsutomi and
O'Brien, 2003). New pilots and controllers all start their career at a point of
almost zero knowledge about what standard phraseology is and how to use it.
Only frequent practise and experience will improve proficiency. Successful use
of phraseology is not isolated from other cognitive workload and may suffer
when overall workload becomes more demanding (Villaire, 1994). Insufficient
proficiency could also result in ‘linguistic stall’ (Mitsutomi, 1999) as there is not
much choice of paraphrasing the ‘lost’ phrase.
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3.3.2 Lexicon and Radiotelephony Procedures
ICAO Document 6180 – Definitions, which was published in 1949, contained
limited entries of phrases as an early regulatory effort to standardise aviation
communications. It was superseded by Document 7200, published in 1952 in
three languages; English, French and Spanish; with 2,500 entries but still
incomplete and had to be expanded by additional relevant entries. New
procedures and better technology require additional suitable phrases to be
implemented. Sometimes, amendments are needed if an earlier version of
phraseology causes confusion or becomes obsolete with changes in
technology.
Other ICAO documents for phraseology references include ANNEX 10 Vol II,
DOC 4444 – Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Rules of the Air and Air
Traffic Services, and DOC 9432 - Manual of Radiotelephony. The ICAO
Standard Phraseology Lexicon is updated as and when required but each State
can publish its own glossary if it so wishes. UK Civil Aviation Authority
published Documents CAP 413 and CAP 483 for this purpose while FAA
published Aeronautical Information Manual Order 7110.10P/CG –
Pilot/Controller Glossary.
In standard phraseology, numbers are pronounced uniquely, unfamiliar words
should be spelled out using the NATO spelling alphabet and phrases are
structured to an expected format. Designation for places and points along air
routes are standardised, as well as names for navigational aids on the ground
and paths on the surface of aerodromes. There are standard units and
measurements; height is expressed as altitude or flight levels, distance in
nautical miles, time is universally coordinated, description of disposition is
referenced to the hour of the clock and there is a standard method of
addressing ground or aircraft stations.
A list of standard phraseology sanctioned by the appropriate aviation authority
is used in ATC operations. This glossary is based on ICAO’s list but could be
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expanded as necessary for local guidelines. There are specific phrases for
different types of aircraft operations, such as start-up, takeoff, climb, descend
and land. ATC operations with radar will also have specific radar phraseologies
such as identified, squawk, transponder and heading. Restrictions imposed on
flights also use specific wordings and phrases.
Differences from ICAO are allowed but must be informed, filed and published in
Annex 10 Volume II for the information of other states. 32 states have notified
ICAO of ‘no difference exist’ status while 8 contracting states; Australia, France,
Germany, India, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and UK have filed differences.
For example, Germany totally disallows the use of words ‘to’ and ‘for’ in
reporting or assigning levels and in place of ‘verify’ uses the word ‘check’. New
Zealand does not allow certain forms of abbreviated callsigns type. In France,
when English is in use the word ‘report’ is substituted with ‘say’ while the word
‘verify’ is not used. Sweden listed a clarification on the usage of words ‘hundred’
and ‘thousand’ with whole numbers (ICAO, 2001a). No information is received
from other contracting states.
3.4 Language Deficiencies’ Impact on ATC Safety
Mell (1991c) summarised that language deficiencies of aircrew or controllers
could cause:
 departures from safe operations as in issuing unclear or misleading
ATC instructions,
 failures to prevent a departure from safe operations such as being
unable to query erroneous transmission by a pilot, or
 failures to initiate a return to safe operations as in usage of non-
standard phraseology.
Historical accident data strongly suggests that failure of Language proficiency
as a protective layer against an unsafe situation has often led to disaster. For
example, in 1993, Chinese pilots flying a United States-made MD-80 attempting
to land in northwest China were baffled by an audio alarm from the plane's
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ground proximity warning system. A cockpit recorder picked up the pilot's last
words: "What does 'pull up' mean?" Another accident in 1995 was related to
the controller's English not being sufficient for him to understand and articulate
the problem of an American Airlines jet having navigational problems. The
aircraft crashed into a mountain in Cali, Colombia (Baron, 2004). If the Chinese
pilots had understood what ‘pull-up’ meant and if the controller had been able to
understand and assist the pilot, the outcome could have been different.
Rasmussen’s (1983) classification of human errors in general refers to skill and
knowledge of a person committing the error. Skill-based error is failure in using
skills that have been acquired over time and stored in memory, usually at
execution of a plan of action. Knowledge-based error is the inability to apply
previous knowledge to new situations. Information may have been learned
under different circumstances and knowledge may be insufficient for present
situation. Rule-based error is related to the inability to recognise or understand
circumstances fully. Rules which were applicable to a similar situation
encountered before through training or experience are not appropriate for
present circumstances. This involves the activation of ‘if-then’ logic but
misapplied when the ‘if’ condition is not actually met. Reason (1990), James
(1998) and, Wickens and Hollands (2000) used other terms such as slips,
errors, mistakes and solecisms. Slips, lapses or omissions are related to
processing problems, inclined towards carelessness, divided attention,
distraction and preoccupation. Mistakes are deficiencies or failures in
judgemental or inferential process involved in the selection of objectives and
method. These are harder to detect, complex and constitute a far greater
danger as errors are in interpretation or choice of intentions. Solecisms and
violations on the other hand are applied for deliberate breach of rules of
correctness and actions contrary to standards.
Errors in language usage indicate that an attempt was initiated at
communicating but resulted in partial or total failure. A total failure means the
message is not understood by the recipient; when the contents makes no sense
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or have no meaning at all. In partial failure, the recipient may understand a
portion of the message well but the remaining may be unclear or not understood
at all. The unclear or garbled portion could then be deducted or guessed based
on total message context. Parts of message not understood may be clarified or
ignored depending on message meaning and completion. Corder (1967) in
discussing language learners’ errors suggested that occurrence of errors
indicate inadequacy in the present teaching techniques and in an imperfect
world, errors will continue to happen in spite of best efforts, that resourcefulness
should be focussed on techniques to deal with errors after they occurred. In
view of aviation safety, waiting until after errors occurred just isn’t good enough.
More should be done to mitigate the occurrence of errors itself.
When a language learner is faced with difficulties and a state of being ignorant
in using the target language, the coping mechanism could either be silence or
substitution. If silence were chosen then there could never be an error analysis
as there would be no language use error at all. However, in air traffic control
communications, none-response is sometimes considered as an error in itself
since there will be no confirmation that message had been received and
understood correctly. In substitutive coping mechanism, learners compensate
for ignorance by paraphrasing or using a best-guess word or phrase as a
solution. Ignorance is conceptually different to incompleteness which suggests
a global insufficiency across all areas of the target language and could be
measured in terms of grammar, acceptability, correctness and strangeness.
Grammatical error is observed when words used are not in the correct order
without taking context into consideration. Acceptability relates to being
contextually correct while grammar is not considered. Ignorance of correctness
is referred to prescriptive normative standards, and strangeness / infelicity is
about being anomalous, contradictory and using inappropriate expressions.
Detecting errors in spoken language is more difficult than written, as is more
difficult on screen than a print-out or by one’s self than others.
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3.4.1 What the Numbers are Saying
The fact that aviation incidents and accidents are recorded in detail enables us
to analyse frequencies and types, as well as categorise causal factors.
However, there may be slight differences in the structure of databases and
searches into the records have to take into account the terminology used during
the reporting of those occurrences and categorisation used for keeping records.
The following are examples of some established sources of safety information
that could be accessed for analysis purposes.
3.4.1.1 FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS)
The ASIAS (formerly NASDAC) databases have been updated and still
available for online search as before (FAA, 2006). The relevant databases are
the Aviation Safety Reporting Scheme (ASRS), FAA Aircraft Incident data
System (FAIDS), National Transportation Safety Bureau (NTSB) and Near Mid-
Air Collision System (NMACS).
These databases could be searched by various criteria such as aircraft types,
flight type, state, airport and events between two dates. A narrative contents
search could be carried out using keywords. A search result will provide query
count, total events count and each individual report. Keywords such as ATC,
tower, tracon, language, phraseology and miscommunication were used for
specific searches. Boolean logic allows for combined keywords search to
narrow down the search area scope.
Table 3-5 lists the various search results carried out in September 2007 using
keywords associated with this research. Based on events recorded, ASRS has
the largest database and the NMACS the smallest. Reports containing the
search keyword were listed and details could be extracted online. The table
only shows the number of relevant events. However, as these events keywords
were not totally independent of each other, the numbers should not simply be
added up. Multiple keywords search could assist in narrowing down search
criteria and type of events.
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Table 3-5: FAA’s Databases Search Results (September 2007)
ASRS FAIDS NTSB NMACS
Total Events 176570 88373 63167 6351
ATC 32366 1576 1625 310
Tracon 3127 37 332 78
Enroute 345 1819 885 83
Tower 223 1907 3369 237
Language 912 9 47 1
Phraseology 811 5 28 3
Miscommunication 25 7 6 0
English 637 9 57 0
ATC & language 227 2 8 0
ATC and phraseology 254 2 15 1
ATC & miscommunication 9 3 1 0
ATC & English 174 2 7 0
Tracon & language 6 0 2 0
Tracon and phraseology 27 (0.015%) 0 6 1
Tracon & miscommunication 1 0 0 0
Tracon & English 5 0 4 0
Enroute & language 2 0 1 0
Enroute and phraseology 1 0 3 0
Enroute & miscommunication 0 0 0 0
Enroute & English 0 0 2 0
Tower & language 1 1 16 (0.025%) 0
Tower and phraseology 0 1 18 (0.028%) 1
Tower & miscommunication 3 1 2 0
Tower & English 1 0 18 (0.028%) 0
Not all events were ATC related or associated with any ATC operations
environment. For example, NMACS has only 78 out of 6351 records pertaining
to ‘tracon’ and only 1 was ‘tracon and phraseology’ related. ‘English’ and
‘miscommunication’ were not associated with any event in NMACS but found in
other databases. The NTSB database showed more records associated with
Tower (with language or phraseology or English). ‘Tracon and phraseology’
showed more records in ASRS. These databases gave an idea of how much
the language, phraseology and communication problems affected the ATC
operations.
3.4.1.2 UK MORS
A search on MORs for ‘language’ resulted in 230 reports and ‘phraseology’
resulted in 143 reports. Other MORS reports listed in the ‘language’ search are
in Appendix C and those categorised by ‘phraseology’, in Appendix D. Each
report contains aircraft type, flight phase, event category, location, date, a pre-
title and the précis of actual report.
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The following Table 3-6 is an example of a MORS report that was listed under
‘language’ keyword search. The incident is of an altitude deviation event that
took place in Spain involving an Airbus-320.
Table 3-6: Example of UK MORS ‘language’ Search Results
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number: 00XYZ
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : ddmmyy
Classification : Occurrences Location : Spain
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
After take off A320 changed frequency at 200ft, but was unable to contact new frequency
until FL49, when clearance was amended to maintain 5000ft. A320 reached 5350ft before
descending back to 5000ft.
Precis :
After take off from R/W36L, at 200ft, A320 was given frequency change by Tower, which
was acknowledged and actioned. New frequency did not respond to initial call, also all other
R/T transmissions were in local language. ATC eventually contacted A320 when it was at
FL49 and instructed it to maintain 5000ft, due to the slow climb of the preceding a/c. A320
climbing to FL130 on the SID, disconnected autopilot, but reached 5350ft before
descending back to 5000ft.
The pilot reported that a clearance to maintain level was not timely and resulted
in a level bust before the aircraft could descend to its assigned level. Usage of
local language in radiotelephony with other aircraft on the frequency was
claimed by the pilot as contributory to the occurrence.
In the Table 3-7 example, listed under ‘phraseology’, there was confusion over
prominent words ‘line up’ and ‘ready immediately’ which had resulted in runway
incursion when the pilot fail to notice the requirement ‘after landing traffic’.
Table 3-7: Example of UK MORS ‘phraseology’ Search Result
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 0WXYZ
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : ddmmyy
Classification : Occurrences Location : UK
Events : ATC Occurrence
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 was given a conditional line up clearance from R3 holding point after a landing B737,
but then observed to have crossed red stop bar ahead of a landing B737. Inbound B737
instructed to go around.
Precis :
Inbound B737 at approximately 2nms on final approach to R/W23 was cleared to land.
Another B737 was given a conditional line up clearance from R3 holding point to 'line up
after landing traffic and be ready immediately'. B737 subsequently observed to have
crossed red stop bar ahead of landing B737 and instructed to hold position. Both pilots
believed initial instruction was 'line up and be ready immediately'. Inbound B737 instructed
to go around.
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Normally, a restriction is issued ahead of the instruction to emphasise to the
pilot that there is a condition to be met. Structuring the message differently may
give pilots the wrong impression as had happened in this occurrence.
3.4.1.3 Aviation Safety Network
This website’s database reports are categorised under various headings such
as regions and countries, year, contributory factor and outcome.
Table 3-8: Occurrences Attributed to Language/ Communications Problems
Year Location Commentary on language / phraseology
1997 Indonesia ATC confusion over direction of aircraft turn
1996 Norway Pilot’s limited knowledge of the operating language. Request for
alternate runway not understood by ATC Information
1992 Thailand language difficulties, ineffective discussion of unresolved problems,
radio communication difficulties between the crew and the air traffic
controllers.
1991 California failure of ATC to maintain situation awareness of traffic situation,
culminating in inappropriate clearances
1989 Malaysia "...descend two four zero zero..." was interpreted by the crew as "...to
400..."Non-standard phraseology by ATC, crew misinterpret
instructions
1985 New Jersey inadequate coordination among ATC, a misleading traffic advisory.
1981 France imprecise language between pilot and ATC
aircraft flying a holding pattern to lose altitude, but the controller
believed aircraft was on direct descent to begin final approach.
1981 California Crew failure to immediately initiate a go-around when instructed to do
so by the ATC
1979 India ATC use of incorrect and/or non-standard phraseology
1979 Brazil '…turn right heading 140, just now, over' Incomplete ATC instructions,
1979 Italy inadequate ATC assistance (controller distracted)
1977 Lebanon Language difficulties forced Beirut Area Control to repeat approach
instructions.
1977 Spain misunderstanding between the tower and the crew, aircraft departed
without take-off clearance, mutual use of usual terminology which,
however, gave rise to misinterpretation.
1977 California crew misinterpreted the IFR clearance and ATC instructions
1975 Washington ATC: "...maintain five thousand", flight responded "Five thousand. MAC
40641 is out of ten". Misidentification.
1973 France Radio difficulty due distance. crew twice tried to request permission to
carry out a 360-degree turn, initiated the turn without clearance.
1969 Puerto Rico Wrong position information and erroneous instructions, controller was
performing beyond the safe limits of his capability
1966 France "you have 5 miles to the Mont Blanc" the positional correction by ATC
was mis-understood by the pilot
1960 Brazil lack of appreciation of the communications difficulties,
pilot misunderstand instructions transmitted by Approach Control
1947 Senegal radiotelephony communications difficulties between the control tower
and the aircraft, insufficient knowledge of the English language by
the controllers in the tower
1947 Washington faulty clearance given by Airway Traffic Control, tacitly approved by
the company dispatcher, and accepted by Flight 410
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A causal/ contributory factor search listed 21 accidents (Table 3-8) associated
with language/ communications problems. Among the language related
keywords used in the narrative of the accidents were confusion, limited
knowledge, difficulties (speaking/ understanding), non-standard phraselogy,
misleading, misinterpretation and imprecise. Based on location, these
accidents were not limited to non-native English speaker countries, which
suggest that language problems are not always ESL associated.
3.4.2 UK AIRPROX Analyses
There were in total 1134 reports recorded between 1998 and 2003. Only 151
reports were found to be associated with language or communication related
problem contributing to the occurrence. Each of the selected Airprox reports
was then categorised based on airspace class and flight phase, and types of
discrepancies which contributed to the occurrence were noted. The problem
may be relevant to air-ground; between a pilot and a controller; or ground-
ground communications; a misunderstanding between controllers and may also
be the outcome of a miscommunication between pilots. For the purpose of this
initial investigation some general criteria have been used to classify these
discrepancies as following:
i. readback/hearback error
ii. alphanumeric confusion
iii. unclear ATC clearance or instructions
iv. non-usage of standard phraseology
v. traffic information not provided / incomplete
vi. displayed information discrepancy / non-usage
vii. insufficient briefing between Controllers / Crew
viii. Inefficient coordination between ATC units
ix. Overloading of communications taskload
x. Equipment or radiotelephony technique
There may be more than one discrepancy in an Airprox. This resulted in a total
of 198 discrepancies in 151 Airprox.
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Figure 3-5 show the percentages of discrepancies per airspace class. It was
noted that discrepancies took place more often (59%) in class A airspace which
is busier and under positive control at all times, compared to other classes of
airspace. 7% were in Class B airspace, which increased the percentage of
discrepancies in positive control airspace to 66%.
Figure 3-5: Airprox by Airspace Classification
In uncontrolled airspace, Classes F and G where flights receive only flight
information, about 20% communication discrepancies were observed. Class D
is advisory airspace and responsibility for separation is shared between pilots
and controllers. This airspace recorded 14% of the discrepancies. There is
very little Class E airspace in the UK and no language or communications
discrepancies were recorded in it.
Figure 3-6 shows the types of discrepancies. The lowest percentage, at about
5%, was for ‘radiotelephony technique and equipment problem’. This may be
due to advanced and more reliable telecommunication systems now. ATC
clearance (unclear or misleading) made up 16% of discrepancies.
Figure 3-6: Types of Discrepancies
Airprox : Types of Discrepancies
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Workload totalled to about 9%, suggesting that problems may have occurred
during high, complex traffic situations. Other discrepancies showed between 12
to 15% occurrence, suggesting that problems between controller-pilot (ATC
clearance, hear/readback and phraseology) and controller-controller (displayed
information, coordination and crew briefing) are seen to be equally significant as
Airprox causal factors. ‘Traffic info’ and ‘confusion’ type of discrepancies could
occur in either pilot-controller or controller-controller communications.
An analysis of the flight phase (Figure 3-7) indicated that the departure, arrival
and enroute phases show high percentages of communication discrepancies.
This could be attributed to high workload and similarly high communication
events between pilots and controller as these phases involved movements of
aircraft within the terminal control area (TMA).
Figure 3-7: Airprox by Flight Phase
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Aircraft in transit, on cruise and on a missed approach (go-around) usually
follow fixed routings and standard procedures where minimum communication
is required. The phases categorised as climb and descend in the data source
are those at higher flight levels, where navigational and level changes are less
frequent. Circuits and holding showed higher discrepancies as these involved
more congested airspace and the possibility of conflict is greater, while
communications needs are more frequent.
The Airprox reports are a source of occurrences in the air, involving two aircraft
which are considered ‘too close for safety’. However, incidents and accidents
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could also happen where only one aircraft is involved, as in controlled-flight-
into-terrain (CFIT) or level busts. On the ground, safety could also be
jeopardised by un-authorised entry onto an active runway. Further information
and databases from CFIT, level bursts and runway incursion safety occurrences
had been looked into to achieve a ‘Gate-to-Gate’ overall picture of possible
communication discrepancies. This information had assisted in mapping the
data collection, encoding and analyses phase of the research.
3.4.3 Statistics Don’t Lie…
…they just don’t tell the whole story. All the numbers and percentages quoted
above are real. There have been incidents and accidents which are an
indication of human or system failures. ASRS database analysis (Connel,
1995) found that over 70 percent of the first 28,000 confidential (self-disclosure)
pilot reports received were related to communication problems. Cardosi,
Falzarano and Han’s (1999) analysis concluded that readback and hearback
errors are influenced by similar callsigns, pilot’s expectations and high controller
workload. Altitude deviations, loss of standard separation, ATC operational
errors, landing on wrong runway and runway transgressions were recorded as
the outcomes of these errors. A study by Cardosi (2001) of all the FAA
databases that looked at the types of communication errors in surface
operations had found that ‘forgetting’ and ‘miscommunication’ as the most
common factors.
However the number of incidents or accidents recorded in databases could not
serve as a performance or safety indicator of ATC and pilots’ daily practices. A
more ‘direct’ study has to be carried out to identify routine practises that are not
in compliance with prescribed standards. ATC safety management used to
react towards unsafe situations after errors have caused failures in which safety
has been jeopardised. Recent years have seen more proactive measures in
the management of safety in that normal routine operations are analysed for
discrepancies and non-adherence to standards. The Line Operations Safety
Audit (LOSA) which was carried out in various airlines cockpit operations
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concluded that these surveys improve performance and enhance safety (ICAO,
2002). A similar concept is now proposed for ATC operations as the Normal
Operations Safety Survey (NOSS). Conforming to this concept of analysing
routine operations for the benefit of safety, this research will use daily ATC
operations communications as a data source in investigating language and
standard phraseology errors. The added value will be to involve English
Second Language (ESL) user controllers whom interact with pilots of various
nationalities. As ESL users have been said to experience more problems and
causing more safety occurrences, this data may show the type of common
problematic areas of language usage and conditions surrounding it.
The language problems with ESL users may not be completely and clearly
described if the research perspective is limited to errors during serious incidents
and accidents. It is also unrealistic to assume native English speakers do not
have any problems in ATC communications which are mostly in English, with
strict and stringent rules applied to usage of words, numbers and phrases. The
serious incidents and accidents emphasise how severe the outcome of
communications or language errors can be. Threat and error management are
now focussing in early detection of system failures (ICAO, 2005). Until now,
non-standard practices that are present in routine operations are not given any
attention if safety was seen as intact and not jeopardised. Statistics from
unsafe occurrences databases pointed to the areas that had gone wrong,
investigated and steps recommended for safety enhancement. Analysis of
routine operations however, looks at good or bad airmanship, tries to identify
safety related practices and to re-enforce adherence to standards. It is an
opportunity to repair and improve present deficiencies within the system,
indirectly enhancing performance and ensuring safety.
3.5 Chapter Summary
English has been established by default as the lingua franca of international civil
aviation. Both native and non-native English speakers are required to
communicate in this language in an ATC environment. This chapter looks into
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the basic characteristics and properties of language, theories of language
learning and comprehension, problems related to limited language knowledge
and how these affects the fluency and proficiency of language use. ATC
radiotelephony utilises standard phraseology instead of general English and
there are subtle usage differences between countries. Standard phraseology is
rigid in terms of design and lexicon while its usage is guided by the standard
and recommended radiotelephony practises. Non-adherence to standard
phraseology is considered as discrepancies and errors, as it may pose a risk to
safety. However, the lexicon of standard phraseology could not cater for all
possible situations and knowledge of plain English is required in certain
circumstances.
Language deficiencies’ impact on ATC safety is shown by safety databases,
signifying the areas and magnitude of phraseology and language problems.
These data pointed to errors that attributed towards occurrences but do not
contain information on routine radiotelephony operations. However, the records
revealed types of common errors and circumstances associated with language-
related problems. The FAA databases showed an estimated portion of safety
occurrences associated with language and phraseology deficiencies. A detailed
study of cases could reveal the context in which keywords were used. An initial
exploratory analysis of UK’s Airprox Reports suggested factors that should be
given due attention in planning data collection program as well as classifying
types of errors and discrepancies. An analysis of actual radiotelephony is best
suited to explore and identify the characteristics of language and phraseology
usage in a routine ATC environment. An ESL perspective is seriously
considered as the South East Asia region is seldom involved in ATC research
studies and this may be a starting point for more data to be collected here in the
future.
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Existing Methodologies
There had been many studies involving ATC communication for various
different objectives. Among the areas researched and examples are:
i. communication problems (Morrow and Rodvolt, 1992),
ii. communication error types and recurrence (Golaszewski, 1989),
iii. causal factors of safety occurrence (Cardosi et al, 1999),
iv. streamlining the terminologies and taxonomies (Prinzo, 2002),
v. characteristics of radiotelephony (Mell, 1991c), and
vi. correlation of communication activities to ATC taskload and workload
(Mills, 1998; Manning et al, 2001)
Data for ATC communication problem research had mostly been sourced from:
i. simulation of an air traffic environment, as used by,
a. Kanki and Foushee (1989),
b. Human Technology, Inc (1991),
c. Risser, Scerbo, Baldwin and McNamara (2002),
d. Rantanen and Kokayeff (2002),
e. Burki-Cohen (1995),
f. Prinzo and Morrow (1999) and
g. Prinzo (1998).
ii. safety reports databases such as ASRS, as used by,
a. Cardosi (2001; Cardosi et al, 1999),
b. Cardosi, Falzarano and Han (1999)
c. Burian and Barshi (2003) and
d. Monan (1983).
ii. real-time ATC radiotelephony, as used by,
a. Morrow, Lee and Rodvolt (1990)
b. Cardosi (1993)
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c. Cardosi (1994)
d. Cardosi, Brett & Han (1996) and
e. Sexton and Helmreich (2000).
Prinzo and Britton (1993) discussed the relevant literature related to this subject
in a general and chronological sequence to establish facts known, approaches
used and further research required. The authors recommended streamlining of
taxonomies and keywords used for classifying information related to ATC
communication, having an ATC audio and video database, and conducting
more co-relational studies. Additionally, the current training program should be
re-examined to determine suitability, effectiveness and accuracy.
Very few studies had actually focussed on ESL controllers and pilots or the
environment in which the majority of participants are of ESL status. An earlier
analysis by Mell (1991c) used the English corpus of radiotelephony involving
French, English, Spanish and Portugese controllers in European airspace. Out
of 7,000 pilot and controller messages, only 70% were in English and
controllers initiated 60% of the communications. Speech acts analysis found
33% associated with managing aircraft movements while another 33% were for
speaker-recipient identification. Speech acts associated with radio frequencies,
SSR codes and radar contact totalled about 26%. A rather significant 5% was
attributed to ‘repairs’ or patching-up misunderstandings, implying that there is a
real risk of confusion in ATC radiotelephony.
In a second radiotelephony study by Mell () involving ESL controllers, the focus
was on discourse analysis of dialogue in abnormal situations. Mell considered
that the understanding of non-standard dialogue in terms of pragmatic and
discursive characters is critically important in maintaining the safety margin of
civil aviation. In this study, only 24 % of messages were found to be associated
with task management, in which 12.1% was issuing of instructions and 11.3%
was information advisory (refer Figure 4-1). Dialogue management occupied
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76% of communication, with 34% for turn management, 21% for dialogue
understanding and 18.6% associated with radar/radio contact.
Figure 4-1: Messages type in abnormal situations dialogue
(Adapted from Mell, 1992)
A more recent study involving ESL Italian controllers (Corradini and Cacciari,
2001) concluded that linguistic discrepancies and errors were more frequent in
the low workload phases compared to high workload. The opposite was found
for redundancies; this category includes courtesies and greetings, negotiation
expressions and intrusion of plain language into phraseologies. This study also
noted differences in error rate between tower and radar controllers, contributed
to age, experience, training and length of service.
4.2 Choosing a Methodology
From the literature reviewed, there emerged various possibilities to undertake
this research. The literature which include the operational and technical
perspective of air traffic control, combined with the language learning and usage
aspects suggest that a balance of knowledge and good operational practice is
important to produce language proficient and operationally efficient air traffic
controllers and pilots.
4.2.1 Safety Survey versus Questionnaire
Pilots and controllers are required to be continuously vigilant and alert in their
daily duties so much so that an earlier intent of carrying out an in-flight / on-duty
language experience survey as a method of collecting data was decided not
suitable. The intended survey would require the pilots and controllers to record
their real life experience of place, time, units involved, an accurate citation of
language used and the problems that arise. A pre-formatted report would be
Messages
24% Task
Management
76% Dialogue
Management
Instructions 12.1%
Advisory 11.3%
Turn (speaker) 34%
Dialogue understanding 21%
Radar/radio contact 18.6%
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provided but the participating pilots and controllers need to allocate time to
complete the details. The high workload of these professionals will be further
disrupted by adding another task to be attended to within their prime taskload
(Pawlak et al, 1996). It was foreseen that the method may not be very
productive considering the limitations, commitments and possible risks.
4.2.2 English Second Language Users
The ESL aspect of the radiotelephony problem is often mentioned in
investigations of ATC incidents and accidents, suggesting that ‘language
problems’ frequently involve non-native English speakers. Previous studies
focus on the native English speaking populations and the ESL perspective was
not specifically emphasised. Non-native English user pilots and controllers
have been highlighted often enough to justify an actual study of their language
and phraseology usage. It is understandably logical that non-native speakers
would have problems when using a language which is not their mother tongue.
This is the key reason why this research was decided to be more beneficial if
focussed on non-native users of the English language.
Due to accessibility and practicality many previous studies had sourced data
from native English speaking populations. It is for the same reasons that an
ESL environment was chosen for this research. This opportunity will contribute
additional data from an ESL population and allow a broader scope of ATC
communication problems research. If the non-native English users are not
proficient enough in some context, then the daily operational behaviour of air
traffic controllers and pilots in the ATC system would provide clues and proof of
deficiencies and problems faced in the usage of the English language and ATC
radiotelephony phraseology. It could then be decided if any discovered
deficiencies are of any significant risk to aircraft safety. These deficiencies
could also point the areas that need more emphasise in training and annual
proficiency checks.
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4.2.3 Real-time ATC Radiotelephony
As had been ascertained during literature search, routine radiotelephony data
was best suited for this research. The actual words spoken by controllers and
pilots were the entities to be studied and analysed. Existing safety occurrences
databases are rich with narrative of occurrences but there are limited
radiotelephony transcripts accessible. These incidents and safety occurrences
are occasional snap-shots from usually round-the-clock non-stop operations
and don’t provide a clear enough picture of the type of errors happening during
normal operations. Furthermore, these occurrences were the consequences of
errors or discrepancies that had not been mitigated or not corrected in time
before safety was considered infringed. There were no direct linkages to actual
daily performance, about what is being practised, and if adherence to standards
is complete or otherwise.
Real-time radiotelephony sourced from air traffic control environments consists
of actual air traffic controllers and pilots’ interactions. The spoken words would
be spontaneous, as practised within a working environment, without prior set
dialogue or traffic pattern. Live radiotelephony recordings would be
representative of air-ground communications and contain samples of
exchanges between air traffic controllers and pilots in daily situations. These
would be real examples of airmanship in terms of radiotelephony performance.
Mell (1991c) commented that incidents only reveal the tip of the submerged
iceberg of routine communication. Mell further suggested that the study of
routine radiotelephony will disclose the contextual and psychological overview
of ATC language training needs. It will show consistent usage patterns while
variations should be critically assessed in context of safety and acceptability.
Simulations of air traffic environments have been used before in ATC related
studies. Role play in simulations however, could cause loss of fidelity. For the
purpose of this research, simulating an ATC environment would require
considerable resources in terms of equipment, software, people, remuneration
and logistics. It was far more practical and accessible to record real time ATC
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radiotelephony. Very minimal digital recording equipment was required and it
was time efficient. Samples were selected at random from the station’s
recording facilities with no disturbances or disruptions to ATC operations.
4.2.4 Location Search
The ESL criterion generally disqualifies United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and United Kingdom as sources of data since these countries are
considered as native English users. Any European country was then
considered a practical choice from the accessible point of view but difficulties
were foreseen in the radiotelephony transcription phase as local languages and
terms may be in use. France for example, designated French as the ground /
local language for ATC radiotelephony communications. English is a language
used for international flights communications or when specifically requested by
pilots. The airspace configuration, local standard operating procedures and
operating systems will also not be familiar to the researcher and would take
extra time to study and understand.
Malaysia was considered ideal for this research for its ESL status. Strong
support and cooperation was also obtained from the Department of Civil
Aviation (DCA). Authorisation was granted to access recording facilities and
ATC workstations. Related documents were made available and all possible
assistance was offered.
The radiotelephony ‘recording-transcription-coding’ method, as will be explained
in this chapter has been used before and recognised as suitable and justified for
carrying out this type of research. The radiotelephony data was complemented
by demographic data collected through a questionnaire. Existing language
related taxonomies could be used appropriately for coding and analyses as
these were established methodologies and tools.
4.3 Research Work Flowchart
The initial plan was for the research to be completed in less than three and a
half years. However, the time needed to process audio data proved to be more
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extensive than expected. Figure 4-2 summarised the work flow involved in the
research and show the proposed chapters for the thesis writing.
Figure 4-2: Research Work Flowchart
Literature Review
Aviation English and ESL (Ch. 2)ATC Communication (Ch. 2)
Language (+ESL) and Standard Phraseology related
Communication problems (Ch. 3)
Safety Databases search (Ch. 3)
AIRPROX Analysis (Ch. 3)
Data Collection Program (Ch.4)
Questionnaire (Ch. 4) RTF Recording (Ch. 4)
Demographics
English usage
Working Experience
Training Courses
Training perception
Safety occurrences
Transcription
Identification
Transmission/lapse
Traffic
Encoding
Database
Data Analyses (Ch. 5 & 6)
Data Processing (Ch. 4)
Conclusions and Recommendations (Ch. 7)
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Literature review and an initial safety data analyses led to the data collection
programme which will be explained in this chapter. Audio data transcription
was very tedious and time consuming as integrity and accuracy of data needs
to be maintained. Existing voice recognition software is not sophisticated
enough to transcribe ATC radiotelephony audio (Churcher, Souter, and Atwell,
1996; Schafer, 2001). All transcriptions were done manually. It was an
advantage to use digital audio recording as it allowed repeated playback without
risking degradation of audio quality as conventional tape recording would. As
the radiotelephony audio was the major data, it was highly important that
timings of transmission start and end be noted accurately. Similarly, word
pronunciation, pauses and fillers should be transcribed correctly. The identity of
the speaker of each transmission must be determined appropriately. Another
advantage of digital recording is the possibility of slowing down the playback
speed so transmissions could be listened at a portion of the actual spoken
speech.
Parsing and encoding of transcribed data was an equally tedious task. Each
message transmitted need to be coded for speech acts, aviation topics,
phraseology usage and associated errors, as well as other relevant
discrepancies. The information was organised in databases for easier handling
but the size and complexity of the data itself requires diligent and extensive
encoding work.
The analyses phase was more straightforward as it was a matter of assigning
the correct variables for suitable analyses. The presentation, interpretation and
discussion of results reflect the amount and type of data analysed. The
demographic information and radiotelephony data had collectively
demonstrated the performance of language and phraseology usage in the
Malaysian ATC environments.
4.4 Location Choice: Malaysia
Malaysia was perceived as an ideal site for data collection, based on the fact
that the controllers are 100 percent non-native English speakers; using English
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as either a second or foreign language. Although English is a dominant
language for international level businesses as well as higher education and
internet, it is only the fifth leading daily language in Malaysia (UNESCO, 2005).
The most frequent language used for inter-ethnic communication is Malay,
followed by Chinese dialects, Tamil and Javanese.
The first language learnt before academic schooling starts is usually the
language used at home among family members. It has to be noted that the
terms native language, first language, mother-tongue or arterial language have
no standard definition. The general idea is that it refers to the language that
was first introduced at home and spoken by immediate family members. As
journalistic and common parlance usually associate the term ‘mother tongue’ to
ethnic group, it is realistic to say that controllers in Malaysia are not native users
of the English language. This justifies an earlier assumption that the ATC
language environment in Malaysian airspace will fundamentally involve English
Second Language (ESL) controllers. On occasions, after changes to different
linguistic environment, for example education and migration, proficiency in the
native language may diminish when another language becomes more
dominant. So there may be a difference between mother tongue and the
language most frequently used daily.
The pilots operating in Malaysian airspace are presumably a mixture of native
and non-native English speakers based on the nationality of the airlines.
However, as the Malaysian controllers are all non-native English speakers, the
controller-pilot communication would always involve an ESL user. Traffic
movements records show about 1% or airlines operating in Malaysian airspace
originated from native English speaking countries such as Australia, UK, US,
and New Zealand. While this percentage is not absolute in indicating the
percentage of native English speaking pilots, it may be safe to assume the
actual percentage is significantly low.
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The Malaysian Airspace is divided into two Flight Information Regions (FIRs);
the Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu FIRs. Air Traffic Control Centres (ACC)
are located in Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu, with an additional sub-centre in
Kuching. Terminal Approach Radar (TAR) Control and Area Radar Control
services are provided at the Kuala Lumpur, Kota Kinabalu and Kuching ACC.
There are 18 towers in Peninsular (West) Malaysia and 10 in East Malaysia.
The selection of workstations for data collection takes into consideration the
traffic movements, type of ATC provided and recording facilities available.
Analysis of Incident Investigation Reports was also considered as a possible
method. However, as the investigation reports in total are categorised as
‘confidential material’ according to Malaysian government procedures, there
would be too much mandatory editing involved that would render the transcript
unsuitable for a satisfactory analysis. Real time recorded radiotelephony was
seen as a more suitable and acceptable source of data that could be used
without much editing and de-identification. It is also realistic to say that not all
ATC incidents made it to the investigation stage as some are ‘mutually
neutralised’ to avoid policy enforcement.
Strong approval and support from the Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia has
made the research possible. Suitable ATC units were selected for
radiotelephony recordings based on type of ATC provided, traffic movement
and recording facilities. These provided data about what the controllers and
pilots chat about in their daily interactions. As the recordings were carried out
at the recording facilities and not at the working positions of the controllers,
there were no distractions or disruptions to the controllers on duty. The
radiotelephony recorded was for live traffic in normal working environment and
was useful in analysing discrepancies and non-standard practices.
The radiotelephony data was sufficient to describe just the radiotelephony
practises, features, characteristics and discrepancies. However, it does not
reflect on the people taking part in the communication. Maybe the gender could
be accurately guessed but no information could be surmised about age,
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qualification and length of service or if the controller has any other ATC related
work experience. To complement the radiotelephony data, a questionnaire was
distributed to gain an insight of the controllers’ demography.
The findings of this research will directly benefit Malaysia as well as other ATC
authorities with similar airspace status. Southeast Asia at the very least
consists of much airspace that is managed by ESL controllers. Some states
may possibly be interested in analysing local radiotelephony performance and
problems, if any.
4.5 Data Collection Methods
Two methods were utilised for data collection:
1. Questionnaire – distributed to controllers
2. Radiotelephony recording – selected ATC units
4.5.1 The Questionnaire
4.5.1.1 Purpose
The questionnaire was aimed at finding out demographic information about the
controllers in charge of the Malaysian airspace. Other than the usual personal
information, the responses will reveal language preferences, proficiency
qualification and work related experience. Respondents were also requested
to describe the language related training undergone in terms of formatting and
access to materials. A simple evaluation of improvements achieved and
suitability of facilitators was also included. The questionnaire further aimed to
get a realistic estimate from the respondents on types and frequencies of
English language / standard phraseology related problems. The information
was useful in understanding the ‘people’ involved in this research as it
complements the radiotelephony data which tells ‘what the people are doing’.
4.5.1.2 Format
The questionnaire consists of 5 main sections; A to E. It was in English and
designed to be simple, using plain language and easy to complete. As
practicable as possible, respondents only need to tick or circle suitable
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answers. Others would require one word or double numerals answers.
However, for those who would like to share more information, the last section
(F) provided an opportunity to share their opinion on the subject area. The
complete questionnaire is in Appendix E.
The questionnaires were personally distributed through ATC Managers to the
controllers at each station. The managers were briefed on the questionnaire
objectives and advised that information provided by respondents will be handled
with utmost confidentiality. The Director of Kuala Lumpur Air Traffic Control
Centre assisted in the collection and return of the questionnaires. Each section
is explained in the following paragraphs. There were 190 (35%) respondents
and information gathered was managed in an Excel database.
SECTION A : PERSONAL PARTICULARS
The first 8 questions were on personal details. The ATC Licence Numbers
were used as cross references to ensure there was no duplication of data. The
respondent’s name was optional and not recorded in the database.
1. Name :
2. ATC Licence Number : DCA / ATC / L
3. Gender: Male  Female 
4. Age: 20 – 25 (1) 26 – 29 (2) 30 – 39 (3) 40 – 49 (4) 50+ (5)
5. Service: less than 3 yrs (1) 4 – 6 yrs  (2) 7 – 10 yrs  (3)
11 – 15 yrs  (4) 16 – 20 yrs (5) more than 20 yrs (6)
6. Station:
Area Control Centre (A) Aerodrome (B) ATC College (C) Headquarters (D)
7. Ethnic Group
Malay  Chinese  Indian  Other ……………………(please specify)
8. Academic Qualification
PhD  Masters  University Degree  Diploma  High School 
The data was entered into a database in codes to cater for statistical analyses.
The codes for the responses above are shown in bold or brackets, for example,
M to indicate ‘male’ in Question 3, or numbers (1) to (5) for age groups in
Question 4.
In this section, Question 9 was important in identifying if English was one of the
three most used languages in daily communications.
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9. Languages: (most used daily)
i.......................................... ii....................................... iii. ……………………………..
Questions 10 to 13 deal with the number of ATC ratings the respondents held,
ATC related experience and training courses attended. In view of languages
and phraseology use, personnel’s exposure to various job assignments,
experience and training were expected to improve proficiency to some extent.
10. ATC Ratings:
 None  Aerodrome Control
 Approach Procedure Control  Approach Radar Control
 Area Procedure Control  Area Radar Control
11. ATC Operations Experience & Duration
 Aerodrome Controller ……………………… years
 Approach Procedure Controller ……………………… years
 Approach Radar Controller ……………………… years
 Area Procedure Controller ……………………… years
 Area Radar Controller ……………………… years
 None
12. Additional ATC Experience
 DCA Airport Manager …………………… years
 ACC Supervisor …………………… years
 Senior ATCO …………………… years
 College Instructor …………………… years
 Training Officer …………………… years
 ATCO Examiner …………………… years
13. Courses Attended in 2004
 ATC Primary Course  ATC Rating courses  Flow Control
 Aviation English  Search And Rescue  Human Factors
 PANS-OPS Design  Safety Management
 Others ………………………………………………….(please specify)
The information gathered from Section A of the questionnaire was stored as
part of a database as shown in Table 4-1. Other information will be added
accordingly to include all responses from the questionnaire. This example show
details for 7 (fictitious) respondents with IDs 1 to 7 listed in the first column. The
numbers are codes for specific information. Age was recorded as the grouping
used in Question 4. Respondent 7 was a Malay (Ethnic=M) female (Gender=F),
who was a University graduate and had been working for 4 to 6 years. She
held 2 ATC ratings; 5 years in Area Procedural and 3 years in Area Radar.
English was declared as her second most used language (English=2).
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Table 4-1: Examples of Demographic Data from Questionnaire Section A
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1 M 5 6 A M H 1 4 5 5 0 2 0 3 4 3 7 2 0 N
2 M 5 6 A C H 1 5 7 8 4 8 7 8 2 4 2 6 0 N
3 M 5 6 A I H 1 4 0 0 20 25 20 0 0 0 0 0 6 OJT
4 M 4 6 A O H 1 5 20 20 18 22 20 8 5 3 1 0 0 N
5 M 4 5 A I U 1 5 2 2 6 18 12 0 1 0 0 18 4 OJT
6 M 5 6 A I H 1 5 20 11 11 25 25 2 0 0 2 2 2 N
7 F 3 2 A M U 2 2 0 0 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 SAR
In 2004, this respondent had attended the Search and Rescue Course (SAR).
Similar information could be deduced for each respondent in the database.
SECTION B : ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TESTS
This section queried the experience in English Language Proficiency Tests;
either for local use or those internationally recognised. The IELTS and TOEFL
results have designated validity periods beyond which the rating or score is
considered not applicable. The TOEFL score ranges up to 300 for computer
based test and up to 677 for paper based test. The TOEIC score range up to
990 points.
1. International English Language Testing System (IELTS)
Year Purpose Overall Rating

 Never taken this examination.
2. Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL)
Year Purpose Score
 Never taken this examination.
Test of English for International Communications (TOEIC)
Year Purpose Result
 Never taken this examination.
Others.
Test(s) Year Purpose Result
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Table 4-2: Examples of Demographic Data from Questionnaire Section B
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8 M 5 0 0 0 N N YP YP YP
9 M 4 6.0 0 0 N N YP YP YP
10 M 4 7.0 0 0 N N YP YP YP
11 M 4 0 0 0 N YP YP YP YP
12 F 3 5.5 520 0 N N YP YP YP
13 M 4 0 0 0 N YS YP YP YP
14 M 1 0 0 0 MUET_3 N YP YP YP
The examples in Table 4-2 show that Respondent 8, 11 and 13 have not taken
any English language proficiency tests (0=none). Respondent 9 and 10 both
took the IELTS exams while Respondent 12 has taken both IELTS and TOEFL.
The results were shown in the respective columns. Respondent 14 took the
Malaysian University English Test (MUET) test and achieved a level 3 (possible
bands 1 – 6). In view of Aviation English training, only Respondent 13 claimed
to have attended a separate course (Y=yes, S=separate) and Respondent 11
claimed to have had training as part of other course (Y=yes, P=part). Other
respondents admitted to not having any specific Aviation English training at all
(N=no). All respondents agree that standard phraseology, radiotelephony and
communications trainings are provided as part of other ATC courses (Y=yes,
P=part).
SECTION C : AVIATION ENGLISH AND ATC COMMUNICATION TRAINING
This section was specific to the provision of Aviation English and
communications training, the format and the perceived value of the courses in
preparation for using English language and standard phraseology in daily work
functions.
Questions 1 to 4 of this section only require a Yes or No answer to indicate if
these aspects were included or not in the training courses. The information
should be useful in designing or improving existing training courses in terms of
identifying missing aspects and needs.
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1. Did you receive any training for:
Yes No
Aviation English
Standard Phraseology
Radiotelephony
ATC communication
2. Was the training conducted as,
part of another ATC
training course
a separate training
course
Aviation English
Standard Phraseology
Radiotelephony
ATC communication
Key: AE = Aviation English
SP = Standard Phraseology
RT = Radiotelephony
Comms = ATC Communications
3. Indicate if the training format included any of the following:
AE SP RT Comms
Classroom lectures
Simulator exercises
Public speaking
Verbal communicational skill
Listening exercises
Real radiotelephony examples
Visits to ATC workstations
Peer role play exercises
Interactive computerised exercises
Handling of unexpected events
Language proficiency tests
4. Indicate if the training materials provided to you included:
Aeronautical Information Publication
Manual of Air Traffic Services
ICAO’s DOC 4444
ICAO ANNEX 10 Vol. II
Manual of Radiotelephony (DOC 9432)
Filed differences (by any contracting state) to ICAO standard phraseology
Locally used terms that may differ from ICAO’s
Work-relevant commonly used plain English words
Potentially confusing words/ phraseology/ numbers
Specific pronunciation of numbers
Audio samples of real radiotelephony
Relevant terminology for potential un-expected events
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Question 5 requested the evaluation of respondents on the improvements
achieved after attending language/ phraseology related training. A scale of 1
(very little) to 4 (very good) is used. This information indicated if the trainees
find the course attended had been useful in improving necessary personal skills
for their job function.
Scale: 1 = very little (further general training will be needed)
2 = adequate (training prepared you for basic daily job function)
3 = good (further specific training not immediately required)
4 = very good (able to handle unfamiliar situations)
5. How would you evaluate the training courses in terms of improvement to
Phraseology / English Language in:
Vocabulary of aviation related words    
Vocabulary of specific ATC related words    
Glossary of ICAO phraseology    
Ability to use correct standard phraseology    
Awareness of words with multiple meanings    
Awareness of phraseologies that may cause misunderstanding    
Correct and clear pronunciation    
Recognition of regional / cultural English accents    
Conversational fluency    
Ability to paraphrase    
Question 6 was an evaluation of the teaching facilitators and instructors with a
scale of 1 (poor) to 4 (excellent). This gave some idea on the perception of
trainees of trainers’ suitability.
6. How would you rate the facilitators and instructors of the Aviation English
and ATC Communication training at the DCA College, in terms of,
Teaching techniques    
English Language fluency    
Knowledge of English Language    
Knowledge of standard phraseology    
Knowledge of ATC topics    
Familiarity with ATC operations    
Time management    
Use of teaching aids
poor
   
excellent
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The training institution should benefit from this information as the perception
and opinion of course attendees reflects on whether or not the instructors were
found to be effective and efficient. Any deficiencies could be dealt with by
refresher or enhancement training on instructional techniques.
Each of the evaluation aspects in question 5 and 6 were recorded in the
database as shown in Table 4-3, allowing a statistical analysis to be carried out.
At a glance, the evaluation varies, depending on personal experience and
perception of individual respondents.
Table 4-3: Examples of Respondents’ Evaluation of Courses and Instructors
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Improvements (Question 5) Instructors’ (Question 6)
15 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
16 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
17 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
18 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
19 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
20 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
21 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2
SECTION D : RADIOTELEPHONY OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES
Section D seeks out the opinion and observation of controllers about their
radiotelephony related experience in terms of problems and discrepancies. The
percentages acquired may not be accurate but it was a realistic perception from
the controllers’ point of view about their daily work experience.
Question 1 requested the respondent to estimate a percentage of ATC duty
time they actually did deviate from standard phraseology by using any language
other than English, or use non-standard phraseology or local jargon.
1. Indicate a percentage of the time within an average shift (6 hours) that controllers
use;
Standard phraseology 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Non-standard phraseology 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Plain English words and phrases 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
National language (non English) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Local ‘terms’ or ‘jargon’ understood only by
frequent/ local operators in your airspace 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
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Question 2 dealt with accommodating different accent and language style to
assist in message comprehension. One or more of these tactical adjustments
may have been applied in daily radiotelephony.
2. Sometimes the accent or style of English usage differs between regions/
nationalities and modifications are made to improve understanding. How often
does a controller need to;
Change ‘style’ of language use 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Modify or amend standard phrases 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Reduce speech rate 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Repeat complete instructions 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Question 3 tried to gauge the readback practise among pilots.
3. With regard to mandatory readback of ATC instructions and information issued to
aircraft; how often does a controller receive;
Complete readbacks 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Incomplete readbacks (correct but some
information omitted) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Incorrect readbacks (full or partial, but wrong
information) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
No readbacks ( no information repeated – a
readback had to be requested) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
This section was completed by Question 4 about repetitions of messages or
parts thereof.
4. There are cases where interference or interruptions had resulted in a message not
fully received or understood by pilots. How often does a pilot request verification /
repetition of;
Whole message 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Taxi route 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Traffic sequence for lining up 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Assigned headings 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Authorised level 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Speed restrictions 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Altimeter setting 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time restrictions (eg. Slot time) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SECTION E: SAFETY OCCURRENCES
This section tried to acquire a general dimension of incidence/ occurrence
related to language and standard phraseology discrepancies within the last 3
months. Although incidents are normally reported, the seriousness and the
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need-to-report are still very much left to the opinion of the controllers and pilots.
Some incidents may not have been reported due to reluctance of handling
‘paperwork’ and if the incident is considered to be not a safety issue.
1. Please indicate () your experience within the last 3 months of any
misunderstanding or miscommunication due to:
< 5 5 - 10 10 - 15 >15
Usage of non-standard phraseology
Usage of plain English words or phrases
Poor level of English
Unclear pronunciations
Technical difficulties
Non-verification of unclear instructions
Non-verification of unclear information
A general estimate was requested from the respondents for the outcome that
resulted from miscommunication/ misunderstanding for similar time frame. The
numbers quoted by the respondents may differ from ATC incident records for
the reasons mentioned above
2. How many times have misunderstandings or miscommunications resulted in:
Increased communications task load
Increased ATC workload
Loss of situational awareness (traffic visualisation)
Loss of separation
Aircraft proximity
Runway incursion
Any other safety related events
All the responses from the questionnaires were organised in a comprehensive
excel worksheet for conversion into SPSS data editor for analyses purposes.
The complete version is in Appendix F.
4.5.2 ATC Radiotelephony Recordings
This was the second data collection method. Based on type of control, traffic
movements and accessibility of recording facilities, 6 aerodromes were
considered suitable for data collection. These were Pulau Pinang, Kuala
Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), Melaka, Johor Bahru, Kota Kinabalu and
Kuching. Terminal approach and area radar control data were collected at the
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Kuala Lumpur Air Traffic Control Centre. Two approach radar and three area
radar control positions were involved in the data collection. The locations are
shown in Figure 4-3.
Figure 4-3: Locations of Radiotelephony Recordings
Segments of suitable recording times were selected based on duty rosters and
daily movements’ records showing medium and high traffic density. A digital
recorder was used for the recordings and time keeping was converted to that of
the recorder, and not the actual date and time to safeguard the identity of those
involved. Each segment length was about 30 minutes for area radar control
(ARR) and terminal approach radar (TAR) while tower (TWR) segments were
about 20 minutes each. 192 controllers’ radiotelephony were recorded, totalling
to about 73 hours of audio data.
At the recording facility, the selection of voice channels was made with care to
ensure all transmitted and received messages were recorded, as well as any
communication with ground units. The more sophisticated recording facilities
use a multi channel system that records each communication source on
different tracks which need to be heard simultaneously to understand the
communication taskload of the controller at any particular time. The complete
list of workstations, dates, frequencies and channels of recordings done is in
KLIA
(ACC)
Johor
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Appendix G. Due to technical inconsistency some of the recordings could not
be processed or analysed. The final number of recordings suitable for
processing and analyses at each workstation is shown in Table 4-4.
Table 4-4: Radiotelephony Recording Sampling
Station Type of ATC Recordings Total minutes
Kuala Lumpur ACC Terminal Approach Radar 28 900
Kuala Lumpur ACC Area Radar 41 1220
Pulau Pinang Tower 11 220
Melaka Tower 9 190
Johor Bahru Tower 12 240
KLIA Tower 37 730
Kota Kinabalu Tower 30 560
Kuching Tower 21 380
Total 189 4400
4.6 Data Processing
4.6.1 Audio to Text
In the study of communications, language use in speech is recorded,
transcribed and broken down into segments and elements of phonetics. There
are two ways of phonetic transcription; a broad way which doesn’t record all of
the aspects (eg. tone, pitch, vowel stress) of how a word is pronounced and a
narrow mode which transcribes utterance with specific descriptions of how the
word was articulated. Language elements could then be studied from various
perspectives depending on the needs and objectives of the research. The
technique utilised in this research will be the former but taking into account the
specifications required by radiotelephony standard practises which may specify
how certain words shall be articulated. The radiotelephony data in this research
was coded using a taxonomy which was relevant for ATC air/ ground
communications and a classification of errors from an operational and linguistic
point of view.
Radiotelephony between controllers and pilots were transcribed verbatim. Start
and end transmission time for each message was noted, as well as lapses
between transmissions. All spoken words and sounds were transcribed as
accurately as possible, including fillers such as ‘ah’, ‘uh’ and ‘er’. Pauses
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between words in a sentence were marked if it is noticeably longer than usual.
Special attention was given to the numeral nine which should be pronounced as
‘niner’. In ATC radiotelephony there are strict procedures of how units should
be addressed, the issuing of instructions, restrictions and advising of pertinent
information. The transcription should capture any deviations from standard
procedures in terms of format, pronunciation and speech. Time keeping of
transmission duration and total words transmitted was used to calculate
average speech rate. It is possible to gauge the communication load within the
recording segment.
About 4400 minutes (73 hours) of audio recordings were transcribed. There
were approximately 21,000 messages in the audio recordings. Initially, land-
line communications were transcribed to understand the context and
perspective of traffic movements. These were removed before analysis stage.
Controller-pilots communication consists of about 20,500 messages of
substance. At planning stage, transcription of these audio files was to be
assisted by a few selected Malaysian controllers. However, due to some
technical difficulties, only a portion of the work was completed by three selected
controllers. The data size, complexity and the need for accuracy put
considerable pressure on time management.
Final discussions with DCA officials had concluded that no excessive editing of
callsigns and unit names would be necessary if the recording segments were
not identified by date and time. The usage of callsign was an aspect that will be
analysed and deleting or changing them will diminish the value of data. As
flights operate on daily or weekly scheduled basis, any particular day selected
for recording could yield the same callsigns. Individual names were deleted if
used, as this could link directly to the person addressed. Only the people most
familiar with the controllers and pilots will be able to identify individuals based
on voice recognition. A request may be submitted to limit access to the actual
audio files in view of sensitivity and privacy. Each segment of transcribed
radiotelephony was identified by facility identification and sample number.
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Table 4-5 shows an example of a message from Malaysian 161 who was trying
to establish communication with Approach North. The message details were as
following:
LINENUM = Message number (1)
FAC_ID = Kuala Lumpur ACC (A)
SEC_ID = working position Approach North (N)
SAMP_ID = sample number (12)
ST_MIN = the minute (time) transmission starts (3)
ST_SEC = the second (time) transmission starts (40)
END_MIN = the minute (time) transmission ends (3)
END_SEC = the second (time) transmission ends (47)
TX_SEC = transmission length in seconds (7)
LPS_SEC = lapse length in seconds since the previous transmission (4)
SID = Speaker Identity (MAS161)
RID = Recipient Identity (ATC)
Table 4-5: Example of an ATC Radiotelephony Message
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1 A N 12 3 40 3 47 7 4 MAS161 ATC
LUMPUR APPROACH NORTH MALAYSIAN ONE SIX
ONE SELAMAT PAGI PASSING ONE EIGHT ZERO FOR
ONE FIVE ZERO RADAR HEADING ONE THREE ZERO
Malaysian 161 informed the controller of the flight level the aircraft was passing
(180) and the flight level that had been authorised (150) as well as the direction
of flight (heading 130). This example showed no fillers or pauses as the
transmission was delivered fluently and clearly. However, it should be noted
that the pilot had used two languages in this transmission. The greeting
‘selamat pagi’ was in Malay and quite commonly used in the Malaysian
airspace, but still not a practise in compliance to the standards. Based on 22
words being transmitted in 7 seconds, it can be approximated that the speech
rate was about 180 words per minute.
The next example in Table 4-6 was from line 93 sample number 9 of Approach
North. It was an instruction to Singapore 103 to cancel the standard instrument
departure (SID) and change flight direction to heading 260. The pilot was
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advised that this change was to enable a climb to higher altitude once the flight
direction had been complied with. Only 17 actual words were transmitted in 6
seconds, making the speech rate 170 words per minute. There were 2 places
within the message that fillers (er..) were used.
Table 4-6: Example of an ATC Radiotelephony Message
LI
N
EN
U
M
FA
C
_I
D
SE
C
_I
D
SA
M
P_
ID
ST
_M
IN
ST
_S
EC
EN
D
_M
IN
EN
D
_S
EC
TX
_S
EC
LP
S_
SE
C
SI
D
R
ID
MESSAGE
93 A N 9 12 27 12 33 6 15 ATC SIA103
SINGAPORE ONE ZERO THREE TO FACILITATE
YOUR CLIMB ER… CANCEL THE S-I-D TURN LEFT
HEADING ER… TWO SIX ZERO
4.6.2 Speech Acts and Aviation Topics
Aviation Topic and Speech Act Taxonomy (ATSAT) was found to be suitable for
coding the radiotelephony messages (Searle, 1969; Prinzo and Britton, 1993;
Prinzo, Britton, and Hendrix, 1995; Kanki and Prinzo, 1996; Prinzo, 2002). The
latest update to ATSAT was the inclusion of complexity measure in a document
titled The Communication Data Dictionary and Procedures Manual (Prinzo and
Hendrix, work in progress). Table 4-7 contains the Speech Acts categories
used for radiotelephony transcript coding. Each speech act is associated with
relevant aviation topics to further classify the phrases.
Table 4-7 : Definition of Speech Act Categories and Codes
Speech Acts Code Definition
1 Address / Addressee Rid / Sid Identifier of station as speaker or receiver for
example facility name or aircraft callsign
2 Courtesy C Word(s) or phrase(s) spoken as an act of
courtesy. Eg. Good morning.
3 Instruction /
Clearance - readback
/ acknowledgement
I
Phraseology used by a controller in issuing
instructions to an aircraft. Eg. Climb to flight
level one four zero
4 Advisory / Remark –
readback /
acknowledgement A
Communication required as part of
controller’s responsibility to issue pertinent
information eg. Traffic, altimeter setting and
altitude. It also includes pilot’s responsibility
in reporting position, altitude or speed.
5 Request – readback/
acknowledgement
R Initiated by pilot or controller for the purpose
of acquiring information or authorisation
6 Non-codable
N
Remarks or comments that do not fit into the
other speech acts, or unintelligible due to
delivery technique or technical.
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
108
Some additional topics had been added to the list used by Prinzo & Britton
(1995) which was based on approach control communications. The data used
in this research includes area radar and tower control radiotelephony, thus
additional topics were needed to accommodate the wider scope. Table 4-8
show the aviation topics and related codes, as used for processing the
radiotelephony data in this research.
Table 4-8 : Aviation Topics, Codes and Explanation
AVIATION TOPIC Code Explanation
Speaker identification Sid identity of the speaker
Receiver identification Rid identity of the intended recipient
altitude / level alt Altitude assigned by a controller or readback by a pilot
approach
app Clearance by controller to make an approach to airport or to
assigned runway; or readback by a pilot
circuit
cct Clearance related to positions in aerodrome circuit eg.
Downwind, base.
communications
com Radio frequency used for communication as assigned by a
controller or readback by a pilot
flight details fld Fuel endurance, POB, etc
general gen Okay, roger, alright or words used as acknowledgement
heading hdg An assigned vector or readback by a pilot
holding
hol Holding instructions issued by a controller or readback by a
pilot
landing
ldg Authorisation to land on assigned runway or
acknowledgement by a pilot
repeat/ verify ver Say again, confirm
restriction rst Eg. Crossing time, levels
route / position
rpo Instruction by a controller pertaining to assigned course of
aircraft or readback by a pilot. This also applies to positioning
on ground for aircraft taxying.
speed spd Speed assigned by a controller or readback by a pilot
start stt Engine start-up
takeoff tof Cleared for takeoff and runway designation
traffic
tfc Information on conflicting traffic eg. Aircraft type, altitude,
position
transponder
ssr Beacon code assigned by a controller or ident instructions or
readback by a pilot
visual / sighting vis Declaration of visual contact, in sight.
weather info wxi Altimeter setting, cloud, wind, weather warning, turbulence
Apology apo Sorry, apologies
Greetings grt Good morning, hello, good day
Thank you tq Words showing appreciation
delivery dlv unintelligible
equipment eqp Unserviceability, interference
other otr
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Speech acts and aviation topics codes were used in pairs, for example ‘Ialt’ to
indicate an instruction/readback (I) of an altitude/flight level (alt). These paired
codes will be referred to as an ‘element’. Only the speaker and recipient
identity will use unique codes of Sid and Rid respectively. Transcribed
radiotelephony was parsed into speech acts and aviation topics, and then
coded by ATSAT elements in the order that these were used. The types of
elements were organised in the database corresponding to the messages. The
full list of elements is shown in Appendix H.
The following example in Table 4-9 is a message from Indonesian 856 to Kuala
Lumpur area radar controller, addressed as Lumpur Control. The message
consisted of 5 elements which were listed as T1 to T5. The first element was a
courtesy (C) with a greeting (grt), coded as Cgrt. Rid is a recipient identification
or who the message was for, which was Lumpur Control. Sid is speaker
identification, in this case, Indonesian 856 that transmited the message. ‘Flight
level three four zero’ was altitude information provided by the speaker, coded as
Advisory (A) and altitude (alt). The last element was a request (R) for change of
altitude, coded as ‘Ralt’.
Table 4-9: Identifying Speech Acts and Aviation Topics
Message T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
GOOD EVENING /
LUMPUR CONTROL /
INDONESIAN EIGHT FIVE SIX /
FLIGHT LEVEL THREE FOUR ZERO /
REQUEST DESCEND
Cgrt
Rid
Sid
Aalt
Ralt
The total numbers of elements used in each message, as well as number of
Instructions and Advisory were noted. In the last example, there was one
Advisory and one request but no instruction as the message was transmitted by
the pilot.
An example of a controller’s message containing 7 elements;
“Malaysian One Two Eight Nine (Rid) Approach (Sid) Good Evening (Cgrt)
Descend Seven Thousand (Ialt) QNH One Zero One … One Zero Zero Seven (Awxi)
Fly Heading Two Three Zero (Ihdg) Radar Vector for Final (Arpo) ”.
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There were two instructions, two advisories, a courtesy greeting and two for
speaker and recipient identities (the elements shown in brackets).
The processing also included word count for each message which could be
used to calculate speech rate in words per minute. Numerals were also
counted separately as these are used very frequently in ATC. As in the
message above, twenty eight words were transmitted in ten seconds, making
the speech rate equivalent to 168 words per minute. Out of 28 words, 16 (more
than 50%) were numerals. 6 words were used for identification purposes, 2 in
greeting, 12 for advisories and only 8 for instructions. There was also a
noticeable pause in the middle of the transmission after which the altimeter
setting (QNH) information was corrected. Pauses are considered as
disfluencies and will be coded accordingly.
4.7 Error Coding
Errors in ATC radiotelephony were coded based on message contents, format
and delivery techniques that deviated from the published standard. Each topic
had specific keywords or phrases that identified the correctness of the intended
messages as stipulated in ICAO Annex 2, ICAO DOC 4444, Malaysia’s Manual
of Air Traffic Services and Aeronautical Information Publication Malaysia.
The ATSAT (Prinzo et al, 1995) generally categorises types of errors based on
one or more of the following:
a. Grouped – grouping or formatting of numerical information contrary to
ICAO standards. For example, in ‘flight level 230’ the numbers should be
pronounced ‘two three zero’. Using ‘two thirty’ would be classified as a
grouping error.
b. Sequential (non-grouped) – failure to group numbers in accordance to
ICAO standards and non-use of the phonetic alphabet. For example,
altitude 5,500 feet shall be transmitted as ‘five thousand five hundred
feet’ not ‘five five zero zero’ or ‘fifty five hundred’.
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c. Omission – leaving out number(s), letter(s) or word(s) as prescribed. For
example the callsign Asian Express shall always use both words and not
shortened to just ‘Express’ or ‘Asian’ by omitting the other word.
d. Substitution – use of other word(s) or phrase(s) in place of the correct
ones. For example ‘what’s your speed’ instead of ‘report speed’.
e. Transposition – number(s) or word(s) used in improper order. For
example ‘Malaysian two five six nine’ is transmitted as ‘Malaysian two
five nine six’.
f. Excessive verbiage – adding word(s) or phrase(s) to standard
phraseology.
g. Partial readback – pilot report or readback that does not include specific
keyword of a topic. For example, ‘leaving ten for six’ in reply to a
descend clearance is considered partial readback.
h. Disfluency – pause(s), stammer(s), utterance(s) that add no meaning to
the message. For example ‘uh’, ‘ah’ or ‘er’. ‘Okay’ could also be a
disfluency if not used as a general acknowledgement.
i. Misarticulation – improperly spoken word, slurs, stutters, mumbling etc.
These general descriptions of error group types have been employed in
classifying radiotelephony errors for this research. The management of data
coding took a more specific approach as in the latest update of ATSAT (Prinzo
and Hendrix, ). Error coding used numbers to denote different error and
additional variables have been added to suit the objectives of this research.
The full list of variables, code, keywords and descriptions are shown in
Appendix I. Data was organised in an Excel workbook which would be
compatible for SPSS analyses later.
Errors were coded for usage, issuance and readback of specific keywords.
Provision of weather advisories and traffic information were also coded as these
should be accurate and in the recommended format. Pilot’s readback of ATC
instructions were coded for presence, reiteration of all pertinent information and
queries of instruction details. Queries were different from repeat requests which
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were associated with the phrase ‘say again’, requesting ATC to repeat the
message in full or part. In readback queries, pilot heard and repeated the
information, but requested ATC to verify it as correct. Readback errors that are
spotted and corrected by the controller were also noted. If readback errors
were missed and not corrected, these are coded as hearback errors. The
following sub-paragraphs will explain in more detail the types of messages and
coded errors.
4.7.1 Usage of Callsigns
Callsign are used by ATC and pilots. It is an item required in most ATC
messages for identification of message speaker, identification of message
recipient, acknowledgement of message receipt and indication that information
had been understood, noted and actioned upon. Table 4-10 show the coding
used to denote how correctly callsigns were transmitted in messages.
Table 4-10 : Callsign Usage Codes
Variable Name Code Description Explanation / Example
ATC_CLSGN callsign use by ATC or pilot
or 1 Complete callsign or permittedabbreviation No error
P_CLSGN 2 Partial callsign Just numbers without prefix ornon-standard abbreviation
3 Omission of callsign No callsign used
7 Callsign error – transposition ofnumbers
MALAYSIAN 2625 instead of
MALAYSIAN 2526
8 Callsign error – substitution ofnumbers
EXPRESS 213 instead of
EXPRESS 203
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
MALAYSIAN ‘SIXTY NINE’
instead of ‘SIX NINER’
Table 4-11 lists codes for callsign miscommunications, consisted of responses
by or to the wrong aircraft, or wrong addresses of a station name.
Table 4-11: Callsign Miscommunication Codes
Variable Name Code Description Explanation / Example
CLSGN_MISCOM Miscommunication arisingfrom callsign discrepancies
1 Wrong aircraft responded toATC
2 ATC responded to wrongaircraft.
(or addressed aircraft by wrong
callsign)
3 Pilot calling ATC by otherunit's name
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In some cases verification of callsign were requested or made by controllers
and pilots to ensure identity. These were suitably coded as callsign verification
as in Table 4-12.
Table 4-12: Callsign Verification Codes
Variable Name Code Description Explanation / Example
CLSGN_VER Request / verification ofintended receiver or speaker
1 Pilot request to verify intendedreceiver Was that for MERPATI 203?'
2 ATC request to verify speaker
Confirm MALAYSIAN 12?' or
Station calling say again'
3 Response error corrected /verified That was for SINGAPORE 112'
4 Response error not corrected /verified
4.7.2 Pilot’s Initial Contact Messages
These messages were coded for a complete report, partial report or no report of
key information. The key information required may vary from one environment
to another but generally, these were needed to verify the disposition and identity
of the aircraft. Initial contact messages that have no key information contain
just the identities, and probably greetings.
4.7.3 Request for Repetition and Verification
Instances when a pilot responded to ATC message by requesting that the
message be repeated, either in full or partially for specific parts were coded as
‘request for message repeats’. For example,
“Maintain speed Three Hundred say again the descend for Malaysia Six Zero
Two please”
Other than the requests such as coded above, pilot may readback messages
(implying that the message was heard) but in the same transmission, requests
confirmation from ATC that the readback information is correct, such as,
“Confirm climb flight level Three Five Zero Air India Eight Five Four”
Similarly, ATC may also request for repeats of messages or confirmation of
relayed information from pilots. For example,
“Asian Express One Zero Three afternoon confirm level Three Six Zero squawk
Zero Four Two Four”
These instances were coded as ‘Rver’ (Request verification).
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4.7.4 Altitude Instruction
An example of an ATC message containing an altitude instruction is:
“[Callsign] descend (altitude) Seven Thousand Five Hundred feet QNH One
Zero One Zero ”
Instructions by ATC pertaining to altitude assignments shall contain the action
word (‘descend’, ‘climb’ or ‘maintain’), numerals of the assigned level or altitude
and the corresponding unit of measurement. Numerals shall be pronounced as
required, using 3 digits for flight levels and the full thousand and hundred if
assigning altitudes. The unit of measurement could be feet, meters or flight
level. An altimeter setting (QNH) is sometimes added at the end of the
message. ATC altitude instructions were coded for presence of key items and
number pronunciation.
4.7.5 Altitude Restriction
These messages involve either a position or time that specific altitude or flight
level needs to be maintained or crossed. As these are usually applied for
separation purposes, it is important that the restrictions be read back accurately
and completely.
4.7.6 Approach Clearance
An approach clearance issued to aircraft contains the wording ‘cleared’, the
type of approach such as ILS, VOR-DME letdown or visual, and the designated
runway. Reference to the landing runway shall include the two digit runway
number and the position (left/ right/ centre) for multiple runways. For example,
“Malaysian One One Four Seven cleared I-L-S approach Runway Three Two
Left Q-N-H One Zero Zero Niner maintain high speed”
These ATC instructions are coded for complete or partial issuance.
4.7.7 Communication Instruction
The keywords associated with communications instructions are the action word
‘contact’, followed by the unit’s name and the radio frequency, including the
word ‘decimal’. Only the first digit (always the number ‘one’) of the VHF radio
frequency could be omitted as it is the same for any station. For example,
“Asian Express One Zero Seven contact Lumpur Tower (One) One Niner
Decimal Four Five”
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Coding of communications transfer instructions is based on inclusive or
omission of keywords.
4.7.8 Heading Instruction
Heading instructions should include the turn direction or the action word ‘fly’ and
three digit numerals. The importance of correct pronunciation couldn’t be
stressed more as these instructions are closely associated with separation with
conflicting traffic and efficient flight operations, such as intercepting the ILS
localiser for landing.
4.7.9 Enroute Holding Instruction
The keywords expected in a holding instruction depends on whether it is a
standard holding pattern or otherwise. Standard holding patterns with
designated direction and tracks are usually named. For non-designated holding
patterns and location, the direction of turn and inbound track need to be clearly
issued. In terms of holdings with reference to visual circuits and approaches,
the altitude and locality need to be specified.
4.7.10 Landing Clearance
The key phrase that needs to be transmitted in a landing clearance is ‘cleared
to land’. Without it, the runway is off limits. The clearance shall also clearly
assign the runway to be used, especially when an airport has multiple runways.
4.7.11 Route and Position Instructions
The messages that are coded for route/position instructions are those
associated with aircraft’s disposition, either in the air or on the ground. These
include direct tracks, joining airways, taxiing, lining up and standard designated
routes.
4.7.12 Speed Control
Speed instructions are quite straight forward, consisting of three digit numerals
for speed and the unit ‘knots’.
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4.7.13 Squawk Code Assignment
Transponder code instructions shall contain the word ‘squawk’ and a four digit
code. Any omission is considered as partial instruction.
4.7.14 Takeoff Clearance
Similar to landing instructions, takeoff instructions are primarily associated with
tower operations. The action phrase ‘clear for takeoff’ shall only be issued at
the end of the whole clearance itself, after designated runway and other
relevant information. Runway to be used shall be identified by its two digit
numerals and for multiple runways, to include left/ right/ centre.
4.7.15 Advisories
The term ‘weather information’ refers primarily to advisories of altimeter setting
information as this should be readback by pilots. The digits of the pressure
setting (QNH or QFE) should be accurately stated as this is relevant to safe
aircraft operations. Traffic information is advised by ATC to pilots for situational
awareness and visualisation, as well as visual sighting where possible. The
details which are provided should be accurate in terms of altitude, disposition,
aircraft type and distance, so as to avoid misidentification. These advisories are
coded for complete relevant contents.
4.7.16 Disfluencies and Excess Verbiage
Disfluencies are associated to insertion of non-words or fillers such as ‘er..’,
‘aah’ or ‘uhm’, and longer than normal pauses in a message. In some
occasions, the speaker may also hesitate, stop mid-word or mid-phrase and
utter a new word or start a new phrase. These ‘false start’ are also coded as
disfluencies. Disfluencies are continuation problem to listeners as these needs
to be edited out from the message (Levelt, 1989). Levelt (1983) and, Nakatani
and Hirschberg (1994) concluded that the parser of a disfluent message needs
to identify the reparandum, the edit interval and the repair interval before
comprehending the intended meaning. A conservative figure for disfluencies in
spontaneous speech is 6 counts per 100 words (Fox Tree, 1995; Bortfeld, Leon,
Bloom, Schober, and Brennan, 2001).
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4.7.17 Language Switching
The radiotelephony data collected contain instances when another language
other than English had been used by either ATC or pilots. The non-English
words and phrases were associated with courtesies and greetings.
4.8 Data Analyses
Demographic and coded radiotelephony data were analysed using SPSS
software. As all data was organised in Excel, it was possible to directly export it
into SPSS for analyses. Data management was also supported by Microsoft
Word. NVivo software has also been suggested as suitable to handle text data.
However, due to the size of this research’s data NVivo was not utilised as there
may be processing capacity constraints. Compatibility with SPSS is also
questionable and it was decided as more practical to continue with Excel/ Word/
SPSS software combination.
Demographic information is gathered to provide a picture of the controllers’ age,
experience and qualification distribution. The analysis of English language
usage includes preference, proficiency exam and aviation related training. A
cross tabulation will test for variance between groups within the population
sampled. Also collected was information on the perception of the value of
training courses, improvement attained and materials provided or made
available in training. The analyses will be very descriptive and informative in
understanding what aspects are lacking and should be improved in terms of
English language training, usage and proficiency.
Analyses of radiotelephony data will be similarly straightforward. The basic
statistics will be frequency or percentages, comparison and patterns about what
actually is being practised daily in an ESL ATC environment such as Malaysia.
Some aspects could possibly be studied in comparison between different ATC
functions or to previous results from other studies. The error and discrepancies
analysis will disclose the present practise and performance of ATC
radiotelephony among pilots and controllers. Certain types of errors may
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impact on safety more seriously than others and should be rectified
immediately. Bad habits and non-standard low risk practises, although may not
be as risky, do reflect on the standard of professionalism and airmanship.
Comparison with previous results and those from other population samples may
indicate if the ESL environment under study is worse than, just as good or
better in terms of radiotelephony practises.
4.9 Chapter Summary
Malaysia was selected as a suitable location due to the ESL status of
radiotelephony environment and accessibility of data. The research received
strong support from the Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia. Two methods of
data collection were used; a questionnaire and controller-pilot radiotelephony
recording.
The questionnaire was distributed to the Malaysian controllers. Information
collected includes basic demography and English language usage, qualification
and training. Also included was an evaluation of language related training
courses and problems in daily work function. The questionnaire is independent
from the radiotelephony recordings and these two data should not be
individually linked. Correlations could only be implied for groups of selected
criteria.
Radiotelephony data was digitally recorded from real-time live air traffic control
environments. It was spontaneous, carried out without disruption of daily work-
routine, without pre-set dialogue and does not involve any role-playing. The
identity of the people being recorded is safeguarded by suppressing the actual
date and time of each recording segment. Callsigns are kept as originally used
due to its importance in evaluation of radiotelephony practice.
Audio was processed into text by verbatim transcribing, preserving the words,
phraseology and fillers usage as accurately as possible. Pauses which were
noticeably longer than usual were also noted. Length of transmission and
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lapses were recorded digitally. The text was parsed into speech acts and
aviation topics. Error and disfluencies were coded based on deviation from
stipulated standards applicable in the Malaysian airspace.
The findings from these data are expected to exemplify the radiotelephony
characteristics in an ATC environment involving ESL controllers and pilots. It
will identify the type(s) of common errors and approximate the chances of
recurrence. Comparison with other studies involving different samples may
point to similarities or peculiarities. The following Chapter 5 will discuss
information collected from the questionnaire and Chapter 6 will focus on
Radiotelephony data analysis.
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5 THE CONTROLLER RESOURCE ANALYSES
This chapter presents and discusses the analyses results of data collected from
the questionnaires. It will incorporate the controllers’ demographics, usage of
the English language, language related training and radiotelephony practises.
A total of 188 controllers responded to the questionnaire distributed, which was
35% of the total population surveyed. About 90% of the respondents were full
time controllers stationed at either the Air Traffic Control Centres or
Aerodromes. The remaining 10% of respondents were Headquarters’ officers
and College Instructors who were also trained controllers but may not be
actively involved in routine operations.
5.1 Demographics Study
The term demographic as used in this research refers to information and
discussion about the population under study. However, it was confined to the
information collected for the research purposes and was not equivalent to a
bona fide demographic study. The similarities were about type setting the
groups within the sample, analyses perspectives and description of groups’
attributes.
5.1.1 Working Units
Table 5-1 show which DCA units/ division the respondents were located at and
the associated ATC operational position they principally worked.
Table 5-1: UNIT * WorkPos Crosstabulation
Principal Working Position
TAR ARR TWR NON
Total
% within UNIT 33.3% 33.3% 29.5% 3.8% 100.0%ACC
% within WorkPos 65.0% 83.9% 20.5% 60.0% 41.5%
% within UNIT 1.1% 97.8% 1.1% 100.0%ADR
% within WorkPos 2.5% 79.5% 20.0% 48.4%
% within UNIT 60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0%College
% within WorkPos 7.5% 3.2% 20.0% 2.7%
% within UNIT 71.4% 28.6% 100.0%
UNIT
HQ
% within WorkPos 25.0% 12.9% 7.4%
% within UNIT 21.3% 16.5% 59.6% 2.7% 100.0%Total
% within WorkPos 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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About 41% of the respondents were located at the Air Traffic Control Centre,
48% at Aerodromes, 7% at ATC/ DCA Headquarters and 3% at the ATC
Training College. The respondents stationed at the ACC included terminal
approach radar, area radar controllers and tower controllers as these ATC
positions were co-located in Subang, Kinabalu and Kuching. Multi-rated
controllers at these locations were inter-changeable for working position
assignments and allow greater flexibility in human resource management.
Other tower controllers were station specific as the ratings are limited by
locality. The respondents from HQ and College were additional resources for
TAR and ARR positions. Overall, the respondents consisted of 21% TAR, 17%
ARR and 60% TWR controllers. About 2.7% respondents that did not have any
specific working positions were controllers who do not perform active
controlling. Other results of cross tabulation analyses in this chapter will
automatically exclude these non-operational controllers; thus, the accumulated
total percentages will be less than 100%.
5.1.2 Ethnic Groups
Table 5-2 show proportions of ethnic groups. More than 70% of respondents
were Malay. There are approximately equal percentages of Chinese, Indian
and other ethnic groups. This overall ratio of 7:1:1 for Malay-Indian-Chinese
was not maintained in any ATC environment. The nearest was in ARR with a
6:1:1 ratio. Respondents from TAR consisted of 45% Malays, 30% Chinese,
20% Indian and 5% other ethnic origin. ARR were 71% Malays, 16% Indian
and 13% Chinese. In TWR there were 83% Malays, 11% other ethnic origin,
4% Indian and 2% Chinese.
Table 5-2: WorkPos * ETHNIC Crosstabulation
ETHNIC
M I C O Total
% within WorkPos 45.0% 20.0% 30.0% 5.0% 100.0%TAR
% within ETHNIC 13.3% 47.1% 63.2% 12.5% 21.3%
% within WorkPos 71.0% 16.1% 12.9% 100.0%ARR
% within ETHNIC 16.3% 29.4% 21.1% 16.5%
% within WorkPos 83.0% 3.6% 1.8% 10.7% 100.0%
WorkPos
TWR
% within ETHNIC 68.9% 23.5% 10.5% 75.0% 59.6%
% within WorkPos 71.8% 9.0% 10.1% 8.5% 100.0%Total
% within ETHNIC 98.5% 100.0% 94.8% 87.5% 95.2%
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5.1.3 Gender
Table 5-3 show the results of cross tabulation between principal working
position and gender. About 78% of respondents were male. This female-male
proportion of 2:7 generally agrees with common understanding that ATC is a
male dominated career. The female-male ratio was about 1:3 in TWR, about
1:2 in ARR and 1:9 in TAR. This ratio however, was not seen to have any direct
bearing on language usage.
Table 5-3: WorkPos * GENDER Crosstabulation
GENDER
F M
Total
% within WorkPos 10.0% 90.0% 100.0%TAR
% within GENDER 9.5% 24.7% 21.3%
% within WorkPos 32.3% 67.7% 100.0%ARR
% within GENDER 23.8% 14.4% 16.5%
% within WorkPos 23.2% 76.8% 100.0%
WorkPos
TWR
% within GENDER 61.9% 58.9% 59.6%
% within WorkPos 22.3% 77.7% 100.0%Total
% within GENDER 95.2% 98.0% 96.6%
5.1.4 Age
The controllers’ age distribution in Figure 5-1 shows that 22% of respondents
were below 30 years of age, while 63% were between 30 to 49 years old.
About 13% of respondents were above 50.
Figure 5-1: Controllers’ Distribution by Age Groups
A working position-age cross tabulation (Table 5-4) generally showed older
controllers in TAR environment and the younger ones in TWR. None of TAR
controllers were below 30 and the majority were above 40. Conversely, 75% of
the TWR workforce was below 40. The above 40s in TWR were mostly
Years
50+40-4930-3926-2920-25
Percent
40
30
20
10
0
13.30%
33.51%30.32%
4.26%
18.09%
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SATCOs and DCA Managers. ARR were the middle group with 90% controllers
aged between 30 and 50.
Table 5-4: WorkPos * AGE Crosstabulation
AGE
20 - 25 26 - 30 30 - 39 40 - 49 > 50 Total
WorkPos TAR % within WorkPos 2.5% 55.0% 42.5% 100.0%
% within AGE 1.8% 34.9% 68.0% 21.3%
ARR % within WorkPos 41.9% 48.4% 9.7% 100.0%
% within AGE 22.8% 23.8% 12.0% 16.5%
TWR % within WorkPos 7.1% 29.5% 36.6% 21.4% 4.5% 100.0%
% within AGE 100.0% 97.1% 71.9% 38.1% 20.0% 59.6%
Total % within WorkPos 4.3% 18.1% 30.3% 33.5% 13.3% 100.0%
% within AGE 100.0% 97.1% 96.5% 96.8% 100.0% 98.08%
5.1.5 Academic Qualification
The Table 5-5 show percentages of respondents’ by academic qualifications
and working positions. 38% of respondents joined the service at secondary
education level. The others were tertiary education qualified, with 36% at
Diploma and 25% at Degree levels. The different entry levels were due to
changes in career scheme and academic qualification requirements. It should
be noted that higher qualifications at Masters and PhD degrees are privileged
proviso acquired while in service, not a career requirement. The larger portion
of TAR controllers were 43% secondary and 35% with degree qualifications.
ARR consisted of 54% degree level qualified controllers while 50% of TWR
controllers were Diploma qualified.
Table 5-5: WorkPos * ACADEMIC Crosstabulation
ACADEMIC
Secondary Diploma Degree Masters
Total
WorkPos TAR % within WorkPos 42.5% 22.5% 15.0% 20.0% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 23.6% 13.2% 18.8% 53.3% 21.3%
ARR % within WorkPos 29.0% 6.5% 48.4% 16.1% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 12.5% 2.9% 46.9% 33.3% 16.5%
TWR % within WorkPos 38.4% 50.0% 8.9% 1.8% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 59.7% 82.4% 31.3% 13.3% 59.6%
% within WorkPos 38.3% 36.2% 17.0% 8.0% 100.0%Total
% within ACADEMIC 95.8% 98.5% 97.0% 100.0% 97.8%
However, the academic qualification is only a pre-requisite to particular entry
points to the ATC service. Specific ATC training and rating still need to be
undertaken before controllers were certified fit for duty. In terms of proficiency
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in using English, the higher levels of education were expected to improve
English language usage if studies were completed abroad.
5.1.6 ATC Ratings
Of the 188 respondents, about a quarter held all 5 ratings (Figure 5-2). Those
with just 2 ratings made up about 45%. A very small percentage (less than 3%)
held 4 ratings.
Figure 5-2: Controllers’ Number of ATC Ratings
An SPSS frequency analysis for ‘years of experience’ for each type of ATC
rating produced the results in Table 5-6 to Table 5-10.
Table 5-6: Frequency Table- Aerodrome Control Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative%
Valid None 43 22.9 22.9 22.9
<5 46 24.5 24.5 47.3
5 - 10 57 30.3 30.3 77.7
10 - 15 16 8.5 8.5 86.2
15 - 20 17 9.0 9.0 95.2
20 - 25 5 2.7 2.7 97.9
25 - 30 4 2.1 2.1 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-7: Frequency Table - Approach Procedural Control Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative%
Valid None 73 38.8 38.8 38.8
<5 46 24.5 24.5 63.3
5 - 10 40 21.3 21.3 84.6
10 - 15 13 6.9 6.9 91.5
15 - 20 7 3.7 3.7 95.2
20 - 25 5 2.7 2.7 97.9
25 - 30 4 2.1 2.1 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
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Table 5-8: Frequency Table - Area Procedural Control Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative%
Valid None 107 56.9 56.9 56.9
<5 30 16.0 16.0 72.9
5 - 10 30 16.0 16.0 88.8
10 - 15 6 3.2 3.2 92.0
15 - 20 8 4.3 4.3 96.3
20 - 25 5 2.7 2.7 98.9
25 - 30 2 1.1 1.1 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-9: Frequency Table - Area Radar Control Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative%
Valid None 126 67.0 67.0 67.0
<5 23 12.2 12.2 79.3
5 - 10 28 14.9 14.9 94.1
10 - 15 5 2.7 2.7 96.8
15 - 20 5 2.7 2.7 99.5
20 - 25 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-10: Frequency Table - Approach Radar Control Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative%
Valid None 146 77.7 77.7 77.7
<5 15 8.0 8.0 85.6
5 - 10 14 7.4 7.4 93.1
10 - 15 5 2.7 2.7 95.7
15 - 20 8 4.3 4.3 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
The results suggested that the human resources of air traffic controllers differ
for each type rating. While 77% of Controllers held Aerodrome ratings, the
opposite was true for approach radar. Only 22% of the human resource was
certified to operate terminal approach radar work stations. The summarised
percentages are shown in Table 5-11 for each ATC working position.
Table 5-11: Percentages of Human Resources by ATC Type Rating
Years Aerodrome ApproachProcedural
Area
Procedural Area Radar
Approach
Radar
None 22.9 38.8 56.9 67.0 77.7
1 – 5 24.5 24.5 16.0 12.2 8.0
6 – 10 30.3 21.3 16.0 14.9 7.4
11 – 15 8.5 6.9 3.2 2.7 2.7
16 – 20 9.0 3.7 4.3 2.7 4.3
20 – 25 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.5 0
25 – 30 2.1 2.1 1.1 0 0
Resources 77% 61.2% 43.1% 33% 22.3%
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Approach procedural rating showed 61% resources but this type of control was
only practised in some aerodromes. Area procedural, area radar and terminal
approach radar control resources were required for Kuala Lumpur, Kuching and
Kinabalu ACC operations. The older radar controllers were usually multi-rated
and interchangeable between area and terminal approach.
5.1.7 ATC Operational Experience
Years of service varied between less than 3 years to more than 20 years as
shown in Table 5-12. The higher percentages were for the 7-10 years (31%)
and more than 20 years (28%) groups. The 4-6 years and 16-20 years service
group were about 13% each. 5% had served between 11 to 15 years and 8%
were very young controllers, having joined the department less than 3 years.
Table 5-12: SERVICE * WorkPos Crosstabulation
WorkPos
TAR ARR TWR
Total
SERVICE < 3 yrs % within SERVICE 100.0% 100.0%
% within WorkPos 14.3% 8.5%
4 – 6 yrs % within SERVICE 16.7% 83.3% 100.0%
% within WorkPos 12.9% 17.9% 12.8%
7 – 10 yrs % within SERVICE 1.7% 18.6% 72.9% 100.0%
% within WorkPos 2.5% 35.5% 38.4% 31.4%
11 – 15 yrs % within SERVICE 100.0% 100.0%
% within WorkPos 8.9% 5.3%
16 – 20 yrs % within SERVICE 56.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0%
% within WorkPos 35.0% 16.1% 4.5% 13.3%
> 20 yrs % within SERVICE 47.2% 20.8% 32.1% 100.0%
% within WorkPos 62.5% 35.5% 15.2% 28.2%
Total % within SERVICE 21.3% 16.5% 59.6% 100.0%
% within WorkPos 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The career advancement seemed to point towards a TWR-ARR-TAR direction
as more experienced controllers were working the TAR position more than
others. This suggested that the controllers progressed from area controlling
before undergoing certification for terminal approach radar duties. The ARR
controllers contained 36% with 7 to 10 years experience and another 36% with
more than 20 years experience. TWR controllers included 56% of those with 10
years and less experience. The 5 year gap at 11-15 yrs for TAR and ARR was
associated with none-recruitment for these working positions.
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5.1.8 Other ATC related Job Assignments
Other than ATC operations experience, the respondents also provided
information on six ATC related job assignments; Airport Manager, Area Control
Centre (ACC) Supervisor, Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO), Instructor,
Training Officer and Examiner. Tables 5-13 to 5-18 show the respondents’
experience by associated number of years for each job assignments.
Table 5-13: Frequency Table – Airport Manager Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid None 166 88.3 88.3 88.3
< 5 15 8.0 8.0 96.3
5 - 10 5 2.7 2.7 98.9
11 - 20 1 .5 .5 99.5
> 20 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-14: Frequency Table – ACC Supervisor Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid None 166 88.3 88.3 88.3
< 5 16 8.5 8.5 96.8
5 - 10 6 3.2 3.2 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-15: Frequency Table – SATCO Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid None 160 85.1 85.1 85.1
< 5 21 11.2 11.2 96.3
5 - 10 5 2.7 2.7 98.9
11 - 20 1 .5 .5 99.5
> 20 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-16: Frequency Table – Instructor Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid None 176 93.6 93.6 93.6
< 5 8 4.3 4.3 97.9
5 - 10 2 1.1 1.1 98.9
11 - 20 2 1.1 1.1 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-17: Frequency Table – Training Officer Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid None 148 78.7 78.7 78.7
< 5 24 12.8 12.8 91.5
5 - 10 12 6.4 6.4 97.9
11 - 20 3 1.6 1.6 99.5
> 20 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
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Table 5-18: Frequency Table – ATC Examiner Experience
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid None 150 79.8 79.8 79.8
< 5 27 14.4 14.4 94.1
5 - 10 10 5.3 5.3 99.5
11 - 20 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Generally, the results pointed out that only a small percentage of respondents
have enjoyed opportunities of other job related experience. The lowest
percentage was for College Instructor and the highest for Training Officer. The
percentages from the SPSS analyses above are summarised in Table 5-19.
There were higher percentages for training officer and examiner as these
assignments were location specific, not linked to seniority and were usually for
shorter duration. Other assignments were associated with seniority, grade and
job vacancies, resulting in usually longer tenure and less opportunities.
Table 5-19: ATC related Job Experiences
Years AerodromeManager
ACC
Supervisor SATCO
ATC College
Instructor
Training
Officer Examiner
None 88.3 88.3 85.1 93.6 78.7 79.8
1 – 5 8.0 8.5 11.2 4.3 12.8 14.4
6 – 10 2.7 3.2 2.7 1.1 6.4 5.3
11 – 15 0 0 0.5 1.1 1.6 0
16 – 20 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
21 – 25 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
26 - 30 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
Total 11.7 11.7 14.9 6.5 21.3 20.2
These assignments were expected to expose respondents to a wider usage of
the English language as the majority of ATC related administration and activities
still use English as its medium of communications.
5.2 The English Language Usage
The questionnaire collected information on English language usage among the
controllers. They were asked to indicate 3 languages used most in daily
communications. Overall, about 39% of respondents indicated English as the
most frequent language used. 57% declared English as the second frequent.
Less than 1% used it as the third but about 4% did not indicate English as one
of the 3 most used languages at all. The following are the analysis of English
language usage from other perspectives.
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5.2.1 Where was English used?
The English*Working-Position cross tabulation results in Table 5-20 showed
that among the TAR controllers, 70% used English as most frequent, whilst only
42% of ARR controllers did. In ARR, 55% declared English as second most
frequent language, as did 67% of TWR controllers.
Table 5-20: ENGLISH * WorkPos Crosstabulation
WorkPos
TAR ARR TWR
Total
% within ENGLISH 38.4% 17.8% 42.5% 100.0%1
% within WorkPos 70.0% 41.9% 27.7% 38.8%
% within ENGLISH 10.3% 15.9% 70.1% 100.0%2
% within WorkPos 27.5% 54.8% 67.0% 56.9%
% within ENGLISH 100.0% 100.0%3
% within WorkPos 2.5% .5%
% within ENGLISH 14.3% 85.7% 100.0%
ENGLISH
0
% within WorkPos 3.2% 5.4% 3.7%
% within ENGLISH 21.3% 16.5% 59.6% 100.0%Total
% within WorkPos 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The choice of using English in daily communications was also associated with
the job location. Officers from HQ and College used the Malay language for
governmental official administrative purposes. These respondents only
operated as active controllers on a once-monthly basis for licensing
requirements and the opportunity to use English in ATC operations were
minimised. As can be seen in Table 5-21, only 21% of HQ respondents noted
English as the most frequently used language. However, College respondents
showed the opposite with 80% choosing English as most frequent. This
corresponded with the fact that all ATC related training courses, workshops and
seminars are always conducted in English. At the operations units, ACC
showed 50% but Aerodromes showed only 30% of respondents using English
as most frequent. This may be associated with coordination and ground
communications which were more of domestic nature in the aerodromes and
international at the ACCs.
Table 5-21: UNIT * ENGLISH Crosstabulation
UNIT Total% within UNIT
ACC TWR College HQ
1 50.0% 29.7% 80.0% 21.4% 38.8%
2 46.2% 64.8% 20.0% 78.6% 56.9%
3 1.3% .5%
ENGLISH
0 2.6% 5.5% 3.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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5.2.2 Who used English?
The English*Gender cross tabulation result in Table 5-22 showed 41% of the
male and 31% female respondents indicated English as the most frequent
language used. The larger portions of both genders declared English as
second frequent language used.
Table 5-22: ENGLISH * GENDER Crosstabulation
GENDER
F M
Total
% within ENGLISH 17.8% 82.2% 100.0%1
% within GENDER 31.0% 41.1% 38.8%
% within ENGLISH 24.3% 75.7% 100.0%2
% within GENDER 61.9% 55.5% 56.9%
% within ENGLISH 100.0% 100.0%3
% within GENDER .7% .5%
% within ENGLISH 42.9% 57.1% 100.0%
ENGLISH
0
% within GENDER 7.1% 2.7% 3.7%
% within ENGLISH 22.3% 77.7% 100.0%Total
% within GENDER 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
None of the female respondent noted English as a third frequently used
language but 0.7% of the males did. However, the small percentage that did
not include English as 3 most used languages consisted 7.1% of female and
2.7% of male respondents.
The Table 5-23 show English* Age cross tabulation. A larger portion of the
above 40s used English as the most frequent language. The 26 to 39s mostly
used English as a second while the youngest age group showed a fifty-fifty
division.
Table 5-23: ENGLISH * AGE Crosstabulation
AGE
20-25 26-30 30-39 40-49 >50
Total
ENGLISH 1 % within ENGLISH 5.5% 8.2% 16.4% 43.8% 26.0% 100.0%
% within AGE 50.0% 17.6% 21.1% 50.8% 76.0% 38.8%
2 % within ENGLISH 3.7% 24.3% 39.3% 28.0% 4.7% 100.0%
% within AGE 50.0% 76.5% 73.7% 47.6% 20.0% 56.9%
3 % within ENGLISH 100.0% 100.0%
% within AGE 4.0% .5%
0 % within ENGLISH 28.6% 42.9% 14.3% 100.0%
% within AGE 5.9% 5.3% 1.6% 3.7%
Total % within ENGLISH 4.3% 18.1% 30.3% 33.5% 13.3% 100.0%
% within AGE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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The Table 5-24 show English usage of ethnic groups. The majority of Chinese
and Indian respondents indicated English as the most frequently used. About
22% of the Malays declared English as most frequently used while 76% use it
as a second frequent daily language.
Table 5-24: ENGLISH * ETHNIC Crosstabulation
ETHNIC
Malay Chinese Indian Others
Total
ENGLISH 1 % within ENGLISH 41.1% 21.9% 23.3% 13.7% 100.0%
% within ETHNIC 22.2% 84.2% 100.0% 62.5% 38.8%
2 % within ENGLISH 95.3% 4.7% 100.0%
% within ETHNIC 75.6% 31.3% 56.9%
3 % within ENGLISH 100.0% 100.0%
% within ETHNIC 5.3% .5%
0 % within ENGLISH 42.9% 28.6% 14.3% 100.0%
% within ETHNIC 2.2% 10.5% 6.3% 3.7%
Total % within ENGLISH 71.8% 10.1% 9.0% 8.5% 100.0%
% within ETHNIC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Cross ethnic communications involving Chinese and Indian respondents were
mostly conducted in English and less frequently in Malay. It should be noted
that cross ethnic communications involving Malays were usually conducted in
the Malay language instead. Other ethnic minorities mostly used English as
most or second frequent language.
An analysis of English usage by qualification produced results in Table 5-25.
Larger portions of controllers with degree and Diploma qualifications used
English as second most frequent language. However, for secondary level
education the portions were about equal between most and second frequent
users of English. The small percentage of respondents that did not include
English in 3 most used languages was from secondary level group.
Table 5-25: ENGLISH * ACADEMIC Crosstabulation
ACADEMIC
Secondary Diploma Degree Masters
Total
ENGLISH 1 % within ENGLISH 49.3% 26.0% 17.8% 6.8% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 50.0% 27.9% 40.6% 33.3% 38.8%
2 % within ENGLISH 30.8% 42.1% 17.8% 9.3% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 45.8% 66.2% 59.4% 66.7% 56.9%
3 % within ENGLISH 100.0% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 1.4% .5%
0 % within ENGLISH 28.6% 57.1% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 2.8% 5.9% 3.7%
Total % within ENGLISH 38.3% 36.2% 17.0% 8.0% 100.0%
% within ACADEMIC 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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5.3 ATC Communication and Language Skills
In relations to usage of English in ATC radiotelephony, there were 4 relevant
training areas that the respondents were requested to provide information on
through Section C of the questionnaire. These were:
i. Aviation English
ii. Standard Phraseology
iii. Radiotelephony Procedures
iv. Communications skills
5.3.1 Courses Attended
Respondents were requested to indicate if they had attended any of these
training either as a separate course or incorporated into other ATC courses.
Table 5-26 summarised the overall responses (percentages) for training
courses attended by respondents. Aviation English had a low respond of only
27%. Standard phraseology (96%), radiotelephony procedures (95%) and ATC
communication (91%) trainings showed much higher results, mostly
incorporated with other ATC courses.
Table 5-26: ATC Communication/Language Training Attendance
None Separate Training Part of ATC Course
Aviation English 112(60%) 25 (13%) 51 (27%)
Standard Phraseology 7 (4%) 2 (1%) 179 (95%)
Radiotelephony 10 (5%) 2 (1%) 176 (94%)
ATC Communications 16 (9%) 2 (1%) 170 (90%)
The cross tabulation for principal working positions and courses attended are
shown in Tables 5-27 to 5-30.
Table 5-27: Work-Position * Aviation English Crosstabulation
Aviation English
None Separate Combined
Total
WorkPos TAR % within WorkPos 82.5% 2.5% 15.0% 100.0%
% within TRNG_AE 29.5% 4.0% 11.8% 21.3%
ARR % within WorkPos 67.7% 9.7% 22.6% 100.0%
% within TRNG_AE 18.8% 12.0% 13.7% 16.5%
TWR % within WorkPos 50.0% 17.0% 33.0% 100.0%
% within TRNG_AE 50.0% 76.0% 72.5% 59.6%
Total % within WorkPos 59.6% 13.3% 27.1% 100.0%
% within TRNG_AE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Aviation English course conducted by DCA college was not a compulsory part
of ATC training, neither was it a pre-requisite for ATCO career advancement.
About 60% claimed never attended this training, 13% claimed attending a
separate course and 27% received combined training (Table 5-27). The
respondents claiming to have had Aviation English training were largely from
TWR. 83% of TAR and 68% of ARR controllers never attended Aviation
English training.
Standard phraseology training had been provided to 96.3% respondents (Table
5-28) of which 95.2% were combined with other ATC courses and 1.1%
separate. 3.7% claimed to have not been trained. TAR, ARR and TWR
working positions showed similar high percentages of respondents claiming to
have been provided this training.
Table 5-28: Work-Position * Standard Phraseology Crosstabulation
Standard Phraseology
None Separate Combined
Total
% within WorkPos 2.5% 2.5% 95.0% 100.0%TAR
% within TRNG_STDP 14.3% 50.0% 21.2% 21.3%
% within WorkPos 6.5% 93.5% 100.0%ARR
% within TRNG_STDP 28.6% 16.2% 16.5%
% within WorkPos 3.6% .9% 95.5% 100.0%
WorkPos
TWR
% within TRNG_STDP 57.1% 50.0% 59.8% 59.6%
% within WorkPos 3.7% 1.1% 95.2% 100.0%Total
% within TRNG_STDP 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The results for radiotelephony procedures training (Table 5-29) also show
similar high percentages of respondents of all ATC working positions having
attended combined training. 5.3% of respondents claimed not received training
in radiotelephony procedures.
Table 5-29: Work-Position * Radiotelephony Procedures Crosstabulation
Radiotelephony Procedures
None Separate Combined
Total
% within WorkPos 2.5% 97.5% 100.0%TAR
% within TRNG_RTF 50.0% 22.2% 21.3%
% within WorkPos 9.7% 90.3% 100.0%ARR
% within TRNG_RTF 30.0% 15.9% 16.5%
% within WorkPos 6.3% .9% 92.9% 100.0%
WorkPos
TWR
% within TRNG_RTF 70.0% 50.0% 59.1% 59.6%
% within WorkPos 5.3% 1.1% 93.6% 100.0%Total
% within TRNG_RTF 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Communication skills training (Table 5-30) showed similar high percentages for
those having been trained.
Table 5-30: Work-Position * Communication Skills Crosstabulation
Communication Skills
None Separate Combined
Total
% within WorkPos 5.0% 2.5% 92.5% 100.0%TAR
% within TRNG_COMS 12.5% 50.0% 21.8% 21.3%
% within WorkPos 19.4% 80.6% 100.0%ARR
% within TRNG_COMS 37.5% 14.7% 16.5%
% within WorkPos 7.1% .9% 92.0% 100.0%
WorkPos
TWR
% within TRNG_COMS 50.0% 50.0% 60.6% 59.6%
% within WorkPos 8.5% 1.1% 90.4% 100.0%Total
% within TRNG_COMS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
5.3.2 Training Format
The data was filtered for those claiming to have attended training as earlier
mentioned and analysed for items included in the training attended. Table 5-31
summarised the percentages that indicated agreement that the listed items
were included as part of the training program.
Table 5-31: Items in Training format
Training Courses
Aviation
English
N=76
Standard
Phraseology
N=181
Radio
Telephony
N=178
Communications
N=172
% indicated ‘Yes’
Classroom lectures 80 78 69 67
Simulator exercises 45 91 85 70
Public speaking 41 10 9 20
Verbal communications skills 51 32 34 40
Listening exercises 49 46 49 41
Radiotelephony examples 32 53 62 47
Visit ATC workstation 49 58 52 53
Peer role-play exercises 34 40 38 36
Interactive computerised exercises 17 13 13 20
Handling unexpected events 34 53 49 42
The features queried were intended to find out if the language skills such as
listening, writing, reading and speaking were incorporated in training. Although
linguistic writing may not be intensely used in ATC operations, but other skills
are important and useful in building up knowledge and confidence. For ESL
users such as these respondents, practical exercises and listening are
particularly important as opportunities to converse in English outside of ATC
operations may be limited due to cultural expectations and practices. The
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results showed that most respondents agreed on classroom and simulator
sessions in training. Other features received fewer votes, indicating less
utilisation in the training courses.
5.3.3 Documents and References
The questionnaire queried if major reference documents and other related
information from sources that may not be readily available or accessible to the
trainees, were provided during training. The AIP and MATS show high
percentages of availability (Table 5-32). These were usually loaned to trainees
during training courses. Other ICAO documents were not provided individually
and usually need to be shared among course participants, or available as
limited library resources. It was noted that queries on terminology and
differences from ICAO received poor results when these were actually
incorporated in other documents and should have been given emphasise in
ATC training.
Table 5-32: Documents and References Provided in Training
Item % Yes
Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) 98
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) 97
ICAO PANS-RAC (DOC 4444) 71
Numerals Pronunciation 70
ICAO Annex 10 Volume II 60
Terminology for Unexpected Events 48
Potentially Confusing Terms / Words 43
ICAO Manual of Radiotelephony (DOC 9432) 41
Commonly Used Plain English Terms 33
Real Radiotelephony Samples 32
Local Differences from ICAO 23
Differences from ICAO SARPS 20
5.3.4 Perception of Training Value
The respondents were requested to rate the improvements attained after
attending ATC communication and language related training courses. The
scale range from very little (marked 0), adequate (marked 1), good (marked 3)
to very good (marked 4). The normal curve was generated by the computer
software, as was calculation of mean and standard deviation.
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5.3.4.1 Vocabulary and Glossary Knowledge
The vocabulary range is important for the efficiency and effectiveness of ATC
function. On average, the respondents considered that the improvements to
overall vocabulary knowledge were just above adequate. Following are results
for perceived improvements after training courses, in terms of aviation general,
ATC specific and standard phraseology vocabularies.
The average rating of aviation general vocabulary (Figure 5-3) was 2.4 with
standard deviation of 0.9.
Figure 5-3: Improvement to Aviation (general) Vocabulary
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ATC vocabulary average was 2.5 (Figure 5-4) with 0.9 standard deviation.
Figure 5-4: Improvement to ATC (specific) Vocabulary
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Standard phraseology also showed similar results with average rating at 2.5
and standard deviation of 0.9 (Figure 5-5). These vocabulary improvements
also included some awareness of words with multiple meanings (Figure 5-6), as
well as certain standard phraseology that may cause possible misunderstanding
(Figure 5-7) in routine ATC operations. These improvements were also
perceived as only adequate. Average ratings were 2.5 and standard deviation
0.9.
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Figure 5-5: Improvement to Standard Phraseology Vocabulary
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Figure 5-6: Improvement to Multiple Meaning Words Awareness
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Figure 5-7: Improve Awareness on Possible Phraseology Misunderstanding
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5.3.4.2 Practical Use of Language
The training courses were also perceived to be beneficial to practical use of
language in routine work. Improvements for standard phraseology usage
(Figure 5-8) and pronunciation (Figure 5-9) were much better noted by
respondents. This could be contributed to the simulator sessions in which
trainees were provided the opportunity to put theory into practise. Similarly,
pronunciation improved with increased number of practises and familiarity with
phrases and terminology.
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Figure 5-8: Improvement to Standard Phraseology Usage
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Standard phraseology usage showed an improvement average rating of 2.8
with standard deviation of 0.9.
Pronunciation improvement rating was 2.7 with standard deviation of 0.9.
Figure 5-9: Improve on Correct and Clear Pronunciation
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Conversational fluency improvements (Figure 5-10) received an average rating
of only 2.3 with standard deviation of 0.9. This implied that the ATC related
training improved some aspects of ATC operational practises but have less
benefit in terms of general conversational context.
Figure 5-10: Improve Conversational Fluency
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The paraphrasing ability improvement (Figure 5 -11) score of only 2.2 also
relate to the ability in using plain language to explain or describe, which again,
may not be incorporated within the scope of ATC operational exercises.
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Controllers presumably learn these skills on the job and through observation of
more experienced controllers. Less emphasise on this skill suggested that
controllers were left to their own judgement and creativity in handling situations
not covered by standard phraseology.
Figure 5-11: Improve Paraphrasing Ability
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However, the overall combined improvements in practical language usage did
contribute to some limited extent, towards better quality ATC communications.
5.3.4.3 Listening and Comprehension
Handling international aircraft in routine ATC operations exposes the controllers
to various ‘accents’ of different nationalities. Not only pronunciations may differ,
but also sentences structure and phrases. The improvement on this aspect was
perceived as just about adequate, rated at 2.2 (Figure 5-12). This aspect of
training could not be realistically put into effect as the roles of pilots in simulated
traffic scenarios were played by other controllers. However, recordings of real
radiotelephony could expose controllers to what will actually be heard.
Figure 5-12: Improve Recognition (understanding) of English accents
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5.3.5 Perception of Training Instructors/Facilitators’ Suitability
Efficiency and effectiveness of Instructors and facilitators running training
courses contribute to the success or failure of the training objectives. All
controllers had undergone some training as part of career development and
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have an estimation of how satisfactory courses had been conducted.
Respondents were requested to rate on a scale of 1 to 4 (poor to excellent) on
instructors and facilitators for some relevant aspects of ATC training.
Figure 5-13 show the results for teaching techniques. An average rating of just
2.4 with standard deviation of 1.0 indicated some diversity in techniques.
Figure 5-13: Instructors/ Facilitators Teaching Techniques
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Respondents generally implied dissatisfaction with instructors’ teaching
techniques used in ATC courses.
Competent and capable instructors and facilitators are important in the efficient
running and success of any training courses. Perception of instructors’
standard phraseology knowledge (Figure 5-14) showed a good rating of 2.9,
with standard deviation of 1.0.
Figure 5-14: Instructors/ Facilitators Standard Phraseology Knowledge
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Instructors’ general ATC knowledge (Figure 5-15) was also rated 2.9 with
standard deviation at 1.1.
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
142
Figure 5-15: Instructors/ Facilitators ATC (general) Knowledge
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ATC operations knowledge (Figure 5-16) of instructors received a 2.8 rating
with standard deviation of 1.0.
Figure 5-16: Instructors/ Facilitators ATC Operations Knowledge
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Respondents were generally satisfied that the instructors were suitably qualified
and possess relevant knowledge to conduct these relevant training courses.
The results for English Language fluency (Figure 5-17) and the language
knowledge itself (Figure 5-18) also showed quite good ratings with averages of
2.7 and 2.8 respectively. Standard deviation for both was 1.0.
Figure 5-17: Instructors/ Facilitators English Language Fluency
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Figure 5-18: Instructors/ Facilitators English Language Knowledge
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The respondents however, were not as satisfied about time management of
training courses as the results show in Figure 5-19. This should be an aspect
that needs thought and consideration in planning ATC training courses.
Figure 5-19: Instructors/ Facilitators Time Management
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The lowest rating of 2.2 was assigned to usage of teaching aids (Figure -20).
This is obviously an aspect to look into. More information is needed on types of
teaching aids that will best suit and benefit ATC communication and language
training courses.
Figure 5-20: Instructors/ Facilitators Use of Teaching Aids
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There should be a balance between theoretical and practical components of the
training, making effective use of updated and superior resources that are
directly beneficial to trainees. It was noted earlier that computer-based training
was not widely incorporated yet. This should be seriously considered as it
allows multiple parallel training and more time-efficient. Recording facilities
could also benefit as it allows for self monitoring and evaluation.
5.3.6 English Language Proficiency Tests
At the beginning of a controller’s carrier, the requirement for English language
proficiency is very informal. ‘Able to speak and understand’ and a passing
grade at School Certificate level is sufficient to qualify as a trainee. The
controllers were expected to improve their language and standard phraseology
knowledge up to the ATC required level through the trainings provided. The
respondents were asked to indicate if they have sat for any English Language
proficiency exams while in service. The frequency analyses results for TOEFL,
IELTS and other tests, including MUET are shown in Tables 5-33 to 5-35.
Table 5-33: IELTS Test Results
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid Not taken test 180 95.7 95.7 95.7
Level 5.5 1 .5 .5 96.3
Level 6.0 2 1.1 1.1 97.3
Level 6.5 1 .5 .5 97.9
Level 7.0 3 1.6 1.6 99.5
Level 8.0 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-34: TOEFL Test Results
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid Not taken test 185 98.4 98.4 98.4
Level 6 1 .5 .5 98.9
Score 500 1 .5 .5 99.5
Score 520 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
Table 5-35: OTR English Proficiency Test Results
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid MUET Level 2 1 .5 .5 .5
MUET Level 3 1 .5 .5 1.1
MUET Level 4 1 .5 .5 1.6
Not taken test 184 97.9 97.9 99.5
Other test 1 .5 .5 100.0
Total 188 100.0 100.0
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Very few were found to have sat for an internationally recognised English
language proficiency test as these were generally associated with further
studies abroad. The MUET result show similarly low count. These results
could not be used to conclude on general levels of English language proficiency
level. However, based on current evaluation practises, all the licensed
controllers are deemed to be proficient to conduct ATC communications and
provide ATC services.
Other than the above mentioned tests, the respondents were asked to indicate
if a proficiency test was included as part of training programs. Approximately
20% of the controllers indicated that some proficiency evaluation or tests were
conducted in Radiotelephony, ATC communication and Standard phraseology
training courses attended (Table 5-36). Aviation English show a higher
percentage of almost 40% for proficiency test in the training course. The
remaining respondents feel that no evaluation was carried out for the training.
Table 5-36: Proficiency Test in Language / ATC training
Proficiency
Test in training
Aviation
English
ATC
Communication
Standard
Phraseology
Radiotelephony
No 61.8 83.1 77.9 78.1
Yes 38.2 16.9 22.1 21.9
The English language qualification data was not conclusive. Very few (6%) have
sat either the IELTS / TOEFL which are internationally recognised proficiency
tests. 2% took the MUET for entry qualification into Malaysian Universities. As
a large percentage of university degree / diploma courses are conducted in
Malay, academic qualification may not be representative of English proficiency.
However, exposures to tertiary education, length of service, management
experience and training courses were expected to have an impact to how much
and how proficiently English would be used by the controllers. ‘Practice makes
perfect’ would be an accurate description of how controllers learn the tricks of
the trade. Observation of experienced controllers and through mistakes of
oneself or others, assist in developing a familiarity and expertise of the ATC
operations. The language competency would be ATC operations specific in
terms of vocabulary, speaking and listening skills. Reading and writing skills
are less frequently required.
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5.4 Phraseology and Language Usage in Radiotelephony
ATC communication requires the use of standard phraseology at all times.
However, usage of plain language is expected in circumstances when no
standard phraseology suits the situation. In routine ATC however, usage of
non-standard phraseology and other language, as well as local terms and
jargons are still practised to some extent.
The respondents were requested to provide an approximation of recurrence
rate on language related problems that were encountered in routine work. The
observed percentages reflected the actuality that the usage of phraseology,
plain English and occasional words of other languages in ATC messages were
not mutually independent. There were overlapping occasions within some
longer messages that standard phraseology was mixed with plain and other
language.
Table 5-37 shows the responses on these components as observed by
respondents in routine daily ATC communications. On average, standard
phraseology usage was observed only 71% of the time. TAR showed best
observation for standard phraseology usage. Deviations from standard
phraseology usage showed highest in TWR working environment. Overall
usage of non-standard phraseology was observed to be about 20%.
Table 5-37: Phraseology and Language Usage in ATC Operations
WorkPos
Mean
TAR ARR TWR Total
Standard Phraseology 74.75 66.45 71.07 70.59
Non-standard Phraseology 14.75 17.10 21.34 19.63
Plain English Language 27.50 19.03 30.27 28.19
Other language (not English) 9.75 9.35 17.32 14.79
Local jargon/ terms 10.25 7.74 18.93 15.37
Respondents also observed plain English being used in 28% of transmissions.
Plain English phrases were lowest in ARR and highest in TWR. The response
for ‘other than English’ and ‘local jargon’ show about 15% overall. These
showed highest in TWR and lowest in ARR. If these were associated with
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courtesies and greetings, the percentages were expected to be lower. Based
on voice recordings, it was noted that local ATC-ATC coordination and those
with Medan ATC were sometimes carried out in Malay language or a Malay-
English mixture, and this had possibly affected the percentages.
Table 5-38 shows the results for modification and adjustment to accommodate
comprehension of messages as observed by respondents.
Table 5-38: Modification to Language Usage in ATC Operation
WorkPos
Mean
TAR ARR TWR Total
Speech rate (slower) 29.75 33.55 38.48 36.22
Repeat messages upon request 29.25 35.16 34.02 33.62
Intonation / pronunciation ‘style’ 18.00 24.52 26.79 24.68
Change standard phrases / format 17.00 21.94 27.50 24.63
These include voice intonation, pronunciation, speech rate and repeating
keywords for the benefit of the message recipient. Slowing down speech rate
and repetition of messages show higher percentages compared to
pronunciation or message format. Between the three working environments,
TAR showed least modification and adjustments. These showed highest in
TWR for speech rate, pronunciation and standard phrases. Repetitions were
observed to be used more in ARR. These observations were in line with the
earlier percentages on adherence to standard phraseology in messages.
5.4.1 Readback and Verification
The respondents’ observation on pilots’ readback performances are shown in
Table 5-39. Generally, ATC was perceived to get complete readbacks for only
about 70% of messages. Partial readbacks were estimated at 35%. It was also
noted that about 20% of readback (complete or partial) may contain incorrect
key information. No readback were received for about 15% of messages.
Table 5-39: Pilots’ Readback Performance
WorkPos
Mean
TAR ARR TWR Total
Complete readback of messages 74.00 65.48 69.29 69.36
Partial readback of messages 32.25 32.58 37.14 35.32
Contain incorrect key information 14.13 19.68 21.25 19.76
No readback of key information 9.38 16.77 15.36 14.71
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Comparison between ATC environments showed that readback received in
TAR was better. It showed highest percentage of complete readbacks and
lowest for partials, incorrect information and none readback.
The analyses of Pilots’ request for repetitions and verifications of certain key
information are presented in Table 5-40. Whole message and authorized level
were items most requested to be repeated / verified followed by time
restrictions, assigned headings and speed control. The least requests were
observed in TAR environment for each item listed. The ARR showed highest
request to repeat messages and verify levels, time restrictions, headings and
speed. Altimeter setting, traffic sequence and taxy route showed highest in
TWR. These were observations made by controllers and may be inaccurate,
but it did imply that some messages were not successfully transmitted and
understood on the first transmission.
Table 5-40: Pilots' Request for Verification or Repetition
WorkPos
Mean
TAR ARR TWR Total
Whole message 15.75 25.48 21.70 21.17
Authorised Level 16.25 27.42 20.00 21.01
Time restrictions 11.50 24.52 16.07 16.81
Assigned Heading 13.00 23.23 14.91 16.06
Speed restrictions 12.25 24.84 11.79 15.11
Altimeter setting 11.00 13.23 14.64 14.36
Traffic sequence 5.68 12.90 13.30 11.73
Taxy route 7.03 8.39 13.75 11.51
5.4.2 Safety Occurrences
The final query in the questionnaire was on respondents’ experiences of safety
occurrences related to language usage. Table 5-41, shows number of
misunderstanding/ miscommunications attributed to listed factors. Technical
difficulty which was not language related was also noted to have caused
unsuccessful relay of information. Message or part thereof may have been
distorted or lost, causing misunderstanding, guess work or the request for
repetition. The overall averages did not show significant differences. Between
one or two occurrences were observed for each factor.
Table 5-41: Occurence of Misunderstanding / Miscommunication in last 3 months
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WorkPos
Mean
TAR ARR TWR Total
Technical difficulties 1.15 1.26 1.97 1.69
Unclear pronunciation 1.03 1.10 1.94 1.59
Poor level of English 1.03 1.03 1.81 1.50
Use non-standard phraseology .93 1.06 1.83 1.49
Use plain English .95 1.03 1.75 1.45
Non-verify unclear instruction 1.00 .97 1.67 1.40
Non-verify unclear information 1.00 .90 1.69 1.40
However, the observations for individual environment showed slight differences.
Observations pointed to more occurrences in TWR compared to TAR and ARR.
TAR showed slightly less occurrences associated with technical, pronunciation,
level of English, non-standard phraseology and plain English. ARR showed
lower observations for non-verification of unclear instructions and information.
Table 5-42 shows the outcome observed due to misunderstandings and
miscommunications which were associated with language factors. Generally,
the frequencies were low. Increased ATC workload and communications
taskload were observed more frequently.
Table 5-42: Outcome of Misunderstanding / Miscommunication in last 3 months
WorkPos
Mean
TAR ARR TWR Total
Increased ATC workload 2.00 4.52 2.40 2.66
Increased communications taskload 2.15 4.55 2.21 2.64
Loss of situational awareness .95 1.90 .98 1.14
Loss of standard separation .58 1.00 .60 .64
Other safety related occurrences .40 1.10 .60 .62
Aircraft proximity .48 1.00 .50 .56
Runway incursion .40 .55 .35 .38
Between the three ATC environments, ARR showed more outcomes related to
language problems. Observations for TAR show slightly better situation
compared to TWR.
5.5 Chapter Summary
The responses from the questionnaire enabled some information to be
extracted and illustrated the situation. This information may not be absolutely
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conclusive but may complement other information obtained from the same or
similar sources.
The responses showed that the controllers were appropriately trained to carry
out ATC operations services which must be tendered in a language which is not
their mother tongue. This language, through necessity or choice, had become
the most dominant language for about 40% of these controllers. This group
consisted mostly of older controllers (late forties and above fifties), of secondary
level education, of Indian or Chinese ethnic, were stationed at the ACC and
were TAR controllers. These controllers were the product of an education
system when English was the medium of communication. Younger controllers
that used English most frequently were those who received tertiary level
education abroad.
Half of the controllers also named English as the second most frequent
language used. Although not many had sat a TOEFL or IELTS for rating of
English proficiency, they were deemed to be suitably proficient through
evaluations in training courses, ATC rating examination or by academic
qualification. The questionnaire responses were not adequate to evaluate or
approximate if these controllers were suitably proficient as per ICAO language
proficiency guidelines. The holistic descriptions could not be self-appraised but
should be evaluated by a certified rater.
The respondents’ observations pointed to particular items that need to be given
due consideration in ATC communication and language related training, such
as,
i. suitability of instructors in terms of knowledge, qualification and relevant
operational experience,
ii. teaching aids and resources that could optimise the improvements to
trainees capability and knowledge,
iii. computer aided training format, and
iv. efficient time management.
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
151
The questionnaire responses had provided some details about the people in the
ATC system in Malaysia. It also included some specific self observation of
experiences and conduct in real time radiotelephony. Misunderstandings and
unsafe outcomes had been observed and experienced, but mitigation had also
taken place, preventing further risks to flight safety. What could not be
ascertained from these responses was the actual count of occurrences that had
digressed into a safety occurrence. Certain facts and figures could only be
confirmed by official statistics. In the next chapter, actual radiotelephony
characteristics from these respondents’ ATC environments will be discussed.
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6 ATC RADIOTELEPHONY ANALYSES
The analyses of transcribed and coded radiotelephony data had discovered
facts and figures that characterise the samples collected. These data consisted
of Terminal Approach Radar (TAR), Area Radar (ARR) and Tower (TWR) data
which were analysed separately for comparison. In total, 189 radiotelephony
samples totalling to 4450 minutes and containing about 20,000 controller-pilot
messages were analysed. The analyses results were overwhelmingly profuse
and as practical as possible, these will be combined for clarity and ease of
comparison. Section 6.1 explains the flow of results presentation, grouped by
similar variables as used in the data coding. The numbers in brackets are the
corresponding sections where the items are discussed.
6.1 Analyses Variables
The general characteristics of ATC radiotelephony (6.2) are discussed by these
factors:
i. Aircraft movements and patterns (6.2.1),
ii. Transmission occupancy (6.2.2),
iii. Words and numerals usage (6.2.3),
iv. Speech rate (6.2.4), and
v. Speech Acts and Aviation Topics (Elements) usage (6.2.5).
The aspects that were analysed to identify adherence to standard ATC
practices, discrepancies and errors in the radiotelephony were:
vi. Callsign usage by pilots and controllers (6.3),
vii. Issuance of ATC instructions (6.4), and
viii. Pilots’ readback of instructions (6.5).
In association with sections 6.4 and 6.5, the following instructions were selected
for analyses:
Altitude assignments
Altitude restrictions
Approach clearance
Communications transfer
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Heading
Holding
Landing clearance
Route / position
Speed control
Transponder code assignments
Takeoff clearance
Altimeter setting
Errors analyses (6.6) in the radiotelephony were examined for;
ix. callsign miscommunications (6.6.1),
x. Pilots’ readback of ATC instructions (6.6.2) and
xi. ATC hearback errors (6.6.3).
Other discrepancies (6.7) examined included the following;
xii. Pilots’ initial contact messages’ contents (6.7.1),
xiii. Advisory of pertinent traffic information (6.7.2),
xiv. Excess Verbiage (6.7.3) and
xv. Disfluencies (6.7.4).
Evidence of verification and safety net (6.8) in the radiotelephony were
analysed through;
xvi. ATC correction of pilots’ readback errors (6.8.1),
xvii. Verification requests (6.8.2), and
xviii. Requests for message repeats (6.8.3).
The analyses for TAR, ARR and TWR were carried out separately to compare
the characteristics between the three ATC environments. The Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software had been used to analyse the
coded data. The presentation of the numerous summarised SPSS tables will
use colour coding highlights for easier references of the relevant results
discussed. TAR will be highlighted in ‘peach’, ARR in ‘pale blue’ and TWR in
‘lime’. Other general purpose highlight will use Light Yellow or bold font.
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
155
6.2 General Characteristics of ATC Radiotelephony
This section describes the fundamental aspects of the radiotelephony and
shows the differences between the ATC environments.
6.2.1 Aircraft Movements and Patterns
Aircraft movements’ pattern differs from one ATC environment to another.
Tower traffic movements relates to the usage of parking bays, taxiways and
runways. Some aerodrome may also include circuit traffic. Approach radar
controller’s contact with aircraft is either at the beginning or end phase of the
actual flight constrained by limited and busy airspaces. Area radar control
generally deals with en-route phase of flight operations, over larger airspace
and longer distances than approach radar. These differences in flight
operations require different numbers and types of messages exchange between
pilots and controllers.
This research’s data allows an analyses of traffic patterns in terms of number of
aircraft handled, the duration that each aircraft remained ‘in contact’ with the
controller and the number of messages exchanged per aircraft. Table 6-1 show
averages for the number of controlled aircraft per 30 minutes, messages per
aircraft and contact time per aircraft. The approach radar was found to handle
an average of 13 aircraft per thirty minutes, slightly lower than the average for
Area radar, which were 14. Tower had the lowest average of only 11 aircraft
per thirty minutes.
Table 6-1: Average Traffic, Messages and Contact Times
Average TAR ARR TWR
Aircraft per 30 min. 13 14 11
Messages per aircraft 13 10 11
Contact time per aircraft 6.5 minutes 11 minutes 7 minutes
However, approach radar exchanged more messages per aircraft than area
radar and aerodrome. What the results pointed out was the need for more
communications per aircraft in approach radar environment and these
communications were bundled into smaller time frames when the aircraft were
in contact.
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The following Figures 6-1 to 6-3 are examples of traffic pattern for various
radiotelephony samples. Other sets of traffic details are included in Appendix J
for TAR, Appendix K for ARR and Appendix L for TWR. Each bar represents an
aircraft’s in-contact duration, starting at the time communication was
established until the time it was transferred to another frequency.
Figure 6-1: Traffic Pattern – Terminal Approach Radar
Sample N8:22 aircraft
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
TAR aircraft’s in-contact bars were shorter (Figure 6-1), but it must be
appreciated that more communication took place along each of these bars. At
any one time, as many as 5 aircraft may be on the frequency. Sample S8 was
of arrival traffic into KLIA and sample N8 was departures. A slight difference
could be spotted between average lengths of bars in the samples. Arrival
aircraft were retained by the TAR controller longer than departures to ensure a
safe arrival sequence and standard separation. The departures needed only to
be positioned onto the airways and transferred to ARR and usually took a
shorter time to sort.
ARR’s contact with each aircraft was for a longer duration as reflected by the
longer bars (Figure 6-2). The number of aircraft handled simultaneously could
be as many as 10, but fewer messages needed to be exchanged with each
aircraft. This implied less urgency for radiotelephony in ARR environment.
Changes in aircraft disposition were less frequent compared to TAR and TWR.
In the ARR environment aircraft climbs to its cruising level and fly along its
Sample S8: 16 aircraft
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
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intended route. Domestic flights may later need to start the descend phase, but
long haul flights will progress to the next ATC sector unchanged.
Figure 6-2: Traffic Pattern - Area Radar
The aerodrome environment showed some varieties in traffic pattern between
localities (Figure 6-3). Melaka which primarily handled training traffic showed
longer bars that reflected on longer duration of circuit training. Similar pattern
could also be seen in Johor where scheduled traffic has shorter bars and
training aircraft longer.
Figure 6-3: Traffic Pattern – Melaka and Johor
Traffic Pattern Melaka
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
Time
Traffic Pattern Johor
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
Time
The other four aerodromes (Figure 6-4) handled predominantly scheduled
traffic. Bars were shorter, and have lesser amount of overlaps between ‘in-
contact’ duration. Penang’s pattern reflected the least complicated environment
where the controller seemingly handled only one or two aircraft at any one time.
Sample Q5
0:00:00 0:14:24 0:28:48
Time
Sample Y4
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48
Time
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Figure 6-4: Traffic Pattern – KLIA, Kuching, Kinabalu and Penang
Traffic Pattern KLIA
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
Time
Traffic Pattern Kuching
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
Time
Traffic Pattern Kinabalu
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36Time
Traffic Pattern Penang
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
Time
The examples above illustrated an idea of how demanding the controller-pilot
communications could be in any of these ATC environments.
6.2.2 Message’s Transmissions Occupancy and Density
Controllers and pilots only communicated when required. There were lapses
when no transmission took place but the aircraft remained under the authority of
the controller. In the data processing and coding, the time taken to transmit
each message and the lapses between transmissions were noted. This
information was used to compute the actual portion of time that was occupied in
controller-pilot verbal communication as well as speech rate. The tabulated
data however did not include the amount of time spent on landline
communications with other ATC units.
Transmission occupancy refers to the percentage of total time that exchanges
of messages took place between controllers and pilots. The data collected
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showed different percentages of transmission occupancies (refer Table 6-2)
between ATC facilities. The TAR environment had the highest average of
transmission occupancy, with messages being transmitted 32% of the time.
Table 6-2: Actual percentage of Transmission Occupancy and Lapses
Station Recorded Minutes Transmission Occupancy %
TAR 900 32.3
ARR (Sector Y) 390
ARR (Sector R) 410
ARR (Sector Q) 420
30.6
Penang TWR 220
KLIA TWR 730
Melaka TWR 190
Johor TWR 250
Kuching TWR 380
Kinabalu TWR 560
17.9
26.3
43.4 (average 27%)
34.9
21.04
21.4
The percentage was lower in ARR environment, with an average of 30% and
lowest in TWR with transmissions occupying only 27% of the time. However,
individual observation for Melaka showed that transmission took place 43% of
the time, even higher than approach radar’s. Penang actually had the lowest
transmission occupancy of only 18%.
Based on the number of messages exchanged within each recorded
radiotelephony, an average number of ‘transmissions per minute’ was
computed. These averages are shown in Table 6-3.
Table 6-3: Average Transmissions per minute
Environment Recorded Minutes Total Messages Messages per minute
TAR 900 4928 5.5
ARR 1220 5752 4.7
TWR 2337 9785 4.1
The terminal approach radar environment was found to transmit the most
number of messages per minute. On a larger time scale, for example twenty
minutes duration, approach radar control on average will have 110
transmissions between pilot and controller while area radar has 100 and
aerodrome only 80.
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6.2.3 Words and Numerals Usage in Messages
The text transcribed from radiotelephony audio was analysed for words and
numerals usage. ‘Numerals’ include the numbers and words associated with
number usage such as thousand, decimal, point, first, second and hundred.
The total words usage in each ATC unit is shown in Table 6-4. These amounts
however, could not be directly compared as the total usage times were different.
The words per minute averages were computed for this purpose.
Table 6-4: Total Time Recorded, Words and Numerals Usage
Station Time Total Words Words / minute % Numerals
TAR 900 51242 57 56.4
ARR (Sector Y) 390 18557 48 50.6
ARR (Sector R) 410 15460 38
ARR (Sector Q) 420 24050 57 47.9
Pulau Pinang 220 6443 29 32.5
KLIA 730 35327 48 46.65
Melaka 190 14949 79 43.4
Johor Bahru 250 15946 64 45.08
Kuching 380 12953 34
Kota Kinabalu 560 18887 34 42.9
The two highest usages were shown for Melaka and Johor. These had raised
the TWR average to 48 instead of 36 words per minute if these were not
included. ARR average was 47 words per minute. The flying training activities
handled by Melaka and Johor had increased the radiotelephony word usage.
Generally, the TAR environment used more words per minute than the other
ATC environments.
A descriptive analysis of word usage is shown in Table 6-5.
Table 6-5: Descriptive Statistics of Total Word Usage in Messages
Statistics TAR ARR TWR
Mean 10.82 9.66 11.00
Mode 9.00 10.00 9.00
Standard Deviation 5.19 5.21 6.15
Maximum 39 38 47
Per message, the average number of words used did not show significant
difference between ATC environments. TAR and TWR averaged 11 words per
message and ARR 10 words. The Mode in TAR and TWR was 9, indicating
that messages containing 9 words occurred most frequently in these two
environments. The mode for ARR is 10 words.
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The longest message containing 47 words was transmitted by Johor Tower,
advising of weather deterioration and the latest tower observation,
“Academy Four Two Three Report Again Benut Maintain Two Thousand QNH
One Zero One Zero and advise weather building up everywhere weather building up
everywhere visibility from tower observation runway..er…runway One Six at er…Seven
thousand meters and raining…raining western and eastern side of the airport”
In comparison, the longest Approach Radar message contained 39 words
consisted more of instructions than advisories;
“Asian Express Nine Five Three Good Afternoon route via Melaka for spacing
descend altitude Seven thousand feet runway Three Two Left on the Q-N-H One Zero
One One after Melaka track direct for fifteen miles finals Three Two Left”.
Area Radar’s longest message contained 38 words which included a correction
of standard arrival instruction;
“Malaysian One Six Two Five identified climb flight level One Five Zero direct
DAKUS for sequencing Lumpur LAPIR Two arrival runway Three Two left Melaka
transition… Lumpur SASRI Two arrival runway Three Two Left BATU ARANG alfa
transition”
Frequency analyses of messages’ lengths produced the results in Table 6-6.
The averages were similar, TAR and TWR was 11 while ARR was 10.
Table 6-6: Frequency Analyses Results of Messages Length
Message Length (words) TAR ARR TWR
Average 11 10 11
% of messages
1 – 5 12 21 18
6 – 11 50 41 42
12 – 22 35 34 34
> 22 3 4 6
Using the averages, the percentages of half-average, about average and twice-
average or more had been computed. Generally about 40% of messages were
more than 12 words in length and only about 4% contain more than 20 words.
Messages which contain up to the average number of words were also of
similar percentage (about 60%) across the three environments. This showed
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
162
no obvious difference between distributions of message lengths in the three
ATC environments.
As shown in Table 6-4 earlier, the average percentage of numerals usage was
highest in approach radar (56%) and lowest in aerodrome (42%), implying the
regularity of numbers usage in ATC radiotelephony. Numbers are supposed to
be pronounced unambiguously with the correct units of measurements to avoid
confusion. The importance of numerals in ATC messages is highlighted by the
fact that its usage is as frequent as non-numerals. The glossary of words that
falls into the numerals category is limited, but the percentage of usage is
comparatively similar. A descriptive analysis of numerals usage produced the
results in Table 6-7.
Table 6-7: Descriptive Statistics of Numerals Usage in Messages
Statistics TAR ARR TWR
Mean 6 5 5
Median 6 5 4
Mode 6 3 4
Standard Deviation 3 3 3
Range 17 18 23
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 17 18 23
The highest average per message was in TAR environment with 6 numerals.
ARR and TWR showed similar averages of 5 numerals. Generally, longer
messages contained more numerals. The message with the highest numerals
recorded was in TWR sample J9, in which 23 out of 35 words were numerals. It
was a pilot’s readback of ATC airways clearance with additional information of
total people on board and fuel endurance.
“Cleared to Penang Whiskey Five Three Four Alfa Four Six Four Flight Level
Three Four Zero Transponder Two Six One Three we have One One Eight
Endurance Zero Three Three Zero Express Six Three Zero”
The message contained seven items of information in which numerals were
used. Long messages with lots of numbers such as these need careful notation
by the recipient to ensure accuracy, clarity and purpose. It is important that
each number is pronounced clearly at a slower rate to allow the writing process.
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6.2.4 Speech Rate
Speech Rate is the average words per minute spoken by controllers/ pilots,
computed using the total words and transmission occupancy information. Table
6-8 shows average speech rates for each workstation recorded. Based on
these information, the approach radar and aerodrome environment have similar
average speech rate of about 175 words per minute. In the area radar
environment, speech rate was about 155 words per minute. However, these
figures are still in excess of ICAO’s recommended speech rate of 100 words per
minute. Between the aerodromes, KLIA, Melaka and Johor Bahru showed
similarly high speech rates of about 180 words per minute. Pulau Pinang,
Kuching and Kota Kinabalu’s rates were much lower, at about 160. The high
speech rate computed were connected to ‘busier’ ATC operations and the many
information types that needed to be transmitted in one message.
Table 6-8 : Computed Average Speech Rate (words per minute)
Station Total Words Used Words per minute
Approach Radar 51242 176
Area Radar S1 18557
Area Radar S2 15460
Area Radar S3 24050
155
Pulau Pinang 6443 161
KLIA 35327 184
Melaka 14949 181
Johor Bahru 15946 183
Kuching 12953 162
Kota Kinabalu 18887 158
6.2.5 Speech Acts and Aviation Topics (Elements)
The Table 6-9 show the total elements and percentages by speech act type
contained in each work station and ATC environments’ radiotelephony. TAR
used approximately 14 elements per minute of communication, while ARR 12
and TWR 11 elements. The elements associated with identification of speakers
and recipients showed percentages of around 40% of total. There were a
higher percentage of instruction elements in Approach Radar environment
indicating more assertive control of aircraft movements. Instructions
percentages were lower in Tower and Area Radar. ARR environment was less
time-critical and fewer instructions were needed to manage aircraft movements.
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Table 6-9 Total Elements and Speech Acts Percentages
Percentages by Speech Act TypeStation TotalElements Ident Instruction Advisory Request Courtesy
TAR (900 mins) 12651 37.7 36.5 14.8 3.3 7.3
ARR (1220 mins) 14546 40.7 27.3 15.8 6.6 9.1
ARR1 4546 40.8 25.3 15.8 7.8 8.8
ARR2 3700 39.6 28.7 16.2 6.3 9.3
ARR3 6300 41.8 27.9 15.5 5.6 9.1
Tower (2330 mins) 25616 38.3 33.4 17.2 4.4 6.1
Pulau Pinang 1517 40.1 32.4 16.7 4.2 5.7
KLIA 8156 36.2 35.7 13.7 2.7 11.3
Melaka 4047 39.2 30.4 23.2 5.1 1.5
Johor Bahru 3993 37.3 29.5 21.2 9.0 2.6
Kuching 3175 38.7 35.8 14.5 3.0 7.6
Kota Kinabalu 4728 38.4 36.8 14.1 2.6 7.8
Advisories were highest in Tower (17.2%), but not significantly lower in other
environments. This could be associated with apportioning of safety
responsibilities to the pilots by advisory of pertinent impending conflict
especially in visual circuit and tower operations. It is observed from the results
that advisories were significantly higher in Johor Bahru and Melaka ATC
radiotelephony, while Courtesies showed similar results in KLIA. Johor and
Melaka on the other hand showed very low percentages for courtesy,
suggesting urgency in the delivery of messages with less inclination towards
greetings. ARR had the highest percentages for Requests (6.6%) and Courtesy
(9.1%). The percentages for TAR were generally in agreement with Prinzo’s
(1996) results which found 37% Addresses, 35.5% Instructions, 16% Advisory,
5% Courtesy and 2% Requests.
The Table 6-10 show the frequency analyses of number of elements per
transmitted message. In all three ATC environments between 80 to 84% of
messages contained 2 to 4 elements. These percentages could be translated
into probabilistic expectations. For example, in the TAR environment, any
message transmitted will have a 50% chance of containing only two elements in
it. On the other hand, the likelihood of a message containing 7 elements is only
0.5%. The chances of finding 2 to 4 elements messages was 84% in TAR and
about similar in ARR and TWR.
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Table 6-10: Instructions and Advisory Elements in TAR Messages
Number of elements in message TAR ARR TWR
Valid 1 9.4 13.5 12.0
2 50.6 47.9 44.5
3 23.4 25.8 24.9
4 10.1 9.0 10.4
5 4.2 3.2 5.3
6 1.9 .5 2.4
7 .5 .0 .6
8 .0 0 .1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
It was also noted that there was a higher probability of finding single element
messages in ARR environment compared to TAR or TWR. Single element
messages were usually greetings or general acknowledgements. As more
messages contained multiple elements, it was inappropriate to evaluate
adherence to standards per whole message. Further discussion on the
characteristics of radiotelephony in this thesis will refer to the elements as
coded in the database. Comparison will be based on percentages of elements
associated with specific speech acts or topics such as identification, instructions
or advisory.
Not all elements were used equally frequently. The Figure 6-5 shows a
diagrammatic comparison of aviation topics usage between environments.
Figure 6-5: Aviation Topics Usage in ATC Environments
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There appeared to be a pattern which conforms to Zipf’s Law which suggested
that the second most used word (element) was only half as frequent as the
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
166
most used word while the third most used will be one third as frequent. The
comparison of proportions may not be as accurate but there was significant
inconsistency between usages of different elements. Table 6-11 show the
percentages of each aviation topic usage in each ATC environment.
Table 6-11: Percentages of Aviation Topics Usage in ATC Environments
PercentageAviation Topic Code
TAR ARR TWR
altitude / level alt 18.3 14.6 6.0
approach app 4.9 0.8 3.9
circuit cct 0.0 0.0 1.0
communications com 5.0 5.8 5.9
flight details fld 0.0 0.0 1.3
general gen 3.5 4.0 5.8
heading hdg 5.2 1.2 0.6
holding hol 0.0 0.2 0.3
landing ldg 0.0 0.0 2.7
repeat/ verify ver 1.1 1.5 1.3
restriction rst 1.7 0.4 3.2
route / position rpo 6.8 7.8 15.5
speed spd 5.0 1.0 0.2
start stt 0.0 0.0 0.2
takeoff tof 0.0 0.0 2.6
traffic tfc 0.2 0.1 1.1
transponder sqk 0.6 1.8 0.3
visual / sighting vis 0.1 0.0 0.5
weather info wxi 2.2 0.4 2.4
Apology apo 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greetings grt 6.6 6.2 6.3
Thank you tq 0.8 0.7 0.7
delivery dlv 0.1 0.3 0.1
equipment eqp 0.0 0.0 0.0
other otr 0.1 0.1 0.2
Percentages which are highlighted, such as 18.3 for altitude/ level, were the
highest amongst the three ATC environments. However, certain topics such as
greetings and traffic showed similar usage across all environments. These
topics are also highlighted. The three highly used topics in all environments
were altitude, route/ position and greetings. Among the less popular topics
were holding, apologies and equipment. These percentages indicated the
topics that need to be emphasised in ATC training, as well as those that need to
be lessened in usage, such as greetings and general acknowledgements which
could not represent a correct readback or understanding of information.
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6.3 Callsign Usage
Analyses of callsign usage were carried out separately for ATC and pilots’
usage, as well as for each ATC environment. Confusion arising from non-
standard usage of callsign had been noted as contributory to safety
occurrences. This analysis proved how much the controllers adhered to or
deviated from the standard practices.
6.3.1 ATC Usage of Callsigns
On average (TAR, ARR and TWR combined), 16.4% of elements used were
associated with ATC usage of callsigns (identification). Complete and correct
use of callsigns was noted in 71% of elements in TAR, 69% in ARR and 65% in
TWR (Table 6-12). This suggests that TAR controllers adhered more to
standard practices for callsign usage compared to ARR and TWR controllers
Table 6-12: ATC Usage of Callsigns in ATC Radiotelephony
Messages TARN=2131, 16.8%
ARR
N=2284, 15.7%
TWR
N=4260, 16.6%
Complete, correct 71.1 69.0 64.7
Partial 9.6 9.8 19.0
Omitted 7.0 6.8 6.1
Numbers transposition 0 .0 .0
Number substitution 0 .2 .1
Complete + pronunciation 10.3 12.8 8.7
Partial + transposition .0 0 0
Partial + substitution .1 .1 .0
Partial + pronunciation 1.8 1.2 1.3
Valid
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
The remaining elements contained some type of errors. Usage of partial
callsigns (truncated and unapproved abbreviation) showed highest in TWR.
Pronunciation discrepancies were also commonly found, with a highest of 14%
in ARR. In 6.6% of messages callsign were totally omitted. These results
indicated that 3 out of 10 identification elements (30%) used by ATC will contain
some sort of callsign error. Taking into consideration the recording time, this
percentage translated into 42 errors per hour of communications. In terms of
identification elements usage, about 1 in 10 will have pronunciation
discrepancy, 3 in 1000 a substitution error and 7 in 100 without any callsign
used.
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6.3.2 Pilots’ Usage of Callsigns
About 20.3% of elements in TAR environment were associated with pilots use
of callsigns, while in ARR were 18.5% and in TWR 19.4%. Of these elements,
about 70% were used complete and correct. Pilots’ adherence to standard
practices showed similar to ATC with possibility of 42 errors per hour of
communications. Truncated and incorrect callsign abbreviations were highest
of 13% in TWR and omissions of callsign were highest of 10% in ARR.
Pronunciation discrepancies showed highest of 12% in TAR, but also similarly
common in ARR and TWR.
Table 6-13: Pilots’ Usage of Callsign in ATC Radiotelephony
Messages TARN=2562, 20.3%
ARR
N=2697, 18.5%
TWR
N=4979, 19.4%
Complete, correct 69.9 71.3 71.2
Partial 10.2 8.7 12.7
Omitted 7.6 9.9 8.3
Number substitution .1 0 0
Complete + transposition 0 .0 0
Complete + substitution .0 .1 .1
Complete + pronunciation 9.6 8.4 6.8
Partial + transposition .0 0 0
Partial + substitution 0 0 .0
Partial + pronunciation 2.6 1.6 .9
Valid
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.4 Issuance of ATC Instructions
The instructions issued by ATC were coded for usage of required keywords
pertaining to the instruction type and any discrepancies in numerals
pronunciation. The results will be presented as interpretation of usage rate per
time and possibility of non-adherence to standards. These will describe the
elements usage more clearly than just the percentages. It is also easier to
compare between ATC environments in terms of usage, adherence and errors.
6.4.1 Altitude
Altitude instructions were most used in TAR environment, consisting 7.4% of
total elements and least in TWR environment where it totalled to about 2.6%
(Table 6-14). These numbers meant that about one altitude instruction was
issued every minute in the TAR environment. In ARR it was one every two
minutes and in TWR, one every four minutes. High percentages of more than
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90% were shown for complete and correct issuance of altitude instructions in all
three environments.
The TAR environment showed lowest percentage for partial instructions. The
ARR results showed highest discrepancies of numerals pronunciation.
However, the possibility of errors in issuing altitude instructions was more
realistically described in terms of rate per time. Non-adherence of 3% in TAR
means one error every 18 minutes or every 18 altitude instructions. The 5.3%
error in ARR translated into one every 30 minutes (every 15 instructions), and
the rate in TWR is one error every hour (every 15 instructions).
Table 6-14: Altitude Instructions Frequency Analyses Table
TAR
N=941, 7.4%
ARR
N=797, 5.5%
TWR
N=655, 2.6%
Valid Complete 97.0 94.7 94.0
Partial 1.1 1.9 5.3
Complete + pronunciation 1.9 3.4 .6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
An analysis of Melaka data actually resulted with 20% of erroneous altitude
instructions. About one altitude instruction was issued every minute and the
error rate was one in 12 minutes (1 in 12 instructions). This is more frequent
than TAR environment’s rate. As TWR with circuit training is a generally busy
environment, the higher likelihood of error need to be highlighted in controllers’
training programme.
Table 6-15: Frequency Analyses on Altitude Instructions – Melaka
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid Complete 129 7.9 80.1 80.1
Partial 32 2.0 19.9 100.0
Total 161 9.9 100.0
6.4.2 Altitude Restrictions
The radiotelephony samples analysed seemed to be sparse in the issuance of
altitude restrictions by ATC. This may be due to the radar environment that
allows other types of separation to be applied. Table 6-16 show the Frequency
analyses results of altitude restrictions elements.
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Table 6-16: Altitude Restrictions Frequency Analyses
TAR
0.06 %
ARR
0.03 %
TWR
0.01 %
Valid Complete 7 4 3
Partial 1 0 0
Total 8 4 3
Total minutes 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
The associated 8 elements in TAR means about one altitude restriction was
issued every two hours. The rate was much less frequent in ARR (one in five
hours) and TWR (one in thirteen hours). There was only 1 partially issued
altitude restriction within 15 hours of TAR radiotelephony and none in ARR or
TWR environments.
6.4.3 Approach Clearance
The usage of approach clearance environment was more associated with TAR
and TWR environments (Table 6-17). The one element used in ARR was due
to delegation of control in which the ARR controller cleared a Subang Airport
arrival for a VOR-DME approach. Under normal circumstances, ARR operation
is not associated with approach clearances. The TAR environment’s usage of
approach clearance was about 12 per hour or one every five minutes. The error
rate (partial instruction) was one in three instructions. In TWR environment, an
approach clearance was issued approximately every eight minutes. The
possibility of a partial instruction is about one every three instructions, similar to
TAR.
Table 6-17: Approach Clearance Frequency Analyses
TAR
1.4 %
ARR
0.01 %
TWR
1.2 %
Valid Complete 130 1 183
Partial 53 0 119
Total 183 1 302
Total time (minutes) 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.4.4 Communications Transfer
The elements coded for communications transfer indicated that in TAR
environment, one instruction was issued every two and a half minutes (Table 6-
18). Every other element used for communication transfer is likely to have an
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error. In ARR environment, one communications transfer was issued every
three minutes. The error rate was approximately one in two instructions issued.
Table 6-18: Communications Transfer Instructions Frequency Analyses
TAR
2.7 %
ARR
3.0 %
TWR
2.5 %
Valid Complete 164 174 243
Partial 139 196 186
Complete + pronunciation 12 28 125
Partial + pronunciation 25 34 81
Total 340 432 635
Total minutes 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
In TWR environment communications transfers were issued one every four
minutes. Errors were expected every six minutes or about three out of four
instructions.
6.4.5 Heading
The Table 6-19 show the results of heading instructions frequency analyses.
Table 6-19: Heading Instruction Frequency Analyses
TAR
2.6 %
ARR
0.6 %
TWR
0.3 %
Valid Complete 270 74 73
Partial 32 8 6
Complete + pronunciation 25 0 2
Total 327 82 81
Total minutes 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
TAR used more (2.6% of total elements) heading instructions than ARR and
TWR. One instruction was transmitted every three minutes in TAR, every
fifteen minutes in ARR and every twenty-eight minutes in TWR. The likelihood
of an error is about one every fifteen minutes in TAR, which is one in every five
instructions. In ARR the error rate is one in every two and a half hours (1 in 6
instructions) while in TWR it is one in five hours (about 1 in 10 instructions).
6.4.6 Holding
TAR environment did not contain any holding instructions. The rate of usage in
ARR was about one holding instruction every 72 minutes while in TWR was one
every 54 minutes (Table 6-20). One in every eight instructions issued in ARR is
likely to be incomplete. The rate in TWR is one every 15 instructions.
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Table 6-20: ARR Frequency Table: ATC Instruction Holding
ARR 0.1 % TWR 1.8 %
Valid Complete 15 38
Partial 2 5
Total 17 (1 instruction every 72 minutes) 43 (I instruction every 54 minutes)
Total minutes 1220 2337
Total Elements 14546 25616
6.4.7 Landing Clearance
Only the TWR environment was associated with landing clearances. The Table
6-21 presented the frequency analyses results of landing instructions for each
aerodrome for comparison. Other than KLIA, all the aerodromes used one
runway for both landings and departures. It was also found that opposite
direction runway operations were sometimes practised.
Table 6-21: Frequency Tables – Landing Instructions per Tower
Station Element Frequency Details
Melaka Complete 4 12 %
190 minutes Partial 29 Error in 7 out of 8 instructions
4047 elements Total (0.8 %) 33 I instruction in 6 minutes
KLIA Complete 134 95 %
730 minutes Partial 6 Error in 1 out of 23 instructions
8156 elements Total (1.7 %) 140 I instruction in 5 minutes
Penang Complete 29 88 %
220 minutes Partial 4 Error in 1 out of 8 instructions
1517 elements Total (2.2 %) 33 1 instruction in 7 minutes
Kuching Complete 44 92 %
380 minutes Partial 4 Error in 1 out of 12 instructions
3175 elements Total (1.5%) 48 1 instruction in 8 minutes
Kinabalu Complete 63 86 %
560 minutes Partial 10 Error in 1 out of 7 instructions
4728 elements Total (1.5%) 73 1 instruction in 8 minutes
Johor Complete 16 76 %
250 minutes Partial 5 Error in 1 out of 4 instructions
3993 elements Total (0.5 %) 21 1 instruction in 12 minutes
The KLIA TWR used landing instructions most frequently and Johor least
frequently. KLIA showed least likelihood of errors in landing instructions.
However, Melaka’s radiotelephony showed a particularly high percentage of
partial instructions. This may be contributed to a localised understanding with
flying school operators to omit runway designation in landing clearances. While
this may cut down frequency congestion, it indirectly encouraged pilots and
controllers to apply non-standard practise in routine operations.
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The Table 6-22 show the overall frequency analysis for TWR environment.
Average usage was about 1.4% of total elements and one instruction was
issued in 7 minutes. 83% of instructions were issued correct and complete. No
pronunciation errors were noted, but one out of 6 instructions was issued
partially, with some keywords omitted.
Table 6-22: TWR Landing Instructions Frequency Analyses
Frequency Details
Valid Complete 290 Correct instructions 83% of time
Partial 58 Error in 1 out of 6 instructions
Total 348 1.4 % of elements
Total minutes 2330 1 instruction every 7 minutes
Total Elements 25616
6.4.8 Route / Position
Frequency analyses of these instructions in the ATC environments produced
the results as in Table 6-23. The highest percentage of 6.2% of total elements
used was found in TWR environment. Usages were lower in TAR and ARR.
Table 6-23: Route / Position Instruction Frequency Analyses
TAR 1.5% ARR 2.8% TWR 6.2%
Valid Complete 180 402 1453
Partial 9 10 126
Complete + substitution 0 0 1
Complete + pronunciation 1 0 10
Total 190 412 1590 (1 in 1.5 minutes)
Total minutes 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
One route / position instruction was transmitted every one and a half minute. In
ARR it was less frequent, at about one in three minutes and in TAR about one
in five minutes. Generally, issuances of instructions were complete more than
90% of the time. Possibility of an error occurring in TAR was 1 in 19
instructions (every 95 minutes). In ARR it was 1 in 40 instructions (1 in 120
minutes) while in TWR was 1 in 12 instructions (1 in 18 minutes). Only one
substitution error was found within 39 hours of TWR radiotelephony and one
pronunciation error in 15 hours of TAR radiotelephony. Other error type was of
partially issued clearances.
The more frequent use in TWR environment of route position instructions was
due to ground movements of aircraft. These included taxiing route, intersection
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
174
and holding point stops, gate assignments and lining up positioning. Route and
positional instructions in TAR were more associated with headings (refer
section 6.4.5) than airways or direct tracks as in ARR.
6.4.9 Speed
Table 6-24 show the frequency analysis results of speed instructions. TAR
showed the highest usage of speed instructions (2.3%), as speed control is a
technique more often used in TAR than other ATC environments. In ARR there
was 0.5% elements associated with speed instructions and in TWR only 0.09%.
Table 6-24: TAR Frequency Table: ATC Instruction Speed
TAR
2.3 %
ARR
0.5 %
TWR
0.09%
Valid Complete 220 49 1
Partial 36 24 21
Complete + pronunciation 30 2 1
Partial + pronunciation 3 0 0
Total 289 75 23
Total minutes 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
This translated to 1 instruction in 3 minutes for TAR, 1 in 16 minutes in ARR
and 1 in 100 minutes in TWR. The error rate in TAR was 1 in four instructions
while in ARR was 1 in three instructions. The possibility of finding an error in a
TWR speed instruction was 96%. This could be explained by the nature of
TWR operations that do not need to assign a specific speed to an aircraft. The
placement and spacing needed were usually achieved by requesting the pilots
to ‘slow down’, ‘keep up speed’ or ‘reduce to minimum’. Traffic information and
visual sighting by the pilots assist in maintaining the required ATC safety
standards for aerodrome environment.
6.4.10 Transponder Code
Table 6-25 show the frequency analyses results of transponder code
assignments.
Table 6-25: TAR Frequency Table: ATC Instruction Squawk Code
TAR
0.02 %
ARR
0.19 %
TWR
0.15 %
Valid Complete 2 17 39
Partial 1 10 0
Total 3 27 39
Total minutes 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
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Generally, the percentages of transponder code instructions were small in all
three environments. There were only 3 instances in TAR environment (0.02%
elements) coded for ‘recycling’ (refreshing) the transponder code. These were
associated with radar identification purposes, averaging once in 5 hours, and
one out of three instructions was issued with some keywords omitted.
In ARR environment, transponder code assignments were 0.19% of total
elements and associated with establishing or confirming radar contacts. An
instruction was issued once in 45 minutes and one out of three of those were
partial clearances. In TWR, an instruction was issued once in 59 minutes and
no errors were found.
6.4.11 Takeoff Clearance
The frequency analyses for this type of instructions were carried out per
aerodrome unit and the results presented in Table 6-26. The total recording
time and elements per aerodrome is noted below the station’s name. Between
0.6% and 1.7% of elements in TWR environment were associated with takeoff
instructions. The usage rate per time was highest in KLIA with one instruction
issued in 5 minutes. Penang was the least with 1 instruction per 10 minutes.
Table 6-26: Frequency Analyses Takeoff Clearance in TWR Environment
Station Frequency Details
KLIA Complete 139 100 %
730 minutes Partial 0 none
8156 elements Total (1.7 %) 139 1 instruction in 5 minutes
PENANG Complete 18 78 %
220 minutes Partial 5 Error in 1 out of 4 instructions
1517 elements Total (1.5 %) 23 1 instruction in 10 minutes
KUCHING Complete 44 88 %
380 minutes Partial 6 Error in 1 out of 8 instructions
3175 elements Total (1.6 %) 50 1 instruction in 7.6 minutes
KINABALU Complete 55 79%
560 minutes Partial 15 Error in 1 out of 5 instructions
4728 elements Total (1.5 %) 70 1 instruction in 8 minutes
JOHOR Complete 10 36 %
250 minutes Partial 18 Error in 2 out of 3 instructions
3993 elements Total (0.7 %) 28 1 instruction in 9 minutes
MELAKA Complete 2 8 %
190 minutes Partial 23 Error in 11 out of 12 instructions
4047 elements Total (0.6 %) 25 1 instruction in 7.6 minutes
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KLIA showed no errors in takeoff instructions implying total adherence to
standards at all times. Errors were most likely found in Melaka where 11 out of
12 instructions were issued partially, with some keywords missing. As in
landing clearances, the local procedures of Melaka made allowances for these
non-standard practices. However, it was non-conforming to ICAO standards.
6.4.12 Altimeter Setting Advisories
These advisories were found more often in TAR than TWR or ARR (Table 6-
27). In TAR, 1 altimeter setting advisory was issued every 7 minutes. TWR
rate was 1 in 11 minutes and in ARR was 1 in 42 minutes. The percentages of
complete advisories were 73% in TAR, 72% in ARR and 96% in TWR. Errors
were most likely found in TAR where the odds were 1 in 4 instructions. In ARR
it was 1 in 6 and in TWR, 1 in 23 instructions.
Table 6-27: TAR Frequency Table: ATC Weather Advisories
TAR
1 %
ARR
0.2 %
TWR
0.8%
Valid Complete 91 (73 %) 21 (72 %) 200 (96 %)
Partial 8 3 2
Complete + pronunciation 19 5 7
Partial + pronunciation 7 0 0
Total 125 29 209
Total minutes 900 1220 2337
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.5 Pilots’ Readback of ATC Instructions
Pilots’ readbacks to ATC instructions were coded for inclusion of key
information, presence of a readback and queries.
6.5.1 Altitude Instructions Readback
Complete readbacks for altitude instructions were 94% in TAR, 89% in ARR
and 83% in TWR (Table 6-28).
Table 6-28: Altitude Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR
7.3 %
ARR
5.1 %
TWR
2.5 %
Valid Complete 866 (94 %) 659 (89 %) 524 (83 %)
Partial 18 (1 in 51) 16 (1 in 46) 40 (1 in 15)
No readback 29 (1 in 32) 55 (1 in 13) 50 (1 in 13)
Repeat / verify 9 (1 %) 12 (1.6 %) 15 (2.4 %)
Total 922 742 629
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
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The percentages of requests for repeat or verification were 1% in TAR, 1.6% in
ARR and 2.4% in TWR. The possibilities of non-readbacks were 1 in 32
instructions for TAR and 1 in 13 instructions for ARR and TWR. Partial
readbacks were more likely found in TWR environment than TAR or ARR.
Overall the non-standard practices of not presenting a readback or responding
partially were highest in TWR with odds of 1 to 7.
6.5.2 Altitude Restrictions Readback
The Table 6-29 show the frequency analyses results for pilots’ readback of
altitude restrictions. There was not many issuance of this instruction in all three
environments as other methods of separation were used. A repeat request was
shown only in ARR environment. Partial or non-readbacks were also
considered to be more likely in ARR.
Table 6-29: Altitude Restrictions Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR
0.06 %
ARR
0.04 %
TWR
0.01 %
Valid Complete 6 (75 %) 3 (50 %) 3 (100 %)
Partial 1 1 0
No readback 1 1 0
Repeat / verify 0 1 (17 %) 0
Total 8 6 3
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.5.3 Approach Clearance Readback
There was only one approach clearance issued in ARR and this was readback
as complete. In TAR environment, complete readback consisted of 57% and
queries were 0.6% (Table 6-30). The possibility of a partial readback was 1 in 3
and non-readback was 1 in 10.
Table 6-30: Approach Clearance Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR
1.4 %
ARR
0.007 %
TWR
1.1 %
Valid Complete 101 (57 %) 1 96 (33 %)
Partial 58 (1 in 3) 0 139 (1 in 2)
No readback 18 (1 in 10) 0 50 (1 in 6)
Repeat / verify 1 (0.6 %) 0 2 (0.7 %)
Total 178 1 287
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
In TWR only 33% instructions were readback complete and 0.7% queried. 1
out of 2 instructions were readback partially and 1 in 6 was not readback by the
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pilots. Collectively, the TWR environment showed a higher likelihood of 2 in 3
non-standard readback (none or partial).
6.5.4 Communications Transfer Readbacks
Communications transfer readbacks by pilots showed low percentages of
complete readback in all three ATC environments (Table 6-31). The most was
shown in TWR with only 12.5%. Queries for repeats or verification were also of
small percentages. In TAR environment, 5 out of 7 readbacks were partials and
1 in 5 were non-readbacks. The odds were lower in ARR and TWR.
Table 6-31: Pilots' Readback Communications Transfer Frequency Analyses
TAR
2.6 %
ARR
2.6 %
TWR
2.4 %
Valid Complete 23 (7 %) 22 (6 %) 76 (12.5 %)
Partial 238 (5 in 7) 297 (3 in 4) 471 (3 in 4)
No readback 65 (1 in 5) 52 (1 in 7) 46 (1 in 13)
Repeat / verify 5 (1.5%) 13 (3.4%) 17(2.8%)
Total 331 384 610
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.5.5 Heading Instructions Readbacks
Heading instructions showed high percentages of over 80% for complete
readbacks in each environment (Tables 6.-32). Partial readbacks were 13% in
TAR, 12% in ARR and 9% in TWR. None readbacks ranged between 2 to 4%.
Only TAR and ARR had about 3% each of queries regarding heading
instructions. The odds of getting partial readback were 1 in 7 for TAR, 1 in 8 for
ARR and 1 in 11 for TWR. This means pilots in TWR environment were less
likely to omit keywords in heading instructions readback. Non-readback was
highest in ARR with odds of 1 in 26.
Table 6-32: Heading Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR
2.6 %
ARR
0.5 %
TWR
0.3 %
Valid Complete 264 (82 %) 63 (82 %) 71 (88 %)
Partial 43 (1 in 7) 9 (1 in 8) 7 (1 in 11)
No readback 7 (1 in 46) 3 (1 in 26) 3 (1 in 27)
Repeat / verify 9 (2.8 %) 2 (2.6 %) 0
Total 323 77 81
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.5.6 Holding Instructions Readbacks
Elements associated with holding instructions readbacks by pilots were only
recorded in ARR and TWR. Complete readbacks were 61 % in TWR (Table 6-
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33). Queries showed higher in ARR at 27% or 1 in 4 instructions. Partial and
non-readbacks were more likely in ARR (1 in 2) than TWR (1 in 3).
Table 6-33: Holding Pilot's Readback Frequency Analyses
ARR
0.1 %
TWR
0.15 %
Valid Complete 4 (27 %) 23 (61 %)
Partial 3 (1 in 5) 8 (1 in 5)
No readback 4 (1 in 4) 4 (1 in 9)
Repeat / verify 4 (27 %) 3 (8%)
Total 15 38
Total Elements 14546 25616
6.5.7 Landing Clearances Readback
Landing clearances were only recorded in TWR environment. Pilots’ readback
analysis showed 67% of complete readback (Table 6-34). There were 32%
partial readbacks, 0.3% queries and 1.4% none readbacks. This meant that 1
in 3 readbacks were partials that had omitted some keywords. 1 in 70
instructions was not readback by the pilot.
Table 6-34: Landing Clearance Pilot's Readback Frequency Analyses
Frequency Valid % Details
Valid Complete 232 66.7 2 in 3 readback
Partial 110 31.6 1 in 3 readback
No readback 5 1.4 1 in 70 readback
Repeat / verify 1 .3
Total 348 100.0
Total Elements 25616
6.5.8 Route/ position Instructions Readbacks
Table 6-35 show the route/ position elements analyses results.
Table 6-35: Route / Position Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR
1.5 %
ARR
2.6 %
TWR
6.0 %
Valid Complete 147 (79 %) 312 (82 %) 1184 (77 %)
Partial 19 (1 in 10) 19 (1 in 20) 215 (1 in 7)
No readback 14 (1 in 13) 32 (1 in 12) 108 (1 in 14)
Repeat / verify 6 (1 in 31) 18 (1 in 21) 36 (1 in 43)
Total 186 381 1543
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
More than 75% of the instructions in all three ATC environments were readback
complete. The likelihood of getting a partial readback was highest in TWR
environment. None readback was more frequent in ARR environment. ARR
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also showed highest possibility of verification request from pilots regarding this
instruction.
6.5.9 Speed Instructions Readbacks
Speed instructions in TWR environment were not associated with specific
numbers but generally a request to slow down or to maintain speed. The
readback also reflects this and recorded no complete readbacks (Table 6-36).
However, in 1 out of 7 instructions, the pilots fail to reply. 1 out of 11 readbacks
was a request to verify the instruction. TAR environment showed 64% and
ARR 51% for complete readbacks. The likelihood of partial, none readbacks
and repeat/verify for TAR and ARR were lower than TWR.
Table 6-36: Speed Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR
2.2 %
ARR
0.5 %
TWR
0.09 %
Valid Complete 180 (64 %) 36 (51 %) 0
Partial 48 (1 in 6) 23 (1 in 3) 17 (3 in 4)
No readback 42 (1 in 7) 8 (1 in 9) 3 (1 in 7)
Repeat / verify 12 ( 1 in 24) 3 (1 in 23) 2 (1 in 11)
Total 282 70 22
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.5.10 Transponder Code Assignment Readbacks
SSR Code assignments were rarely used in TAR. Only 2 elements were
associated with it (Table 6-37). The likelihood of getting complete readback
was 74% in ARR and 90% in TWR environment. 1 in 5 instructions in ARR was
shown to be readback partially. There were also possibilities of non-readbacks
by pilots in all environments.
Table 6-37: Transponder Code Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR ARR
0.13 %
TWR
0.15 %
Valid Complete 1 (50 %) 14 (74%) 34 (90 %)
Partial 0 4 (1 in 5) 0
No readback 1 (1 in 2) 1 1
Repeat / verify 0 0 3 (1 in 13)
Total 2 19 38
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.5.11 Takeoff Clearance Readback
The Table 6-38 show the analysis results of takeoff clearance readback which
were associated with TWR environment only.
Table 6-38: TWR Frequency Analyses: Pilots' Readback Takeoff Clearance
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
181
Frequency Valid % Details
Valid Complete 207 61.6 2 in 3 readback
Partial 108 32.1 1 in 3 readback
No readback 20 6.0 1 in 17 readbacks
Repeat / verify 1 .3
Total 336 100.0
Total Elements 25616
Takeoff clearance readbacks were likely to be complete two thirds of the time.
1 in 3 was a partial readback and 1 in 17 was a none-readback. Very rarely did
this instruction need verification.
6.5.12 Altimeter Setting Readbacks
Readback analysis results are shown in Tables 6-39. The highest percentage
of complete readbacks was shown in TWR environment.
Table 6-39: Altimeter Setting Pilots' Readback Frequency Analyses
TAR
1 %
ARR
0.2 %
TWR
0.4 %
Valid Complete 81 (64 %) 21 (75 %) 74 (77 %)
Partial 23 (2 in 11) 2 (1 in 14) 1
No readback 22 (2 in 11) 5 (2 in 11) 17 (2 in 11)
Repeat / verify 1 0 4 (1 in 24)
Total 127 28 96
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
None readbacks were similar in all environments and queries showed highest in
TWR environment. Partial readbacks were more likely in TAR environment.
There were similar chances of a non readback in all ATC environments.
Verification was rare but only slightly more likely in TWR.
6.6 Error Analyses
This section presents the frequency analyses results of elements associated
with errors in the radiotelephony.
6.6.1 Callsign Miscommunications
Table 6-40 show the types of miscommunication coded. 17 elements in TAR
environment, 15 in ARR and 16 in TWR were associated with callsign
miscommunications. The possibility of a callsign miscommunication was
generally small, 0.2% in TWR, 0.3% in ARR and 0.4% in TAR. ATC in TAR
environment were more likely to respond to the wrong aircraft, but pilots in TWR
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environment were more likely to respond to messages which were not
addressed to them.
Table 6-40: Callsign Miscommunication Frequency Analyses
TAR ARR TWR
Valid Wrong aircraft respond 2 (of 2131)=0.1% 3 (of 2284)=0.1% 8 (of 4260)=0.2%
ATC respond wrong aircraft 14 (of 2562)=0.5% 12 (of 2697)=0.4% 6 (of 4979)=0.1%
Wrong ATC callsign 1 (of 2562)=0.04% 0 2(of 4979)=0.04%
Total 17 (0.4%) 15 (0.3%) 16 (0.2%)
6.6.2 Readback Errors
Errors in pilots readback were analysed for information type confusion,
transposition, substitution and pronunciation errors.
6.6.2.1 Altitude
Readback errors found associated with altitude were of numerals substitution
and pronunciation discrepancies types. It was more likely in TAR and ARR
environments (Table 6-41) but the chances were quite small. Errors in
pronunciation were more common than numerals substitution.
Table 6-41: Altitude Readback Error Frequency Analyses
TAR
2.1 %
ARR
2.0 %
TWR
0.3 %
Valid Substitution 5 (0.5%) 9 (0.5%) 5 (0.1%)
Pronunciation 14 (1.5%) 26 (1.5%) 8 (0.2%)
Total 19 35 13
Total Altitude Elements (Pilots) 922 1723 4031
6.6.2.2 Altitude Restrictions
No error types were found for altitude restrictions readbacks.
6.6.2.3 Approach Clearance
No error types were found for approach clearance readbacks.
6.6.2.4 Communications Transfer
Encoding for errors in communication transfer readback was slightly adjusted.
7 = error in facility name and
8 = error in frequency to contact (transposition or substitution)
The Table 6-42 show results of communication transfer readback errors. These
errors were more common in TWR environment but of similar frequency in TAR
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and ARR. Pronunciation errors were most likely in TWR but contact frequency
errors were about similar in all environments.
Table 6-42: Communication Transfer Readback Error Frequency Analyses
TAR
14.1 %
ARR
15.1 %
TWR
32 %
Valid Facility name 0 0 1
Contact frequency 4 (1.2%) 4 (1.0%) 7 (1.1%)
Pronunciation 43 (13%) 54 (14%) 187 (31%)
Total 47 58 195
Total Elements Communications Transfer (Pilots) 331 384 610
6.6.2.5 Heading
Table 6-43 showed the analysis results for heading readback errors. It was
about 7 in 100 for TAR environment, mostly associated with pronunciation.
There was between 1.2 and 1.5% chance of transposition or substitution error.
In ARR there was a 2.6% chance of confusion on information type.
Table 6-43: Heading Readback Error Frequency Analyses
TAR
7.4 %
ARR
5.2 %
TWR
4.9 %
Valid Confusion type info 0 2 (2.6%) 0
Transposition 0 0 1 (1.2%)
Substitution 5 (1.5%) 1 (1.3%) 1 (1.2%)
Pronunciation 19 (5.9%) 1 2
Total 24 4 4
Total Elements Heading (Pilots) 323 77 81
6.6.2.6 Holding
There was no readback error associated with holding instructions.
6.6.2.7 Landing Clearance
Only one instance of landing clearance readback error was recorded in TWR
environment, which was a numeral pronunciation error type (Table 6-44).
Table 6-44: TWR Landing Clearance Readback Error Frequency Analysis
Frequency Details
Valid Pronunciation 1 =0.3% chance that this error occurs
Total Elements Landing (Pilots) 348
As landing clearances are critically important, pilots were more attentive and
responsive and errors were not found in the radiotelephony messages
associated with these clearances.
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6.6.2.8 Route / Position
The Table 6-45 shows route/ position readback error frequency analyses
results. This error was more likely to happen in ARR environment with a 1.3%
chance. There was also 0.8% likelihood that pilots readback the position name
wrongly in ARR environment. Confusion with another type of information,
tracking error, pronunciation and transposition also showed small probabilities.
Table 6-45: Route / Position Readback Error Frequency Analyses
TAR
0.5 %
ARR
1.3 %
TWR
0.8 %
Valid Confusion type info 0 1 (0.3%) 1 (0.06%)
Transposition 1 0 0
Tracking 0 1 2 (0.1%)
Position name 0 3 (0.8%) 3 (0.2%)
Pronunciation 0 0 7 (0.5%)
Total 1 5 13
Total Elements Route/position (Pilots) 186 381 1543
6.6.2.9 Speed
There was no speed readback error in TWR environment. Table 6-46 show the
results of frequency analyses for errors in TAR and ARR environments. Errors
were twice as likely to happen in TAR environment. The likelihood of
substitution errors was quite similar in both environments. Pronunciation errors
were more likely in TAR.
Table 6-46: Speed Assignment Readback Error Frequency Analyses
TAR
16.6 %
ARR
8.5 %
Valid Substitution 5 (1.8 %) 1 (1.4%)
Pronunciation 42 (1 in 7 readbacks) 5 (1 in 14 readbacks)
Total 47 6
Total Elements Speed (Pilots) 282 70
6.6.2.10 Transponder Code
There was only one readback error for transponder code assignments, found in
TWR environment (Table 6-47). This was from Johor radiotelephony data in
which the speed numerals had been mistakenly understood for another type of
information.
Table 6-47: Transponder Code Readback Error Frequency Analyses
Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Valid Confusion type info 1 .0 100.0 100.0
Missing System 9781 100.0
Total 9782 100.0
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6.6.2.11 Takeoff Clearance
No readback error was noted for takeoff clearance readback. Similar to landing
clearances, these were given full attention and adhered to completely by pilots.
6.6.2.12 Altimeter Setting Advisory
Altimeter setting advisories readback errors were more common in TAR and
generally of number pronunciation type (Table 6-48). In TWR environment there
was also a likelihood of substitution errors.
Table 6-48: Altimeter Setting Readback Error Frequency Analyses
TAR
11 %
ARR
17.9 %
TWR
6.3 %
Valid Substitution 1 (0.8%) 0 3 (3 %)
Pronunciation 13 5 3
Total 14 5 6
Total Elements Altimeter (Pilots) 127 28 96
6.6.3 Hearback Errors
Pilots’ readback errors that were not noticed by ATC and subsequently not
corrected developed into hearback errors. Types of hearback errors coded in
the radiotelephony against the originating readback errors are shown in Table
6-49. The numbers shown in grey had no hearback errors.
Table 6-49: Frequency Analyses: Hearback Errors
TAR ARR TWR
Errors in readback hearback readback hearback readback hearback
Altitude assignments 5 1 9 4 5 4
Heading instructions 5 1 3 0 2 1
Communication transfer 4 1 4 2 8 2
Route / position 1 1 5 0 6 2
Speed control 4 1 1 1 0 0
Transponder 1 0 0 0 1 0
Altimeter Setting 1 0 5 0 3 1
Sometimes a readback error was purposely left uncorrected as there had been
no safety risk. An example was the route/position readback error in TAR which
was associated with direction of turn for a direct tracking. Similarly for speed if
the readback was not exact, but served the purpose of regulating traffic. The
highest occurrence shown was for altitude assignment hearback error in TWR
environment in which 4 out of 5 readback errors were not corrected by ATC.
Altitude readback error in ARR also showed a higher occurrence. It was noted
that ATC sometimes accomodated pilot’s mistake in readback by issuing
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another altitude assignment depending on traffic scenario. The following is an
example in which ‘three five zero’ was accommodated by ‘one five zero’:
ATC: Malaysian Six Five identified descend flight level Three Six Zero Nipar Three
Alfa Arrival runway Three Two left Istan Alfa transition
Pilot: Okay leaving Three Nine Zero for Three Five Zero Istan Alfa arrival for
runway er.. Nipar Three Alfa arrival Istan transition Three Two Left Malaysia
Six Five
ATC: Six Five Descend flight level One Five Zero
The numbers shown in the table should not be converted directly to probabilities
of hearback errors as the occurrences were not mutually exclusive from
readback errors. For example in ARR environment, altitude hearback error
occurred 4 times out of 9 (44%) readback errors. The possibility of an altitude
readback error occurring in ARR was actually 1.2% (9 out of 742). So the
appropriate probability for altitude hearback error in ARR is 0.44 multiplied by
0.012, which comes out as 0.005, or 1 in 200. However, keeping in perspective
the possibility of ATC noticing and accommodating some readback errors, the
real threat of an altitude hearback error was actually much smaller.
6.7 Other Discrepancies
Besides the non-adherence to standard practices associated with ATC
instructions, codes were also assigned to examine pilots’ initial contact
messages, advisories, disfluencies, verbosity and language switches.
6.7.1 Pilots’ Initial Contact Messages
Table 6-50 show the frequency analyses results of pilots’ initial contact
messages. There were in total 1225 messages (about 6%) which were
considered as pilots’ initial contacts to establish communications with ATC. On
average percentage of complete messages was less than 30%. In TAR and
ARR more than half were partial messages. TWR showed the highest
percentage of initial contact messages in which no other information except the
aircraft’s and the ATC unit’s callsign were transmitted. These discrepancies
were coded to investigate areas that radiotelephony could be further improved.
If these messages were transmitted in full, containing all required information,
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queries for information may not be needed, number of transmissions will be
reduced and the communication frequency will be less congested.
Table 6-50: Pilots' Initial Contact Messages Frequency Analyses
TAR
6.1 %
ARR
5.6 %
TWR
6.1 %
Complete 96 (32 %) 69 (21 %) 200 (33 %)
Partial 167 (56 %) 172 (53 %) 145 (24 %)
No information 37 (12 %) 83 (26 %) 256 (43 %)
Valid
Total 300 324 601
Total Time 900 1220 2337
Total Messages 4928 5738 9782
6.7.2 Traffic Advisory
Traffic advisories were found most in TWR environment and least in ARR
(Table 6-50). This is associate with the nature of activities in the ATC
environments in which the information could best be utilised to resolve traffic
situations. Traffic information provided in TWR environment was to a large
percentage, complete. This assisted in establishing visual contact and eased
traffic resolution. In ARR and TAR, visual separation was less practical and
controllers employ other separation standards.
Table 6-51: ATC Traffic Advisory Frequency Analyses
TAR
0.16 %
ARR
0.07 %
TWR
0.6 %
Valid Complete 6 2 102 (68%)
Partial 14 (70%) 8 (80%) 47
Total 20 10 149
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
6.7.3 Excess Verbiage
The ARR environment (Table 6-52) showed slightly higher percentage of
elements associated with excess verbiage. Mostly were for using the word
‘roger’ or ‘okay’ within messages.
Table 6-52: Excess Verbiage Frequency Analyses
TAR
1.8 %
ARR
2.0 %
TWR
1.9 %
Valid Roger or okay 224 283 471
Unnecessary adjectives 7 6 3
Total 231 289 474
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
Total words (% verbiage) 51242 (0.45%) 58067 (0.5%) 104505 (0.45%)
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These words, especially ‘okay’, hold a special significance as it had been a
factor associated with an aircraft accident in Tenerife. In ARR the excess words
made up 0.5% of total words used and in TAR and TWR, the percentages were
0.45% each.
An example of excess verbiage in messages exchange from Sample S2:
1 Pilot: Lumpur Approach South Malaysian Six Zero Two Good Morning on
descend passing flight level One Niner Three for One Five Zero
information Xray One Zero Zero Niner
2 ATC: ROGER Malaysian Six Zero Two Descend Seven Thousand
3 Pilot: ROGER descend Seven Thousand Malaysian Six Zero Two Two Seven
Zero Knots
4 ATC: YOU'RE Number Three AT THE MOMENT
5 Pilot: ROGER ER.. WANT US TO SLOW DOWN Six Zero Two
6 ATC: TWO FIFTY will be just nice
7 Pilot: ROGER Two Five Zero Malaysian Six Zero Two
In the example above the word ‘roger’ was used at the beginning of messages
2, 3, 5 and 7. In message 4, the essence was to inform the sequence number
of Malaysian Six Zero Two. Message 5 enquired of any speed restrictions and
message 6 imposed a speed control. The words shown in capital letters were
not part of standard phrases but common in ATC radiotelephony. However, the
word ‘roger’ had been used rather excessively and habitually without any
specific benefit to the messages.
6.7.4 Disfluencies
Coding for disfluencies included the usage of ‘er..’, ‘ah..’ and similar fillers in
between words or phrases, noticeable long pauses in mid-sentence and false
starts where transmission stops at ‘half words/phrase’ and immediately changed
to another word/phrase. Examples of fillers in messages:
“Malaysian er.. One One Three Seven er.. descend to er.. Niner Thousand”
“Malaysian Five er.. contact control er.. One Three Two decimal Six”
Overall, disfluencies were lowest in ARR environment and highest in TWR
(Table 6-53). The larger portions in each environment were fillers. False starts
were found more in ARR than other environments. However, the overall
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likelihood of disfluencies was only about 1 occurrence in 50 elements or 1 count
in 200 words.
Table 6-53: ARR Frequency Table: Disfluencies
TAR
2.04 %
ARR
1.61 %
TWR
2.26 %
Valid Fillers (er.., uhm.., ah.. ) 214 (86%) 143 (61%) 468 (81%)
Long pauses 2 15 16
False starts 43 (17%) 76 (32%) 94 (16%)
Fillers and False start 0 1 1
Total 259 235 579
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
Total words 51242 58067 104505
This implied a much better performance than the theorised rate of disfluencies
in spontaneous speech which is 6 counts per one hundred words. Although
fillers, pauses and false starts are commonly associated with uncertainty and
indecision, alternative theories also relate it to tactical strategies to improvise
instantaneous decision making. Studies have also shown that disfluencies do
not always impair understanding of whole messages.
6.7.5 Language Switching
Usage of other languages was strictly confined to greetings and courtesies.
These depended on the perceived nationality of the pilot and familiarity with
phrases. Word search in all the radiotelephony transcription produced the
results in Table 6-54. The most frequently used were Malay greeting words.
Table 6-54: Usage of non-English Words in ATC Radiotelephony
Words TAR51242
ARR
58067
TWR
104505
selamat + (pagi /petang/tengahari) 54 116 168
assalamu’alaikum 7 1 23
sawadi-kap 4 2 0
namaskadam 0 4 0
Percentage out of total words usage 0.13 0.21 0.18
These were associated with well wishes such as ‘selamat pagi’ (good morning)
and selamat tengahari (good afternoon). Other non-English words used were
assalamu’alaikum (Arabic), sawadi-kap (Thai) and namaskadam (Tamil). The
usage of these non-English words was about 0.2% of total words used.
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6.8 Verification and Safety Net
Readback by pilots should be monitored closely by ATC to ensure instructions
and information are copied and understood correctly. Some errors were made
but corrected by ATC. These were coded and analysed for information type.
6.8.1 ATC Corrected Readback Errors
Table 6-55 show the count of readback error corrected for each type listed.
These errors were those of confusion, transposition or substitution type. The
errors that were not corrected were counted as hearback errors and had been
discussed earlier. Overall, the ARR environment showed the highest
percentage for ‘catching’ readback errors.
Table 6-55: TAR Frequency Table: ATC Corrected Readback Errors
TAR ARR TWR
Valid Altitude assignments 3 of 5 4 of 9 1 of 5
Heading instructions 4 of 5 3 of 3 1 of 2
Communication frequency 3 of 4 2 of 4 5 of 7
Altimeter setting 1 of 1 0 2 of 3
Route / position 0 of 1 5 of 5 4 of 6
Total 11 of 16 14 of 19 13 of 23
% Error Corrected 69 73 56
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
For individual type of errors, efficiency in correcting was more apparent in TAR
and ARR, as the highlighted cells showed.
6.8.2 Callsign Verification
Table 6-56 showed counts of elements associated with request for verification
of callsigns.
Table 6-56: Callsign Verification in TAR Environment
TAR
0.13 %
ARR
0.25 %
TWR
0.09 %
Pilot request verify 7 (of 2131)=0.3% 6 (of 2284)=0.3% 6 (of 4260)=0.1%
ATC request verify 5 (of 2562)=0.2% 24 (of 2697)=0.9% 9 (of 4979)=0.2%
Error corrected 3 (0.1%) 7 (0.3) 8 (0.2%)
Error not corrected 1 0 0
Valid
Total 16 37 23
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
Request by pilots were 0.3% both in TAR and ARR. Requests by ATC were
0.9% in ARR. Some elements which were erroneous were corrected directly
without a request for verification. These were 0.3% in ARR, 0.2% in TWR and
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0.1% in TAR. The callsign miscommunications and verification elements were
associated with unsuccessful attempts to relay intended information on first
transmission. These were found highest in ARR environment and least in TWR,
resulting in extra messages to be transmitted to effect understanding.
6.8.3 Repeat or Verification Requests
The radiotelephony messages were analysed for pilots’ requests for ATC to
repeat messages in full or in parts, associated with the phrase ‘say again’. The
results are shown in Table 6-57. Additionally, there were 681 ‘Rver’ elements in
which verification was sought by either ATC or Pilot for various types of
information. These again, caused extra transmissions as the relay of
information was not initially successful.
Table 6-57: Pilot Request Message Repeat
TAR
0.32 %
ARR
0.33 %
TWR
0.18 %
Valid Whole message 8 12 (1 in 478) 14
Part of message 8 7 (1 in 820) 4
Total 16 19 18
Total Messages 4928 5738 9782
‘Rver’ elements 137 (1.1%) 220 (1.5%) 324 (1.3%)
Total Elements 12651 14546 25616
Collectively, verification and repeats were highest in ARR. 1 in 478 messages
would be requested to be clarified in full and 1 in 820 clarified in parts.
Verification of specific information (element) will be about 1 in 66.
6.9 Chapter Summary
The radiotelephony analyses showed that there were differences between the
characteristics of the three ATC environments recorded. A tabulated summary
of details for each ATC environments’ radiotelephony is included in Appendix M.
The number of messages transmitted per unit time indicated TAR transmitted
5.9, ARR 4.7 and TWR 4.1 messages per minute. These transmission rates
were slightly higher than those found by Cardosi & DiFiore (2004) which were
TAR 4.5, ARR 2, TWR 3.8 and GND 3.5 messages per minute. However, this
could be due to the traffic load and pattern and should not be associated with
language deficiency.
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Analysis of traffic load also showed differences between environments. TAR
environment handled an average of 13 aircraft per 30 minutes and each aircraft
was in contact for about 6.5 minutes. The average number of messages
exchange per aircraft was 13. In ARR environment average number of aircraft
handled was 14, in contact duration of 11 minutes and had 10 messages
transmissions. TWR averaged about 11 aircraft per 30 minutes, in contact for 7
minutes and exchanged 11 messages. These numbers were to some extent,
against the normal perception that TAR is the busiest ATC working position in
terms of total traffic handled. What probably gave that impression is the higher
rate of radiotelephony exchanges and transmission occupancy.
The transmission occupancy showed 32.3% in TAR, 30.6% in ARR and 27% in
TWR. Anomalies were shown for Melaka (43%) and Johor (35%), which
actually boosted the TWR average percentage. However, this occupancy
percentage was not inclusive of other ground communication. It also did not
reflect on other activities such as planning and monitoring traffic movements.
The construct of messages showed a similar average of 10 words per message
in all three environments. Numerals usage differ slightly, 6 per message in
TAR, and 5 for ARR and TWR. Similar percentages were shown for ‘short’
messages up to average lengths in all environments. TWR showed slightly
higher percentage for twice average length, which was associated with issuing
of ATC clearances.
In terms of complexity associated with the number of different topics and
speech acts within messages, there was no significant difference between
environments. The three most used topics were altitude, route/position and
greetings. The majority of messages contained between 2 to 4 elements.
Overall, TAR and TWR showed higher percentages of instruction speech acts
than ARR which had more requests.
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About 40% of elements were associated with identification of speaker and
recipient. Mell (1991c) quoted 33% for this category while 33% was
categorised as speaker turn management (Mell, 1992). Mell (1991c) also found
33% speech acts associated with management of aircraft movement, 33% for
speaker/recipient identification, 26% for frequency, SSR code and radar
contact, and 5% for repairs. The present research found that 43% aviation
topics were associated with aircraft disposition, with highest usage of altitude,
route/position heading and communications. Greetings were regularly used in
all three environments.
Another study by Mell (1992) found 24% messages were for task management
and 76% for dialogue management. Task management consisted of 12%
instructions and 11% advisory, while dialogue management consisted of 34%
speaker turn, 21 understanding and 19% radar/radio contact. Corradini and
Cacciari (2001) found that discrepancies and error were more frequent in low
workload phases whilst redundancies (greetings, negotiations, plain language)
were more frequent in high workload. Differences were also noted by Corradini
and Cacciari in error rate between environments, associated with age,
experience, training and service. The present research did not specify the low
and high workload phases, but analysis results could be directly correlated to
environments, and indirectly associated with age, experience and training.
Based on callsign usage in radiotelephony by ATC, the most deviations were
shown in TWR environment with 27% non-usage of correct callsign format.
Pilots’ deviation was highest in TWR with 22% unapproved format.
Miscommunications arising from callsign usage were about 0.2%, where other
than the intended recipient responded to messages or ATC wrongly responded
to a different aircraft than the speaker.
The issuances of instructions by ATC were also found to deviate from standard
format or were incomplete. The highest partial instructions percentage was
shown for communications transfer instructions, followed by approach
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instructions, speed control and restrictions. Pilots’ readback of ATC clearances
showed the highest deviations in communications transfer. High percentages
were also noted for approach clearance, speed and restrictions. Request for
messages repetition was on average about 0.2% overall, while usage of
aviation topics associated with ‘ver’ (verification) were 1.3%. Pilots fail to
provide complete initial information on average of 70% contact messages.
In TAR messages, 3.2% contained errors, while ARR 2% and TWR 2.3%.
These errors were coded for substitution, transposition and misunderstanding of
relayed information. However, most of these errors were corrected. Those that
were not corrected and became hearback errors totalled to 0.1% in each
environment. Taking into account all messages from all three environments
and considering the types of errors coded in the data analyses, collectively, 1%
of messages contained some type of error that should not have been
committed. This amount was similar to what Cardosi (1993, 1994, and 1996)
concluded although the classification of error messages was slightly different.
Other discrepancies coded were excess verbiage, fillers, pauses and language
switch. Roger, okay and filler types were commonly found, greeting were
sometimes in another language and false starts for immediate correction or
changes were also noticed. Collectively, these showed low percentages and
did not impair ATC communication. In some instances, these were strategically
accommodating thinking time and impromptu decision making to handle the
dynamic traffic situation.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Opening Remarks
This research was undertaken to examine research objectives associated with
ATC radiotelephony, English language and ESL speakers. These objectives
and sub-objectives are summarised in Chapter 1 part 1.3.
Demographics information was collected by questionnaire, intended to ascertain
the population’s composition, usage of English language, perception on Aviation
English’s training format, structure and management; and observation of non-
adherence to stipulated standard practises in routine operations. The detailed
cross sectional study of ATC radiotelephony was aimed towards identifying and
quantifying the radiotelephony characteristics; and to determine types and
recurrence of errors related to language and/or phraseology usage. The
hypotheses assumed was that “the characteristics of ATC Radiotelephony
involving ESL controllers will show frequent evidence of non-proficiency and
language related errors commonly associated with safety occurrences”
(Chapter 1 part 1.4).
The initial assessment of the research area and focus was through a review of
UK AIRPROX reports spanning over 7 years. These reports contained
information on types of possible errors, class of airspace in which the errors
occurred, flight phases and ATC units involved, as well as verification or
mitigation steps taken (parts 2.4.2 and 3.4.2). This information pointed towards
an appropriate method of data collection and analyses. Information from other
databases such as MORS (Appendices C & D), ICAO ADREP and FAA’s
ASIAS supported and enhanced the information from UK AIRPROX,
contributing towards structuring the research as explained in Chapter1 part 1.5
and depicted as a flow chart in Figure 4-2. Previous researches related to the
subject area in United States and UK/Europe provided further information on
established coding and analyses tools that are appropriate for this research
(parts 4.6 and 4.7). The current research investigated ATC radiotelephony for
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three different environments; Tower, En-route Radar and Approach Radar
Control.
7.2 Demographics Composition
This section refers to the results as presented in Chapter 5 on the human
resources of the ATC system, the dominance of English language in daily
communications and perceptions of training efficiency and non-adherence to
standard ATC operations.
7.2.1 Controllers’ Demographics
Table 7-1 summarises some factors by ratio description to compare between
the three ATC environments investigated in the research (parts 1.3 and 5.1).
Table 7-1: Summarised Description of Controllers’ Demographics
% ratio TAR ARR TWR
Ethnic Malay:Chinese:Indian:Others 45 : 30 : 20 : 5 71 : 13 : 16 : 0 83 : 2 : 4 : 11
Gender Male:Female 90 : 10 68 : 32 77 : 23
Majority Age Group 40 – 50+ 30 - 49 25 – 40’s
Service <11:11-15:>15 years 2 : 0 : 98 49 : 0 : 52 70 : 9 : 20
Education secondary:diploma:degree 43 : 23 : 35 29 : 7 : 64 38 : 50 : 11
English 1:2:3:0 70 : 28 : 2 : 0 42 : 55 : 0 : 3 28 : 67 : 0 : 5
These responses allowed some general description of the controllers in the
three ATC environments investigated as follows:
TAR:
- a fair mixture of ethnic groups and academic background,
- consists of older age group (40’s and 50’s),
- 9 to 1 male-female ratio,
- more than 15 years in-service experience.
ARR:
- Malay ethnic majority, small portion of Chinese and Indian,
- age group between 30 to 50,
- one third female, two-thirds male
- mixture of in-service experience.
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TWR:
- Malay majority, minor portion of other ethnic groups,
- younger age group, 25 to 40s,
- one quarter female, three quarters male,
- largely less 11 years in-service experience.
7.2.2 English Language Dominance
Usage of English language was more dominant in TAR as 70% declared it as
the most frequent daily language. In ARR, more than half the controllers used
English as the second frequent language. The dominance was still evident as
40% did declare it as the most frequently used. This dominance was less
obvious in TWR as two-thirds of the controllers declared English as the second
frequent language used. In both ARR and TWR, a small percentage of
controllers did not include English as the first three most frequently used
languages. English was most frequently used in the ACC and College by
controllers aged over forty, specifically by the majority of Chinese and Indian
ethnic groups. Detailed findings on English language usage are explained in
Chapter 5 part 5.2.
Air traffic control is a specialised area that requires specific terminology,
knowledge and skill. Controllers are trained from scratch and all training is
conducted in English. Language proficiency has always been an operational
and licensing requirement. Aviation related documents, manuals and notices
are published in English. The education system in Malaysia introduced English
as a mandatory taught subject and students started learning the language as
early as 6 years old. This early exposure and access to reading as well as multi
media resources assist in ordinary usage of the language. The language is
more dominant in developed city areas and where multi-racial communities are
the norm.
7.2.3 Respondents’ Perception of Training Courses’ Efficiency
The intake into the air traffic controllers’ career used to be at secondary
education level up to the early 1980’s. Tertiary level intake introduced diploma
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and degree holders into the service. Academic qualifications of TAR controllers
were a mixture of levels from different intake groups. In ARR, more controllers
were from degree intake and TWR showed more Diploma level intake.
However, this did not change the training format and controllers are still
required to attend and pass basic courses, as well as rating courses before
being licensed for operational ATC duties.
The general perceptions on training (part 5.3) are:
i. ATC communications, standard phraseology and radiotelephony
skills training were generally provided to the majority of controllers.
ii. Aviation English training was less readily available, of which only
40% of controllers claim to have attended.
iii. The format was classroom lectures orientated with less emphasis
on public speaking, role play, verbal communications and listening
comprehension. Radiotelephony examples were not well
incorporated into the module, as were computerised exercises and
handling unexpected situations.
iv. Documents and references were noted by respondents as limited or
not readily available.
v. The responses also emphasised the need for better training format
and resources as well as more efficient time management.
vi. There were positive opinions on instructors’ knowledge of ATC
operations and English language usage.
vii. Teaching techniques and management of training courses were not
so highly valued. These need to be improved as it has a bearing on
the achievements of trainees attending training. Better resources
should be utilised to enhanced training effectiveness.
viii. Benefits from training were more ATC operations related rather
than language related. The overall ATC communication and
language related training were evaluated by respondents as
adequate but not overly successful.
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7.2.4 Non-adherence to Standard Practices
These estimations were based on experience and observation by controllers in
daily operations (part 5.4):
i. Daily ATC operations contain general non-adherence to standard
practices in the range of 30 percent,
ii. Pilots’ readback were observed as incomplete or incorrect or both
around 30 – 40% of the time,
iii. Standard phraseology was adhered to, at best, about 75% of the
time by controllers and pilots,
iv. Message comprehension problems and the need for verification
and repeats were observed and estimated to be between 5 to 15%,
v. Most common causes of misunderstanding are poor language
usage, unclear pronunciation, incomplete or ambiguous
information and usage of non-standard phraseology,
vi. Mitigation of errors were considered quite efficient as the outcome
were more likely increased workload or communications taskload
than loss of separation or aircraft proximity.
7.3 A Question of Proficiency
The analyses of radiotelephony had fulfilled the objectives of identifying and
quantifying the characteristics of pilot-controller messages. In addition, the
types of errors had been determined and possibility of recurrence had been
approximated. These had been presented in detail in Chapter 6 and will be
summarised and recapped in this section.
7.3.1 Radiotelephony Characteristics
Table 7-2 summarises the results of the analysis for a comparison of
characteristics (parts 1.3 and 6.2 - 6.4). Based on general characteristics, the
TAR environment seemed to be the busiest. More time was occupied with
transmission of messages, more messages were transmitted per unit time and
per aircraft, and more instructions were issued compared to ARR and TWR.
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Table 7-2: Comparison of General Characteristics of ATC Radiotelephony
Analyses TAR ARR TWR
Transmission occupancy 32.3 % 30.6 % 27 %
Aircraft / 30 minutes 13 14 11
Contact time / aircraft 6.5 minutes 11 minutes 7 minutes
Messages / aircraft 13 10 11
Messages / minute 5.5 4.7 4.1
Messages frequency 1 in 11 seconds 1 in 13 seconds 1 in 15 seconds
Words / message 11 10 11
Numerals / message 6 5 5
Speech rate 176 155 171
Elements / hour 843 715 658
Identification Elements 37.7 % 40.7 % 38.3 %
Instruction Elements 36.5 % 27.3 % 33.4 %
Advisory Elements 14.8 % 15.8 % 17.2 %
The elements and numerals usages also supported the notion that TAR
environment has a higher workload compared to ARR or TWR. More advisory
elements were found TWR than other environments.
7.3.2 Error Analyses
The parsed messages were coded by a set of 47 variables to evaluate usage of
elements, adherence to standards and identification of errors (parts 1.3 and 6.3
– 6.7). The results indicated that the routine ATC radiotelephony contained:
i. non- adherence to standard phraseology,
ii. usage of plain language in place of standard phraseology,
iii. non-standard formatting of elements,
iv. not abiding to recommended pronunciation,
v. usage of other language, fillers and verbosity,
vi. need for repetition or verification of messages or information, and
vii. occurrences of misunderstandings and miscommunications.
Table 7-3 shows the summarised percentages of elements that were coded for
errors (non-compliant to required ATC standard practices). Although TWR
showed highest percentages in more categories, the differences were not
significantly excessive. The types of errors and airspace of occurrence whilst
matching those found in the pilot study of Airproxes, are more definitely coded
and quantified in the radiotelephony analyses.
ATC Radiotelephony Safety: Investigating the ESL Perspective
201
Table 7-3: Percentages of Errors in Elements for Categories Analysed
Categories TAR ARR TWR
ATC Callsign Usage 28.9 % 31.0 % 35.3 %
Pilot Callsign Usage 30.1 % 28.7 % 28.8 %
Callsign Miscommunication 0.36 % 1.04 % 0.42 %
ATC Instruction Issued 17.7 % 17.8 % 20.1 %
Pilot Readback 34 % 38 % 41 %
Verbosity 0.8 % 1.5 % 1.8 %
Disfluencies 1.2 % 1.4 % 2.0 %
Resulting readback errors 0.8 % 1 % 0.8 %
The percentage of non-adherence (eg. partial / no readback, non-standard
phraseology) showed in the analyses was also found to be quite similar to that
estimated or observed by the controllers in the questionnaire responses.
Table 7-4 shows some results of previous and current studies.
Table 7-4: Previous and Present Results on Radiotelephony Analyses
Reference Analysis TAR ARR TWR
Mell (1991) Speech acts
33 % aircraft management
33 % speaker turn management
26 % communications mngt.
5 % clarification / correction
Mohd (2008)* Elements
39% Identification
32% Instructions
16% Advisories
1.3% verification
72 %
40 %
Pilots’ incomplete
readbacks
29 %
Cardosi (1994)
Cardosi et.al.(1996)
Cardosi (1997)
Readback error Less 1% of instructions issued
Pilots’ partial readback 34 % 38% 41 %Mohd (2008)*
Readback error 0.8 % 1.0% 0.8%
ATC Address errors 14 %
Pilots’ Address errors 25 %
ATC instruction errors 55 %
Pilot readback errors 53 %
Elements errors (ATC) 40 %
Prinzo (1996)
Elements errors (Pilots) 59 %
ATC callsign errors 28.9 % 31.0 % 35.3 %
Pilots callsign errors 30.1 % 28.7 % 28.8 %
ATC Instructions 17.7 % 17.8 % 20.1 %
Mohd (2008)*
Pilots’ readback 34 % 38 % 41 %
Cardosi & DiFiore
(2004)
Transmissions per
minute 4.5 2 3.8
Mohd (2008)* Messages per minute 5.5 4.7 4.1
Mohd (2008)* is the current research (PhD thesis).
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Some were focussed on errors in messages while other results indicated usage
of speech acts and aviation topics (Elements). The current research
complements some aspects studied before. In comparison, the percentages
discovered in this research do not indicate any inferior standards of language
and phraseology usage. In fact, some percentages showed better adherence to
standards, for example pilots’ readback of ATC instructions.
The current research evidence concluded that errors did occur in ATC
environments where the controllers are ESL users, but the recurrence rates
were not much different from environments in which the controllers were native
English users. Based on the findings, it is fair to conclude that routine
radiotelephony involving ESL controllers are as ‘safe’ as those involving native
English users (Chapter 1 part 1.3 & 1.4).
7.4 Concluding Note
This research had achieved what it set out to discover. However, it had proven
the earlier hypothesis to be false. Although errors were found, these were no
more frequent than the percentage previously computed in native English user
environment (Chapter 1 part 1.4). There was insufficient evidence to indicate
non-proficiency in standard phraseology and English language usage in routine
ATC operations.
In terms of originality, the research has sourced and analysed data from a
country (Malaysia) and region (South East Asia) not accessed before. This
complements previous researches which sourced data from United States and
parts of European airspace. A well established methodology and coding tools
applied in this research enhanced the value of findings as these could be
compared with earlier results.
The deficiencies and discrepancies of the routine ATC radiotelephony in TAR,
ARR and TWR environments, in which the controllers were ESL users, were
identified. In addition, some observations by controllers were summarised
about the training format and structure. Together, these findings should benefit
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the service provider in future training plans, subject areas to emphasise and
particular problematic areas to address.
The information gathered in this research has not contradicted the general
assumption that ESL users’ radiotelephony will contain errors. However, the
occurrence and recurrence of errors in the radiotelephony had NOT:
 frequently interfered with ease of understanding,
 interfered with meaning of messages,
 showed lack of vocabulary range,
 frequently prevented effective communication,
 prevented clarification strategies in complicated situations, and
 resulted in failure to adequately deal with misunderstandings.
The conclusions of the research have pointed out that the radiotelephony was
not in absolute adherence to ICAO standard and recommended practices.
However, the English language was used efficiently and did not adversely affect
any ATC functions. There were a recurrence of errors and discrepancies, but
these were, to a large percentage, noticed and corrected. In those instances
that problems did occur, suitable correctional actions were taken to avoid
misunderstanding. These occurrences were observed as very low in recurrence
rate and usually mitigated, consequently causing additional communication
taskload but were prevented from progressing into an unsafe situation.
However, these problems were not noted as frequently causing difficulties to the
extent that ATC function and objectives were not achieved.
ATC is a dynamic operation, with ever changing patterns and people
participating in the system. Error percentages that the system indicated today
may not be as accurate in the future if performance levels are not maintained
continuously. The development of controller resources has successfully
prepared these controllers for the functions of ATC but there needs to be a
constant effort to improve and enhance training and day to day performance,
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taking into account the growth of the aviation industry and air traffic movements
worldwide.
Overall, there was no definite evidence to prove that the controllers were not
proficient in using English for routine ATC communications. The research was
not meant to evaluate a general proficiency in English; neither could it speculate
the performances of pilots and controllers in an emergency situation. It did
however realistically examine the radiotelephony characteristics in the
Malaysian airspace. Within the scope of routine radiotelephony, the findings of
the research could only confirm that the radiotelephony between these ESL
controllers and pilots had not shown evidence of serious language
incompetence. The language usage in radiotelephony was found not sufficient
to evaluate knowledge on subjects related to ATC. Messages used routinely
were standardised and formatted to suit the service objectives. The
communication recorded only allowed for an evaluation of adherence to
recommended practises. Marks of disfluencies such as fillers, hesitations, false
starts and verbosity were only found in small percentages and did not hamper
or prevent understanding. Fillers, pauses and verbosity were mostly
strategically used to allow instantaneous thinking and decision making.
Otherwise, it was a bad habit that needs to be unlearnt.
At present, there is no scale or rating to denote a grade to the radiotelephony
performance of an ATC system. The regulatory authorities and the industry are
unable, as yet, to draw a limit beyond which the amount of discrepancies and
errors in a system are considered unacceptable. The holistic descriptions as
used by ICAO uses markers such as ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’, ‘sufficient’, ‘often’,
‘sufficiently’ and ‘adequately’. These markers are not attached to specific
numerical values and are more discretionary in evaluation. There is also no
definite ranking of error types to prioritise corrective steps. Further conclusive
evidence is needed before one type of error could be classified as being more
risky than others.
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7.5 Managing the Research
This research employed well established methods and utilised a verified
taxonomy for encoding. It involved collecting primary data and required
meticulous processing. Completion took 46 months and the most tedious, time
consuming portion was data collection and processing. Any research such as
this need to take into serious account the time constraints, expertise and
amount of data collected. Previous studies had also shown that the occurrence
of errors may be in 1% of the data. A reasonably large data set was collected
for this research to best capture rarer but critical errors that may be missed in a
smaller data set.
The audio selection stage was quite complicated as segments selected should
be from different controllers, of moderate to high workloads and with suitable
audio quality for recording. 7 different locations were involved in the data
collection, consisting of 2 out of 5 TAR work positions, 3 out of 6 ARR sectors
and 6 out of 20 TWR locations. Over 300 hours of radiotelephony was
examined for suitability before the selected 73 hours consisting of 190
segments were digitally recorded. The selection and recording process took
about 3 months to complete. These segments represented 95% of TAR
controllers, 65% of ARR controllers and 90% of TWR controllers, amounting to
a comprehensive cross sectional selection of controllers’ radiotelephony. The
time of day and seasonal variations were not taken into consideration as the
aim was to collect a representative sample from the population studied. The
radiotelephony data contained normal daily scenarios, exchanges of messages
between pilots and controllers and the non-standard practices that had
occurred.
The automatic transcription technology available today has not yet reached the
level of sophistication to process ATC radiotelephony audio. Manual
transcription of audio into text is a slow and time consuming task, especially
when accuracy is of utmost importance. A random cross check of transcription
and coding accuracy (as has been done in the current research) by suitably
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qualified independent person(s) should be seriously considered as quality
control measures. The audio quality, speech rate and contents add to the
difficulty of transcription work. One minute of audio need at least 10 minutes
listening for the transcription to be completed accurately. Collectively, the audio
to text transcription took around 8 months to complete. Parsing of messages
was equally tedious and required familiarity with the subject matter.
Encoding of the messages segments utilised the ATSAT that best classify the
contents as well as discrepancies and errors. As the research was safety
related, it was the error recurrence rate and type which were of prime interest.
The parsed and coded data was organised in an Excel database for easy
accessibility. SPSS software was most suited for character and error analyses
to be carried out effectively as well as compatible with Excel.
A similar study of this magnitude could be more time efficient if the transcription
work could be carried out by a qualified person. A subject matter expert could
also be employed to parse and code messages. In this manner, the researcher
only needs to analyse the processed data and interpret the results. However,
knowledge of the ATC system and operations is important to realistically
construe the results in terms of relevance to routine operations and its
correlation to safety.
7.6 Future Research
This research had found answers, but had also found more questions and
highlights possible areas of further research. Malaysia is but one country in the
South East Asia region where English is used as a second or foreign language.
One data source is not enough to allow a generalisation of all countries that
have a majority of ESL user controllers. However, taking the language
background into consideration, these findings may also be applicable to
countries such as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei and Philippines where
English plays quite a dominant part in education and business. The controllers
in these countries are also ESL users. Other Asian countries such as Japan,
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Korea and China also use English as a second or foreign language, but there
may be differences in language learning policies. A similar study in any of
these locations may add further evidence about radiotelephony involving ESL
speakers. Other issues are:
i. Speech rate: It was noted that the speech rate computed from the
radiotelephony was higher than the recommended 100 words per minute
(ICAO, 1992f). Generally, ATC related words (half of which are numerals)
are short and messages are transmitted with some urgency, which may be
contributory to higher speech rate. However, no conclusion could be fairly
formed as there wasn’t any specific data on ATC radiotelephony speech rate
to compare against. A speech rate of 235 words per minute, stated as
‘typical’ by Taylor et. al. (2005) did not specify any definite source. It may be
worth examining world wide ATC speech rates in comparison to the
recommendation by ICAO, which was made in 1950’s. Current
sophisticated communication technologies could prove that a different
speech rate may be safely designated and practised.
ii. Abnormal message structure: In the current research, no emergency and
unexpected events were recorded. These occurrences are generally few
and far between. However, a specific study into radiotelephony prior, during
and after such an event may be relevant to understand changes to routine
practices and habits. Mell’s (1991b; 1991a) studies had found differences in
messages structure of non-routine communications. The present study was
unable to include this aspect of the radiotelephony.
iii. ATC-ATC messages: Another form of communications, that these ESL
controllers participate in, is the coordination telephony with adjacent ATC
units. These are for traffic management, briefing of pertinent information
and relaying of relevant information. These are part and parcel of the ATC
operations and complement the actual controlling of aircraft. Records had
shown that misunderstandings could and had happened within these
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channels of communications. The different nature to radiotelephony renders
a combined study in the present research unsuitable. Separate research is
more appropriate to uncover how far this area poses a risk to flight safety.
One study that had looked into this area was by Peterson and Bailey (2001).
The study attempted to develop and verify taxonomy of communications
between the radar controller and the procedural controller at en-route ATC
working positions.
iv. Error prioritisation: Presently, there is no specific priority or ranking of
errors in terms of risk. An assessment of error recurrence in safety
occurrences could possibly show the way forward.
The data collected in this research were analysed for non-adherence to
standard practises and errors in different ATC environment, whilst emphasising
on the ESL perspective. It is but a small portion of the knowledge gap explored.
There are still vast possibilities for in-depth studies on how voice and audio
quality, ethnic and gender may affect types and percentages of error.
In terms of data resources, the transcribed messages could be further used for
message structure analyses, conversation analysis and ethnomethodology
studies. The audio recordings are suitable for listening comprehension
practises in controllers and pilots training. It is realistic, represents the actual
environment and specific clips could be used for error detection and prevention
training. These could also be resourced for voice recognition studies which are
still developing better software to transcribe ATC radiotelephony successfully.
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APPENDIX A: Example of NMACS Database Query Result Using Keywords ‘TRACON’ and ‘phraseology’
APPENDIX B: ICAO LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY RATING SCALE
Expert, Extended and Operational Levels (Source: ICAO Annex 1)
LEVEL PRONUNCIATION
Assumes a dialect and/or
accent intelligible to the
aeronautical community.
STRUCTURE
Relevant grammatical
structures and sentence
patterns are determined by
language functions
appropriate to the task.
VOCABULARY FLUENCY COMPREHENSION INTERACTIONS
Expert
6
Pronunciation, stress,
rhythm, and intonation,
though possibly
influenced by the first
language or regional
variation, almost never
interfere with ease of
understanding.
Both basic and complex
grammatical structures and
sentence patterns are
consistently well
controlled.
Vocabulary range and
accuracy are sufficient to
communicate effectively
on a wide variety of
familiar and unfamiliar
topics. Vocabulary is
idiomatic, nuanced, and
sensitive to register.
Able to speak at length
with a natural, effortless
flow. Varies speech flow
for stylistic effect, e.g. to
emphasize a point. Uses
appropriate discourse
markers and connectors
spontaneously.
Comprehension is
consistently accurate in
nearly all contexts and
includes comprehension of
linguistic and cultural
subtleties.
Interacts with ease in
nearly all situations. Is
sensitive to verbal and
non-verbal cues and
responds to them
appropriately.
Extended
5
Pronunciation, stress,
rhythm, and intonation,
though influenced by the
first language or regional
variation, rarely interfere
with ease of
understanding.
Basic grammatical
structures and sentence
patterns are consistently
well controlled. Complex
structures are attempted
but with errors which
sometimes interfere with
meaning.
Vocabulary range and
accuracy are sufficient to
communicate effectively
on common, concrete, and
work-related topics.
Paraphrases consistently
and successfully.
Vocabulary is sometimes
idiomatic.
Able to speak at length
with relative ease on
familiar topics but may not
vary speech flow as a
stylistic device. Can make
use of appropriate
discourse markers or
connectors.
Comprehension is accurate
on common, concrete, and
work- related topics and
mostly accurate when the
speaker is confronted with
a linguistic or situational
complication or an
unexpected turn of events.
Is able to comprehend a
range of speech varieties
(dialect and/or accent) or
registers.
Responses are
immediate, appropriate,
and informative.
Manages the speaker/
listener relationship
effectively.
Operational
4
Pronunciation, stress,
rhythm, and intonation are
influenced by the first
language or regional
variation but only
sometimes interfere with
ease of understanding.
Basic grammatical
structures and sentence
patterns are used creatively
and are usually well
controlled. Errors may
occur, particularly in
unusual or unexpected
circumstances, but rarely
interfere with meaning.
Vocabulary range and
accuracy are usually
sufficient to communicate
effectively on common,
concrete, and work-related
topics. Can often
paraphrase successfully
when lacking vocabulary
in unusual or unexpected
circumstances.
Produces stretches of
language at an appropriate
tempo. There may be
occasional loss of fluency
on transition from
rehearsed or formulaic
speech to spontaneous
interaction, but this does
not prevent effective
communication. Can make
limited use of discourse
markers or connectors.
Fillers are not distracting.
Comprehension is mostly
accurate on common,
concrete, and work- related
topics when the accent or
variety used is sufficiently
intelligible for an
international community of
users. When the speaker is
confronted with a
linguistic or situational
complication or an
unexpected turn of events,
comprehension may be
slower or require
clarification strategies.
Responses are usually
immediate, appropriate,
and informative. Initiates
and maintains exchanges
even when dealing with
an unexpected turn of
events. Deals adequately
with apparent
misunderstandings by
checking, confirming, or
clarifying.
Levels 1, 2 and 3 are on subsequent page.
Pre-operational, Elementary and Pre-elementary Levels
LEVEL PRONUNCIATION
Assumes a dialect and/or
accent intelligible to the
aeronautical community.
STRUCTURE
Relevant grammatical
structures and sentence
patterns are determined by
language functions
appropriate to the task.
VOCABULARY FLUENCY COMPREHENSION INTERACTIONS
Levels 4, 5 and 6 are on preceding page.
Pre-
operational
3
Pronunciation, stress,
rhythm, and intonation are
influenced by the first
language or regional
variation and frequently
interfere with ease of
understanding.
Basic grammatical
structures and sentence
patterns associated with
predictable situations are
not always well controlled.
Errors frequently interfere
with meaning.
Vocabulary range and
accuracy are often
sufficient to communicate
on common, concrete, or
work-related topics, but
range is limited and the
word choice often
inappropriate. Is often
unable to paraphrase
successfully when lacking
vocabulary.
Produces stretches of
language, but phrasing and
pausing are often
inappropriate. Hesitations
or slowness in language
processing may prevent
effective communication.
Fillers are sometimes
distracting.
Comprehension is often
accurate on common,
concrete, and work- related
topics when the accent or
variety used is sufficiently
intelligible for an
international community of
users. May fail to
understand a linguistic or
situational
complication or an
unexpected turn of events.
Responses are
sometimes immediate,
appropriate, and
informative. Can initiate
and maintain exchanges
with reasonable ease on
familiar topics and in
predictable situations.
Generally inadequate
when dealing with an
unexpected turn of
events.
Elementary
2
Pronunciation, stress,
rhythm, and intonation are
heavily influenced by the
first language or regional
variation and usually
interfere with ease of
understanding.
Shows only limited control
of a few simple memorized
grammatical structures and
sentence patterns.
Limited vocabulary range
consisting only of isolated
words and memorized
phrases.
Can produce very short,
isolated, memorized
utterances with frequent
pausing and a distracting
use of fillers to search for
expressions and to
articulate less familiar
words.
Comprehension is limited
to isolated, memorized
phrases when they are
carefully and slowly
articulated.
Response time is slow
and often inappropriate.
Interaction is limited to
simple routine
exchanges.
Pre-
elementary
1
Performs at a level below the
Elementary level.
Performs at a level below
the Elementary level.
Performs at a level below
the Elementary level.
Performs at a level below
the Elementary level.
Performs at a level below
the Elementary level.
Performs at a level
below the Elementary
level.
APPENDIX C: Results for ‘Language’ Query of UK CAA MORS Database
Safety Regulation Group
Safety Investigation & Data Department
Aviation House Direct Dial 01293 573220 Switchboard 01293 567171
Gatwick Airport South Direct Fax 01293 573972 Fax 01293 573999
West Sussex E-mail sdd@srg.caa.co.uk Telex 878753
RH6 0YR
These records were retrieved from the UK CAA Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) system by a member of the
SIDD Department
The MOR system records include information reported to the CAA, information obtained from CAA investigations, and
deductions by CAA staff based on the available information. The authenticity of the contents or the absence of errors
and omissions cannot be guaranteed. Records in this system commenced on 1 January 1976 coincident with the
introduction of Mandatory Occurrence Reporting in the UK, but occurrences reported voluntarily are also included, and
no distinction is made between them.
Note: Any data provided from these records are made available on the understanding that they are only to be
used for purposes of Flight Safety and must not be used for other purposes.
Note: Any data provided from these records are made available on the understanding
that they are only to be used for purposes of Flight Safety and must not be used for other
purposes.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200000066
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 09 Jan 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Barcelona
Events : ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion over heading between ATC & crew.
Precis :
After departure the a/c was allegedly given a climb clearance to FL170 & right heading 340 degrees,
which was read back. Passing FL70 radar requested a/c to stop climb FL70, climb arrested at FL75. Radar
claimed that instructions had been to climb FL170 & right heading 240 degrees. Reporter believes that
there might have been language confusion & their readback was not corrected.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200000094
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 09 Jan 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Barcelona
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion between ATC and crew concerning B767's clearance.
Precis :
Following take off from R/W20, on an OKABI 1C SID, a/c changed frequency. The new controller cleared
the B767 to FL170 and right heading 340deg, which was read back as the B767 was passing FL70. ATC
requested B767 to stop climb at FL70, by which time it was passing FL75. ATC agreed that the B767
should be held at FL80 due to opposite direction traffic at FL90. Subsequently the controller claimed that
the B767 had been cleared to climb to FL170 and a right heading of 240deg. P1 states that the readback
given was not corrected.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200000115
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 03 Jan 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Las Palmas
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info : THAIS - NERNO
Pretitle :
During climb to cleared FL350 ATC instructed A320 to level off at FL190, which was complied with.
Subsequently A320 received a TCAS RA.
Precis :
During A320's climb to FL350 ATC instructed it to level off at FL190 due traffic. A320 then received a
TCAS RA of descend, which was complied with. ATC advised. When clear of conflict, ATC cleared A320 to
FL350. During the incident Spanish was being spoken to the other a/c.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200000513
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 30 Jan 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : English Channel
Events : Engine/Malfunction Power
Loss - First Engine
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
An MD80 diverting to Gatwick, due to an engine problem, requested step down descents to 2000ft while to
2the South of Gatwick:, descent to 2000ft refused. A/c descended to 3000ft.
Precis :
CAA Closure: Whilst the pilot did not actually declare an emergency he did say that he had an engine
problem and was descending in order to restart it. This was interpreted as an emergency and the aircraft
was put on a 7700 squawk and transferred to a discrete frequency because the en-route frequency was
busy. The operator reported afterwards that the engine failure had also caused a pressurisation
malfunction requiring a rapid descent, which was requested. However, the loss of pressurisation was
unknown to ATC at the time and descent to 2000ft provoked a question about fuel and a certain amount of
unease and uncertainty in the minds of the controllers that with only one engine, the crew wished to
descend so low so early. When ATC tried to establish why the pilot wished to make such an early
descent, confusion arose about fuel. When asked by the controller "can you just advise me, are you
descending to use fuel?" the crew misinterpreted this as - did they have enough fuel? - and replied "yes
we are descending with fuel enough and everything is OK". There was not only a misunderstanding of
language, but a misunderstanding by the foreign pilot of the question, and in that respect the reply
confused rather than clarified the situation. Nevertheless, the controller's question "are you descending to
use fuel ?" uses rather complex English syntax, and was perhaps always open to mis-interpretation by a
pilot whose native tongue is not English.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200000912
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 10 Feb 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bucharest
Events : Ramp Incident Location Info :
Pretitle :
Potential hazard during B737 pushback due to the ground engineer not being able to speak English.
Precis :
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200001058
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 17 Feb 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : ATC Conflict Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged poor ATC culminating in a TCAS RA climb.
Precis :
A/c cleared FL130 MAR VOR. With 10nm to run to MAR re-routed to MGA VOR. After 30 seconds and
descending through FL155, told to fly to MAR VOR, stop descent FL150. No response to 2 requests by crew for
routing after MAR. VHF very busy with Spanish being spoken. Overhead MAR a/c cleared for MAR 1C arrival .
On descent & at 5,500 ft abeam R/W 14 threshold a TCAS RA of climb received & complied with against a
possible biz-jet. Believed controller training being performed: also possible poor co-ordination between Seville
Area Radar & Malaga Approach.
A/C Type : DHC8 Occurrence Number : 200001130
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 26 Feb 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Reporter believes there was inadequate separation between two landing a/c.
Precis :
Reporter states that the DHC8 was established onto R/W09 ILS and instructed to reduce speed to 150kts and
then at 8nm, to minimum approach speed. Clearance to land was given relatively early. After landing ATC
instructed DHC8 to expedite vacating R/W at RET 15 due 'a/c close behind'. The DHC8 had just vacated the
R/W when a B727 passed on its landing roll. Reporter believes B727 landed whilst the DHC8 was still on the
R/W centreline. ATC were talking to the B727 in French.
A/C Type : Piper PA34 Seneca Occurrence Number : 200001573
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 13 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Daventry (DTY)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
PA34 failed to follow its ATC heading and came into potential conflict with a B737. Traffic info and avoiding
action given.
Precis :
CAA Closure: The pilot appears to have misinterpreted an instruction to continue on heading, made after his
initial call, as a clearance to continue on flight plan. Hence, he carried out a turn towards BPK which brought him
into conflict with the B737. Appropriate action has been taken.
3A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200002112
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 30 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Passing FL117 during climb to FL280, A320 was told to maintain FL110. A320 reached FL126 before returning
to FL110.
Precis :
After departing R/W14 A320 was cleared to climb to FL280. When passing FL117, ATC told A320 to maintain
FL110 on reaching, but was given no reason for this action. A320 called ATC to confirm instruction whilst
TCAS showed a B737 above descending. Autopilot disconnected and A320 descended to FL106 at which point
the B737 was indicating 800ft above & still descending.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200002151
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 03 Apr 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B757 600ft low over high terrain due to 8000ft/FL80 being used.
Precis :
ATC cleared B757 to descend to FL80, but was subsequently recleared to 8000ft. The pressure setting of
993mb was a difference of 600ft. Crew twice queried the clearance but ATC confirmed 8000ft on QNH. The
next controller recleared the B757 to FL80. B757 climbed back to FL80.
A/C Type : Military Occurrence Number : 200002295
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 07 Apr 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : LOMON
Events : Loss of Standard Separation
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Separation lost between two military a/c North of LOMON at FL105. STCA activated. Avoiding action given.
Precis :
One of the foreign military a/c involved was also involved in an altitude excursion inbound to Glasgow on the
same day, possibly caused by an altimeter setting problem.
CAA Closure: The military aircraft seemed to ignore ATC instructions and it is possible that they were actually
attempting to fly in formation. The responsible military authority has indicated that many of the problems
encountered were probably caused by language difficulties. It is not known whether there was a lack of
knowledge of procedures for flying in CAS. The military authority has taken appropriate authority in respect of
the language problem.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200002573
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 07 Apr 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Caracas
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Caracas ATC cleared B777 for a turn onto final approach to R/W09 from a position that it was unable to comply
with.
Precis :
As B777 was approaching airfield , with no warnings it was cleared to turn onto final approach from a position
that made it impossible for the aircraft to execute. The B777 requested a turn downwind to give more distance,
but ATC did not understand and kept clearing the B777 for the approach. As the LOC and high terrain were
approaching and with a B727 1100ft above, also believed to be on the LOC, the B777 elected to turn away from
the airfield. Visual separation was maintained with the B727.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200002911
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 28 Apr 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Prestwick
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 4 SE
Pretitle :
MD80 descended 500ft below its cleared level (FL80) before returning to FL80. Standard separation maintained
Precis :
A/C Type : Bell 206 Jet Ranger Occurrence Number : 200002983
4Flight Phase : Flight Occurrence Date : 29 Apr 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : BOURNEMOUTH
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign helicopter infringed the Bournemouth CTR/ATZ. Communications difficult & pilot failed to follow ATC
instructions.
Precis :
Helicopter eventually landed in a field short of the southern airfield boundary.
CAA Closure: The pilot reports that he had a radio problem and has apologised for the incident.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200003096
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 07 May 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : TCAS Report
ATC Conflict
Location Info : 15 W
Pretitle :
MD80 came into conflict with a B747 when it failed to turn for ILS R/W09L, due traffic believed to be in the White
Waltham circuit, which was on its right and showing on TCAS with no height readout.
Precis :
Traffic info and avoiding action given.
CAA Closure: The pilots report states that the a/c received 2 TCAS warnings at this time when both ATC and
pilot workload was high. He attempted to avoid the conflicts but due to the intensity of radio communications
had no time to fully explain the situation to ATC.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200003136
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 28 Apr 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : RATUK
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
As the BAe146 was approaching its cleared FL260 it was instructed, in French, to level at FL230. Fortunately
the P2 understood the instruction and was able to respond.
Precis :
The BAe146 belongs to a UK operator contracted to fly for the French National airline and was using the RT
callsign of the French operator. This probably explains why the French controller lapsed back into speaking
French.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200003200
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 09 May 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Valencia
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
As B737 pushed back from Stand 3, an unmarshalled ATR72 taxied directly in front across Stands 2, 3 and 4,
coming close to the tug.
Precis :
After a straight push back from Stand 3, the B737 had obliquely stopped across the taxyway. As the tug was
being disconnected, an ATR72 taxied unmarshalled across Stands 2, 3 and 4, directly in front of the B737 and in
close proximity to the unattached tug.
A/C Type : Robin 400 Occurrence Number : 200003226
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 11 May 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Leeds Bradford (LBA)
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info : 5 NE
Pretitle :
Alleged infringement of the Leeds-Bradford CTR (Class D) by a Robin 400. Traffic info given.
Precis :
CAA Closure: No report has yet been received from the pilot concerned. No further CAA action is possible.
A/C Type : SD330 Occurrence Number : 200003538
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 25 May 2000
Classification : UK Reportable Accident Location : Paris CDG
Events : Reportable Accident
Ground (AD) Collision -
Other A/c
Location Info :
Pretitle :
5UK Reportable Accident : Runway collision - MD83 collided with SD330 during take off run. 1 fatality in SD330.
French BEA investigation.
Precis :
The MD83, registered F-GHED, was cleared to take off from runway 27 at Paris Charles de Gaulle. The Shorts
330, registered G-SSWN, was then cleared to line up and to wait as "number two". The controller believed that
the two aircraft were at the threshold of the runway, whereas the Shorts had been cleared to use an
intermediate taxiway. The Shorts entered the runway at the moment the MD83 was reaching its rotation speed.
The tip of the MD83's left wing went through the Shorts 330's cockpit and hit both pilots, one of whom was killed.
The MD83 then aborted its take off. As a result of its investigation the French Bureau Enquetes-Accidents made
a number of safety recommendations, none of which were addressed to the CAA. The full BEA report can be
viewed on http://www.bea-fr.org/anglaise/rapports/rap.htm
CAA Closure: No CAA action appropriate.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200004060
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 10 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Olbia
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged poor ATC service /potential loss of separation.
Precis :
Departure clearance given & readback as "LGW VIA A/W 9 AJACCIO 5A SQK 1276 CLIMB TO FL160". A/c
was subsequently given a radar vector & whilst passing 5000ft a TCAS target was observed closing on the
reporters a/c. The PNF attempted to confirm cleared level but due to continuous comms in Italian was unable to
do so. A/c levelled at 5700ft & ATC informed of a/c's level & requested to confirm cleared level. Controller stated
"maintain 6000ft". Reporter concerned over the safety implications of mixed language ATC. Italian authorities
alerted.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200004065
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 10 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : AIRWAY UN 866
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B757and unknown a/c on Airway UN866 at FL370. Subject to investigation by the
Portuguese authorities.
Precis :
B757 received a TCAS RA. Controller acknowledged his error.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200004122
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 13 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : AVN VOR
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged that the Marseilles Approach Controller was unable to understand simple requests in English.
Precis :
A/c requested to hold away from MRS until a thunderstorm had cleared and then requested radar vectors from
the North. Approach controller could not understand this request. A/c self positioned in hold at AVN and was
then offered an approach from the South for R/W 14L. As the thunderstorm had now cleared to the South the
approach was flown without further incident. Reporter concerned about the controller's English language ability.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200004311
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 10 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info : 15
Pretitle :
TCAS TA during ILS approach to R/W 27 at CDG. Alleged poor ATC service and most control being conducted
in French.
Precis :
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200004734
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 02 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Brookmans Park (BPK)
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
6B747 climbed above cleared FL270. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
The pilot requested higher from ATC. The controller asked the a/c if FL270 was acceptable to which the a/c
replied in the affirmative. The a/c is then unambiguously cleared up to FL270 but the crew replied in guttural
tones, "up to 370", which was not detected by the controller concerned.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200004821
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 27 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bodrum
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC instructed a/c to maintain FL80 in an area where the MSA is 8500ft (QNH 1007mbs). ATCs English very
poor.
Precis :
ATC clearance on ground was RWY 29 DEP AKBUK 1E CLIMB FL100. On passing 7700ft a/c was instructed to
maintain FL80. A/c turned back to the BDR VOR to remain terrain safe.
A/C Type : SD360 Occurrence Number : 200004916
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 06 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Deauville
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX - SD360 and a TB9 on finals for R/W12 at Deauville. Subject to investigation by the French
authorities.
Precis :
SD360 on short final when TB-9 in visual RH circuit turned from base leg to final. He had been informed , in
French, that he was Nr2 to SD360. SD360 approach broken off to position back to finals. Controller did not
inform SD360 of other traffic.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200005017
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 12 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : ORTAC
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B757 crew believed they had a slot for a route via ORTAC and PATEL and turned at SAM, but a/c was flowed
via LND, the "Tangos" and STG.
Precis :
The a/c was permitted to proceed to ORTAC on the wrong route. However, the reporter is concerned about
various safety factors and flight planning implications raised by this occurrence.
CAA Closure: ATC took appropriate action to control the situation that was presented to them. The main
problem appears to have been lapses in the company's flight planning procedures. More robust procedures
have been introduced.
A/C Type : CL600RJ Regional Jet Occurrence Number : 200005026
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 06 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rome Fiumicino
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
CRJ left high on descent into Rome Fiumicino Airport with ATC not replying to descent requests.
Precis :
Pilot kept calling for descent with ATC speaking in Italian on the RT. No acknowledgement of request. Finally
given descent at 24nm for R/W 16R from FL140 to 6000ft. High workload resulted.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200005138
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 13 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Malaga - B737's line up clearance cancelled after crossing holding point stop bar. 2 a/c then allowed to land.
Precis :
The line up clearance was cancelled to allow a Spanish a/c to land. ATC were informed that reporter's a/c was
infringing the runway safe area but ATC allowed the a/c and a following British airliner to land. ATC did warn the
landing flights of the reporter's position. Spanish being spoken on the R/T to first inbound a/c.
7A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200005268
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 10 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Sao Paulo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Due to poor ATC radar positioning, a/c was placed too high on approach. Controller was then unable to
understand a request for an orbit. Go-around flown.
Precis :
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200005489
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 10 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Sao Paulo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B747 was positioned too close behind preceding a/c to allow normal approach profile to be completed. Go-
around flown.
Precis :
Poor understanding of English by the controller meant that the controller could not understand a request for an
orbit.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200005530
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 27 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rome Fiumicino
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Rome ATCC had total comms failure.
Precis :
A/c had descended to FL130 in the "TAQ" hold and was told to contact 125.50. A/c unable to contact this or
previous frequency. This happened to all a/c on these frequencies, who could not receive a reply from Rome but
could "hear each other". This failure also affected all departing a/c on other Rome frequencies. The only comms
that could be established were with FCO Landing Tower (118.70). After 7-10 minutes comms re-established on
125.50. It then became clear that Rome ATCC had no contingency plans, as the ATC service allegedly
collapsed: with no ETAs, no runway notification, no readbacks and constant conversations in Italian between
Italian airliners operating in the area.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200005698
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 31 Jul 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
After landing on R/W08R at Paris CDG, the BAe146 was cleared to cross R/W08L at S6. On entering R/W08L
an a/c was cleared for take off before the BAe146 had vacated the R/W. ATC admitted error.
Precis :
The BAe146 became aware from a transmission in French that another a/c had been cleared for take-off on
R/W08L Subsequent and detailed correspondence to the foreign authority has failed to elicit an explanation of
the incident.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200005790
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 07 Aug 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Barcelona
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B737 and low wing, twin engine a/c. Subject to investigation by the Spanish authority.
Precis :
The unknown a/c passed right to left climbing through the B737's level. ATC stated that the a/c had been
cleared, with the B737 in sight. The reporter states the crew had not heard this clearance spoken in English.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200005980
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 15 Aug 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
Location Info :
8Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - A320 and CN235. Subject to investigation by the Spanish authority.
Precis :
Following departure and during climb, A320 was asked to maintain R/W heading. At the same time the A320
had TCAS indication on visual descending opposite direction CN235. During a conversation in Spanish, the
A320 manoeuvred left to increase separation.
A/C Type : Piper PA32 Occurrence Number : 200006122
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 18 Aug 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Dover (DVR)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Indecision by LATCC concerning who would be working a foreign PA32 inbound to Oxford. Avoiding action
given.
Precis :
CAA Closure: The PA32 was routing to Oxford from Hilversum. In mid-Channel the aircraft called LATCC FIS (E)
with a request to join CAS at DVR on an IFR plan. Terminal Control could not accept the aircraft below FL90 and
in the exchange between TC and the FIR over the level the fact that they would accept the aircraft was lost. The
aircraft was instructed to contact Thames Radar which it did. It appeared that the pilot not only found it difficult to
remain at a level due to the weather, but also to understand English or English ATC procedures. Considerable
doubt was also raised as to whether the pilot was able to conform to IFR Flight Rules. However,
notwithstanding that there was some misunderstanding between ATS units regarding the clearance, the primary
cause of the incident was that the PA32 entered CAS even though a clearance to do so had not been issued to
the pilot. No further CAA action is possible.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200006478
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 27 Aug 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Figari
Events : Ground (AD) Occurrence Location Info : Corsica
Pretitle :
During taxy to ramp, a sheep walked on to the runway centreline, forcing the aircraft to stop.
Precis :
Due to poor English in the tower, it took several attempts to convey the problem. It was also noted that there
was a considerable amount of loose gravel on the apron.
A/C Type : BE200 Super King Air Occurrence Number : 200006551
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 04 Sep 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bovingdon (BNN)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 3 NE
Pretitle :
BE200 failed to stop at 5000ft during its climb on the CPT3B SID.
Precis :
The a/c was observed climbing above 5000ft , the initial SID altitude. The pilots command of English was poor
but the controller established that the a/c was climbing to FL100 but could not establish why. The a/c was
instructed to climb to FL70 but was later seen at FL74 before descending back to FL70. The operator was
alerted and has taken appropriate action.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200006661
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 02 Sep 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : DRAMO
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
Airprox - Foreign
Location Info : Hold
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX-B767 and a Hercules at SINTRA at FL70. Subject to investigation by the French
authorities.
Precis :
B767 was given descent clearance to FL60. Descent was not actioned as TCAS TA had showed another a/c,
estimated approx 500 feet below, opposite direction. Climb RA was followed as other a/c was not visual.
Reporter comments that controller allowed a number of a/c close to the hold, most of which were controlled in
French. Controller appeared to be under pressure. The French authorities investigation concluded that the main
cause of this AIRPROX was a penetration of Class D airspace by the Hercules. Possible relevant factors,
1/Complexity of the TMA and lack of legibility of the 1/500 000 map, 2/Workload placed on the Hercules pilots by
the operation of several frequencies simultaneously and 3/High level of R/T on frequency. Appropriate actions
9have been taken as a result of this AIRPROX. French AIRPROX risk assessment Cat B.
A/C Type : Robin 400 Occurrence Number : 200006748
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 10 Sep 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Luton (LUT)
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info :
Pretitle :
Infringement of the Luton CTR (Class D). Traffic information given. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
The pilot concerned allegedly spoke very little English. See also occnums 1997/03355 and 1998/02914.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200007053
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 20 Sep 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris Orly
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info : 20 NM
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX - B757 and MD80 at 4900ft on approach to Orly. Subject to investigation by the French
authorities.
Precis :
French language being used to all a/c except reporters. The French investigation into this AIRPROX concluded
that it was caused by "bad command of the radar guidance" by the controller concerned. A contributory factor
was the controllers intent to keep his a/c within the geographical limits managed with CDG when a co-ordination
to obtain some airspace temporarly would have resolved the problem. French risk assessment CAT B.
Appropriate follow up action has been taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200007190
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 22 Sep 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : CGG
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info : VOR near
Pretitle :
Foreign Airprox - between B737 and an unidentified a/c.
Precis :
B737 was in the climb to high level when Bordeaux ATC instructed a/c to stop climb at FL280 and turn 40
degrees right, due conflicting traffic at FL290. Instruction was given in French language and by the time the crew
received it in English the B737 was approaching FL290. Autopilot disengaged and a/c returned rapidly to FL280.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200007392
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 04 Oct 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Valencia
Events : Ramp Incident
Foreign ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Breakdown of communication between Headset Operative (HO) and a/c, as well as ATC and a/c.
Precis :
Reporter stated that during pushback the a/c was pushed the wrong way: the crew experienced great difficulty
with the HO who was unable to communicate in standard phraseology or in plain English. During the
conversation from the reporter to the HO there was a conversation in Spanish between a local Spanish operator
and ATC . Presumably as a result of this, an ATR taxied towards the reporter's a/c and passed very close down
its right hand side at a high taxi speed off the taxi way, through Stands 16 and 17. There were other a/c parked
on 15 and 18. The B737 ended up without the parking brake set, still connected to the tug, stationary and in a
state of confusion as to ATC requirements.
A/C Type : CL600RJ Regional Jet Occurrence Number : 200007471
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 06 Oct 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Milan Malpensa
Events : Adverse Weather
Diversion /Return
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Severe unforecast weather conditions at Milan Malpensa. CL600RJ diverted to Linate.
Precis :
Forecast for Malpensa indicated no CBs or Thunderstorms, with wind 010 degrees 8 kts. Actual weather large
CBs, strong westerly wind, hail, lightning and heavy rain. Windshear caution received at 1500ft and a/c went
around. ATC reported runway 'flooded' but P1 missed the call due to the controller's accent. A/c initially entered
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the hold, following missed approach but the weather was too severe and a/c diverted.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200007558
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 11 Oct 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Barkway (BKY)
Events : UK Airprox
Loss of Standard Separation
UK Airprox
Location Info : 6 SW
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 169/00 - IL76 and a B737 6nm SW of Barkway VOR at FL100.
Precis :
The incident occurred when the IL76 descended in response to a clearance addressed to another flight,
resulting in the IL76 coming into conflict with the B737. In addition, the controller significantly contributed to the
cause by not recognising that the intended addressee of the descent clearance had not yet arrived on the
frequency, and did not detect that the readback had been erroneously made by the IL76 crew. On realising the
mistake, the controller subsequently took quick action to seek confirmation that the IL76 was maintaining its
original assigned level, although the IL76 subsequently commenced a descent. Separation was lost with the
B737, but no resolution instructions or traffic information was passed to the IL76. The incident will be subject to
assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC action taken.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200007667
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 05 Oct 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : NY 360/50
Events : TCAS Report
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Traffic, taking avoiding action by descending from FL330 to FL310, caused a B747, cruising at FL310, to receive
a TCAS TA. B747 turned right to offset track by 1nm. Traffic climbed back to FL320.
Precis :
Traffic reported later that descent was required because of other a/c at FL330. Traffic dialogue with ATC was
conducted in French.
A/C Type : EMB 145 Occurrence Number : 200008342
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 03 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Milan Malpensa
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Potential conflict between an EMB145 taxying to Stand Y2 and an opposite direction a/c. A/c was marshalled
around the EMB145, which was then recleared to Stand Y5.
Precis :
EMB145 had originally been allocated Stand Y5, but was cleared to park on Stand Y2, due to an a/c pushing
back near Stand Y5. As the EMB145 was taxying along its cleared route, the P1 became aware of a conflict
between the EMB145 and opposite direction a/c. The EMB145, which initially had its taxy light on, stopped, but
the other a/c continued to taxy and only stopped when the EMB145 repeatedly flashed its landing lights.
Subsequently there was no room left for a safe manoeuvre of either a/c on taxy centre lines. Eventually the other
a/c was marshalled around the EMB145, which was then recleared to park on Stand Y5. The other a/c had
been issued ATC taxi instructions in Italian.
A/C Type : CL600RJ Regional Jet Occurrence Number : 200008496
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 02 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info : SID
Pretitle :
Disagreement between crew and ATC over whether CRJ was in the correct position whilst on a NURMO 8A SID.
Precis :
On a/c arrival at waypoint PG272, whilst on a NURMO 8A departure from Runway 27R at CDG, the controller
requested an immediate turn to heading 360 and stated that a/c was not on the SID. Crew re-confirmed and
cross checked position twice and both crew agreed that they were exactly where they were meant to be. The
controller insisted that they were not and kept the a/c on the heading. Reporter believes that another a/c may
have called ATC (in French) and reported a "near miss".
A/C Type : Falcon 900 Occurrence Number : 200008547
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 19 Nov 2000
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Classification : Occurrences Location : Bovingdon (BNN)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
Falcon 900 climbed 500 feet above its cleared FL80, due to incorrect pressure setting. Pilot apologised and set
the correct pressure. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
A/C Type : Fokker F27 Friendship Occurrence Number : 200008617
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 19 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Dean Cross (DCS)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
Fk27 climbed above its cleared flight level and was asked to check its pressure setting. A/c had Glasgow QNH
set. Pilot told to set 1013mb and descended back to FL170. Standard separation maintained
Precis :
A/C Type : BAE ATP Occurrence Number : 200008758
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 22 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : PNA SW
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion between crew and ATC over ATP's correct FL.
Precis :
Initial pre-start clearance from Pamplona was FL170. During taxy this was amended to FL90. After take-off
handed to Madrid on 133.95, and then cleared FL160 and told to contact Madrid on another frequency that could
not be understood. FL160 read back and re-confirmation of frequency requested. 120.9 was given. However, a/c
unable to make contact on that frequency but could hear other a/c talking to Madrid. Approximately 5 minutes
later, re-contacted Madrid on 133.95 and told that a/c was only cleared to FL90. Both crew adamant that the
crew received a clearance to climb to FL160. Another a/c with a similar callsign was on the frequency. Spanish
language being spoken on R/T. Spanish ATC authorities alerted to this incident.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200008865
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 23 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lanzarote
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
During approach to R/W21, the A321 received a TCAS RA on visual military traffic in the 11 o'clock position.
Language communication problems.
Precis :
During approach, level at 3300ft, the A321 requested to fly overhead the field to visually position left base for
R/W21. This was approved at the pilot's discretion. A321 was also told that it was Nr 1and cleared to land. When
the A321 was over the field, passing 1500ft, a military a/c was observed in the 11 o'clock position. A few
seconds later a TCAS RA was received. Tower advised, who after a moment informed the A321 it was Nr 2 to
land. Reporter believes the incident was partly caused by the use of Spanish which did not allow the reporter to
get a 'picture' of the traffic in the area.
A/C Type : EMB 145 Occurrence Number : 200008991
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 29 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : AMOGA
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info : 30 S
Pretitle :
EMB145 was cleared to climb above the SID level of FL100 (FL100 gives a 1000ft separation from inbound
traffic). Approaching FL110 EMB145 received a TCAS RA of descend which was complied with.
Precis :
EMB145 was cleared to climb to FL180, expedite through FL120. Approaching FL110 EMB145 received a TCAS
RA of descend. Whilst complying with TCAS, ATC instructed the EMB145 to change heading. TCAS action
reported to ATC. Also French was being spoken to other traffic at time of incident.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200100327
Flight Phase : Flight Occurrence Date : 18 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Toulouse
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
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Pretitle :
ATC Occurrence - Bordeaux control called a/c repeatedly in French.
Precis :
It took several attempts to successfully establish 2-way communication in English.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200100328
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 17 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Milan Malpensa
Events : Ground (AD) Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Runway state information unavailable - snow conditions at Malpensa. B757 crew unable to determine rwy
condition, due to lack of ATIS information and language difficulties.
Precis :
A/c crew examined and determined rwy state visually and proceeded.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200100389
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 09 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lisbon
Events : Smoke / Fumes (not engine)
Adverse Weather
Ground (AD) Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Smoke/haze in cabin during boarding. Passengers disembarked, QRH drill actioned, smoke cleared. Suspect
heavy rain entered APU ducting.
Precis :
Fire crew did not speak English and initially went to wrong stand. A/c checked, no faults evident, unable to
locate source of smoke. Suspect heavy rain at time of incident entered APU ducting, adjacent a/c experienced
similar incident.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200100468
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 22 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Puerto Vallarta
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B767 approaching airport was given altimeter setting of 3001. Due poor quality of RT
crew believed altimeter setting to be 1001. As soon as VOR started, discrepancy apparent.
Precis :
Approaching airport, B767 was expecting 1013 (QNH from AERAD charts). Pressure setting 3001 was given,
but due to the poor RT quality and heavy accent the crew read back 1001, with no correction from ATC. As soon
as the VOR started, the discrepancy became apparent. Approach continued because of good weather and
visual with R/W22 from start of approach.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200100500
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 23 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : France
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A320 was given avoiding action, due to possible conflict with military a/c. A320 unable to
monitor situation due to foreign language being used.
Precis :
A/C Type : Not Applicable Occurrence Number : 200100664
Flight Phase : Not Applicable Occurrence Date : 26 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Biggin (BIG)
Events : Runway Incursion Location Info :
Pretitle :
Lorry and white van crossed the threshold of Runway 29 without clearance.
Precis :
Both (foreign) drivers were supposed to wait for an escort but, presumably because of language difficulties,
crossed anyway. The company receiving the goods has since apologised for the incident.
A/C Type : Fokker 100 Occurrence Number : 200009588
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 19 Dec 2000
13
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Runway incursion at CDG.
Precis :
After landing on 08R , the a/c was cleared to vacate and hold short of 08L on S5. The training captain then
looked up from his landing 'flow' checks to note that the a/c appeared to have taxied through the CAT1 holding
point at S5. Captain was told to stop and he explained that he thought he had taxied through the Cat 2/3 hold
and was continuing to the Cat 1 holding point. ATC then instructed a/c to hold position. ATC then spoke to an
a/c on the 08L threshold and cleared it for take-off. The a/c rotated well before the Fokker's position and once
airborne ATC advised him in French that the Fokker had gone through the hold point at S5.
A/C Type : A300 Occurrence Number : 200100714
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 04 Feb 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Brookmans Park (BPK)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
A300 departed Luton on a CLN 6B SID, and climbed straight to 5000ft before BPK and before making contact
with LATCC. Pilot's English poor. Pilot advised of error. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
See also occnum 2000/08393. The operators report states that during the SID there was a combination of
problems with the Autoflight System and the crews actions. The annunciation system did not work correctly
although the flight director gave correct information on the MCP. Nevertheless the crew should have taken the
problem into account. Appropriate follow up action has been taken by the operator concerned.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200100821
Flight Phase : Flight Occurrence Date : 07 Feb 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : LATCC - Lakes Sector
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Telephony designator lead to callsign confusion and pronunciation problems.
Precis :
Operator alerted.
A/C Type : A300 Occurrence Number : 200100988
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 19 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Luton (LUT)
Events : Altitude Deviation
RT Problems
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - A300 on a CPT 3B SID climbed to 5500ft before contacting frequency 119.77. A300 was asked
to maintain 5000ft then cleared to climb to FL70. A/c observed to have descended to 4500ft.
Precis :
See also occs 200008393 and 2001/00714. A number of attempts to contact the foreign operator concerned
have failed to elicit a response.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : Unknown Occurrence Number : 200101725
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 13 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info : CTR
Pretitle :
Infringement of the Heathrow Control Zone by an unidentified a/c. Heathrow departures affected.
Precis :
Pilot appeared to have a limited understanding of English.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200101823
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 10 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - BAe146 was given ATC instructions in the French language, but the French speaking P2
replied in English.
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Precis :
The French speaking P2 was doing the R/T on a BAe146 operating in French airspace and when the a/c was
transferred, all initial calls initiated by BAe146 were responded to by ATC in English. Subsequent calls initiated
by ATC were in French, but the crew responded in English. On transfer to approach the BAe146's call was
replied to in French and so were the following instructions. The P2 read back the instruction in English making
some mistakes that were not corrected by ATC. Due to a discrepancy between the P1 and P2 as to the meaning
of the clearance, the P1 requested clarification which was received in English and subsequent transmissions
were in English.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200101832
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 20 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : BRC
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info : 20 N
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - A320 and another airliner 20nm N of BRC at FL100.
Precis :
As A320 was descending to cleared FL100 on approach, the controller was speaking French to opposite
direction traffic on climb out from aerodrome. The A320 received a TCAS TA, but not an RA, on visual traffic,
which levelled at FL100 and passed down the RH side. ATC informed.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200102415
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 23 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
With B737 on short finals to Runway 27L at 600-700 feet, ATC reported a helicopter at the threshold of 27L.
Precis :
ATC were queried as the crew were not visual with the helicopter. ATC then stated "helicopter is 200 feet
above the threshold of 27L". Shortly after crew spotted helicopter in a 200 feet hover approximately 200 yards
south of the threshold and elected to continue approach.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200102499
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 31 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Chambery
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
BAe146 received and reacted to a TCAS RA against a light a/c whilst at 2300 feet on approach to Chambery.
Precis :
When ATC were subsequently questioned about this incident they stated that a light a/c had departed R/W 36
and was maintaining visual separation with the BAe146. The light a/c had received ATC instructions in French
and the BAe146 crew were not alerted to it at any time.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200103208
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 13 May 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Kalamata
Events : GPWS Report
RT Problems
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B737 descending to 7000ft reported poor radio transmissions, loss of DME and garbled
VOR. During climb back to 9000ft, B737 received a brief GPWS.
Precis :
B737 was cleared to descend to 9000ft. B737 recommenced descent to 7000ft at 15 DME KAL VOR. Reporter
requested a left turn 15 due weather avoidance. There was no reply from ATC, then a garbled response
descend 7000ft QNH. B737 maintained track 215 and started descent, then all at the same time there was (1)
No response from ATC, despite several calls on boxes 1 and 2, (2) KAL DME lost, (3) Ident on KAL VOR on
recheck garbled, and (4) GPS P1's side had been giving RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring)
warnings. B737 commenced an immediate climb back to 9000ft during which the GPWS warning sounded once
briefly. Comms eventually re-established and the VOR procedure was carried out from the KAL VOR from
9000ft instead of 7000ft.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200103246
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 15 May 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
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Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Altitude deviation - MD80 noted at 6000 ft instead of cleared 5000ft whilst outbound from Gatwick. Standard
separation maintained.
Precis :
Investigations indicate that the crews understanding of English appeared poor and the readback of the initial
ATC clearance was unintelligible but was accepted as confirmation by ATC.
A/C Type : Piper PA46 Malibu Occurrence Number : 200103533
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 28 May 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : ABERDEEN (ADN)
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info : 15 SW
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Infringement of Airway P600 (Class A) by a PA46 receiving a FIS. Avoiding action given to a
DHC8.
Precis :
The PA46 pilot subsequently reported that he believed that, having submitted a flight plan, clearance to enter
CAS was automatic. The pilot has been reminded of the responsibility to obtain clearance before entering CAS.
CAA Closure: Appropriate CAA action taken.
A/C Type : Piper PA28 Occurrence Number : 200103635
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 30 May 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Birmingham
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info : Honiley 7 NW
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Infringement of the Birmingham CTR (Class D) by a PA28R, due to the foreign pilot failing to
understand the ATC instructions given to him.
Precis :
Standard separation maintained.
A/C Type : Piper PA30 Twin Comanche Occurrence Number : 200103891
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 09 Jun 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : WOTAN
Events : Loss of Standard Separation Location Info : 5 N
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Separation lost between a DHC8 and a PA30 on Airway G1. Conflict Alert activated.
Precis :
The PA30 was westbound on Airway G1 at FL120, under the control of the Area Radar SC. The DHC8 had
departed from Birmingham for Exeter under IFR and when approximately 7nm north of the airway boundary
called the Bristol APR for a radar service outside CAS and to arrange a crossing clearance through the airway at
FL120. Although the DHC8's details had been pre-noted by Birmingham its proximity to the airway boundary
when it called required the Bristol controller to act quickly to co-ordinate a crossing clearance with the Area
Sector. Area Sector controllers had already detected the as yet 'unknown' traffic tracking on a converging
course with the PA30 within the Airway. The PA30 was warned of the traffic but the foreign pilot appeared to
have difficulty in comprehending the traffic information. Eventually an agreement was reached with the Area SC
that the Bristol APR would descend the DHC8 to FL 110 and pass astern of the PA30. Descent clearance (and
traffic information) was issued to the DHC8 when it was just under 7nm from the PA30 and turn instructions
were issued when it was at a range of 5nm. Minimum separation occurred a short while later when horizontal
separation reduced to 3.9nm at the point when the DHC8 was 500 feet below the PA30. Although horizontal
separation reduced further to less than 2.5nm, almost 1000 feet vertical separation had been established by
then and tracks were now diverging. There was no risk of collision. It has subsequently been established that
the Bristol APR had mistakenly believed that the application of 3nm separation was sufficient in these
circumstances. This was not the case and in conjunction with SRG, Bristol's MATS Part 2 has been
appropriately amended to clarify the circumstances and conditions where the application of 3nm radar
separation may be applied. In addition, Bristol ATC have opened a dialogue with the DHC8 operator to
emphasise the importance of flights establishing communications with Bristol early where it is the intention to
seek a crossing of Class A controlled airspace.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200103986
Flight Phase : Landing Occurrence Date : 12 May 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Caen
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
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Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX-B737 and a CAP10B at Caen airport at 600 feet. Subject to investigation by the French
authorities.
Precis :
A/C Type : Fokker 100 Occurrence Number : 200104127
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 17 Jun 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Clearance confusion, ATC used both English and French. Potential misunderstanding avoided due pilots able to
speak both languages.
Precis :
A/c cleared to line-up behind Air France B737 and wait. An Air France B737 was rolling from taxi-way at the
time, so P2 replied to ATC that subject a/c would line-up behind departing B737 and wait. ATC then cleared
another Air France B737 to land using French. P1 queried clearance with P2, B737 confirmed visually on finals
at approximately 2 miles. P2 (French national) again checked clearance with ATC who advised that subject a/c
was to line-up after B737 on finals. Reporter concerned that use of both languages and ambiguous clearance
could have resulted in a hazardous situation, which was averted because both pilots could speak French.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200104422
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 24 Jun 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Ramp Incident Location Info :
Pretitle :
Non-standard push-back. Ground spoke French and used hand signals. Communication between ground and
flight crew inadequate.
Precis :
Push-back initially normal with brakes off and call to start engines. As a/c stopped, flight crew assumed it would
be pulled forward to align with taxi-way. However, a/c began heading slowly back towards terminal, at which
point flight crew realised they were disconnected from main gear remote control push machine. Brakes were
applied and ground controller disconnected his headset prior to uneventful taxi.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200104465
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 30 Jun 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Palma
Events : Ramp Incident Location Info :
Pretitle :
Non-English speaking ground engineer gave a/c clearance to commence taxi (using hand signals) while
baggage conveyor belt was still in front of RH engine.
Precis :
P1 observed object in front of RH engine as taxi commenced, adjacent ground crew also saw problem and
immediately moved mobile baggage conveyor.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200104472
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 02 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Narbo
Events : Smoke / Fumes (not engine)
Emergency Call
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info : S
Pretitle :
ECAM avionics smoke warning. PAN declared. No fault found. Attributed to high humidity.
Precis :
At FL370 during cruise, ECAM avionics smoke warning activated although there was no visible sign of smoke.
PAN declared (which was allegedly not acknowledged by ATC), and flight continued to destination with constant
monitoring of flight deck and pax cabin. During taxy-in the flight crew were advised that intermittent non-odorous
smoke had emanated from the overhead vents in the cabin during latter stages of approach. The aircraft was
parked on the taxiway and a slight delay encountered before the arrival of steps and buses. Passengers then
disembarked without further incident. Avionics / cargo compartments inspected with no evidence of smoke, and
system tested satisfactorily. The operator's investigation revealed no defect which could have attributed or
caused smoke/smoke warning. The operator investigated a re-designed smoke detector, but found it no more
reliable than the current type due to problems with dust and airborne particles. As thee was no odour and no
defects were found, it is assumed that the warning was caused by high humidity causing water vapour to be
seen as "smoke" form the air vents. See also 200106064.
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CAA Closure: The hazard is adequately controlled by the actions stated above.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200104550
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 01 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Missed approach executed by B737 due to an Airbus still on the runway. Tower ATC failed to provide any
information. ATC in Spanish.
Precis :
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200104695
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 06 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Crew brought B757 to a sudden halt to give way to an MD80 thereby preventing a potential ground collision.
Precis :
B757 was exiting via D5 onto the parallel taxi-way for R/W 32 when the First Officer warned the Captain of the
MD80 exiting very quickly from D4. It is believed that the MD80 crew had no intention of giving way. Spanish R/T
in use.
A/C Type : SA332 Super Puma Occurrence Number : 200105051
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 20 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : North Sea
Events : Ground (AD) Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Excessive ship movement - exceedance of roll limits on ship's helideck.
Precis :
The Crystal Ocean Weather was telephoned through to operations, but did not include the Pitch, Roll & Heave.
Crew requested PR & H as the Ocean Alliance, which was in close proximity, was reporting 4.4 meters heave.
The weather was passed as R 0.3 P 1.5 & H1.3. Flight departed. In accordance with standard procedures, the
ship was called on ‘log’ frequency, then 'radio' frequency but there was no reply to either. Communication was
established with the nearby Britannia platform, but they had no communication with the Crystal Ocean. Descent
was initiated at 100 miles, (Crystal Ocean was 120 NM) with communications finally established on ‘radio’
frequency at 9 miles to go, ( 4 mins before ETA). Log frequency was not manned and so the ship had to be
directed to this frequency. The ship weather was again requested and PR & H figures were passed as
1.8/0.4/1.7. The ship was circled and appeared to be stable most of the time with some heave at times. A
landing was carried out and the crew left the anti-colls on, so as to assess the deck movement; whilst it
appeared to be more than that stated, it seemed to be within limits. The outbound load of 723 lbs, included some
large boxes in the cabin. Only 2 deck crew were available, the HLO + 1. P1 remained on the brakes whilst P2
climbed out on deck to supervise and in the event did most of the unloading himself. Suddenly, the motion of
the ship picked up noticeably. P1 asked for a read-out of the heave which was reported as 1.7 meters. P1
questioned this and asked if there was a record of the heave and being told there was, requested a printout of
the last 10 minutes. P1 was then told that it was not available. P1 was unhappy with the deck movement and
stated that they would be lifting as soon as P2 was on board. The deck movement then increased further, to a
completely unacceptable level which was sensed by P2 on deck who, through his experience, realised it was
time to return to his seat. The aircraft lifted out of the chocks and just before departure, P1 noticed 8deg left roll
and 4deg right roll and suspected that the right wheel was at least light on the wheels during the immediate time
prior to lift, with 8deg left roll. After departure, P1 raised the ship on the radio and stated that the details passed
about ship movement were totally unacceptable and highly inaccurate, making the deck a very dangerous
operating environment. It was not possible to raise the ship again, which was also supposed to have flight
watched the aircraft until the pilot advised en-route contact. On return to Aberdeen it was discovered that a mail
bag had been put into the boot which was neither advised to the crew, nor manifested. During communications it
became obvious that the ship's radio operator's knowledge of English was limited. Operations advised that only
a partial departure message had been relayed and that was only after pressure from the radio room. See also
2000/09490. Following discussions with the vessel owner, helicopter operations resumed on 27 July 2001 to the
operator's satisfaction.
CAA Closure: The hazard is controlled by the actions stated above.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200105059
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 23 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : KIPPA
Events : Loss of Standard Separation Location Info :
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Altitude Deviation
Pretitle :
Loss of separation between B747 and two military jets. Initial reports attribute cause to foreign military crew
language difficulties.
Precis :
The 4 foreign military jets were on an air-to-air combat training exercise over the North Sea, in a designated
area. On completion, the formation cleared the area, contacted London Mil for descent, and were cleared from
FL390 to FL280, 1000 ft above a B747. The foreign crew reported that there was some difficulty with radio
reception, and they believed they had been cleared to descend to FL260. During the descent they observed the
B747, and maintained their heading but increased their rate of descent to avoid. As the formation was levelling
at FL260, it was instructed to maintain FL280, and initiated a climb back, keeping the B747 in sight.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200105169
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 24 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Geneva
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info : 15 SW
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX-B737 and unknown a/c at FL290 15nm SW of GVA. Subject to investigation by the Swiss
authorities.
Precis :
B737 received and actioned a TCAS RA. The Swiss authorities have advised that the cause of this AIRPROX
was a misunderstanding between the controller and the crew of the other a/c probably due to their lack of
knowledge of English. Swiss risk assessment CAT B. The Swiss authorities have contacted the airline over this
problem.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200105171
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 24 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Gerona
Events : A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
Ground (AD) Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Leading Edge (L/E) slat asymmetry.
Precis :
The aircraft was established on finals and the flaps were selected to 20 when an EICAS warning 'LE SLAT
ASSYM' displayed. A go-around was initiated and the aircraft returned to the hold whilst the QRH was consulted.
The Pilot Reference Manual was also consulted to check landing distance as the aircraft was tankering round-
trip fuel. Once all checklists had been completed, the aircraft was established on finals for an uneventful flap 25
landing. On clearing the runway the aircraft requested that the Fire Services check the brakes, however difficulty
was experienced communicating directly with the Fire Truck/Services as the fire crew could not speak English
and could only liaise with the tower. When parked the first officer inspected the brakes and declared normal
operations.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200105199
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 28 Jul 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Murcia
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Reporter concerned at ATC service given. On contact with tower, B737 informed of a
delayed landing due to Gliding activity. When asked duration of delay informed 10-20mins.
Precis :
Reporter states that on first contact with tower, B737 informed of a delay to their landing due to Gliding activity.
When asked duration of delay, B737 was told maybe 10-15-20mins. Reporter concerned that priority was given
to gliders over commercial traffic, also fuel state, absence of activity from NOTAMs and poor English by ATC.
ATC were also happy for B737 to divert.
A/C Type : A300 Occurrence Number : 200105530
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 06 Aug 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bodrum
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC) Location Info :
Pretitle :
Crew of A300 allegedly received a poor ATC service at Bodrum.
Precis :
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Various modified ATC clearances were received until passing 5600 feet in the climb when the a/c was instructed
to maintain 4000 feet. A/c levelled at FL60 and ATC informed.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200105793
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 11 Aug 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Murcia
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B737 and a microlight. Subject to investigation by the Spanish authority.
Precis :
B737 at 2400ft on final to R/W05 was cleared to land. At 1400ft the crew became aware of TCAS traffic ahead
and below. ATC then issued the a/c (a microlight), which was on base leg, a clear instruction that it was Nr 2 to
land . The microlight then entered an orbit. Subsequently the B737 crew looked for and acquired the microlight
visually as it was climbing above the B737. Microlight pilot had difficulty understanding English and did not
acknowledge many clearances.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200105904
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 17 Aug 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Palma
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 had to stop to avoid a collision with an ATR72 at the hold for R/W 24R at Palma. Spanish being spoken on
the R/T.
Precis :
A/C Type : SA365 Dauphin Occurrence Number : 200105954
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 24 Aug 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Battersea
Events : UK Airprox Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 154/2001 - Bell 206 and SA365 final approach to R/W21 at Battersea.
Precis :
The Bell 206 was joining London Battersea Heliport from the West, called ATC passing Barnes, and was cleared
to join downwind left hand for R/W21. Traffic information was passed on an SA365 inbound via Vauxhall Bridge.
The specification of a circuit direction to the Bell 206 was at variance with the Battersea MATS Part 2. The
SA365 made its initial call over Vauxhall Bridge at 1500 ft, and was advised as number 2 behind the Bell 206,
which was at the time overhead the heliport on its downwind leg. No specific joining instruction was passed to
the SA365, nor was any mention made of the flight remaining North of the river to maintain separation from the
Bell 206. It was the controller's responsibility to provide separation in accordance with local procedures. Due to
the bends in the river, the controller could not see the SA365, but estimated that the Bell 206 would complete its
approach safely ahead of the SA365. The controller's view to the East was restricted by trees, and the situation
was not helped by the late initial call from the SA365. When the controller eventually saw the SA365, it was
realised that the 2 helicopters were on conflicting flight paths. Instructions were passed to the SA365, which the
pilot found somewhat confusing. However, the SA365 pilot then saw the Bell 206, and keeping it in sight
descended behind it to position as number 2. The incident will be subject to assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action appropriate.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200105971
Flight Phase : Initial Climb Occurrence Date : 24 Aug 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Thessaloniki
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - After take off from R/W28 B737 received and complied with a TCAS RA.
Precis :
During the B737's take off roll the crew heard a conversation in Greek and the words 'go around'. TCAS showed
an a/c above and slightly behind for the latter stage of the take off roll. The B737 did not hear ATC issue any
avoiding instruction to it or the other a/c. B737 was aware of the other a/c at all times and appropriate action was
taken following the TCAS RA.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200106461
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 13 Sep 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Milan Linate
Events : Ground (AD) Occurrence Location Info :
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Pretitle :
Refueller deliberately adjusted the ordered and selected fuel figure.
Precis :
The P1 personally went up the ladder and selected 7,500 kgs of fuel and then returned to the flight deck. Later
the P1 returned to the re-fuel panel and found the refueller was up the ladder and that the selection had been
increased to 7,700kgs. The P1 was unable to ascertain from the Italian worker why the selection had been
changed. See also 2001/06619. The foreign handling agent subsequently reported that the procedure adopted
was designed to allow fuel pressure relief during hose disconnection, rather than to load more fuel. Language
difficulties did not help. The UK operator has issued a NOTAC, advising crews of the problems experienced,
and to be vigilant.
CAA Closure: Appropriate operator action taken.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200106619
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 20 Sep 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Milan Linate
Events : Ground (AD) Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Refuelling incident - Refueller intent on adding additional fuel to specified 7100 kgs to BAe146. Refueller did not
speak English.
Precis :
See "Master" occnum 2001/06461.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200106804
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 04 Sep 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : NTS
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC) Location Info : 180 S
Pretitle :
ATC incident - Late ATC re-clearance to crew of B737. During climb to FL310 ATC requested climb stopped at
FL280. A/c reached FL286 before descent initiated.
Precis :
The situation was compounded by the fact that majority of ATC transmission was in French leading to poor
awareness of other a/c.
A/C Type : Unknown Occurrence Number : 200107027
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 02 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rio De Janeiro
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC incident - ATC at Rio de Janeiro allegedly changed SID after take off leading to a 270 degree left
turn.
Precis :
On clearance delivery the ATC clearance was confirmed 3 times as a CARMI 1 departure, involving a right turn
downwind. The standard of English was poor and had to be reconfirmed. After take-off ATC queried the SID and
a 270 left turn had to be initiated. ATC eventually confirmed the SID required and gave a radar heading of 260
degrees and gave a radial to establish on. The controlling was poor as was the English phraseology used. The
Brazilian investigation concluded that the incident was caused by the poor English of the inexperienced under
training controller and the wrong pronunciation of the MARICA ONE procedure. Appropriate ATC follow up
action has been taken.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200107176
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 15 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lanzarote
Events : RT Problems
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B757 initiated a go-around at 400ft due loss of communications with tower on final
approach.
Precis :
B757 on visual approach to R/W03 was instructed to contact tower on frequency 118.90 (usual tower frequency
is 120.70). The B757 was at 3nm final when it called 118.90 using the left VHF box, where the controller was
heard speaking Spanish. B757 reported 'final approach R/W03' and the controller queried reporter's callsign,
who restated callsign and position. Again controller queried the callsign and B757 again responded with callsign
and position. The frequency then went quiet. By now the B757 was on short finals. One pilot then transmitted
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requesting landing clearance whilst the other pilot selected alternate tower frequency 120.70. Pilot initiated a go
around at 400ft and contact established on frequency 120.70 during go around, and subsequent clearance for a
visual circuit and landing was given. During taxy in the controller confirmed tower frequency as 120.70 and
reported that the B757 had actually been cleared to land on frequency 121.50. Operation of the left VHF box
was normal throughout both sectors.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200107245
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 18 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Occurrence - Poor ATC service provided to a B737 on descent/approach to Madrid.
Precis :
Crew were initially instructed to hold at PARLA FL150, landing ILS R/W 33. Before reaching PARLA they were
instructed to proceed to POT (VOR), for ILS approach R/W 18R (R/W change in progress). Cleared to FL110 &
frequency change. After reaching POT instructed to DUKKE (waypoint) and after speed control enquiry with no
reply, reduced to 220kts. Approaching DUKKE preceding a/c (right to left approx 5nm on TCAS) cleared for a
VOR/DME 18R. On enquiry as to approach type - informed a VOR/DME 18R. Frequency change, descent
requested, no reply, so requested radio check. Callsign confusion (correct callsign was Midland 8G9 -
addressed as 8GA). Instructed heading 360 degrees. Another frequency change. No reply. Finally addressed
as 8GB and cleared to RBO (VOR). At this time 50% of transmissions were in Spanish. Preceding a/c (A321-
visual contact) now showing 4nm on TCAS (still no speed control). Enquired speed control - no reply. Therefore
configured Flap 1 190kts. Frequency change at RBO (again callsign confusion 8GA) instructed VOR/DME 18 R
and min 190kts to 6 DME. Frequency change to Tower and cleared to LOC for ILS 18R. B737 reduced to
minimum approach speed and subsequently advised by Tower to reduce speed. Satisfactory landing completed.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200107313
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 11 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Niamey
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B777 and another airliner. Subject to investigation by the Niger authority
Precis :
B777 southbound on Airway at FL350 was asked by ATC to confirm maintaining FL370. ATC cleared the B777
for immediate climb to FL370. At this point an a/c appeared on TCAS at 38nm northbound at FL350. B777
reached FL370 as the a/c passed each other. ATC claimed to have been calling the B777, but nothing was
heard, also the other airliner claimed to have called on frequency 126.9, but again nothing was heard by the
B777. B777 stated that ATC were unreadable for a lot of the time. French language being used.
A/C Type : AN124 Occurrence Number : 200107406
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 25 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Daventry (DTY)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
AN124 allegedly entered CAS at FL80 at Daventry without appropriate clearance. Attributed to language
difficulties. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
A/C Type : Military Occurrence Number : 200107439
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 26 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : East Midlands
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Conflict alert activated when 2 military jets with poor R/T and height keeping, allegedly
descended below their cleared level. Traffic info and avoiding action given to a BAe146.
Precis :
A pair of military a/c that had been observed deviating from their cleared FL280 by plus and minus 400ft prior to
entering sector were put on heading 335deg. On initial contact with a BAe146, it was instructed to climb to
FL260 and fly heading 330deg. Both the BAe146 and the military a/c were then given further heading changes,
and the military a/c instructed 'left heading 330'. Subsequently the military a/c were observed at FL290 and
climbing. When this was queried pilot reported maintaining FL280 but shortly after stated 'FL330 was our last
clearance'. During the military a/cs rapid descent it passed through FL280 to FL272. Traffic info and avoiding
action given to the BAe146 and avoiding action to the pair of military jets. A subsequent report from the military
crew stated that they were experiencing poor radio reception due to a technical problem, and their difficulty in
22
understanding radio calls was due to this, and radio saturation problems, rather than a lack of language
understanding.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200107504
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 29 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : RT Problems
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - For 15mins a foreign B747 with radio problems taking intermittent ATC instructions, allegedly
failed to follow ATC procedures, which resulted in an increase in ATC workload.
Precis :
Due to radio problems, foreign B747 lost contact on frequencies 124.92, 121.22 and 119.72 and subsequently
could not establish on ILS R/W27R. The operator subsequently reported that the radio problems emanated from
a short circuit in the a/c ILS selector panel, which was rectified.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200107569
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 05 Apr 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rome Fiumicino
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Rejected Take-Off
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B737 at holding point was cleared to take off. An expeditious line-up, followed by rolling
take-off was executed. ATC then instructed B737 to stop. Take off rejected at 65kts.
Precis :
Whilst B737 was at holding point it received clearance to take off R/W25. An expeditious line-up, followed by
rolling take-off was executed. ATC then instructed B737 to stop, which took a couple of seconds to comply with
due to the instruction not being very clear. Take off rejected at 65kts with power stable, R/W vacated and brakes
cooled. ATC had ordered RTO due to a/c on finals to R/W16R being faster than anticipated.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200107791
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 08 Nov 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : GADOR
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - A321 and unknown a/c. Subject to investigation by the Spanish authority.
Precis :
A321's initial clearance was via VIBAS FL140, but a GADOR 1A was requested which was approved by ATC,
but with a ROC of 2000ft/min. As A321 turned towards GADOR traffic was seen below flying from left to right at
8nms. A321 was cleared to climb to FL280 and then received a TCAS TA on the climbing traffic which was now
5nms and 1000ft below. A321 increased ROC. All conversations with the other a/c were in Spanish.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200107880
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 12 Nov 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - When A320 was locked onto localiser for R/W33, ATC gave radar vectors to allow
another a/c to approach before A320. Extensive use of Spanish on R/T.
Precis :
Use of Spanish was a severe hindrance to the crew's understanding of the situation around them.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200108026
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 22 Nov 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX-B737 and Swearingen Merlin on approach to R/W 27L at CDG. Subject to investigation by
the French authorities. TCAS TA.
Precis :
Reporter states that AIRPROX was caused by a lack of ATC awareness which led to the other a/c involved
heading to cross the B737's path at the same level. ATC allegedly unaware of conflict until B737 called
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established 27L. French and English being used over the R/T. The French authorities confirm ATC error. The
French investigation revealed that the AIRPROX was caused by an unsuitable first instruction to the Merlin,
heading 160 , which was associated with an anticipation of descent to FL50 which had not been vacated by the
B737. A second heading given to the Merlin also failed to resolve the conflict. Contributory factors were high
ATC workload and the large speed differential between the 2 a/c involved. French AIRPROX risk assessment
CAT A.
A/C Type : Falcon 900 Occurrence Number : 200108243
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 03 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Northolt
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - DA900 made an approach to R/W07 below airfield minima and below glide path. DA900 initiated
a go around approximately 0.5nm from R/W07 threshold.
Precis :
CAA Closure: The operator's report states that both the pilots were very experienced professional pilots who
have flown hundreds of PAR approaches each. They both state that they had great difficulty in understanding
the directions and terminology used by the final PAR approach controller. This was allegedly exacerbated by
distorted or scratchy radio reception on his frequency. All directions issued were discussed between the pilots.
Whilst on the approach the pilot flying elected to use the autopilot. Whilst on descent he used autopilot inputs to
follow the directions of the controller whilst discussion continued about the controller's directions. The resultant
misunderstanding of the terminology used by the controller caused the a/c to be controlled so as to proceed
below the glide path while the pilot erroneously thought he was being advised he was above the glide path. The
a/c levelled out at minimums, and the pilot disconnected the autopilot and performed a missed approach. On
the next approach the a/c was flown without autopilot to a successful landing. Appropriate and comprehensive
remedial action is being taken by the operator concerned.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200108351
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 16 Nov 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Calcutta
Events : Flight Crew Occurrence
A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
SID in chart booklet superseded but information in NUBRIEF inadequate to cross check FMC stored SID.
Precis :
Aerad SID chart G6 for CCU (Calcutta) allegedly gives no current or appropriate westerly departure. Reporter
comments that NUBRIEF advises only that Dhanbad NDB is withdrawn and replaced by Tepal waypoint and to
expect Tepal 1 SID. Reporter concerned that Tepal 1 SID in FMC database is substantially different from former
Dhanbad 1 SID and, therefore, SID cannot be cross checked. A cross check with ATC (difficult due to poor
English) revealed eventually that expected SID was closer to old Dhanbad 1 than Tepal 1 shown in FMC.
Reporter suggests that FMC database should be cross-checked with correct Tepal 1 SID and chart amended
also to show correct Tepal 1 SID.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200108689
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 23 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - As B737's slot time approached P1 found it difficult to contact ATC and get a clear
picture of the situation as Spanish was spoken on delivery, ground and tower frequencies.
Precis :
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200200365
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 05 Jan 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Chambery
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - BAe146 at hold had been cleared to backtrack R/W36. A single engine a/c on approach
was observed heading for the BAe146. BAe146 moved onto R/W and light a/c landed on grass.
Precis :
BAe146 had been cleared to line up and backtrack R/W36. On checking, a single engine a/c was noticed on
approach. BAe146 stopped at hold and was told by ATC to expedite. BAe146 informed ATC that it would not be
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ready on turn round. There was no answer. ATC spoke to the light a/c in French, who replied in French. BAe146
held position, it was then realised that the light a/c was heading for the BAe146. BAe146 moved onto R/W and
light a/c landed on grass parallel to the R/W. All details of the incident were passed to the French authorities,
who are conducting a full investigation, and will advise when completed.
CAA Closure: Appropriate foreign authority action being taken.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200200494
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 25 Jan 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : PUERTO CABE PBL VOR
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Occurrence- B777 and unknown a/c. Subject to investigation by the Venezualan authority.
Precis :
As B777 was passing FL284 during its cleared climb to FL390, ATC called B777 to maintain FL280, due to an
a/c on a reciprocal heading descending to FL290. B777 descended back to FL280. The Venezuelan authorities
have identified an ATC error and appropriate remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200200736
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 07 Feb 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Valencia
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
Airprox - Foreign
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B757 and an MD80. Subject to investigation by the Spanish authority.
Precis :
B757 approaching VLC VOR at FL330 was cleared to descend to FL230 with visual MD80 tracking right to left at
FL320 in one o'clock position. P2 (flying) confirmed with P1 traffic and started descent. B757 then received a
TCAS RA and P2 asked P1 'do you want to follow them', but P1 thought he had said 'do you want control' and
said no you do it, meaning for P2 to carry out RA drill. MD80 was visual and B757's track would always take it
behind, but due to MD80 being 30degs off reciprocal track the clearance was less than originally intended.
There was no risk as MD80 passed down left side of B757.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200200834
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 09 Feb 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Biggin (BIG)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 5 SW
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 departed on a CLN SID and cleared to climb to FL80, but subsequently seen passing FL84.
As there was no traffic to affect B737 was cleared to FL100. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Pilots English poor.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200201404
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 02 Mar 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : SAPCO
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info : 6 S
Pretitle :
Possible unauthorised transmissions on East Midlands Approach frequency 134.17, 6nm south SAPCO.
Appropriate ATC action taken.
Precis :
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200201824
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 24 Mar 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Nantes
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX-B737 allegedly cleared for take-off three times at Nantes while a TB10 was holding on the
runway.
Precis :
B737 crew questioned take-off clearance due to light a/c on runway. ATC cleared B737 twice more and then
instructed B737 to hold position when clearance was questioned for a third time. ATC allegedly spoke in French
to the light a/c throughout. Light a/c eventually commenced take-off, following which B737 departed without
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further incident. The severity of the incident was brought to the attention of the French authorities, who are
taking appropriate action. The French AIRPROX investigation concluded that the controller having lined up the
TB10 from an intermediate position then forgot about it. The Local controller's workload was high. Contributory
factors were non-detection of the TB10 when making a visual check due to difficulty in adjusting the light
contrast with the blinds and non-use of the phraseology "line up and wait" which could have reinforced the
controller's mental image of the situation.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200201959
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 29 Mar 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location :
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX/TCAS RA-B757 and a B737 at FL305 climbing out of Banjul. Subject to investigation by
the Senegalese authority.
Precis :
B757 crew actioned a TCAS RA descend instruction. The B737 was communicating with Dakar radio in French.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200201964
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 02 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Las Palmas
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - During climb after take off, B757 received a TCAS RA of descend, on military circuit
traffic. Traffic turned right and passed down B757's LH side. ATC informed of TCAS RA.
Precis :
Whilst B757 was on stand, ground frequency issued ATC clearance of 1st altitude of 5000ft. At handover to
Tower, they were speaking with military circuit traffic in Spanish and cleared B757 to line up after and then
immediate take off. On climb out traffic observed on TCAS and obtained visually in 10 o'clock position. When
TCAS TA sounded, B757 reduced ROC, this was followed by RA of descend. Traffic turned right and passed
down B757's LH side. B757 levelled at 5000ft and informed tower of RA who transferred B757 to approach who
were also informed of RA . Approach confirmed clearance issued should have been 'Stop climb at 3000ft'.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200201985
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 30 Mar 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : PIXOT
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC gave an a/c clearance in French to climb through subject B767 level (FL170) to FL180. Potential conflict.
Precis :
B767 observed other traffic on TCAS, but were not visual. ATC asked other a/c, in French, if they were visual
with B767. They were and so were cleared to climb through B767 FL170 to FL180. B767 P1 had a sufficient
understanding of French to understand ATC clearance. Potential hazard. The French authorities response
stated that, formally, the controller did not infringe any rule, the French regulation stipulating that the language to
be used in radio exchanges is either French (with French speakers) or English. In the case of a visual crossing,
the agreement of only one pilot is required. They further advised that studies are under way to revise the French
CAA regulations and it is believed that visual crossing clearances is one of the points to be revised.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200202034
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 26 Mar 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lyon
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Twice A319 stopped push back from Stand C61. First time due to RJ100 pushing back
from adjacent Stand C43 and second time due to a/c taxiing behind. Third attempt satisfactory.
Precis :
A319 requested and given push back clearance from Stand C61. After push back started, P2 advised push back
crew of an RJ100 pushing back from adjacent Stand C43. Push back stopped and ATC informed. ATC believed
A319 was on Stand C63 not C61. Once RJ100 had cleared, clearance received and push back commenced, but
had to be stopped again as another a/c taxied behind. ATC told A319 to stop and once a/c clear, push back re-
commenced. Confusion over stand and clearance may have been caused by language problems and a/c's call
sign "363" on Stand C61. The French investigation has revealed that the controller wrote on his strip that the
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A319 was on Stand C43. They strongly believe that the controller confused the stand numbers and reporters call
sign.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200202134
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 04 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC incident - RJ100 departed R/W09R on a OPALE 9G SID and cleared by ATC to turn right, which
was twice queried by crew. Right turn commenced and immediately instructed by ATC to turn left.
Precis :
RJ100 departed R/W09R on a OPALE 9G SID and cleared by ATC to turn right heading North, which was twice
queried by crew and both times controller confirmed right turn heading North. P1 was visual with a B747 level at
2000ft. Right turn started at 3800ft climbing to FL100. In right turn ATC gave immediate instructions to turn left.
Initial investigation has revealed that the controller thought he was telling the BAe146 to turn left, but in
fact instructed it to turn right. Appropriate action is being taken by the foreign authority.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200202272
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 02 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Palma
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
After departing Palma, A321 crew allege that Barcelona frequency 134.67 was blocked for 3mins by
conversation in Spanish between ATC and another a/c. Palma then allocated A321 a different frequency.
Precis :
A/C Type : A300 Occurrence Number : 200202381
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 12 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rimini
Events : GPWS Report Location Info :
Pretitle :
GPWS 'Terrain' Mode 2A warning.
Precis :
The aircraft was overhead the VOR at 5000 ft. and had been cleared for an ILS approach but while making a LH
turn a GPWS 'Terrain - Pull Up' warning sounded and a GPWS 'Red Light' displayed. Autothrottles and autopilot
were disconnect and the aircraft climbed, reaching 9000 ft. over the sea to the east of Rimini before the warning
ceased. A subsequent approach and landing was completed without incident. The reporter notes that there was
confusion between the aircraft and ATC as the flight crew informed ATC that they were obeying a GPWS
command whilst ATC believed the aircraft was navigating using GPS, adding that GPS was unreliable in the
Rimini area.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200202455
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 17 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bogota
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B777, on approach into Bogota, allegedly experienced difficulty obtaining essential information from ATC due
frequency blocked by continuous and unnecessary conversations in Spanish.
Precis :
Additionally, flight crew allege that they were repeatedly asked for their a/c registration, point of departure and
other similar questions while parking, which is a time of very high workload.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200202560
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 19 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : LORES
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - ATC cleared B737 to descend from FL280 to FL180. Passing FL275 during high ROD
ATC instructed B737 to maintain FL280. Descent stopped below FL260 and B737 cleared to FL260.
Precis :
High ATC workload.
A/C Type : Gulfstream 2 Occurrence Number : 200202667
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 27 Apr 2002
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Classification : Occurrences Location : Luton (LUT)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - After take off from R/W26 G2 failed to follow the CPT 3B SID heading and climbed above its
cleared altitude of 5000ft. Pilot reported having problems with the compass.
Precis :
The Gulfstream 2 pilot reported having a compass problem, and requested vectors to assist. The G2 was
reminded to maintain 5000 ft as it passed 5300 ft, and the a/c ahead was climbed from 6000 ft to FL80 to
maintain prescribed separation.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200202704
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 27 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : En Route
Events : Pressurisation Failure
Emergency Call
Emergency Descent
RT Problems
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Pressurisation malfunction - aircraft unable to maintain pressurisation on one bleed. MAYDAY declared.
Emergency descent.
Precis :
LH bleed tripped at FL390 and aircraft was unable to maintain cabin height (cabin rate of climb increased from
500fpm to 1000fpm). PAN declared followed immediately by a MAYDAY when no response was initially received
from ATC. Rapid descent then initiated and oxygen masks donned as a precaution. Aircraft then levelled at
FL290 when cabin altitude stabilised. QRH drills actioned, bleed reset and all systems operated normally.
MAYDAY cancelled and flight continued to destination at FL330. Investigation found the LH engine fan air valve
plate spindle and bearings severely worn and the valve plate seized in an almost closed position - valve
replaced.
A/C Type : Microlight Occurrence Number : 200202905
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 01 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Glasgow (GOW)
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged infringement of Glasgow CTR (Class D) by microlight at 2000ft.
Precis :
Microlight entered CAS without clearance and then failed to respond to repeated ATC instructions (attributed to
poor English). Microlight track took it into potential confliction with departing a/c, one departure stopped until
microlight had vacated vicinity. An investigation by the foreign authority determined that the pilot mis-read his
chart, and did not appreciate that CAS extended from ground level in the Class D airspace around Glasgow.
The pilot also experienced radio problems which resulted in not receiving transmissions from Glasgow.
Appropriate action was taken by the foreign authority.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200203085
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 16 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC instructed B737 to go-around from 400ft at Paris CDG due B747 lined up for take-off yet to commence
take-off roll.
Precis :
B737 on approach to R/W09R, 5nm behind B747. ATC then instructed another B747 (in French) to line-up after
landing B747. Seeing the B747 commence taxi from holding point to threshold, B737 questioned ATC but was
told to continue approach. However, ATC then instructed B737 to go-around from 400ft as B747 was yet to
commence take-off roll.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200203325
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 23 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : TADEX
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info : 15 E
Pretitle :
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Repeated unauthorised deviations from flight plan route by B747, 15nm East of TADEX at FL370. Potential
conflict with Falcon 900. STCA activated, standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Investigations indicate that the flight was given a clearance to Heathrow which was different from the planned
route. The flight was cleared PRAWN, 59/50,59/40,58/30,57/20, NIBOG, TADEX then planned route. The filed
flight plan had been via 57/20, MASIT, DEVOL, RINUS and DUBLIN. Therefore when the B747 crossed TADEX
it turned onto UN560 to Dublin. It appears that the confusion arose because the crew did not copy the
requirement to track to Belfast. Consequently the FMC would have turned the a/c automatically after TADEX
direct to Dublin. The event coincided with communication difficulties which delayed the crew response to ATC.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : BE200 Super King Air Occurrence Number : 200203349
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 22 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lambourne (LAM)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 10 E
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - BE200 was cleared to climb to FL80, but observed passing FL81 when pilot requested
confirmation of cleared level being FL90. BE200 reached FL84 before descending back to FL80.
Precis :
BE200 was cleared to climb to FL80 underneath an inbound A300 at FL90. BE200 observed passing FL81 when
pilot requested confirmation of the cleared level being FL90. BE200 turned and told to descend to FL80. BE200
reached FL84 before descending back to FL80. Standard separation maintained.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200203374
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 22 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Reporter states poor ATC vectoring resulted in reduced separation and late landing
clearance given to A320.
Precis :
Reporter states that ATC vectored A320 away from airfield to allow other local airline a/c to join approach first.
A320 was turned in 2nm behind an A300. On approach ATC reported separation distance as 4.5nm but reporter
believes it was closer to 2.5nm. Final landing clearance given below 10ft due long roll out of preceding a/c. All
communication to other inbound a/c was in local language.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200203413
Flight Phase : Circuit Occurrence Date : 27 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
TCAS RA "monitor vertical speed" received on a conflicting a/c indicating 300 feet above. Other a/c was into the
setting sun and could not be visually acquired. Spanish being spoken on frequency.
Precis :
A/C Type : Falcon 50 Occurrence Number : 200203552
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 28 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bristol International
Events : Altitude Deviation
ATC Occurrence
Location Info : 7NNW
Pretitle :
Altitude deviation. Falcon 50 climbed through cleared 3000ft towards FL90, 7nm NNW of Bristol Lulsgate.
Potential conflict with B737 at FL90. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Falcon 50 allegedly commenced take-off without clearance, failed to select instructed frequency (124.35) and
then climbed through cleared 3000ft. The pilot's report subsequently received acknowledged that a changed
clearance, correctly read back, was not followed. The pilot apologised for the misunderstanding, and for the
frequency confusion.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200203569
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 19 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Figari
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
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TCAS Report
Altitude Deviation
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX/TCAS RA - B737 and Cessna single at 4000ft on approach into Figari. Subject to French
authority investigation.
Precis :
Communication between ATC and light a/c was in French.
A/C Type : Piper PA28 Occurrence Number : 200203924
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 08 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Brize Norton
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Infringement of the Brize Norton CTR (Class D) by a PA28. Avoiding right turn given to a climbing
B757 and traffic info to a military a/c. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Chief Flying Instructor telephoned and apologised, stating that the duty instructor and foreign student involved in
the infringement had been debriefed.
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200203969
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 12 Jun 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info : 30 N
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A319 believed it was cleared to climb to FL240. Passing FL130 with high rate of climb,
A319 instructed to maintain FL140 on reaching. Traffic seen on TCAS at FL150 4-5nms abeam.
Precis :
Both crew heard the clearance to FL240 which was clearly read back. Alleged poor standard of ATC with clipped
and non standard R/T often in Spanish.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200204161
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 23 Jun 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Alexandria, Egypt
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info : 5 NE
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - As A320 was passing 3500ft during its climb to FL140, ATC asked to maintain 3000ft.
A320 descended back to 3000ft and given avoidance heading due conflicting traffic.
Precis :
After A320 took off climbing unrestricted to FL140 on a heading, TCAS traffic was noted ahead and above. On
contacting ATC, A320 was asked to maintain 3000ft. A320 was passing 3500ft so autopilot disconnected and
a/c descended back to 3000ft. An avoidance heading was given, and when clear of traffic A320 cleared to climb
to FL140.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200204189
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 21 Jun 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : St Petersburg
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B737 was cleared to descend to FL167. Approaching FL197 ATC asked B737 to
maintain FL197 and subsequently gave immediate climb to FL217 and left turn, which was complied with.
Precis :
Alleged poor ATC vectoring/service. Information received indicates that the controller failed to tell the pilot that
he would be taken through the localiser. Additionally, twice instructions were given to 600 metres instead of
6600 metres. Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken as a result of this incident.
A/C Type : Other Occurrence Number : 200204427
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 30 Jun 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Compton (CPT)
Events : Airspace Infringement
Airspace Infringement
Location Info : 5N
Pretitle :
Infringement of LTMA by Extra 400 at FL170, 5nm North of Compton.
Precis :
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Investigations indicated that the primary cause of this incident was the pilot entering CAS without a clearance.
The Farnborough controller however did not act on the fact that the pilot had advised that he was inbound to
CPT at FL170. The pilot's report subsequently received indicated that the pilot believed that filing a flight plan
gave automatic authority to enter CAS. The pilot has been advised, through the appropriate foreign authority,
that positive clearance from ATC to join CAS is required in the UK before an a/c can enter.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200204821
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 15 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : SILVA
Events : UK Airprox
TCAS Report
A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
Location Info : NE
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 114/2002 - B747 and military a/c at FL260 Northeast of SILVA. B747 received TCAS RA, avoiding
action issued.
Precis :
The B747 was at FL260, and the controller, on seeing another a/c with unknown intentions, gave the B747 a
precautionary turn. The B747 subsequently received a TCAS RA on the unidentified traffic, and turned left and
descended. At the same time ATC gave an avoiding turn and traffic information. The intruding a/c was a
foreign military a/c, operating in a military ACMI exercise area/range. The ACMI tracking system had failed, and
the military a/c's inertial navigation system developed a position error, leading to the infringement of CAS. The
military pilot had visual contact with the B747 at 3 nm. The incident will be subject to assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200204882
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 13 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location :
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Non-compliance with ATC instructions by RJ100 climbing out of Heathrow at 4000ft.
Precis :
Pilot continuously queried ATC instructions, which were repeated, and failed to comply with instructions on
several separate occasions. Standard separation maintained throughout. The pilot's report, subsequently
received, acknowledged that the RJ100 crew had received a cabin emergency light soon after take off, and
whilst attempting to confirm with the cabin crew the nature of the problem, had become distracted and stressful
over the potentially serious incident. Consequently the crew became uncertain of the assigned heading and
height instructions, and reported being unable to confirm because of the high R/T loading. The cabin
emergency warning proved to be spurious.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : Other Occurrence Number : 200204946
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 12 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Le Touquet
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - ZLIN Z37A and a Yak. Subject to investigation by the French authority.
Precis :
In severe rain and poor visibility the Zlin was instructed to join downwind R/W14 and whilst downwind was
cleared to land Nr 1. On final approach at a height of approximately 50ft, pilot became aware of a Yak
approaching R/W at high speed from opposite end and descending rapidly. Zlin immediately broke off the
approach and initiated a very low sharp turn to the left to avoid oncoming Yak. After landing Yak pilot
approached reporter and apologised for causing the go around and also informed reporter that the Yak had
been cleared by ATC in French, to give a low level pass against R/W in use.
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200205077
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 18 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : AUTUN
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info : 10 NE
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A319 on a radar heading passing FL285 received a TCAS RA when it was cleared to
climb from FL280 to FL310 through the level of an a/c at FL290.
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Precis :
A319 was on a radar heading at FL280 when ATC asked if it was visual with traffic in one o'clock position 1000ft
above. On replying affirmative A319 was told to maintain visual contact and cleared it to climb to FL310.
Passing FL285 A319 received a TCAS RA of maintain vertical speed. French being used on the frequency. The
French investigation indicates that following the a/c receiving a visual separation clearance from ATC, they
(ATC), forgot to release it from its assigned heading. The heading assigned led to a traffic convergence and the
subsequent TCAS RAs that both a/c received.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200205584
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 03 Aug 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bologna
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - A320 and unknown light a/c. Subject to investigation by the Italian authority.
Precis :
At 7nms during A320's approach to R/W12 it was cleared for the ILS and instructed to continue. Calls were
made at the 'outer marker' and at '2nms', but no reply was received to these calls. At approximately 450ft a light
a/c was observed in the 2 o'clock position at same level, passing right to left. A320's flight path was taking it
below and away from the light a/c and approach was continued. Due to local language being used, A320 being
unsure of traffic situation, and no word from Tower, a go around was initiated.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200205639
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 31 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign Ground Incident - Due to change of stand from 92 to 32, ATC instructed B737 to perform a 180deg right
turn, which if followed would have resulted in a collision with an a/c parked on Stand 36.
Precis :
Due to change of stand from 92 to 32, ATC instructed B737 to perform a 180deg right turn, which if followed
would have resulted in a collision with an a/c parked on Stand 36. After many requests for a 'follow me' vehicle/
marshaller, one was provided. Reporter believed that some problems existed due to poor English being used.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200206205
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 28 Aug 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Marseilles
Events : Airprox - Foreign
Airprox - Foreign
Location Info :
Pretitle :
FOREIGN ATC INCIDENT-Whilst BAe146 was holding on R/W 32R a B737 landed on the r/w after the
displaced threshold, 660 metres ahead of the BAe146.
Precis :
French BEA Investigation. The BAe146 was cleared to 'line up and wait 32R'. The instruction was read back and
a/c entered runway. On lining up an a/c was seen turning onto final approach at 4 to 5 miles. With the BAe146's
TCAS showing the inbound at 2nm and +500 feet and still no take off clearance, the PNF transmitted that the
flight was lined up on 32R with landing traffic 300 feet behind. There was then a transmission in French and
approximately 20 seconds later the B737 flew directly overhead by 100-200 feet and landed about 600 metres
ahead. Queries regarding this incident with ATC received an unclear response.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200206377
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 08 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lanzarote
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A321 which had been cleared nr 1 visual RH for R/W03 was not advised of a PA28 that
was nr 2 to land. A321 received a TCAS alert.
Precis :
PA28 on a VFR flight had been cleared in Spanish to be nr 2 to an A321 which was on visual final to R/W03.
PA28 advised tower that he had A321 in sight. A321 received a TCAS alert and PA28 was observed below and
ahead. Due to speed differential A321 overtook the PA28 very quickly. A321 carried out an uneventful landing.
A/C Type : Fokker 100 Occurrence Number : 200206380
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 08 Sep 2002
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Classification : Occurrences Location : Venice
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Whilst in the hold, ATC cleared FK100 to descend from FL100 to 6000ft with traffic
below at FL80. FK100 levelled at FL90 and advised ATC. Use of foreign language involved.
Precis :
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200206440
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 05 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A319 entered and lined up on Madrid R/W36L out of ATC designated order. Local
language was being used during this incident.
Precis :
Reporter's A319 arrived at holding point of R/W36L in time for its ATC slot, behind Operator 1's MD80. A B747
also Operator 1 was on R/W waiting to depart and an A320 Operator 1, which A319 had followed to the holding
point, was to the right of A319. Subsequently an A321 Operator 1 drew up behind the A320 and later on
another MD80 belonging to Operator 2 drew up behind the A321. ATC then cleared A319 to line up behind the
MD80 (ATC claim that the MD80 Operator's name 2 was used in the clearance). B747 and A320 departed and
A319 moved beyond the holding point, following MD80 Operator 1. When MD80 departed A319 lined up on
R/W36L. ATC told A319 to taxi off as it should have lined up behind the MD80 Operator 2. ATC instruction
complied with. Reporter stated that all ATC calls except the ones to the A319 were all in local language.
A/C Type : Learjet Occurrence Number : 200206772
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 16 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Learjet was given several headings and altitude changes, some taking it into CBs, before
being cleared for approach to R/W18R. Learjet three dots high on approach.
Precis :
Learjet was instructed to enter hold at DUKKE at FL190 with no EAT given, then handed to ATCC controller who
immediately gave a heading of 090deg. After being given several heading and altitude changes, some taking a/c
into CBs, and handed to several controllers within ATCC, who all held conversations in local language, Learjet
repeatedly requested headings. Subsequently Learjet told controller its destination and was informed that
parking there was full, then given a heading and told to report established. At no time was Learjet cleared to
intercept LOC or glide until this point, which turned out be R/W18R at the alternate airport. Approach was three
dots high as crew was unfamiliar with this airport. A very comprehensive report was subsequently received from
the Spanish authorities, in which it was acknowledged that, overall, the ATS services given to the Learjet were
far from ideal. Improvements in the service which were identified will be incorporated in the local ATC refresher
course programme.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200206844
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 02 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Sao Paulo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Due to ATC giving B777 a tight turn and keeping it high, the approach was fast and flap selection
was late. B777 initiated a go around at approximately 500ft.
Precis :
During a busy ATC environment and with language problems, B777 found it difficult contacting approach
controller to state that they were unable to maintain ATC's requested speed. The operator has contacted the
Brazilian authorities requesting a phrase that would be understood by ATC and that crew could use to alert ATC
to the fact that a/c are unable to comply with their demands and to request extra track miles. The Brazilian
authorities state that controller misunderstood the performance of the a/c. Appropriate follow up action has been
taken.
A/C Type : A310 Occurrence Number : 200207023
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 27 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Southend (SND)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 7 SE
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Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - A310 cleared to climb to FL70 and later instructed to contact frequency 120.52. Reply was
difficult to understand. Subsequently A310 climbed towards FL120.
Precis :
A310 was cleared to climb to FL70 as per Standing agreement and subsequently transferred to frequency
120.52. The readback was difficult to understand, but the controller assumed that the A310 had changed
frequency. The a/c did however return to the frequency seeking confirmation that it had been cleared up to
FL120. ATC replied by repeating the frequency 120.52. The A310 did not contact this frequency until after
entering the sector passing FL94 and later checked in, climbing to FL120. A310 instructed to maintain FL100
and turn left 105degs. Mode C indicated FL103 then FL106, and A310 instructed to maintain FL110. Pilot
believed A310 had been cleared to FL120 by the previous controller. The a/c's RT transmissions were of poor
quality.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200207153
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 02 Oct 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Amsterdam
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Alleged A320 received poor radar vectoring during an ILS approach to R/W06. A320
elected to go visual at the outer marker and disconnected automatics.
Precis :
Reporter states that A320 was at 2000ft on a radar heading 130deg, 6.5nm to threshold, when ATC allegedly
forgot to turn A320 onto an intercept for R/W06 ILS. A320 was unable to query the lack of instruction as ATC
were talking to other a/c in local language. A320 went through the localiser on a heading of 130deg, when ATC
gave an instruction to turn left heading 030deg to intercept localiser and descend to 1800ft. This heading gave
an intercept inside the outer marker (outer marker altitude should be 1280ft). Due to lack of further descent
clearance or a more suitable radar vector A320 went visual at the outer marker. Automatics disconnected iaw
SOPs and a/c configured accordingly. Approach fully stable at 500ft above threshold.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200207168
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 05 Oct 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : BEGAS
Events : UK Airprox
Loss of Standard Separation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 195/2002 - A321 and B737 at FL360 at BEGAS.
Precis :
The B737 was issued with an Oceanic clearance by Shanwick to cross BEGAS at FL370. Madrid ACC were
advised of the clearance. However, the pilot was not cleared to the Oceanic level by Madrid (only FL360), nor
did he query why he had not been cleared to that level. Both a/c received and reacted to TCAS RAs. This
AIRPROX has been reviewed by the United Kingdom AIRPROX Board (UKAB).
CAA Closure: No further CAA action however the CAA has requested that the Spanish authorities forward a
copy of their investigation into this incident.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200207458
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 14 Oct 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : ELGAR
Events : Loss of Standard Separation
TCAS Report
Location Info : 5 S
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - A320 failed to follow ATC heading instructions and lost separation with a B767, which received a
TCAS RA of climb on A320. Traffic info and avoiding action given to A320.
Precis :
The A320 was on a heading of 005 deg and the B767 on a heading of 010 deg, at FL260, when the A320 called
turning right onto 075 deg, towards the B767. The A320 was instructed to descend to FL:240 more than once,
which was not acknowledged. Avoiding action was then given, which again was not acknowledged. The B767
received a TCAS RA, which was not actioned as the A320 was in sight. The A320 was eventually contacted
and instructed to route direct, but on failing to comply the A320 was given a heading of 000 deg, before being
directed to destination. It was apparent from the A320 pilot's report, subsequently received, that there was some
confusion on the flight deck over the heading and FL on an allegedly busy frequency, involving the A320
receiving both a TCAS TA and RA which the crew attempted to follow.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
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A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200207495
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 05 Oct 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Tours
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - No radar or ATC service available below FL60 to BAe146.
Precis :
28nms from destination BAe146 was informed that foreign ATCC control radar service would be terminated and
descent below FL60 was at pilot's risk and discretion. There was no co-ordination to destination's approach
frequency. On approach frequency there was an auto statement playing that ATZ was closed/deactivated.
BAe146 landed safely, but reporter believes that for weekend public transport operations, more protection must
be provided. See also 200207523. The operator subsequently negotiated appropriate opening times with the
destination ATC unit.
CAA Closure: Appropriate operator action taken.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200207722
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 20 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
RT Problems
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Unauthorised climb to follow SID heights after radio contact with ATC temporarily lost.
Precis :
A320's initial departure clearance was to stop climb at 5000ft. After departure tower changed A320 to radar, but
following a rapidly spoken instruction with an accent, P1 readback 120.9 instead of 127.9, which was not
challenged by ATC. A320 tried new frequency without success. Meanwhile P2 (HP) announced a climb to FL80
was needed to meet minimum SID altitude, which P1 authorised before going back to tower frequency who then
gave correct onward frequency. They were aware of A320's climb.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200208132
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 05 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Beijing
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B777 had been cleared to push and start from Gate 214. Then several a/c manoeuvred
in vicinity of B777, infringing its pushback zone. B777 gave way to 5 a/c.
Precis :
Alleged that national a/c were either not monitoring the ground frequency or simply ignoring instructions. The
Chinese investigation revealed that the frequency was very busy with 19 a/c on the frequency within 10 minutes.
Due to construction work all landing traffic on 36R was crowded onto one taxiway. One Chinese a/c had been
instructed (in Chinese) to give way to the B777 but as the B777 crew were not alerted in English they were not
aware of this situation.
A/C Type : Falcon 20/200 Occurrence Number : 200208183
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 07 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Northolt
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Falcon 20 climbed above the SID altitude outbound from Northolt. A/c almost unreadable, had a constant 'ident',
failed to follow the departure route and had poor English.
Precis :
Standard separation maintained. See also occs 199802163 and 199805001. The operator subsequently stated
that whilst performing the CPT4Y SID in turbulent conditions the a/c lost a generator. This led to the failure of the
autopilot to capture the assigned 3000 feet and the a/c therefore exceeded that altitude.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : CL600RJ Regional Jet Occurrence Number : 200208201
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 30 Oct 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Brussels
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - CRJ was given very late landing clearance due to vehicle in the touchdown area. At 150ft
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vehicle was clear of R/W and CRJ was 'cleared to land'.
Precis :
At 6 DME CRJ was handed over from approach to Tower and at 4.5 dme checked in with Tower and told to
continue approach. At 1.2 dme passing 300ft AGL CRJ checked with tower if cleared to land and again told to
continue. At 200ft AGL (decision height) CRJ became visual and continued visually. At this point a vehicle was
spotted around the touchdown area, rapidly vacating the R/W. At 150ft vehicle was clear of R/W and CRJ was
'cleared to land'. Conversation between Tower and vehicle was in local language. LVPs in force, Tower did not
inform the crew of the presence of the vehicle.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200208220
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 11 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Insufficient notice of level change could have resulted in an altitude deviation and a
possible TCAS RA. Local language being used at time of incident.
Precis :
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200208222
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 13 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : CRL VOR
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info : 8
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A321 was at FL110 when a B737 was cleared to climb through its level. ATC gave left
turn to A321 which received a TCAS RA. A/P engaged throughout.
Precis :
A321 was at FL110 when a B737 was cleared to climb through its level. B737 observed on TCAS approaching
from the two o'clock position. ATC ordered A321 to turn left turn immediately, during which A321 received a
TCAS RA for approximately 5secs. B737 was also observed to turn left. Situation awareness was difficult for
A321 crew to establish early as communications between B737 and ATC were in French.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200208800
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 29 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Sofia
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A320's take off clearance from R/W27 cancelled after brakes had been released, due to
proximity of an a/c landing on same R/W, which subsequently carried out a go-around.
Precis :
A320 was initially informed of R/W09 for departure, but was changed to R/W27 as part of the taxi clearance.
A320 held position for approximately 30secs to make sure A320 could accept R/W27. ATC insisted A320 start
taxiing ASAP and on approaching threshold awaited for an ATC clearance. Cabin checks were still being carried
out and ATC were informed that A320 would need a further minute before being ready. A320 cleared to line up
with an a/c approximately 14nms out. With cabin checks complete A320 was given an immediate take off
clearance and subsequently an initial clearance, but due to deliverance of clearance, needed two attempts to
decipher the altitude and squawk. A320 released brakes and had only moved a couple of metres when told to
hold position. P1 read back 'aborting take off' and the traffic on approach was instructed to go around. Crew
believe original traffic information was inaccurate.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200209062
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 12 Dec 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Santiago, Spain
Events : Ground (AD) Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign Ground Incident - Throughout tow of B737 ground crew would not use headsets, but used poor non
standard hand signals. Subsequently tow bar disconnected without any reference to flight deck.
Precis :
During tow of B737 from stand to 'Industrial Area' with P1 and P2 on flight deck, due no engineering staff
present, ground crew would not use headsets despite being asked and having the equipment. Instead
throughout the tow poor non standard hand signals were used. When B737 was reaching the 'Industrial Area'
the tow bar was disconnected without reference to flight deck crew. Crew's first indication was the ground crew
walking away and the tug reversing.
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A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200300105
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 02 Jan 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - During B737's approach to R/W18R, local language was used to other a/c. This meant
B737 crew were unable to establish a mental picture of the arrival sequence.
Precis :
There have been other similar reports submitted.
A/C Type : AN12 Occurrence Number : 200300373
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 22 Jan 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : St Abbs (SAB)
Events : A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
A/c Equipment / System
Failure
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
AN12 Mode C malfunction at SAB. P1 called level at FL235 but Mode C indicated FL226. Second transponder
selected, but this failed completely.
Precis :
P1 allegedly failed to understand ATC request to switch off Mode C and reverted to initial transponder which
continued to display incorrect altitude. Subsequent ATC units were advised of Mode C malfunction before
transfer. A report subsequently received from the foreign operator indicated that the primary transponder failure
resulted from static pressure line icing, and the secondary to incorrect connections, both of which were corrected
after flight.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200300386
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 21 Jan 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - For 10-15mins during later stages of B737's taxi to R/W and holding prior to take off, only
local language spoken. P2 could speak the language thus crew were aware of events.
Precis :
See also occs 200203374, 200203969, 200206440, 200206772 and 200300105,
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200300595
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 02 Feb 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Alicante
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B737 passing 5000ft during cleared descent to 2200ft, was given traffic info on light a/c
maintaining 3500ft. Traffic seen on TCAS and visual. Descent stopped at 4200ft.
Precis :
B737 had been cleared to descend to 2200ft on the VOR/DME procedure R/W28. Passing 5000ft ATC gave
B737 traffic info on light a/c, which displayed on TCAS, but there was no height readout. When B737 was
passing 4500ft ATC advised that light a/c was maintaining 3500ft. Descent stopped at 4200ft and light a/c
became visual. Light a/c passed directly underneath B737 and when clear, B737 resumed descent to 2200ft.
Also pilot of light a/c communicated with ATC in local language.
A/C Type : AN2 Occurrence Number : 200300657
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 07 Jan 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Scampton
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Infringement of active EG R313 (Scampton) by an AN2. Prior to departure, pilot was given
assistance planning his route and had been warned about R313.
Precis :
The a/c was in the process of leaving the UK for Brazil when this incident occurred. The relevant foreign
authority was contacted and a pilot's report received. This report stated that he did not have "correct information
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about the en route area".
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200301165
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 25 Feb 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : A/c Equipment / System
Failure
APU Fire / Failure
Emergency Call
Diversion /Return
A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Nr2 generator failed and APU start unsuccessful. VSCF failed. APU anti-surge valve failed.
Precis :
Nr2 generator tripped 'Off' during the climb, with the BIAS light illuminating. An APU start was then attempted,
resulting in 'APU Fault' and 'No start' warnings. The CB panel was checked and two further unsuccessful APU
starts were attempted. After consulting the QRH, a PAN was declared and the aircraft returned to the departure
airport. The passengers were briefed via the PA, but the SCA later advised the volume was low and some
passengers failed to hear the announcement, which others were unable to understand due to language
difficulties. Defect diagnosis carried out resulting in No.2 VSCF replacement Subsequent strip report confirmed
unit was defective - short circuit in power module. With regard to APU defect, this was tested successfully on the
ground and operated correctly. Aircraft was released with requests for further crew reports. Subsequent reports
established that the starting difficulties were confined to higher altitudes. Various trouble shooting activity carried
out resulting in replacement of Anti-surge valve which resolved the problem.
CAA Closure: The Hazard is adequately controlled by existing requirements, procedures and documentation.
A/C Type : Falcon 900 Occurrence Number : 200301339
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 05 Mar 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Runway Incursion Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - F900 failed to follow ATC taxy/conditional line up clearance and crossed red stop bar at Block
88/87 and attempted to line up on R/W27L at same time as an MD82.
Precis :
See also 200304002. The foreign operator concerned has failed to respond to a number of attempts to elicit an
explanation.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200301658
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 22 Feb 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Low go-around on Runway 18R Madrid due to crew being unable to confirm whether they were cleared to land.
Precis :
When crew checked in with Tower, with an a/c 2.7 nm ahead, they were unable to understand whether they had
a landing clearance. Tower spoke continuously in Spanish until the a/c was over the threshold.
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200301706
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 10 Mar 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location :
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
Flight crew believed, and read back, climb to FL340, while ATC stated cleared altitude was to FL330.
Precis :
On a climb request to FL370, Brest control allegedly cleared the aircraft to climb initially to FL340, with FL340
being read back by the flight crew. After levelling off, ATC informed the flight crew that clearance had only been
given to FL330 prior to continuing to FL370. Comment made by crew that "a common language would be a good
idea". The tapes were subsequently checked by ATC and it was confirmed that the aircraft had, in fact, been
cleared to FL340.
A/C Type : B727 Occurrence Number : 200301799
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 25 Mar 2003
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Classification : Occurrences Location : ATO VOR
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
Loss of Standard Separation
Location Info : 20 NE
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX - B727 and unidentified a/c at FL260 under control of Madrid ATCC. B727 received TCAS
RA.
Precis :
B727 initially received TCAS TA and contacted Madrid ATCC who were slow to respond. By the time Madrid
ATCC had contact B727, TCAS RA had been received with appropriate action taken. ATCC then queried why
B727 had departed from cleared level, despite being twice informed of TCAS RA and subsequent avoiding
action. B727 crew allege that Madrid ATCC service was poor and that Spanish language was frequently used.
A/C Type : MS Rallye Occurrence Number : 200301975
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 22 Mar 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Newtownard
Events : UK Airprox (non ATC
related)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 30/2003 - Rallye 110ST and a Bell 206 1nm Southeast of Newtownard at 1000ft.
Precis :
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200302288
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 15 Apr 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Banjul
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Following departure B757 was involved in two potential conflicts within 5 minute period.
Precis :
Whilst on ground B757 received a clearance of YF VOR climb FL330. After departure contact established with
next sector and as B757 was passing FL36 was told to maintain FL40 due opposite direction traffic at FL50.
After maintaining FL40 for approximately 20nms, no traffic observed, B757 was cleared to FL330 and expedite
passing FL110 due opposite direction traffic at FL110. Passing FL90 B757 told to maintain FL100. 30 seconds
after an FK27 was seen, estimating to be maintaining FL90, which B757 queried with ATC, who confirmed FK27
was climbing through FL95 to maintain FL110. The FK27 was being controlled in French.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200302352
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 08 Apr 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rome
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 received TCAS RA against A320 at 5000ft under Rome ACC control. A320 also received TCAS RA.
Appropriate action taken, standard separation maintained.
Precis :
B737 initially cleared to climb out of Rome Ciampino to 5000ft. B737 then continued at 5000ft towards Rome
Fiumicino, which was using R/W34R. ATC then instructed B737 to descend to 3000ft immediately. This was
shortly followed by the TCAS RA. B737 flight crew allege that foreign language was used by ATC on RT, which
could have been a contributory factor to the incident.
A/C Type : Cessna C550 Citation 2 Occurrence Number : 200302408
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 23 Apr 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Luton (LUT)
Events : ATC Occurrence
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - C550 allegedly failed to follow ATC instructions and taxied beyond holding point B1, crossing an
illuminated stop bar and entering active R/W08.
Precis :
C550 was cleared by GMC to holding point B1, which is the last holding point prior to R/W08. Pilot correctly
acknowledged this clearance. C550 was then passed its ATC clearance, which was read back correctly
(believed) and then transferred to Tower. It is possible that flight crew's attention was preoccupied with copying
clearance and re-briefing as they approached the holding point, resulting in C550 crossing holding point B1.
MATS Part 2 requires controllers, unless previously requested by flight crew, to offer ATC clearances to flight
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crew at the time that engine start is approved to enable crews to pre-brief at time of lower workload.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200302495
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 19 Apr 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Palma
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - ATIS indicated R/W24L for landing and controllers reaffirmed this. B757 was then
cleared for ILS R/W24L, but it became apparent ILS was u/s. B757 carried out a visual landing.
Precis :
ATIS indicated R/W24L for landing and several controllers reaffirmed this. Approach control cleared B757 for
approach and call ATC for visual R/W24L. It soon became apparent ILS R/W24 was u/s, although B757 was
locked on and glide path looked good. LOC then disappeared and then reappeared. A few seconds later it went
off the air. B757 was visual and disconnected the automatics for a visual landing. B757 had not been pre warned
that there was a problem with the ILS.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200302539
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 28 Apr 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - ATC asked a B757 during its ILS approach to R/W09R, to maintain 3000ft and R/W
heading due to a B737 being vectored to adjacent R/W08R through B757's final approach path.
Precis :
During incident B757 received no TCAS warnings. Reporter considers that the Paris radar sequencing was poor
and the crew's attempts to obtain a clear picture of the sequencing was hindered by French language
instructions being issued to some of the other a/c. Controller workload high. Appropriate foreign authority
alerted.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200302643
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 04 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Palma
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A320 climbing to FL120 received a TCAS TA on reciprocal traffic above descending
through its level. ATC informed and A320 made a 40 deg right turn. Traffic passed abeam at 3nm.
Precis :
Spanish language being used on the frequency reducing situational awareness.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200302655
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 01 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lisbon
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Lisbon ATCC allegedly missed an incorrect read back by A321at FL340, which subsequently received a TCAS
RA against opposite direction traffic at FL350.
Precis :
During cruise at FL340, Lisbon ATCC asked A321 if they could take FL360. A321 advised ATCC that they could
and were then cleared to climb to FL360. However, this instruction was immediately cancelled and the A321
advised to expect clearance in 2mins. Approximately 1min later, all three flight crew claim to have heard their
clearance to climb to FL360 and the P2 ( a Dutch national) responded accordingly. A321 commenced climb but
soon received a TCAS RA against opposite direction traffic at FL350 (which was subsequently issued avoiding
action). Lisbon ATCC then instructed A321 to maintain FL340 and advised that second climb clearance had
actually been issued to a different (Dutch) a/c.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200302856
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 11 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 inbound to Gatwick with a suspected tyre burst could have misinterpreted a consideration
of an alternative airfield as an instruction to divert.
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Precis :
The aircraft was inbound to Gatwick and it was believed that it may have burst a tyre on departure. The
standard message was passed by the ATCO on behalf of the BAA ODM requesting the pilot to consider
diverting elsewhere. It would appear that no published information is available to pilots indicating that this action
may be taken. This particular Captain appeared to have interpreted the message as a directive to divert, which
it was not. The situation will be monitored for any future similar incidents.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200302971
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 12 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : NEVEL
Events : Wake Turbulence Location Info :
Pretitle :
A321 encountered wake turbulence during cruise at FL350 at NEVEL under control of Casablanca ATCC, from
opposite direction B747 at FL360. 35deg RH roll experienced.
Precis :
A/C Type : BE90 King Air Occurrence Number : 200303005
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 14 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Stansted
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - After BE90 took off from R/W23 it turned left, instead of the expected right turn to follow the CPT
3R SID. Appropriate action taken and standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Controller cleared BE90 on a CPT 3R SID, but pilot spoke with a very heavy accent and read back was difficult
to decipher. Controller accepted readback as CPT, but pilot reported to LTCC that he had said LAM 3R, as filed
on his FPL. This incident has highlighted incorrect use of LAM departure, as this route is only available for
Stansted - Heathrow transits. However IFPS (Integrated Flight Plan Processing System) accepts a/c with this
routeing and some flight data does not list restrictions. A request will be sent to IFPS to amend their database
and restrict use of these routeings. Appropriate ATC action has been taken.
A/C Type : Piper PA44 Seminole Occurrence Number : 200303072
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 20 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Daventry (DTY)
Events : ATC Occurrence
Airspace Infringement
Location Info : 6 E
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - PA44 receiving a FIS wanted to join CAS at Daventry and was repeatedly told to 'remain clear of
controlled airspace', but still entered CAS without a clearance.
Precis :
When a PA44 wanting to join CAS at Daventry called, controller instructed that it was on a FIS and to 'remain
clear of controlled airspace'. PA44 observed climbing through FL76 and was again informed to remain clear of
CAS. PA44 continued climbing to FL110 and repeatedly told that no clearance to join CAS had been given. A
comprehensive report subsequently received from the PA44 pilot stated that after a delayed take off, difficulty
was experienced with radio reception on both London Control and London Info. Eventually, whilst still
experiencing reception and language problems, the pilot thought he heard a transponder code issued, and
mistakenly thought that gave permission to enter CAS. The pilot acknowledged and apologised for his mistake.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : CL600RJ Regional Jet Occurrence Number : 200303162
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 03 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - CL600RJ lined up on R/W27L and whilst waiting for Vortex spacing from a departing
DC10 an a/c on finals initiated a Go-around.
Precis :
CL600RJ was cleared to line up from intersection Y11 R/W27L, with a DC10 just airborne from Y13 intersection
(full length). CL600RJ saw an a/c on final approach, which appeared to be at approximately 6nms. CL600RJ
advised Tower that it would still require another 2 minutes, as at that point the DC10 had been airborne for 1
minute by reporter's timing. Tower advised 'it is no problem for me' and cleared CL600RJ for take off. After
approximately 1 minute tower queried the delay advising of traffic at 2nms. CL600RJ confirmed that a further 45
seconds were required, but this timing was queried by Tower, who then spoke local language to landing a/c.
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CL600RJ then reported rolling and landing a/c went around.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200303375
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 20 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : GROSSETO
Events : Loss of Standard Separation
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
A320 allegedly received inconsistent instructions from ATC during descent into Rome Fiumicino on frequency
125.5. Altitude deviation due late ATC re-clearance and loss of separation experienced.
Precis :
A320 initially cleared to descend to FL200. However, passing FL230, ATC re-cleared a/c to FL230. A320
descended to FL218 before recovering to FL230. A320 was then issued another clearance to FL200 but,
passing FL210, was re-cleared to FL210. On this occasion, A320 descended to FL207 before recovering to
FL210. Flight crew comment that controller workload was high and that the standard of English used
deteriorated. Appropriate ATC authority alerted.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200303395
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 28 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
FORIGN AIRPROX - A321 and A320/1 at 5500ft during approach into Malaga. A321 carried out evasive
manoeuvre to avoid further conflict.
Precis :
A321 cleared to descend to 5500ft for ILS approach to R/W14 and instructed to reduce speed. Approaching
5500ft, P2 observed another a/c approximately 1500ft above passing left to right. This a/c continued to descend
and then turned left into conflict with A321, which subsequently performed an evasive manoeuvre. High
proportion of RT was in Spanish. Subject to investigation by Spanish authorities.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200303575
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 06 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Trent (TNT)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 allegedly descended below its cleared FL270. Pilot believed B737 had been cleared to
FL250. As there were no other a/c in the vicinity B737 was cleared to FL250.
Precis :
Pilot had a very strong accent and had requested a repeat of the clearance " FL270 45DME before POL".
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200303641
Flight Phase : Flight Occurrence Date : 06 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : En Route
Events : Flight Crew Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Communication difficulty between crew and mainly non-English speaking passengers. Safety hazard in an
emergency.
Precis :
The reporter comments that no Chinese speaking cabin crew members were part of the crew complement on
this service into China, despite the fact that 2 appropriately qualified cabin crew members are normally carried
on this route. On the ICN to LHR sector it was estimated that three-quarters of the passengers in World Traveller
class were non-English speaking. Also, the safety video was only available in the English language. The reporter
is concerned that during an emergency there would have been severe communications problems with such a
large group of passengers, which would have compromised aircraft/passenger safety. The reporter confirms that
2 other crews in ICN also did not have any Chinese-speaking crew amongst their complement.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200303728
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 15 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
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Foreign ATC Incident - B737 descending to FL50 for approach to R/W27L was given traffic info on outbound
helicopter at 4000ft. B737's TCAS then showed helicopter at FL50 and descent stopped at FL60.
Precis :
B737 was cleared to descend to FL50 on a radar heading for approach to R/W27L. B737 also given traffic info
on outbound helicopter at 4000ft that would pass below. When helicopter appeared on B737's TCAS it showed
helicopter level at either 5000ft or FL50. B737 stopped descent at FL60 and helicopter passed within 3nm. ATC
and helicopter were speaking in local language.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200303812
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 14 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 allegedly failed to follow an amendment to the HON 1R SID, resulting in a following
departure being given a heading to ensure separation, visual separation maintained.
Precis :
B737 was given an amendment to the HON 1R SID to fly to 5dme, then turn left heading 190deg climbing to
5000ft. B737 appeared to turn left at 2dme and reported routeing direct to HON to MACC. The next departure,
which was rolling when B737 turned early, was turned onto a heading to ensure separation. Visual separation
maintained at all times and B737 observed establishing on track. Due to language problems, no further
comments were made on R/T.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200303819
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 19 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Oceanic
Events : UK Airprox
Loss of Standard Separation
Altitude Deviation
Location Info : N4615 W02457
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 80/2003 - B747 and A340 at N4615 W02457 at FL370.
Precis :
B747 at N4615 W02457 was cleared to climb to FL370 after passing 22W, but initiated climb immediately and
came into conflict with an airliner at FL370. Avoiding action (immediate descent instruction) issued. See also
200303809. The B747 pilot's report subsequently received indicates that the B747 crew believed they were
cleared by Shanwick to commence the climb, which was read back. The duty Radio Officer at Ballygirreen did
not obtain a correct readback of the clearance passed by the ScOACC controller. The incident will be subject to
assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : CL600 RJ700 Occurrence Number : 200303841
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 09 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bordeaux
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged potential conflict with a team of aerobatic a/c following CRJ late landing clearance at Bordeaux.
Precis :
CRJ had been instructed to report to ATC at 4 DME. However, from 5 DME to 4 DME, controller was
continuously talking to a/c in French and CRJ was unable to report. CRJ attempted to contact ATC on numerous
occasions, before eventually establishing contact when landing clearance was received. Just after landing, an
aerobatic display team were observed carrying out a low fly-by overhead in the opposite direction to the landing
traffic. Suspect ATC had been in communication with these a/c. Occurrence "Opened" 18/07/2003 to facilitate an
investigation.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200304053
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 25 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Brookmans Park (BPK)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info : 5E
Pretitle :
B737 allegedly failed to comply with ATC instructions.
Precis :
B737, at FL110 and routing via Brookmans Park following a BPK4K SID from Heathrow, was erroneously issued
a RH turn heading 070. B737 should have been instructed to perform a LH turn. ATC controller (trainee) issued
the correct clearance several times. Numerous read backs followed, including one stating heading 120 which
took the B737 towards holding traffic in Lambourne hold. Mentor took control and vectored B737 away from
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Lambourne. Avoiding action and traffic info issued. Standard separation maintained.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200304162
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 22 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : En Route
Events : Engine/Malfunction Power
Loss - First Engine
Emergency Call
Emergency Descent
RT Problems
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Nr1 engine failure during cruise. Emergency declared. Precautionary descent. Alleged communication problem
with Mumbai ATC. Full authority fuel control (FAFC) failed.
Precis :
At FL310 shortly after top of climb, nr1engine fuel valve failed causing nr1 engine to run down. QRH engine
failure/shutdown checklist actioned and an emergency declared to ATC at Mumbai (on HF 5601) who allegedly
failed to understand the descent request. Descent clearance to FL270 obtained on Karachi VHF 126.5 and flight
continued to destination where a successful autoland was carried out. See also 200303943 (similar incident,
same aircraft 2 days earlier). Following strip examination of the changed components, the fuel metering unit
(FMU), the full authority fuel control (FAFC) and the dedicated generator (DG), the root cause was identified as
a defective FAFC which had a contaminated internal connection (short circuit on card D07275B)which would
have caused spurious auto-start shut off vale commands to the FMU. Considered to be an isolated occurrence
by the operator's propulsion department based on the research of the aircraft maintenance records and fleet
technical system monitoring data. The incident was discussed with the production personnel involved from which
it was determined that the defect was intermittent in nature and therefore difficult to trace. In addition, the initial
maintenance input had a pre-determined FMU change called up based on standard fault isolation procedures.
Following the first event the remaining components were changed as a continuation of the troubleshooting and
as a precaution due to the nature of the defect. No further action proposed.
CAA Closure: The hazard is adequately controlled by existing requirements, procedures and documentation.
A/C Type : Robinson R22 Occurrence Number : 200304420
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 30 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lyneham
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info : 6
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Infringement of the Lyneham CTR (Class D). Pilot called requesting FIS, but when asked to
confirm position reported being lost. A/c asked to squawk, identified and given heading.
Precis :
A/C Type : Microlight Occurrence Number : 200304482
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 11 Jul 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bournemouth
Events : Airspace Infringement Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Alleged infringement of the Bournemouth CTR (Class D) by foreign pilot who had difficulty
understanding ATC instructions due to poor English.
Precis :
The appropriate foreign authority has been fully informed on this incident.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : CL600 RJ700 Occurrence Number : 200304603
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 16 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Nice
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Increased workload for crew who had to repeat themselves on frequency to ATC, either
to gain a response or make themselves understood, both prior to and after declaring a PAN.
Precis :
Reporter alleges that ATC displayed a lack of understanding of calls made by the crew on a number of
occasions.
CAA Closure: The French authorities report that the unit responsible for investigating this incident received
notification almost 2 months after the incident occurred. Although the local unit were asked to investigate, the
elapsed time involved meant that the radar and radio data had been returned to service; data is retained for 30
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days. The pilot concerned allegedly did not report the event on the frequency.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200304665
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 16 Jul 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Erevan
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged erroneous instructions by Erevan ATC.
Precis :
A320 initially carrying out an INDUR 1A approach to Erevan, but ATC delayed descent which necessitated a
change to an INDUR 1B approach. ATC then allegedly proceeded to repeatedly misdirect A320 towards high
ground below MSA. A320 crew declined headings issued and followed the procedure for an INDUR 1B
approach. The Armenian report indicates that the crew misheard the ATC heading of 265 degrees as 165
degrees following which confusion occurred.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200304701
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 10 Jul 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Algiers
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Algerian ATC allegedly spoke in French, to French speaking a/c. Reduction of situational awareness for English
speaking crews in the area.
Precis :
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200304844
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 23 Jul 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Stansted
Events : Runway Incursion
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
A320 given conditional clearance to line-up at Stansted but reported not ready and so clearance was cancelled.
However, A320 then proceeded to line-up without appropriate clearance.
Precis :
The ADC position was being operated by a mentor and trainee. The A320 was given a clearance to line up and
wait on R/W23. The trainee then initiated a telephone call to the TC North West coordinator. At the same time,
the pilot reported that he was not yet ready and would need 2 or 3 minutes. The response from ATC was
"..cancel line up hold position" and then the trainee continued with the telephone conversation. The crew
responded but neither the trainee nor the mentor assimilated this. The A320 continued and lined up. No further
safety incident took place as there was no other traffic affected by the runway being occupied.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC action taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200304878
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 26 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Prague
Events : Rejected Take-Off
Flight Crew Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Take off rejected due to configuration warning. Flaps were not in the take off position. Flaps reset and
subsequent take off proceeded normally.
Precis :
Failure to set take off flap attributed (by crew) to a combination of factors and distractions leading to a
complacent and hastily completed checklist.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200305021
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 27 Jul 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lambourne (LAM)
Events : TCAS Report
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 descending to FL90, advised ATC it was stopping at FL100 due possibly to traffic climbing
to FL80. A following B747 then called descending to FL100.
Precis :
B737 being vectored from LAM for R/W27R was released at FL90, but advised that it was stopping its descent
at FL100, due to concerns of traffic below. ATC informed B737 of traffic which was climbing to FL80. A B747
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following the B737 then called descending to FL100 and instructed to stop descent at FL110, which was
acknowledged. Believed that the B747 may have intended descending below its cleared FL. The quality of
spoken English during this incident was poor with simultaneous transmissions evident.
A/C Type : Piper PA46 Malibu Occurrence Number : 200305290
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 06 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bournemouth
Events : UK Airprox Location Info : 8 SE
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 121/2003 - PA46 and a BE76 8nm Southeast of Bournemouth at 2000ft.
Precis :
PA46 allegedly departed from allocated clearance and came into conflict with a BE76 carry out an ILS approach.
The PA46 pilot's report indicates that the foreign national was picking up his a/c after partially completed
maintenance. When airborne an a/c warning alarm then sounded with the pilot trying to check the problem. He
was aware to turn to the right on departure but not of any specific heading. The pilot was also having trouble in
the speed of delivery of ATC instructions. ATC aspects included not reinforcing the direction required, non use of
VRPs and alleged poor radar performance.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC follow up action has been taken. This AIRPROX is now subject to a separate
review by the United Kingdom AIRPROX Board (UKAB).
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200305478
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 10 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Nice
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B757 holding at C1 was cleared to cross R/W04L. After releasing brakes and starting to
move, crew heard ATC clear another a/c for landing in local dialect. Crossing stopped.
Precis :
Foreign authority has been alerted to this incident.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200305977
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 28 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : BAMAR
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info : 25 N
Pretitle :
B757 received TCAS RA descending through FL250 towards cleared FL240, 25nm North of BAMAR, against
A321 below. ATC had been speaking to A321 in Spanish, so B757 crew unaware of A321 cleared level.
Precis :
A/C Type : Falcon 2000 Occurrence Number : 200306050
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 01 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bovingdon (BNN)
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info : 4 SE
Pretitle :
A Falcon 2000 allegedly failed to comply with the climb profile whilst on the CPT 5X SID. A similar incident
occurred a few minutes later involving a C550, same operator.
Precis :
Falcon 2000 on the CPT 5X SID called ATC and correctly reported climbing to 3000ft and advised by ATC
'further climb shortly'. In fact Falcon 2000 should have continued its climb iaw with the SID to be at 5000ft 4nm
prior to BNN, but in fact was still at 3000ft 2nm prior to BNN. It is believed that due to the ATC statement the
foreign pilot may have been under the impression that further climb would be at instruction of ATC. Appropriate
ATC action will be taken. The second incident which occurred a few minutes later involved a C550, same
operator, ATC had instructed C550 to continue iaw with SID, but a/c continued at 3000ft for an extended period
and was only passing 4000ft approximately 1nm prior to BNN. The operator is to be alerted to these incidents.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200306210
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 07 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
Following vectors for R/W27R A320 allegedly descended 500ft below its cleared altitude of 4000ft whilst on base
leg for R/W27R. A320 reminded of its cleared altitude. Standard separation maintained.
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Precis :
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200306245
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 10 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lambourne (LAM)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 in the LAM Hold was given an EAT of 1030hrs. Subsequently B737 was seen leaving LAM heading
230deg and pilot informed controller of this action. B737 instructed to return to LAM immediately.
Precis :
Pilot's English poor.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200306304
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 09 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged poor ATC at Madrid. Landing A310 observed passing just behind tail of RJ100 which was exiting
R/W33 via RET K1. ATC persistently spoke in Spanish. Recurring problem at this location.
Precis :
See also 200306501, 200306907, 200308055 and 200308058.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200306501
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 13 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
A320 was cleared to descend to FL90 and heading 180deg, then cleared direct to RBO to regain STAR. During
turn and passing FL110, A320 received/complied with a TCAS RA of climb on traffic at FL100.
Precis :
Frequency was busy and local language used at time of incident. Investigation continues under occ 200306304
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200306646
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 17 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Verona Brescia
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 received a TCAS RA during climb out of Verona Brescia at 3000ft against light a/c orbiting over airfield.
Precis :
With B737 following SID at 3000ft, heading 120deg, ATC issued instruction to change heading to 090deg but did
not specify left or right. B737 crew attempted to clarify with ATC but were unable to establish contact due to ATC
talking to another a/c in Italian. B737 slowly commenced a left turn before establishing contact with ATC who
advised that a right turn should have been commenced. This was performed, with a TCAS RA then being
received against a light a/c orbiting over airfield. Appropriate action taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200307427
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 26 Oct 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : ATC Occurrence
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 was instructed 'after the landing B737 at 2nms line up 26L at B1', which was read back. B737
subsequently observed crossing B1 stopbar. An inbound B737 was sent around. Pilot apologised.
Precis :
On handover to London pilot apologised stating B737 had only just crossed stopbar and that there was no
intention of lining up on R/W26L. Pilots English reported as poor.
A/C Type : CL600 RJ700 Occurrence Number : 200307530
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 25 Oct 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bordeaux
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
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CRJ 700 cleared for ILS R/W23 and told to report at 4nm. At 4nm called ATC, but transmissions from ATC were
in local language. CRJ 700 was given a late landing clearance due departing a/c.
Precis :
Departing a/c performed a rolling take-off and CRJ 700 received its landing clearance at 300 feet AGL/1 mile.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200307694
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 05 Nov 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Ghardaia
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged poor ATC communications/overload involving ATCC and Tower. Many communications in local
language.
Precis :
During descent towards GHA VOR, ATCC became overloaded. B737 eventually cleared to descent to FL120,
but not released by ATCC, even though they were told B737 was in two-way contact with Tower. B737 informed
Tower it was taking up the hold at GHA at FL120, but they had difficulty in understanding this. At the same time
B737 was released by ATCC and Tower cleared it to descend to FL110. Another a/c was also holding at GHA at
FL110, they were in the NDB hold and B737 was in the VOR hold, less than 5nm track separation. B737
remained at FL120 until other a/c had descended through FL90 by mutual agreement of both pilots not ATC.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200307910
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 13 Nov 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Oceanic
Events : Loss of Standard Separation Location Info : 52N020W
Pretitle :
Loss of Oceanic separation between B747 and B777 at FL350, 54N020W. B747 crew had mistaken reporting
points MALOT/ MOLAK.
Precis :
B747 crew allege that they readback MOLAK to Gander ATCC. Gander ATCC had issued a clearance via
MALOT and they have subsequently stated that the pilot's accent may well have masked the incorrect readback
of MOLAK. The a/c also twice readback a heavily accented "MOLAK" on HF to Ballygirreen (different
controllers) which went undetected on both occasions and which was readback to the crew as "MALOT" without
being challenged by them. The conflict was detected when the B777 was still well within Shannon radar cover
and appropriate and effective action alleviated any actual risk. This is the first incident of confusion between
MALOT and MOLAK.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200307939
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 16 Nov 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Almaty
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
A321 passing FL247 during cleared climb to FL256 received a TCAS TA followed by RA 'adjust vertical speed'
on known opposite direction traffic. SOPs followed. R/T with unknown was in local language.
Precis :
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200308085
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 19 Nov 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Airway B200
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
Location Info : Surgut
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B747 and a Tu154M. Subject to investigation by the Russian authority.
Precis :
B747 cruising at 10600mtrs on Airway B200, received TCAS TA on descending traffic above that initially
stopped its descent 800ft above B747, then continued a rapid descent. B747 received TCAS RA of descend and
autopilot disconnected. B747 descended approximately 400-500ft. When clear of conflict B747 returned to
10600mtrs, but when autopilot re-engaged for level off, B747 gained approximately 300ft in capturing. All
communications between ATC and other a/c were in local language making it impossible for B747 to monitor
other a/c's clearances. The Russian investigation revealed that this incident was caused by a malfunctioning
transponder in the Tu154, ie the height readout was malfunctioning. The crew of the Tu154 confirmed that their
a/c was level at 11100 metres at the time of the event.
48
A/C Type : Unknown Occurrence Number : 200308325
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 29 Nov 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence
Ground (AD) Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Airbus failed to follow ATC taxy instructions to hold at ROKIT and taxied to Block 133/134.
Precis :
Airbus instructed to 'follow the greens, hold at ROKIT for 27R', which was read back correctly. It was then
noticed on SMR that Airbus had gone passed ROKIT and was at Block 133/134 stopbar. This was queried and
foreign crew replied they had greens taking Airbus past ROKIT and therefore did not hold. Investigations
revealed that the instructions given were clear and unambiguous and were read back correctly. Upon arriving at
ROKIT the greens continued to the r/w and the pilots continued on the greens. In the 27R holding area for
outbounds, there are 3 routes through blocks 133, 134 and 137 only one of which will throw up the stop bar at
ROKIT. The frequency was very busy at the time. The AGL system is to be replaced in July 05 and a review of
the lighting arrangements in the holding areas is being discussed.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200308501
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 26 Nov 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Barcelona
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Flight Crew Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ILS allegedly withdrawn from service without warning during B767 approach to Barcelona. Additionally, B767
was then vectored close to preceding a/c, with numerous speed reductions required.
Precis :
ATIS and brief had given no indication of ILS maintenance at Barcelona. Preceding a/c was cleared to approach
using ILS. B767 was then cleared to intercept BCN 067 radial before being cleared for a VOR DME approach.
There was no mention of ILS being unserviceable but rapid conversation in Spanish followed, leading reporter to
believe that maintenance had withdrawn ILS from service with very little warning. Additionally, ATC vectored
B767 close to preceding A319 and continuously instructed B767 to reduce speed. With B767 at 3000ft, crew
were advised that they were flying 40kts faster than the A319 although B767 crew do not believe this was the
case. At this point, A319 showed as 2nm ahead of B767 on TCAS. While attempting to reduce speed iaw ATC
instruction, B767 crew selected flap 25 before the landing gear was locked down, resulting in a brief gear not
locked warning. Flap 20 was reselected to silence warning and approach continued without incident with landing
clearance being received from ATC at 100ft.
A/C Type : Not Applicable Occurrence Number : 200308702
Flight Phase : Not Applicable Occurrence Date : 12 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : LACC - Clacton
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Overload between 1430-1500hrs, LACC Sectors 13 and 14 (Clacton West High and Low).
Precis :
At the time of the Overload there were no flow restrictions in place. The Traffic Manager had been informed that
sectors 13/14 could be split if necessary and so was not monitoring the bandboxed sector. The Watch
Supervisor had planned to operate with 7 sectors on LAGs East and North with 3 on East. This assumed that
North Sea remained as one sector and Clacton could be split tactically to deal with the expected late afternoon
rush. The LAS had planned to operate with 8 controllers on 6 positions increasing to 10 for 8 later. Due to two
controllers arriving late, at 1330, there were only 5 for 4 on Clacton and 2 for 2 on North Sea. He liaised with the
Traffic Manager and confirmed that the potential demand on Clacton would not require it being split until early
evening. The TLPD showed a peak of 26/15 was visibly reducing to 23/15 and then 16/15. The actual traffic
was 21/15, 24/15 and 24/15. The TSF for the sector was 38/60 but between 1400-1459, 56 a/c entered the
sector. The Tactical controller took over the position at 1431 when there were already 10 a/c in the sector.
Sector capacity was calculated as being a constant throughput of 8 a/c. Traffic volume remained at between 9-
13 for the next 30 minutes. The traffic situation was complex which further increased the controllers' workload.
The sector team were under the impression that there were insufficient staff to split the sector, however, there
were 3 controllers on breaks that were available. Between 1440-1450, the sector team became concerned and
the Planner actively assisted the tactical in decision making. RTF loading increased significantly and by 1449,
pilots were being told to stand by. The LAS North arrived, at 1450, to Support the Tactical controller but this was
not very effective due to the time required for the Support controller to assimilate the traffic situation. Further
staff were called but, by then, the situation was too complex to hand over and split the sector. It was then
decided to operate in a 'man and boy' mode. Between 1435-1450 a total of 21 a/c entered the sector, equivalent
to a rate of 78/60. During the overload period 29 a/c entered the sector, equivalent to 60/60. The Traffic
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Manager did not actively monitor the sector as he understood that it could be split if necessary and so flow
management was effectively delegated to the LAS. The primary tool for the LAS was TLPD which did not give a
timely warning, and when the demand became obvious it was too late to take effective action. TACT showed
that the parameters set for both sectors was breached but it was later established that a predicted demand of 46
changed to an actual delivery of 56. It was found that 15 a/c which arrived in the hour were not in the predicted
TACT demand. 8 were expected in the previous hour and 5 in the following one, with 2 a/c not appearing in
TACT. This gave TACT a prediction accuracy of only 64%. Standard separation was maintained throughout.
Appropriate action is being taken at the unit to address the best way that a Support Controller can be utilised
together with reviewing the method of recalling staff in similar circumstances.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC action taken.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200308953
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 21 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Sao Paulo
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B777 and unidentified a/c. Subject to investigation by the Brazilian authority.
Precis :
As B777 was climbing through 2000ft whilst on a TONI SID it received a TCAS TA on slow climbing traffic below.
ATC seemed unaware of this traffic. B777 increased its ROC to avoid an RA. B777 reported traffic to ATC, but
controller seemed not to understand, due possibly to poor English.
A/C Type : EMB 145 Occurrence Number : 200308999
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 23 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : ATC Engineering Location Info :
Pretitle :
A/c captured glide path approximately 2.5nm earlier than published approach procedure. A/c subsequently
noted low on profile until 7nm when A/P disconnected and Localiser DME approach flown.
Precis :
On taxi in ATC were advised of problem experienced and asked if other a/c had reported this problem. The reply
was no, however, as the crew were shutting down the a/c they made out a conversation in French that another
a/c had a problem with the glide path. This was queried with Ground who confirmed that an Air France B737 that
had been Nr 2 to the reporter's a/c had experienced a similar problem.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200309069
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 29 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bologna
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
After B737 departed R/W30 and in left turn on SID, ATC requested a right turn then a left turn, due conflicting
traffic. In both turns B737 received a 'bank angle' warning.
Precis :
Following departure from R/W30, B737 told to proceed to LUPOS, which is a left turn. Whilst in left turn to
LUPOS, B737 was asked its heading and ATC then requested right turn due conflicting traffic. Autopilot
disconnected and right turn flown, during which B737 received a 'bank angle' warning. ATC then told B737 to
turn left due conflicting traffic. Left turn initiated and again a 'bank angle' warning occurred. Whilst in left turn
crew told to fly direct to LUPOS and autopilot re-engaged.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200400037
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 04 Jan 2004
Classification : Occurrences Location : Malaga
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Due to local language being spoken there was some confusion concerning A320's line up clearance, which was
subsequently cancelled . A320 was almost on the R/W and an inbound a/c had to go around.
Precis :
A320 was asked if it was ready for an immediate departure and replied 'yes', but received no clearance to line
up. A320 was then cleared for an immediate rolling departure and as it approached R/W, line up was cancelled.
A320 braked sharply, but this left a/c almost on the R/W. An inbound a/c was instructed to go around and A320
cleared to line up and depart. Controller was speaking Spanish at time of incident, which led to confusion.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200309075
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Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 27 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
BAe146 called established R/W26L and told to reposition R/W26R due vehicles on R/W26L. At no time was
problem communicated to BAe146 prior to approach as these transmissions were in local language.
Precis :
BAe146 at CRL VOR given vectors for R/W26L and eventually put onto heading 220deg to call established
R/W26L. BAe146 became established and changed to Tower who asked BAe146 to confirm established
R/W26R. Pilot replied negative and ATC asked if a/c could reposition R/W26R. Initially pilot declined, but was
then told R/W26L not available due vehicles on R/W. BAe146 then vectored to R/W26R. At no time was problem
or QNH change communicated in English prior to approach.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200309114
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 30 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Tokyo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B747 believed it had been cleared to climb to FL310, but approaching 7000ft on the SID it was clear this was not
correct. B747 levelled at 7000ft iaw SID and clarification from ATC was sought.
Precis :
ATC had difficulty in understanding the crew's query over the clearance. Reporter states that if the ATC unit had
given an initial clearance of "Expect FL310" the incident would have been avoided.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200400545
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 25 Jan 2004
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
After take off A320 changed frequency at 200ft, but was unable to contact new frequency until FL49, when
clearance was amended to maintain 5000ft. A320 reached 5350ft before descending back to 5000ft.
Precis :
After take off from R/W36L, at 200ft, A320 was given frequency change by Tower, which was acknowledged and
actioned. New frequency did not respond to initial call, also all other R/T transmissions were in local language.
ATC eventually contacted A320 when it was at FL49 and instructed it to maintain 5000ft, due to the slow climb of
the preceding a/c. A320 climbing to FL130 on the SID, disconnected autopilot, but reached 5350ft before
descending back to 5000ft.
A/C Type : DO 328JET Occurrence Number : 200400636
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 02 Feb 2004
Classification : Occurrences Location : Port Harcourt
Events : Engine/Malfunction Power
Loss - First Engine
Emergency Call
Diversion /Return
Location Info :
Pretitle :
LH engine failure after take off. MAYDAY declared. Aircraft returned.
Precis :
At approx 2800ft during climb out, a loud bang was heard followed by a brief rumbling noise and low frequency
vibrations, accompanied by a sudden yaw. LH engine failure suspected because LH engine parameters
decreased in comparison with the RH engine; this also agreed with the aircraft yaw response (yaw to left). The
aircraft attitude was stabilised whilst the crew briefly assessed the problem iaw the emergency checklist. ATC
were then informed and a return to the airfield was requested. The aircraft was cleared for initial descent and
then handed back to the ATC tower for further clearance. The crew experienced some difficulty in explaining to
the ATC tower controller that they had declared an emergency and wanted clearance for an emergency landing.
When the airfield was visual, the aircraft was manoeuvred to position for a visual left base join for R/W 21. The
post-flight inspection of the LH engine confirmed that the oil level was satisfactory and there was no sign of a
birdstrike but there was evidence of impact by small fragments inside the cold exhaust duct with numerous
different sized pieces of metal evident in the hot exhaust duct. Suspect HPT1 turbine blade failure. See also
200106824.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200400677
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 01 Feb 2004
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
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Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Windshear / Gusts
Location Info :
Pretitle :
An inbound B737 and an outbound a/c had conversations in French with ATC concerning windshear, but when
RJ100 was cleared for take off there was no mention of windshear until queried by pilot.
Precis :
Whilst RJ100 was at holding point K7 waiting for take off from R/W27L, an inbound B737 landed on R/W27L and
reported windshear in the local language. Once B737 had cleared R/W another a/c was cleared for take off,
again clearance was in local language but reporter's limited understanding of the language believed this
clearance included a report of windshear and wind speeds up to 35kts. RJ100 was cleared to line up and then
take off. At no time did controller mention windshear. Crew queried if there had been any reports of windshear
and controller then gave windshear information.
Number of Records : 230
APPENDIX D: Results for ‘Phraseology’ Query of UK CAA MORS Database
Safety Regulation Group
Safety Investigation & Data Department
Aviation House Direct Dial 01293 573220 Switchboard 01293 567171
Gatwick Airport South Direct Fax 01293 573972 Fax 01293 573999
West Sussex E-mail sdd@srg.caa.co.uk Telex 878753
RH6 0YR
These records were retrieved from the UK CAA Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) system by a member of the SIDD
Department
The MOR system records include information reported to the CAA, information obtained from CAA investigations, and
deductions by CAA staff based on the available information. The authenticity of the contents or the absence of errors and
omissions cannot be guaranteed. Records in this system commenced on 1 January 1976 coincident with the introduction of
Mandatory Occurrence Reporting in the UK, but occurrences reported voluntarily are also included, and no distinction is made
between them.
Note: Any data provided from these records are made available on the understanding that they are only to be used for
purposes of Flight Safety and must not be used for other purposes.
Note: Any data provided from these records are made available on the understanding that they
are only to be used for purposes of Flight Safety and must not be used for other purposes.
A/C Type : ATR 42 Occurrence Number : 200000035
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 10 Jan 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Detling (DET)
Events : A/c Technical Occurrence Location Info : 10 SW
Pretitle :
Nr1 engine oil pressure fell to zero. Engine shut down. Mayday call later downgraded to Pan. Checklist actioned
& a/c descended. Returned & landed safely.
Precis :
Loss of oil pressure associated with engine assembly procedure. A new assembly procedure was introduced in
1997 but this engine was built prior to introduction of the revised procedure.
CAA Closure: Hazard adequately controlled by existing requirements/procedures.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200000513
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 30 Jan 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : English Channel
Events : Engine/Malfunction Power
Loss - First Engine
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
An MD80 diverting to Gatwick, due to an engine problem, requested step down descents to 2000ft while to the
South of Gatwick:, descent to 2000ft refused. A/c descended to 3000ft.
Precis :
CAA Closure: Whilst the pilot did not actually declare an emergency he did say that he had an engine problem
and was descending in order to restart it. This was interpreted as an emergency and the aircraft was put on a
7700 squawk and transferred to a discrete frequency because the en-route frequency was busy. The operator
reported afterwards that the engine failure had also caused a pressurisation malfunction requiring a rapid
descent, which was requested. However, the loss of pressurisation was unknown to ATC at the time and
descent to 2000ft provoked a question about fuel and a certain amount of unease and uncertainty in the minds
of the controllers that with only one engine, the crew wished to descend so low so early. When ATC tried to
establish why the pilot wished to make such an early descent, confusion arose about fuel. When asked by the
controller "can you just advise me, are you descending to use fuel?" the crew misinterpreted this as - did they
have enough fuel? - and replied "yes we are descending with fuel enough and everything is OK". There was
not only a misunderstanding of language, but a misunderstanding by the foreign pilot of the question, and in that
respect the reply confused rather than clarified the situation. Nevertheless, the controller's question "are you
descending to use fuel ?" uses rather complex English syntax, and was perhaps always open to mis-
interpretation by a pilot whose native tongue is not English.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200000693
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 18 Jan 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Brussels
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion over R/W line up clearance.
Precis :
There was a company B737 ahead and the Tower requested reporter's a/c (B737) to "line up after the Malev
737 from Whisky" This was read back. Then the tower called reporter's aircraft and amended line up clearance
to "line up after the company B737" (which was ahead of both the Malev B737 and the Company B757 at
holding point B1). This was understood by both P1 & P2 & read back. P1 then duly lined up. The next call from
ATC was for the Malev B737 to take off. Immediately, a " company B757" pilot called to ATC saying that the
2reporter's a/c had taken an incorrect clearance & was lined up in front of the Malev.
A/C Type : Military Occurrence Number : 200000935
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 17 Feb 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Berry Head (BHD)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Military a/c inbound to Valley caused excessive workload for LATCC staff due fuel shortage & a late indication of
this situation.
Precis :
Shortly after this incident 3 similar a/c inbound to the same military airfield had to divert to Liverpool after calling
PAN/Mayday with fuel shortages.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200001251
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 01 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion between crew & ATC over B747's cleared flight level.
Precis :
Crew believed they received a descent clearance to FL100 & set the MCP, which was confirmed by both pilots &
read back by the P1. Passing FL106, ATC requested a/c to confirm cleared FL110. The R/T tape confirms that
the ATC clearance was to FL110, which was correctly read back.
CAA Closure: The operator is to include details of this & a similar incident 2000/01497 in their next edition of
their bulletin. The operator notes that neither readback from the crews contained the use of the word 'flight level'
or the use of the standard phrase 'flight level one hundred'. The bulletin will highlight the need to correctly use
both of these phrases.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200001297
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 04 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Midhurst (MID)
Events : UK Airprox
Altitude Deviation
Loss of Standard Separation
Location Info : 6 E
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX - B757 and BAC 1-11 6nm East of Midhurst at FL80.
Precis :
B757 cleared on a BOGNA SID from Gatwick climbing to altitude 6000ft. The B757 pilot took a climb clearance
to FL150 addressed to another aircraft, same company.
CAA Closure: The operator has acknowledged the errors and actions of the crew and taken appropriate
corrective action This Airprox is now subject to a review and collision risk assessment by the UKAB.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200001363
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 03 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : Runway Incursion
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 misinterpreted ATC instruction & lined up on R/W 26L without clearance. Inbound B737 sent around at
2nm.
Precis :
A B737 was cleared for take off 26L & was rolling. Another B737 was at A2 holding point & cleared to line up
after the next landing a/c (another B737). A fourth B737 was instructed to line up (from M1 holding point) after
the departing B737. The pilot of this a/c took his traffic to be the B737 already rolling on 26L & proceeded to
line up on 26L. ATC training in progress. See Digest 00/D/05.
CAA Closure: ATC error due ambiguous instructions. The confusion arose because the B737 already cleared for
take off & the 1st B737 to line up were wearing the same colours but with a different callsign/company.
Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200001441
Flight Phase : Landing Occurrence Date : 11 Feb 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lagos
Events : Flight Crew Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Poor Visibility
Location Info :
Pretitle :
A/c landed without ATC clearance.
Precis :
3When a/c was established on ILS at 12 miles, ATC instructed flight crew to confirm when a/c was leaving 2200ft.
However, high workload in poor visibility caused flight crew to omit call to ATC on leaving 2200ft. At 600ft, flight
crew were visual with runway, confirmed that it was clear and therefore assumed that a/c had been cleared to
land. Flight crew realised their error/omission when, at end of landing roll, ATC asked if a/c had passed 2200ft.
Reporter alleges that poor ATC phraseology & high workload meant that flight crew assumed that landing
clearance had been given when visual and the runway was confirmed clear. Reporter also alleges that a late
landing clearance was given to following a/c & previously to his a/c on 12Feb2000. The operator's ATS Manager
led a Technical Mission to Lagos during which the poor performance (equipment and human) as well as the Late
Landing clearance were discussed. The Authorities there have committed to improve their standards.
CAA Closure: The hazard is adequately controlled by the operator's actions.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200001497
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 12 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : WILLO
Events : ATC Conflict
UK Airprox
Location Info : 20W
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX - B747 & BAe146 at FL100 at WILLO.
Precis :
CAA Closure: Aircrew error/altitude excursion on the part of the B747 crew. The a/c had been cleared to
descend to FL110 but the crew set the MCP to FL100. Appropriate remedial action has been taken by the
operator concerned. This AIRPROX is now subject to a separate review by the United Kingdom AIRPROX
Board (UKAB).
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200001707
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 18 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : REFSO
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Callsign confusion - Fltnums "507" & "907", same operator.
Precis :
Both a/c were on the same frequency at the same time & were taking each others instructions. The controller
also believes that "507" was acknowledging instructions without using his callsign. See also occnum
199805056. This incident has been brought to the attention of the foreign operator concerned.
A/C Type : Saab F340 Occurrence Number : 200002050
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 09 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Perth (PTH)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion between crew and ATC concerning SF340's descent clearance.
Precis :
CAA Closure: When the SF340 called ATC the response from the controller was a series of numbers, with no
company prefix, followed by instructions to descend when ready to FL90. The SF340 responded with a readback
of the instruction and the numerical part of the callsign. 4 minutes later, when the SF340 reported leaving FL190,
the controller responded by stating that a clearance had not been issued. A/c climbed back to FL180 from
FL173.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200002196
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 28 Mar 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bordeaux
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info : 30 S
Pretitle :
Misunderstanding between ATC and crew concerning B737's cleared flight level.
Precis :
The reporter states that ATC called the B737 'Fltnum 302 'is cleared 350 - what will your mach number be?'. The
pilot read back 'cleared 350, mach .75', to which ATC said 'call you back'. At 31800ft in a climb ATC called to
say that the B737 had not been cleared to climb: apparently the controller had said 'if cleared 350'.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200002654
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 19 Apr 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Saski
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Filed flight plan was not the correct ICAO RTF code for the operator. When the B767 called, it used a callsign
with over 7 alphanumerics.
Precis :
Confusion resulted at a busy time, as the callsign printed on the FPS was different from that on the radar display
4and what the a/c was using. Operator informed and asked to comply with the correct procedures in future.
CAA Closure: The a/c commander concerned has acknowledged his mistake. A reminder has been sent to all
the operators pilots in an attempt to avoid any future incidents.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200002887
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 28 Apr 2000
Classification : Serious Incidents Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Conflict Location Info :
Pretitle :
SERIOUS INCIDENT-Conflict when a B747 was given a late go-around, over an A321 lined up on R/W09R
which had its take off clearance cancelled..
Precis :
AAIB Field Investigation. ATC training in progress.
CAA Closure: ATC error. The Departure Controller mentor misjudged the spacing required between the 2 a/c.
The controller planned to allow the A321 to depart ahead of the B747 but because he failed to monitor the FPS
of the departing a/c, he based his understanding of the situation on erroneous information. Despite concerns
shown by his trainee, the controller continued with his plan beyond the point where it needed to be changed to
affect a safe orderly flow of air traffic. Remedial action was taken at too late a stage, allowing the B747 to
overfly the A321 at an unsafe altitude. The controller did however cancel the A321's take-off clearance.
Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken. See also AAIB "Yellow Book" report (Aircraft Incident Report
No 1/2001, Ref EW/C2000/4/6) published 12/06/01 which contained 3 Safety Recommendations. See also CAA
FACTOR F11/2001 published on the same date.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200003212
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 10 May 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Runway Incursion
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
A321 failed to follow ATC clearance & entered the edge of 09R at Block 85 as a B737 was taking off from 09R.
Precis :
The controller attempted to stop the B737's take off but without success. The incident was subsequently
discussed with the B737 pilot & it was established that ATC used incorrect phraseology when trying to stop its
take off. The RT tape shows "**** hold position err you can see the **** has nearly entered the runway". This
transmission was 40 seconds after the "clear take-off" message & the P1 of the B737 reports he was passing
80 kts, could see that the runway was not infringed & the approaching a/c had stopped & therefore considered it
safe to continue. See Digest 00/D/06.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200003726
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 29 May 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Glasgow (GOW)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
A320 crossed active R/W 28 without clearance.
Precis :
The A320 requested taxi clearance for R/W 23. The ground controller, a trainee, told the a/c to taxi "to holding
point alpha four for two three..QNH...". Alpha four is the holding point at R/W28 threshold & was the clearance
limit since R/W28 was in use. The pilot did not appreciate the significance of the clearance however the
controller having noticed the taxi speed of the A320 instructed it to expedite the crossing of R/W 28 as a light a/c
was on short final for that runway. There have been previous incidents of a/c crossing this active runway &
suggested improvements in phraseology has been widely publicised. As a result of this incident this
phraseology has been issued as a SI & will be incorporated in the next MATS Part 2 update.
A/C Type : DC10 Occurrence Number : 200003881
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 02 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Dean Cross (DCS)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 10 S
Pretitle :
ATC incident - Believed that the crew of a DC10 misinterpreted a descent clearance of FL190 & attempted to
descend to FL100. Excursion noted when a/c was at FL170. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
This is an example of a level bust being caused by the use of non-standard RT phraseology. A/c was cleared to
be "FL190 level ten before LAKEY" . The readback was FL190 & ten before LAKEY. The controller then noticed
the a/c passing FL190 descending. On being advised of his cleared level , the pilot replied that he thought he
had been cleared FL190 & then "10" (FL100) before LAKEY. The correct ATC RT phraseology for these type
of instructions must include a horizontal distance measurement such as nautical miles or DME i.e. "Descend to
FL190 to be level 10 DME before LAKEY" which should prevent this kind of confusion.
5A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200004093
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 06 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Norwich
Events : UK Airprox
ATC Conflict
TCAS Report
Location Info : 5 SW
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX - B757 and flight of two military jets 5nm South West of Norwich at FL60.
Precis :
CAA Closure. The lead military jet pilot reported that they were making an approach to RAF Lakenheath whilst
receiving a RIS from London Mil who first gave traffic information at a range of 10 to 15nm. Radar lock
acquired on the traffic and the flt descended to altitude 5000ft. Passing 6200ft, mil controller called traffic at
range of 3nm and asked if pilots visual. Visual contact obtained shortly afterwards as flt became VMC and
conflict confirmed. Flt climbed to 7500ft to avoid and assessed miss distance as 1000ft vertical. The Norwich
Approach Controller, who was controlling the B757, did not inform the pilot of the type of ATC service being
provided and the B757 pilot believed he was under Radar Control, whereas outside controlled airspace it should
have been a RAS. Additionally, the initial avoiding action from the controller lacked clarity. By the time the
controller's avoiding action was repeated, the B757 pilot reported visual with the traffic and he then followed his
TCAS RA to resolve the confliction. This Airprox is now subject to an independent review from the UK Airprox
Board (UKAB).
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200004378
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 19 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Belfast (BEL)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
A B737 was instructed to go around due to a B767 still on its take off roll on R/W07.
Precis :
See also occ 2000/03212.
CAA Closure: The B767 was cleared to line up and hold. Shortly afterwards the B737 called right base on a
visual approach. The controller asked the B767 if he was ready for departure, and the reply, based on securing
the cabin, was "not more than 60secs". The a/c was cleared for take-off. When the B767 reported rolling, about
2 mins later, it was told to "hold position", which it could not do since it was at 50Kt. The B767 continued to roll
and the B737 crew, who were aware of the problem, broke off its approach. The incident occurred because the
B767 took longer to roll than the controller had assumed and also the controller did not use correct phraseology
to stop the take-off. Appropriate ATC action has been taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200004669
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 21 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Frankfurt
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Potential misinterpretation of take-off clearance.
Precis :
B737 was lined up on 25R and Tower told flight to be ready immediate take-off. The P1 only heard "immediate
take off", but due to good visibility could see 2 a/c crossing the runway.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200004675
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 25 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Due to a line-up clearance misunderstanding, a foreign B767 allegedly taxied within 10 metres of the nose of a
B747 whilst holding for 27R.
Precis :
The B747 pilot believed that the foreign B767 crew misinterpreted their ATC clearance. They understood he
had been cleared by ATC to line-up "after the British Airways B757 on R/W 23" but had inadvertently lined up
after the wrong British Airways B757 and that this had gone unnoticed by ATC. Whilst aerodrome controllers will
endeavour to ensure that the correct sequence is achieved and will step in if thought to be unsafe, it is ultimately
the a/c commander's responsibility for safe ground manoeuvring.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : Piper PA28 Occurrence Number : 200004728
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 28 Jun 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Shoreham
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
6Pretitle :
A PA28 was using a radio callsign which does not comply with approved company/registration abbreviation. See
also occ 1999/03813.
Precis :
CAA Closure: The flying school has reminded all its members of the need to use approved callsigns. ATC has
also been requested to contact the FS if further problems are encountered.
A/C Type : Balloon Occurrence Number : 200005682
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 05 Aug 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bristol International
Events : Wake Turbulence
Emergency Call
Forced Landing
Flight Crew Occurrence
Location Info : 2nm E
Pretitle :
Balloon encountered wake vortex from A310. Balloon canopy damaged. 4 POB - 3 minor injuries.
Precis :
The balloon lifted off at 0520 from a site 5nm north east of Bristol Airport. At 0530 the pilot contacted Bristol ATC
to report that the balloon would be heading 160deg at approx 10kt, at up to 2000ft. At 0555 an A310 was
receiving radar vectors for an ILS approach to runway 27 at Bristol. ATC advised that there were several
balloons in the area, drifting in a southerly direction. At 0608 the A310 was established on the ILS at 5nm and
commenced a descent from 2200ft amsl. At the same time the balloon pilot reported that he was "Abeam on
your extended centreline 5km east of the field at 500ft QNH1025". ATC responded "There is Airbus traffic just
going over the top of you on the ILS now". In fact the A310 was still 3nm from the balloon. The A310 passed
over the balloon at an altitude of 1300ft amsl, 2nm inbound on the ILS. The balloon was operating at an altitude
of 500ft amsl thus, with the canopy extended some 80ft above the basket, separation between the two craft was
about 700ft. The balloon was not seen by the A310 pilots but the balloon pilot saw the A310 pass overhead and
started the burner to arrest a sink. Once the aircraft had passed he noticed a ripple in the canopy. Very soon
after this the envelope was violently forced downwards such that it was below the basket which had itself tipped
to approx 30deg. With the burner at full deflection the flame could not be directed into the mouth of the
envelope. A few seconds later the envelope swung violently upwards and all the occupants of the basket were
flung to the floor, suffering minor injuries. The pilot again attempted to direct the burner flame into the mouth of
the envelope but was unsuccessful because it remained closed. The balloon continued to be knocked about by
turbulence and the pilot then burned through the material to get air into the envelope. He managed to regain
some control, put out a PAN call and made a successful emergency landing in a field. Despite the pilot’s initial
report, the actual track of the balloon was 200deg, taking it within 2.5 miles of the airport. In the pilot’s later
position report, 5km was misinterpreted by the controller as 5nm. Hot air balloons are not usually visible on a
radar screen, so the pilot's report was the sole means by which the controller could determine the balloon’s
location. The UK AIP requires pilots making position reports to use nautical miles. However, balloon pilots
normally use Ordnance Survey (OS) 1:50,000 maps onto which aeronautical information has been transposed,
although an aeronautical 1:500,000 chart is also carried. The OS maps have a 1km square grid overlay which
greatly facilitates the assessment of distances. Therefore, when communicating by R/T with each other or their
retrieve crews, balloonists commonly use metres or kilometres. ICAO recommend a minimum spacing of 6nm
when a 'Light' aircraft is crossing behind a 'Heavy' aircraft at the same altitude, or less than 1000ft below, and
the CAA minimum is 8nm. There are no published minima for the operation of balloons with regard to wake
turbulence separation. CAA 'General Aviation Safety Sense Leaflet 15B Wake Vortex' states that the lighter the
aircraft the more vulnerable it would be to a turbulence upset. There are no records of any previous wake
turbulence encounters between balloons and aircraft in the UK. In the event of such an encounter being
anticipated there are some options a balloon pilot could take to avoid the wake vortex. He may have the
opportunity to climb above the aircraft track or, under favourable conditions, to land in a safe area until the
danger has passed. The British Balloon and Airship Club have drawn attention to this matter in their September
2000 edition of the 'Pilot's Circular'. There is also an article to remind pilots of the importance of using standard
phraseology when giving position reports. See AAIB Bulletin 12/2000, ref: EW/G2000/08/05.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200005854
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 03 Aug 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Tokyo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Incorrect altimeter setting phraseology used by Tokyo ATC led to confusion on the flight deck.
Precis :
Upon changing from Narita departure to Tokyo Control, a/c was cleared to "maintain 7000ft on QNH 992". Japan
uses altimeter settings in inches not in millibars, so altimeter setting was immediately queried. "Confirm QNH
992 millibars or Altimeter 29.92 inches ? The reply was "affirm", so it was queried again. "Do you mean 29.92
inches?". The reply to this was "affirm, climb 14,000ft on 29.92 inches. Reporter opined that the practice of using
only 3 digits when using inches as the pressure datum is very misleading and potentially unsafe. In this case
the altitude difference between 992 millibars and 29.92 inches would have been 600ft.
7A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200005868
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 07 Aug 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : New York Newark
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Cleared for ILS approach with no glideslope/DME available.
Precis :
The a/c was proceeding direct to TEB at 3000ft expecting an approach to R/W 22L at Newark for which the
glideslope was NOTAM U/S. Instructions received were "maintain 3000ft to the marker, cleared ILS 22 Left,
contact Tower 118.3". No glideslope or DME information was received on internal equipment. New York
TRACON subsequently contacted and advised that normal clearance in the event of an ILS partial serviceability
should be "cleared to ILS Rwy XX, Glideslope not available". TRACON have undertaken to ensure that all
controllers adhere to standard phraseology.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200006698
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 10 Sep 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : AMMAN
Events : Emergency Call
ATC Occurrence
Location Info : Rep Point
Pretitle :
B777 pilot declared a "medical emergency" to ATC and was given priority without initially using the correct
phraseology.
Precis :
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200006881
Flight Phase : Initial Climb Occurrence Date : 16 Sep 2000
Classification : Serious Incidents Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : ATC Conflict Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 149/00 - B747 and a BAC1-11 at Manchester airport.
Precis :
The BAC 1-11 was instructed to line up on R/W24R at Manchester, behind a landing A320. Shortly afterwards,
a B747 reported on final approach for R/W24R, and advised that the a/c was very heavy and would require the
full length of the R/W. After landing, the A320 was slow to vacate the R/W, and by the time it had vacated and
the BAC1-11 was cleared for take off, the B747 was approx 1.5 nm from touchdown. The BAC1-11 began its
take off when the B747 was at 0.5 nm. The B747 pilot reported visual with the traffic and was cleared to land
after the departing traffic. However, the B747 pilot elected to carry out a go-around and to make a right turn.
Subsequently the controller instructed the B747 to turn onto 330 deg and climb to 3500 ft., whilst the BAC1-11
continued on its outbound routing involving a left turn after departure. The closest point between the B747 and
the BAC1-11 was when the BAC1-11 was still rolling down the R/W and the B747 had commenced its right turn,
a distance of approx 480 m. The incident was subject to assessment by UKAB, and to a Field Investigation by
the AAIB. See AAIB Bulletin No 6/2001, Ref EW/C2000/9/5.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC personnel action taken.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200007102
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 23 Sep 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : WILLO
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info : Hold
Pretitle :
B747 entered the WILLO hold incorrectly.
Precis :
The B747 was inbound to Gatwick and had been held at POMPI for a period of time. It was then cleared "XXX ,
your hold is cancelled, make a right turn now to WILLO, descend Flight Level 170". The a/c replied "right turn
direct WILLO, descend FL170, thank you". Subsequently the a/c routed direct to WILLO, without using the entry
fix of HOLLY, crossed WILLO and then turned on to a South Easterly track as it commenced its "dirty entry". An
ATC source subsequently commented that, controllers should clear a/c under their own navigation to holds, with
the entry points for these holds to be mentioned in their onward clearance, or a form of words such as "route to
the WILLO hold" could be used.
A/C Type : Cessna C560 Citation 5 Occurrence Number : 200007629
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 13 Oct 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Scunthorpe
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info : Radar Corridor
Pretitle :
Cessna 560 climbed 600 feet above cleared FL100. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
8Manchester enquired with Humberside over this incident and the controller stated that he had not personally
repeated the a/c's cleared level to him but told him that he was passing clear of traffic "maintaining FL110". It is
considered possible that the a/c may have taken this as a climb clearance.
A/C Type : Piper PA28 Occurrence Number : 200007685
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 14 Oct 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Shoreham
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
A PA28 was using an unauthorised abbreviated callsign. See also occs 1999/03813 and 2000/04728.
Precis :
CAA Closure: The operator was informed of the use of the unauthorised callsign and has taken appropriate
action.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200008214
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 03 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bristol International
Events : ATC Conflict
Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Conflict Alert activated when a B767 descended below its cleared flight level. Traffic info and avoiding action
given. Separation maintained.
Precis :
B767 came on frequency descending to FL270 and was given further descent to FL150. Following co-ordination
with next sector it was agreed to stop the B767 at FL160. B767 was instructed to stop descent at FL160 to which
the crew responded, "roger report 160" (this non-standard response was not challenged), and subsequently a
further instruction to be level at FL160 by abeam KENET, which was acknowledged by "Wilco". B767
transferred to next sector and observed to be level at FL160 for several sweeps before descending to FL150. A
BAe146 at FL150 was given an avoiding heading and descended to FL140.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200008229
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 03 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Ganta
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion concerning B757's cleared flight level, due to the use of non-standard radio transmission by ATC.
Precis :
Reporter states that the B757, operating at a speed of 270kts, was cleared by ATC to 'descend level two five
zero, reduce two six zero'. On passing FL258 ATC instructed B757 to 'maintain two six zero' to which the pilot
confirmed that the B757 was maintaining 260kts. ATC then said 'maintain level two six zero' by this time the
B757 was passing FL256 and ATC cleared the B757 to descend to FL240.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200008654
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 22 Nov 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : Daventry (DTY)
Events : UK Airprox Location Info : 8 W
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 192/00 - B757 and military jet 8nm West of DTY VOR at FL100.
Precis :
AAIB Investigation. The B757 was level at FL100, and advised of military traffic 1000 ft above and crossing left
to right. This traffic was seen on TCAS, and shortly after the traffic passed clear, whilst in cloud, the B737 crew
became aware of an a/c on their left at very close range and about the same level. The military a/c engines
were heard, and wake turbulence encountered, but with no time to take any avoiding action. The military a/c
were a formation pair, with only the leader squawking, under military radar control. The leader was granted a
request to climb from FL100 to FL110, but this was not heard by the No 2, non-squawking, a/c which remained
at FL100. The No 2 became aware of a "shadow" flashing rapidly down the right-hand side, and after an ATC
query asking the flight to confirm that both a/c were at FL110, the No 2 climbed rapidly to FL110. Two safety
recommendations were made (2000-71 and 2001-31), relating to establishing safety assurance based on the
use of SSR codes for a/c in formation, and the applicability of revised RT procedures for formations in Class F
and G airspace. The incident was also subject to assessment by UKAB. See AAIB Bulletin 5/2001, Ref
EW/C2000/11/05, and UKAB Airprox Report 192/00.
CAA Closure: CAA FACTOR F12/2001, detailing the CAA responses to the 2 AAIB Safety Recommendations,
was issued on 15 June 2001. Any further CAA action required will be progressed via the "Annual Review of
AAIB Recommendations" procedure.
A/C Type : HS125 Occurrence Number : 200008904
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 30 Nov 2000
9Classification : Occurrences Location : Farnborough
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion over an HS125's take off clearance from R/W 25 when a vehicle had been cleared to cross the
runway.
Precis :
Investigations indicate that the pilot failed to use the correct phraseology when given departure instructions and
read back cleared for take off. The controller had also cleared a vehicle to cross the runway. The pilot was told
that he had not been given take off clearance, however, the pilot replied that he was cleared for take off. The
controller instructed the vehicle to hold position but he was not aware of the vehicle's position relative to the
runway. The a/c took off without take off clearance and was not instructed by the controller to hold position.
Appropriate ATC action has been taken on various aspects as a result of this incident.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200009317
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 21 Dec 2000
Classification : Occurrences Location : HOLLY
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
RJ100 was instructed to turn right on to heading 280 degrees but a/c turned left and into conflict with an ATR72.
Separation lost. Traffic information and avoiding action given.
Precis :
The a/c was instructed to turn right the long way, onto heading 280 degrees (this was not actually the longest
way to heading 280 degrees but the controller did specify the direction of turn). When the pilot was asked to
confirm turning right, he stated he was turning the long way round, to heading 280 degrees. Further
investigations have revealed that the controller failed to establish the original heading of the RJ100 and the crew
acknowledged the instruction but did not mention the direction of turn, just 'the long way round'. It was later
established that a right turn would involve a 140 degree manoeuvre whereas a left turn would involve 220. The
RJ100 crew turned left , without querying the direction and came into conflict with the ATR72. Appropriate local
ATC remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : GD Eqp Svs Occurrence Number : 200100270
Flight Phase : Not Applicable Occurrence Date : 17 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : Ground (AD) Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
R/W incursion - At 1600hrs whilst the Rescue Fire Fighting Service was towing an unserviceable vehicle across
R/W24R the tow rope broke. Removal of the vehicle complete by 1615hrs.
Precis :
Inspection and research of the broken cable concluded that it was not suitable for towing a fire appliance.
Instructions have been issued to not use cables for appliance recovery. In addition, instructions have been
issued and a training programme instigated covering runway clearance reporting and R/T terminology.
CAA Closure: Appropriate action taken by airport authorities.
A/C Type : Saab F340 Occurrence Number : 200100300
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 12 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : Runway Incursion
Rejected Take-Off
ATC Occurrence
Security Event
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Vehicle was sent to chase fox off R/W06L. When clear, a Saab 340 was given take off clearance. Saab 340
observed vehicle crossing R/W and take off run aborted. When vehicle clear of R/W a/c took off.
Precis :
Whilst the Saab 340 was lining up for R/W06L, another a/c reported a fox on the R/W. Ground staff were cleared
to enter the R/W to chase the fox off. When the vehicle and fox were clear of R/W, take off clearance was issued
and acknowledged to/by the Saab 340. During take off roll, vehicle was seen to cross the R/W 300-500mtrs
ahead. Saab 340 decided to abort take off, also a/c instructed to stop by ATC. A/c stopped abeam intersection
and when vehicle was clear of R/W a/c was re-cleared for take off. The ATC report states having given
permission for the vehicle to cross the runway to chase off the fox , further permission was given to continue but
to remain South of Runway 06L at all times - this was acknowledged. On speaking to the vehicle driver
subsequent to the incident it appears that he misunderstood the clearance he had been given. An investigation
into this incident revealed that the vehicle reported when he had sight of the fox and the Tower Controller
requested "to call me off the runway please". The driver replied that "the fox is off the runway on the grass area".
Tower Control asked "are you clear, confirm?". The reply to this was "the fox is off the runway - I can try and
disperse it a bit further south." The Tower Controller agreed to this plan to keep the fox moving southwards and
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added "just remain clear of 06L please" There was no readback to this last instruction. The controller concerned
has been counselled on the importance of using correct phraseology and ensuring that read backs are received.
In addition, the vehicle driver has been re-trained.
CAA Closure: Appropriate local action taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200100386
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 23 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Milan Malpensa
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Reduced separation under low visibility procedures - Milan ATC operated 4nm separation during low visibility
procedures.
Precis :
A/c queried 4nm separation under low visibility. Milan ATC appeared not to understand phraseology.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200100406
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 16 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Toronto
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Take off clearance to B777 issued by ATC while another a/c (the previous landing) was still on R/W 24.
Precis :
The P2 queried the clearance but the controller did not seem concerned at the situation. Weather - drizzle at
night. Relevant Canadian authorities alerted. The response from the Canadian authorities was that the controller
was operating consistent with existing procedures although the phraseology was not.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200100523
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 27 Jan 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : SPRAT
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Controller had to repeat an expect clearance of FL310 level by SPRAT 2-3 times. B747 was
subsequently cleared to FL310, but when South of SPRAT it was still at FL330 and descending.
Precis :
Standard separation maintained.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200100736
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 05 Feb 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : TIGER
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 30 SE
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - A321 allegedly descended below its cleared flight level of FL210. As standard separation was
maintained A321 was given continuous descent to FL160.
Precis :
A321 had been descended to FL210 and told to expect FL160 abeam TIGER.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200100887
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 09 Feb 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : LATCC - N Sea Sector
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Fltnums 1262 and 1226, same operator, were warned of the similar callsigns, which was
acknowledged, but Fltnum 1226 persisted in replying to ATC instructions without using any callsign.
Precis :
Attempts to contact the foreign operator have been unsuccessful.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action possible.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200101120
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 19 Feb 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Gander ATCC
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Confusion between flight crew and ATC resulted in B777 climbing from FL370 to FL380
without clearance. Crew apologised for the error.
Precis :
Reporter states that ATC had cleared the B777 when ready FL380. The crew understood that the B777 was
cleared to climb from FL370 to FL380, but ATC had actually said advise when ready climb FL380.
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A/C Type : GD Eqp Svs Occurrence Number : 200101560
Flight Phase : Not Applicable Occurrence Date : 05 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Glasgow (GOW)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - During a busy period the GMC allocated Stand 19, which was occupied by a BA41, to an inbound
a/c. The apron became blocked by the inbound a/c waiting for the BA41 to vacate the stand.
Precis :
During a busy period the GMC allocated Stand 19 to an inbound a/c. The controller then realised that the stand
was occupied by a BA41 and instructed the inbound a/c to hold short of the stand until it had been vacated. The
controller then confirmed the BA41 was ready for pushback and instructed it to push far enough back to allow
the inbound a/c onto the stand. Prior to this an SF340 on Stand 16 had started and been given pushback
clearance. The BA41 was informed of the SF340's movement and told it could pushback to abeam Stand 18.
Immediately after this the SF340 requested taxy clearance and was told it could taxy in turn and would be
following a BA41 in the cul-de-sac to A1 for departure R/W23. The SF340 then taxied behind the BA41 which
had not yet pushed back, rather than waiting to follow it. Investigations revealed that the incident arose from a
misunderstanding by the SF340, as to the position of the BA41 it was to follow. There was a similar incident the
previous day being investigated under occ 2001/01559.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200102093
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 29 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence
RT Problems
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B747 consistently failed to use its callsign when acknowledging clearances, which led to increase
in ATC workload, as the controller had to query which a/c had accepted the clearance.
Precis :
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200102141
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 31 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : HAZEL
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
UK Airprox
Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX-50/2001-A320 descended 500 feet below its cleared FL130 due to confusion over cleared flight
level. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Investigations indicate that the A320 was instructed to descend to FL130, to be level abeam HAZEL, speed 270
kts. The crew read back 'Down err seven er zero confirm and to be level er one three zero abeam HAZEL',
omitting the words flight level. ATC believed the speed instruction had been acknowledged but it appears the a/c
intended to descend to FL70. The read back was seeking confirmation of the accuracy of the clearance but the
ATCO under training did not reply and missed the incorrect read back. Appropriate ATC remedial action taken.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200102155
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 31 Mar 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Glasgow (GOW)
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
RJ100 cleared to A4 but taxied across A4 and the Runway 28 threshold.
Precis :
The a/c was cleared by the controller concerned to "taxy to holding point Alpha four for runway 23 eventually".
The pilot read back the clearance correctly but failed to follow it. The controller concerned did not use the local
phraseology that had recently been publicised in order to prevent this type of incident. Appropriate local ATC
remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200102624
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 23 Apr 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Ground (AD) Collision -
Obstacle / Vehicle
Ground (AD) Collision -
Obstacle / Vehicle
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Tug disconnected from B747 after pushback. B747 taxied forward and hit the tug which was directly in front of
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nosewheel. No damage or injuries.
Precis :
AAIB AARF investigation. The crew believe that the visual signal portion of the ground crew clearance was
missed. The ground engineer had disconnected and was unable to give a verbal warning. The operators
investigation identified the immediate cause of this incident as being the a/c starting to taxi before the final visual
clearance had been received from the headset operator. The report indicated that both flight crew and ground
crew had deviated from push back procedures and standard phraseology. It also highlighted several
shortcomings in the operators stated push back procedures applicable to both ground and flight crew.The
investigation made several internal safety recommendations to amend current procedures in order to prevent
any recurrences. (See also AAIB Bulletin 11/2000 Ref: EW/G2001/04/18).
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200103246
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 15 May 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Altitude deviation - MD80 noted at 6000 ft instead of cleared 5000ft whilst outbound from Gatwick. Standard
separation maintained.
Precis :
Investigations indicate that the crews understanding of English appeared poor and the readback of the initial
ATC clearance was unintelligible but was accepted as confirmation by ATC.
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200104153
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 20 Jun 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info : 7nm
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX-A319 and a Beech 90 at FL60 7nm from CDG. Subject to investigation by the French
authorities.
Precis :
The French investigation into this AIRPROX concluded that it was caused by a late detection of the conflict by
the Dep controller. The controller authorised the Beech to turn onto heading 090 without taking account of the
existence of CDG departures. There was then a poor resolution of the conflict because the controller did not
take into account the differences in performance between the 2 a/c. The controller also failed to use emergency
phraseology when detecting the conflict. French risk assessment CAT B.
A/C Type : EMB 110 Bandeirante Occurrence Number : 200104245
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 22 Jun 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Norwich
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - E110 took off from R/W04 without ATC clearance.
Precis :
The E110 was holding at point 'C1' awaiting its CTOT (Calculated Take Off Time) of 1613hrs. The E110 was
issued with its departure instructions and informed that the controller would call back with the airways joining
clearance. The controller observed a helicopter, which had been instructed to vacate R/W27 via taxyway after
landing, touch down on R/W27. The controller then called the E110 to give the airways joining clearance, but the
a/c was already rotating after taking off from R/W04 at 1602hrs. The crew subsequently acknowledged their
mistake, and commented that the confusion arose over the term "after take off" being used by ATC in the
clearance, rather than "after departure". The crew has been interviewed by the company chief pilot.
CAA Closure: Appropriate operator action taken.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200105507
Flight Phase : Parked Occurrence Date : 07 Aug 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Tampa
Events : Ramp Incident Location Info :
Pretitle :
Unsafe non-standard pushback to a B777 by ground engineer at Tampa airport.
Precis :
A/c was pushed back tail first from stand. Right hand engine was started and a/c then moved forward 5 metres.
Crew thought tug was still attached and was pulling a/c, however tug had been disconnected unseen and brakes
to park not requested by ground engineer. A/c brakes applied. Engineer later disconnected before being cleared
by crew. Engineer was using non-standard phraseology throughout the push back and did not warn the crew
that the a/c was rolling towards the terminal, unconnected to the tug.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200106008
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 26 Aug 2001
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Classification : Occurrences Location : SEPAL
Events : Loss of Standard Separation
ATC Conflict
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Loss of separation when a B767 entered Oceanic airspace without a clearance. A B737 and
another B767 were given traffic info.
Precis :
At 1330hrs controller received messages from foreign ATCC of estimates for the OAC boundary of 1402hrs
(B767) and 1407hrs (A340). Normal procedures are that traffic request OAC clearance within 30mins of the
boundary. At 15-20mins prior to the a/c reaching the boundary, the foreign ATCC was telephoned and asked
that the flights contact Ballygirreen on frequency 5598 immediately for their OAC clearance. Approximately
5mins later the a/c still had not called Ballygirreen and the controller again telephoned foreign ATCC to get them
to contact the a/c and again gave the frequency 5598. Ballygirreen was asked to SELCAL the a/c concerned.
Approximately 8-10mins to the boundary the controller was alerting Planning to the scenario, when the Foreign
ATCC phoned asking for confirmation of the frequency. At 1357hrs the Planner received a request from
Ballygirreen for the B767 est SEPAL at 1401hrs requesting FL330. The only level available was FL260. The
Foreign ATCC was contacted to ask if the B767 could be descended to cross SEPAL at FL260, but they had lost
contact and it was heading for Oceanic airspace at FL330. The Planner phoned the en-route controller to
descend a B737 at FL330, which was in conflict with the B767. B737 was given traffic info and descended to
FL325, and another B767 at FL320 was given traffic info on the B737. The Planner then co-ordinated and
instructed the B767 to return back to Foreign airspace.
CAA Closure: The operator's report states that they asked Brest Control for the Oceanic Clearance and the
answer was "**7561 do not cross LAPEX without contact on HF with Shanwick". The flight then contacted
Shanwick on HF and their alleged answer was "**7561 positive contact...Standby...". The crew then called Brest
back stating "**7561 positive contact with Shanwick". Brest then said "OK, Bye,Bye" On initial re-contact with
Shanwick the flight was told to standby, and Shanwick subsequently called back stating "** do not enter into
Oceanic Area, return to LAPEX and contact Brest". The a/c contacted Brest and received vectors back to
LAPEX to enter a hold at FL330. 37 minutes later they were cleared to enter Shanwick Oceanic Airspace. The
a/c subsequently diverted to Bermuda to refuel.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200106276
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 09 Sep 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bovingdon (BNN)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Controller twice received improper read backs. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Controller cleared Fltnum '753C' to climb to FL210. The reply received was 'Roger FL210'. Controller
immediately asked the station to state their callsign and the reply was something like '***715C was that FL210
for us'. '715C' informed that it was not. The operator has subsequently issued a notice to all crews, to ensure
that the cockpit environment is sterile during climb and descent, and to be more vigilant in monitoring R/T.
CAA Closure: Appropriate operator action taken.
A/C Type : Grumman AA5 Occurrence Number : 200106609
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 19 Sep 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Londonderry
Events : Runway Incursion Location Info :
Pretitle :
Aerodrome incident - During take off from Londonderry, Grumman AA5 almost collided with airport vehicle that
was cleared to carry out a bird control patrol.
Precis :
ATC permitted the bird patrol operator to carry out a bird patrol on all areas, to remain East of R/W02 which was
the active R/W. The vehicle was equipped with a ground frequency radio allowing cross coupling of the ATC
frequency to the ground frequency, which was selected. The AA5 requested, and received clearance for, a
touch and go, and during the take off phase the bird control vehicle was observed driving fast towards the R/W
intersection. A call from the Tower to hold position resulted in the vehicle managing to stop at the edge of
R/W02, and the AA5 became airborne safely. See also 2000/02031.
CAA Closure: Appropriate and comprehensive remedial action has been taken by the Airport authority
concerned.
A/C Type : EMB 145 Occurrence Number : 200106626
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 20 Sep 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : Runway Incursion Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - An EMB145 failed to follow ATC taxy instructions and entered R/W06L. The EMB145 was
instructed to leave the R/W and the error was pointed out to the pilot, for which he apologised.
Precis :
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A B757 was lined up full length of R/W06L and an A320 was given a conditional line up clearance behind the
B757. The EMB145 was instructed after departing A320, line up 06L at AF, which was read back correctly.
When B757 departed EMB145 lined up ahead of the A320. Controller pointed out the error, for which pilot
apologised. EMB145 was asked to vacate R/W at AE. EMB145 departed after A320 without further incident. The
incident concerned has also been discussed with the controller and appropriate action has been taken by the a/c
operator. The ATC investigation has revealed the potential for misinterpretation of the relevant section of the
MATS part 1 and appropriate action is being taken on this aspect.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200106880
Flight Phase : Initial Climb Occurrence Date : 01 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Nice
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - RJ100 and EMB 145. Subject to investigation by the French authority.
Precis :
Reporter states that shortly after the RJ100 had taken off from R/W22L and about to turn left on the SID, the P1,
in the RH seat, noticed an a/c slightly above, passing from right to left ahead. The left turn was not initiated and
very shortly afterwards the controller instructed the RJ100 to maintain heading. At 900ft the traffic showed on
TCAS to be 200ft above and was to the left of the RJ100. The crew of the inbound EMB 145 became confused
as to the actual R/W in use. During this confusion the crew, whilst intending to select "NAV" mode to track as
required to the next waypoint, inadvertently entered "APR" mode thus disabling the 'ASEL' function, and the a/c
subsequently descended through the previously cleared altitude (2500 ft) to 1500 ft. The a/c then received a
TCAS RA which was not actioned because of visual contact with the RJ100.
A/C Type : Unknown Occurrence Number : 200107027
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 02 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rio De Janeiro
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC incident - ATC at Rio de Janeiro allegedly changed SID after take off leading to a 270 degree left
turn.
Precis :
On clearance delivery the ATC clearance was confirmed 3 times as a CARMI 1 departure, involving a right turn
downwind. The standard of English was poor and had to be reconfirmed. After take-off ATC queried the SID and
a 270 left turn had to be initiated. ATC eventually confirmed the SID required and gave a radar heading of 260
degrees and gave a radial to establish on. The controlling was poor as was the English phraseology used. The
Brazilian investigation concluded that the incident was caused by the poor English of the inexperienced under
training controller and the wrong pronunciation of the MARICA ONE procedure. Appropriate ATC follow up
action has been taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200107394
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 13 Oct 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Reporter believes taxy instructions, given to B737 after landing on R/W26L, caused confusion,
resulting in a/c turning onto Stand 08L instead of 108L. ATC has been alerted by operator.
Precis :
After B737 landed on R/W26L, reporter requested taxy instructions and believed clearance as 08L J-R-L, which
was read back. Ground confirmed read back, but as B737 turned into Stand 08L crew again queried clearance
and ground then said a/c should have taken 'J'. Reporter believes confusion caused by ground reading stand
allocation of 108L first and this being heard by the B737 as 08L. The operator has alerted ATC to this incident.
ATS investigations confirm that the B737 was instructed to taxy to Stand 108L via J, R and L. The crew
readback "08L say again?" and the controller confirmed the taxiway routing but did not pick up the incorrect
stand. The phraseology used was abbreviated and it was not until the crew asked again that they realised the
allocated Stand was 108L.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200107678
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 08 Nov 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Philadelphia
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - High volume of ground movements combined with poor R/T phraseology led to a
reduction of safety margins. Also potential conflict between taxying B777 and B737.
Precis :
During high volume of a/c ground movements, a number of a/c accepted clearances that were given to other a/c
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without ATC realising the error. For example, it took several calls from outbound Fltnum '066' to get ATC to
realise that there was an inbound company a/c Fltnum '069', same a/c type, also on the taxyways. The situation
was compounded by ATC using non standard R/T. A B777 had been cleared to taxy to 'Y', but when it saw a
B737 vacating R/W27R at 'T' and enter 'K' in front of the B777, the B777 was brought to a halt to allow B737 to
continue its taxy. The FAA investigation into this incident identified controller performance deficiencies.
Appropriate remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200107811
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 14 Nov 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Barkway (BKY)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info : 3 SE
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B747 descended below its cleared FL80. Traffic info and avoiding action given to B747 due to a
B737 climbing to FL70. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
An inbound B747 cleared to FL80 was told to continue its heading and assigned a speed. At the same time an
outbound B737 was cleared to climb to FL70. The B747 was observed passing FL77 and told to climb back to
FL80 and given an avoiding turn. B747 reached FL75 before climbing back to FL80 and subsequently passed
behind the B737 with approximately 2500ft vertical separation. The operator who was fully alerted to this
incident is taking appropriate and comprehensive fleet wide remedial action.
A/C Type : Falcon 900 Occurrence Number : 200108243
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 03 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Northolt
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - DA900 made an approach to R/W07 below airfield minima and below glide path. DA900 initiated
a go around approximately 0.5nm from R/W07 threshold.
Precis :
CAA Closure: The operator's report states that both the pilots were very experienced professional pilots who
have flown hundreds of PAR approaches each. They both state that they had great difficulty in understanding
the directions and terminology used by the final PAR approach controller. This was allegedly exacerbated by
distorted or scratchy radio reception on his frequency. All directions issued were discussed between the pilots.
Whilst on the approach the pilot flying elected to use the autopilot. Whilst on descent he used autopilot inputs to
follow the directions of the controller whilst discussion continued about the controller's directions. The resultant
misunderstanding of the terminology used by the controller caused the a/c to be controlled so as to proceed
below the glide path while the pilot erroneously thought he was being advised he was above the glide path. The
a/c levelled out at minimums, and the pilot disconnected the autopilot and performed a missed approach. On
the next approach the a/c was flown without autopilot to a successful landing. Appropriate and comprehensive
remedial action is being taken by the operator concerned.
A/C Type : Learjet Occurrence Number : 200108248
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 03 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Northolt
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - It appeared Learjet was not familiar with PAR approaches and phraseology, subsequently
descended below the glide path. Learjet instructed to break off approach and go around carried out
Precis :
CAA Closure: The operators report states that the P1 was quite nervous as his chief pilot was acting as
assistant pilot and it was the first time they had flown together. The P1 was not well prepared to fly a PAR
approach which he did not often have opportunities to fly. On the first approach the P1 states that his rate of
descent was quite fast, following the go-around from this approach the assistant stated that for the second
approach the P1 would take care of heading and speed and the assistant manage the rate of descent. An
appropriate debrief occurred after this flight with the P1 admitting he was very disappointed with his
performance.
A/C Type : DC10 Occurrence Number : 200108293
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 09 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : WILLO
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Controller cleared an a/c to climb to FL170, but this instruction was read back by a DC10.
Controller did not notice the incorrect read back and DC10 climbed above its cleared altitude.
Precis :
DC10 had been previously told to maintain 6000ft, but was observed climbing out of 6000ft. When questioned,
DC10 stated it had been cleared to FL170 and had read this back. This incorrect read back had not been picked
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up by the controller, who had cleared another a/c Fltnum '81' to climb to FL170, but '81' was later observed
having never taken this instruction. The ATC mentor's headset had failed and he believed that he was in the
process of changing headsets when the missed readback occurred. The DC10 failed to use its call sign in any
response to ATC instructions while on this frequency. The operator has alerted all crew members to use full call
signs for all flights.
CAA Closure: Appropriate operator action taken.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200108547
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 20 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lanzarote
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Possible descent below cleared altitude following confusion between ATC and crew over a height restriction
whilst on a visual approach.
Precis :
Canaries ATC approved a visual approach to R/W 03. Descent made to 3500 feet QNH whilst positioning
downwind RH. P2 then questioned P1 if a/c should be maintaining 5000 feet. Canaries ATC queried, who stated
that 5000 feet was the cleared altitude but now cleared visual and to contact Tower.
A/C Type : SD360 Occurrence Number : 200108587
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 22 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Brecon (BCN)
Events : ATC Conflict
ATC Conflict
Location Info : SE
Pretitle :
Alleged that the Bristol Lulsgate controller transferred the wrong outbound flight to the LATCC Sector 05
controller. LATCC provided immediate avoiding action to maintain separation.
Precis :
An F27 was working Bristol Lulsgate descending through FL90 into Lulsgate when a fltnum "***856" was
transferred to London on track RADNO climbing FL85 and in direct conflict. In a subsequent telecon the
Lulsgate controller stated that he had transferred "856" by mistake thinking he had transferred a fltnum "411" of
the same operator. The controller at Bristol gave a position to "856" which was the actual position of "411" but
the crew did not query this. The crew on hearing the frequency change instruction, readback the frequency but
did not state their callsign.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200108641
Flight Phase : Initial Climb Occurrence Date : 27 Dec 2001
Classification : Occurrences Location : Rio De Janeiro
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
Airprox - Foreign
Location Info :
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX - B777 and small transport a/c. Subject to investigation by the Brazilian authority.
Precis :
After take off from R/W10 and passing approximately 500ft, B777 received a TCAS TA followed by RA. B777
levelled and a turboprop a/c was seen on the LH side turning to the Northeast. AIRPROX reported to Tower
frequency 118.2, but no explanation was given by ATC. The Brazilian investigation concluded that this
AIRPROX was caused by poor phraseology on the part of the controller concerned combined with a radar fault.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200200011
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 03 Jan 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC instructed A321 to reject take-off at 90kts due B747 on approach at Heathrow. Traffic information and
avoiding action given, B747 instructed to go-around. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Attributed to a combination of preceding a/c (B777) being slow to depart and B747 being faster than anticipated
on the approach. Investigations have indicated that this incident was caused by poor judgement in lining up the
A321. Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200200206
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 15 Jan 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Cliff
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
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Incorrect RT phraseology.
Precis :
On two occasions, when instructed to descend, B737 pilot replied "At our discretion". On each occasion, ATC
instructed a/c "negative, descend now". The operator and crew have been reminded that, whilst obtaining
clarification is always considered good practice if any doubt exists, any unnecessary use of RT transmissions
will have an impact, particularly on a very busy frequency.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : DO 328 Occurrence Number : 200200242
Flight Phase : Hold Occurrence Date : 15 Jan 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : LANAK
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Flight number "317G" accepted a call intended for another operator flight number "30G" in LANAK hold, resulting
in altitude deviation. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Do328 (flight number "317G") was entering the hold at FL100 at LANAK, with an EMB145 (another operator
flight number "30G") holding at FL90. ATC instructed the EMB145 to descend to FL80, but this was
acknowledged by the DO328. The controller failed to notice the incorrect readback, (the tape review indicates
that the readback error was not obvious and that "317G" did not use his company designator) and both a/c
commenced descents. Scottish Sector then observed the Do328 descending through FL84, with the EMB145
level at FL80. ATC then instructed the Do328 to climb and level at FL90. Appropriate ATC remedial action has
been taken as a result of this incident.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200201232
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 26 Feb 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Loss of Standard Separation
TCAS Report
Location Info : 4SW
Pretitle :
Loss of separation between B777 and B747 at 4300ft, 4nm Southwest of Heathrow. Both had departed 27R at
Heathrow. TCAS and STCA activated, traffic information and avoiding action given.
Precis :
The B747 was airborne on a MID4F SID and the B777 was cleared for take off on a DVR5F SID. The required
minimum separation between such departures was 2 min. A subsequent examination of the RTF tape indicated
that only one min had been applied. At the time there was a strong South-westerly wind blowing, and this added
to the problem. The B777 was transferred to London Control, and the controller there immediately issued
avoiding action as there was virtually no vertical separation and only 2 nm laterally.
CAA Closure: Appropriate local ATC action taken.
A/C Type : A340 Occurrence Number : 200201429
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 07 Mar 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : GIBSO
Events : UK Airprox Location Info : 7 NE
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX-16/2002-A340 and a military jet at GIBSO at FL230.
Precis :
In accordance with the standing agreement, the A340 had to be positioned on the North side of Airway R8,
which was achieved. However, although perhaps not immediately apparent to the controller, the radar recording
showed the A340 track slowly converging with the Northern boundary of the Airway, rather than remaining
parallel with it. The A340 reached the Airway boundary, and continued tracking along its edge. It was then
released on its own navigation to Lands End VOR, some 149 nm distance, and transferred to the next sector.
The radar recording showed the A340 just outside the Airway at this stage. Subsequently the A340 was cleared
up to FL270, and the STCA activated against fast moving traffic outside CAS approaching the A340 from the
West in a climb. A right turn and traffic information was passed, with the unknown traffic closing to 6 nm as the
A340 regained CAS. Ultimately the unknown a/c did not penetrate CAS. The incident will be subject to
assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200201824
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 24 Mar 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Nantes
Events : Airprox - Foreign Location Info :
Pretitle :
FOREIGN AIRPROX-B737 allegedly cleared for take-off three times at Nantes while a TB10 was holding on the
runway.
Precis :
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B737 crew questioned take-off clearance due to light a/c on runway. ATC cleared B737 twice more and then
instructed B737 to hold position when clearance was questioned for a third time. ATC allegedly spoke in French
to the light a/c throughout. Light a/c eventually commenced take-off, following which B737 departed without
further incident. The severity of the incident was brought to the attention of the French authorities, who are
taking appropriate action. The French AIRPROX investigation concluded that the controller having lined up the
TB10 from an intermediate position then forgot about it. The Local controller's workload was high. Contributory
factors were non-detection of the TB10 when making a visual check due to difficulty in adjusting the light
contrast with the blinds and non-use of the phraseology "line up and wait" which could have reinforced the
controller's mental image of the situation.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : BE200 Super King Air Occurrence Number : 200202236
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 02 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bournemouth
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged use of very poor non standard R/T. Pilot on later stages of approach failed to read back headings and
accept vectoring.
Precis :
On transfer to Tower confusion was caused by non standard phraseology. Appropriate CAA action has been
taken as a result of this incident.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200202443
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 03 Apr 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : New York JFK
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - B767 believed it had been cleared to line up on R/W31L, which it did. Subsequently ATC
instructed an a/c on approach to go around.
Precis :
The B767 taxiing to R/W31L behind an MD80 was cleared to 'taxi up to him and hold short', which was read
back as 'follow him and hold short''. After MD80 started its roll, B767 taxied into position and held as it believed it
had been instructed. When B767 had been lined up for a short while, an a/c was instructed to go around.
Terminology used on this incident will be discussed when FAA visit the operator at the end of April.
A/C Type : B757 Occurrence Number : 200202793
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 01 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Due to operator changing its name, the three letter code in the Fltnum also changed, but the
company telephony still remained the same, which caused confusion to controllers.
Precis :
A/C Type : EMB 145 Occurrence Number : 200203251
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 13 May 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lambourne (LAM)
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info : 35 E
Pretitle :
Altitude deviation - EMB145 descended through cleared FL270 to FL250 during descent into Birmingham.
Alleged that incorrect readback was not detected by ATC.
Precis :
Investigations revealed that the flight was issued a descent clearance to FL270. However, in his response the
pilot asked to confirm if the level cleared was FL250 to which the SC responded, erroneously, that it was and the
flight accordingly continued descent to FL250. No other flight was apparently involved but the error was
identified when the pilot reported at the 'wrong' level on the next sector frequency.
CAA Closure: Appropriate personnel action has been completed at the Unit concerned.
A/C Type : A319 Occurrence Number : 200203969
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 12 Jun 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Madrid
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info : 30 N
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - A319 believed it was cleared to climb to FL240. Passing FL130 with high rate of climb,
A319 instructed to maintain FL140 on reaching. Traffic seen on TCAS at FL150 4-5nms abeam.
Precis :
Both crew heard the clearance to FL240 which was clearly read back. Alleged poor standard of ATC with clipped
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and non standard R/T often in Spanish.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200204037
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 17 Jun 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bodrum
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Alleged poor ATC service provided at Bodrum. Recurring problem.
Precis :
ATC RT allegedly non-standard and ambiguous. ATC also failed to comply with Jeppesen chart information.
Similar problem experienced by operator on following day (18 Jun 2002). A number of attempts to elicit a
response to this incident from the appropriate foreign authority have been unsuccessful.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action practical.
A/C Type : DO 328 Occurrence Number : 200204106
Flight Phase : Circuit Occurrence Date : 18 Jun 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : London City - LCY
Events : Loss of Standard Separation Location Info : 4 SE
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Tower informed controller that a DO328 would be making a RH orbit for spacing, but DO328 then
observed to enter a LH orbit towards a CL600 and separation was lost.
Precis :
Whilst resolving a vortex spacing problem between an F50 and a DO328, the London City ADC Controller asked
the latter a/c if it wished an orbit. However, phraseology used was somewhat ambiguous, resulting in its pilot
carrying out a left hand turn. This brought it into confliction with the CL600, inbound to Biggin Hill. The CL600
was given an avoiding action climb and turn. Minimum separation approximately 2nm/600ft.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC personnel action taken.
A/C Type : SA332 Super Puma Occurrence Number : 200204540
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 03 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : BANFF
Events : UK Airprox
UK Airprox
Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX-104/2002- 2 military jets and an AS332 near Banff at 1600 feet.
Precis :
The military jets were in close formation, in receipt of a FIS, at 1000 ft on Rad Alt. The formation was too low for
identification, but the controller advised of traffic in the area at 1600 ft. The military a/c captain thought that the
formation could be seen on radar and, after converting the Rad Alt height using SPS to around 1600 ft,
incorrectly believed that the reported traffic was in fact the military formation. Consequently, the military captain
thought that the formation was the only traffic in the area. About 1 min later the AS332 was seen late, with no
time for avoiding action, and the military a/c crossed 50 m ahead of and about 100 ft above the helicopter. The
AS332 was VMC inbound to Aberdeen, under a limited RIS at 1000 ft on the RPS. The military traffic was
reported at 3 nm to the NE at 1700 ft, which would pass down the left hand side of the AS332. A subsequent
message reported the jets passing the helicopter, when they were seen at a range of 1/4 nm. The helicopter
was pitched nose down to avoid, with the jets passing about 100 m down the port side, 100 ft above. The
incident was subject to assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200205146
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 22 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : LOGAN
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info : 15 W
Pretitle :
B737 crew misinterpreted an instruction to stop descent at FL320 as a descent clearance to FL220. Altitude
excursion occurred but standard separation maintained.
Precis :
The a/c was originally descended to FL280 but ATC then amended the clearance to "Stop your descent FL320".
The read back was "220 924". The R/T indicates that the difference between 320 and 220 is only just discernible
and was not detected by the controller. The a/c was then QSY'd and on its first call to the next sector called
passing 310 for 220. The R/T tape shows that the pilot consistently failed to use the company call sign or the
word "Flight Level" hence "220 924". Operator alerted.
A/C Type : Saab F340 Occurrence Number : 200205268
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 23 Jul 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Aberdeen (ADN)
Events : Loss of Standard Separation Location Info : 10S
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Pretitle :
Loss of separation between SF340 and J31 at 3000ft, 10nm South of Aberdeen. SMF activated. Appropriate
ATC action taken.
Precis :
ATC controller misjudged J31 speed and rate of turn and so issued a 90deg turn on 10nm final in an attempt to
maintain separation with SF340. SMF analysis later confirmed that separation had been lost between J31 and
SF340 although they were on diverging tracks at that time. ATC controller was aware of potential conflict
throughout. Appropriate local action taken.
A/C Type : Not Applicable Occurrence Number : 200205546
Flight Phase : Not Applicable Occurrence Date : 05 Aug 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : LACC - Hurn
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Overload at 1415hrs, LACC Sectors 19, 20 and 21 (Hurn East, West and Low).
Precis :
This Overload took place during an afternoon shift when preparations were being made for a Deploy, Download
& Cutover (DD&C) to take place later. During this preparation it was not possible to split sectors at short notice.
Regulations had been applied to S19 and 20 at 22/60 and 18/60 respectively. Shortly after the shift started
there were reports of crews making weather avoidance manoeuvres and so the rates were further reduced to
18/60 and 15/60 from 1320. The sector was flowed for single manning but due to the amount of traffic and
complexity the controller became overloaded and a colleague was called back to assist. The standard of RTF
discipline by crews was poor and, with the increasing number of a/c on frequency, the controller began talking
faster which added to the need for repeat transmissions. The combined S19/20/21 actual rate between 1400-
1459 was 37 (regulation should have kept this to 33) but during 1401-1420, 17 a/c entered the sector, equivalent
to a rate of 51/60. Standard separation was maintained throughout.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC action taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200205575
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 07 Aug 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Compton (CPT)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Alleged poor R/T discipline by B737. Transmissions were clipped, incorrect or missing readback
of instructions, and frequent use of callsign 'one oh three' (103).
Precis :
Poor R/T discipline has been discussed with the operator in the past.
A/C Type : Gardan 80 Occurrence Number : 200205933
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 20 Aug 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Birmingham
Events : Airspace Infringement
Airspace Infringement
Location Info : 2 NNW
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Alleged infringement of the Birmingham CTR (Class D). Traffic info and avoiding action given to a
departing CL600RJ. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Appropriate CAA action has been taken as a result of this incident.
A/C Type : Piper PA28 Occurrence Number : 200206086
Flight Phase : Circuit Occurrence Date : 27 Aug 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Cardiff (CDF)
Events : UK Airprox Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 150/2002 - EMB145 and a PA28 at Cardiff at 500ft.
Precis :
The Tower position was being operated by a mentor and low-experience trainee. The EMB145 requested and
was given use of the non-duty R/W12. As the a/c was taxying for that R/W, a PA28 requested a VFR rejoin from
a local flight, and was cleared to join on base leg for the duty R/W30. The mentor's plan was to depart the
EMB145 first, but when the PA28 reported on base leg the trainee, without reference to the mentor, instructed it
to report final number one. The mentor then told the trainee to instruct the PA28 to orbit on base leg. No
readback of this instruction was received. The EMB145 was cleared for take off R/W12 and was rolling when
the PA28 reported final for R/W30. An avoiding action right turn was issued to the PA28 and the EMB145
turned right at about 100 feet. The 2 a/c are believed to have passed 0.75 nm/300 ft apart. The incident will be
subject to assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC personnel action taken.
A/C Type : DO 328 Occurrence Number : 200206221
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 30 Aug 2002
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Classification : Occurrences Location : Polehill (POL)
Events : Loss of Standard Separation Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Following handover of sector, controller did not notice that an A320 was catching up a DO328
until STCA activated. Traffic info and avoiding action given. Separation lost.
Precis :
The faster A320 was following the DO328, both at FL260. During ATC controller handover, which was
protracted due in part to RT difficulties with another a/c on the frequency, the outgoing Radar controller and Co-
ordinator had not recognised the "catch up" situation and did not brief the oncoming Radar controller. The
oncoming controller was alerted to the situation by STCA, avoiding action instructions were issued, but standard
phraseology was not employed.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC action taken.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200206283
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 30 Aug 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location :
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Altitude Deviation
TCAS Report
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
TCAS TA received following R/T confusion regarding cleared flight level.
Precis :
A/c was given descent on approaching FL350 to FL240 which was read back. On passing FL338 Madrid
requested a/c stop descent at FL340 due opposite traffic at FL330. Autopilot disconnected and climb back
commenced, lowest level reached was FL331. Subsequent conversation with ATC confirmed that actual descent
clearance was FL340 and not FL240. It appears that both ATC and crew misheard the word "two" as "three" and
vice-versa.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200206319
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 03 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Compton (CPT)
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Altitude Deviation
Location Info : SE
Pretitle :
Level excursion - MD82 crew using abbreviated RT phraseology made 2 errors in readback which went
undetected at the ATC units concerned. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
The a/c was instructed to "descend FL140 40 miles before Midhurst". The pilot read back "descend FL140, 40
before Midhurst". The controller acknowledged and transferred the a/c to LTCC. On the next frequency the a/c
reported "leaving 15 down to 40", the controller acknowledging, having missed the first digit of 140. The errors
were detected as the a/c was descending through FL118 for FL40. The operator has been alerted, and accepts
that the RTF phraseology from his crew was inaccurate, and has taken steps to remind the crew concerned and
all their other crews of the absolute need to use complete and not abbreviated phraseology, especially within the
LTMA.
A/C Type : Cessna C525 Citationjet Occurrence Number : 200206417
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 06 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lambourne (LAM)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - C525 observed passing through FL160 when cleared to descend to FL170, which had been read
back correctly. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
When level was queried with the pilot he responded that he was descending to FL70. Pilot was using
abbreviated R/T phraseology. Operator alerted.
A/C Type : Cessna 152 Occurrence Number : 200206445
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 08 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : London City - LCY
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info : 3 E
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Controller accepted VFR traffic from another unit, but subsequently misidentified a/c concerned.
Traffic info given to inbound Saab 2000. SMF activated.
Precis :
Thames Radar transferred a C152 VFR flight to London City, giving its squawk and route. Shortly after a
SB2000 6nm from touchdown to R/W28 was also transferred to London City. London City then requested
release on a BAe146, which was approved subject to C152. Thames then asked London City if it had the C152
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against the SB2000 and received a reply in the affirmative. C152 then requested vector for the Isle of Dogs, but
London City estimated that it was already in the vicinity of the Isle of Dogs. Thames called to pass details on
another VFR transit holding at the Isle of Dogs awaiting departure of BAe146 and during this co-ordination it
became apparent that London City had misidentified the C152 which was actually orbiting to the North of final
approach. Investigations have revealed that the misunderstanding was caused initially by the use of
inappropriate phraseology by both controllers concerned. Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken as a
result of this incident.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200206739
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 18 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Loss of Standard Separation
ATC Occurrence
Location Info : 15W
Pretitle :
Loss of separation between two B737 a/c at 4000ft, 15nm West of Heathrow. One B737 allegedly failed to
comply with ATC instructions. Avoiding action and traffic information issued to other B737.
Precis :
Both a/c were being vectored inbound to 09L at Heathrow. B737 (A) was being positioned ahead of the other
B737 and was downwind left hand descending to 4000 feet. B737 (B) had been routed underneath the OCK
stack and positioned downwind right hand, also at 4000 feet. B737 (B) was then turned right onto 305º towards
base leg and, shortly afterwards, turned right onto 340º and instructed to reduce speed to 180 kt. B737 (A) was
instructed to turn left onto 140º but, possibly due to the fact the transmission was clipped, the crew did not
respond immediately. The controller confirmed to the crew the instruction was for them and to turn further left
onto 140º to establish on the ILS. The controller had anticipated a tighter turn by B737 (A) and the lack of this
resulted in the two a/c coming into conflict. Avoiding action was passed to B737 (B) and the crew reported both
visual and having a TCAS contact. Separation was lost before being quickly restored due to the track
divergence.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200206844
Flight Phase : Approach Occurrence Date : 02 Sep 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Sao Paulo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Due to ATC giving B777 a tight turn and keeping it high, the approach was fast and flap selection
was late. B777 initiated a go around at approximately 500ft.
Precis :
During a busy ATC environment and with language problems, B777 found it difficult contacting approach
controller to state that they were unable to maintain ATC's requested speed. The operator has contacted the
Brazilian authorities requesting a phrase that would be understood by ATC and that crew could use to alert ATC
to the fact that a/c are unable to comply with their demands and to request extra track miles. The Brazilian
authorities state that controller misunderstood the performance of the a/c. Appropriate follow up action has been
taken.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200207531
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 17 Oct 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Faro
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B767 and a light a/c. Subject to investigation by the Portuguese authority.
Precis :
B767 on radar vectors to R/W28 was cleared to descend from 4000ft to 3000ft on an intercept heading. B767
became aware of a TCAS return ahead, level at 3000ft and visually acquired a light a/c. ATC cleared B767 for a
visual approach to which P1 replied ' cleared approach and contact a/c ahead at 3000ft'. ATC replied 'Roger
continue descent'. The light a/c was observed to commence a left turn, still level at 3000ft, which would cross
B767's intended track. B767 began a gentle right turn and reduced descent rate. TCAS then gave 'monitor
vertical speed' followed by 'climb'. TCAS RA complied with and light a/c passed down LH side. RA reported to
ATC who replied 'disregard, the a/c's transponder is incorrect', which was queried and ATC called the a/c to
confirm that it was at 1500ft. A/c replied 'negative, 3000ft as requested'. ATC then instructed a/c to orbit left. The
Portuguese investigation has revealed that the light a/c was on a training flight and had been instructed to
"descend one thousand five hundred". The student descended from 4500 to 3000. The a/c's transponder had an
intermittent fault. The controller made an error of judgement in assuming the a/c had descended as cleared.
A/C Type : BAE146 Occurrence Number : 200207535
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 16 Oct 2002
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Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : Runway Incursion
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - BAe146 was cleared to line up after a departing B757, but at night mistook an Airbus as the B757
and crossed holding point at Block 75 and entered R/W27L. Appropriate action taken.
Precis :
BAe146 at Block 75, holding point for R/W27L, was cleared by tower to line up on R/W27L after departing BA
B757. There were no stop bars at this holding point. The only a/c to be seen from this holding point was a BA a/c
lined up on R/W27, which the BAe146 believed was the B757, and a B747 at adjacent holding point Block 76.
On departure of BA a/c, BAe146 taxied to line up on R/W27L. B747 was also seen to be taxiing parallel to
BAe146. ATC cleared B747 for take off and BAe146 immediately called ATC to say that it had entered the R/W.
B747's take off clearance was cancelled. BAe146 reported it had been cleared after the B757 and was informed
that it was an Airbus that had departed. The ATC report states that the BAe 146 (which was on the North-side)
was given a conditional line-up clearance after a "British B757 from the south-side". Whilst the clearance was
read back, it was not read back in full, ' after the B757 to line up, (flight number) '. Following this incident a
detailed review of multiple line up procedures has taken place at Heathrow. All Local Competency Examiners
(LCEs) have been instructed to pay specific attention to this subject and to ensure all controllers comply with the
requisite procedures. A listing of all line up incidents has been issued to them for discussion with the controllers
at the unit. Increased vigilance is expected to resolve the problems that have been experienced in the past. The
situation will be monitored.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200207638
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 10 Oct 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Tokyo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Reporter believes that after B747 departed R/W34L on a SYE 4 SID an ambiguous climb
clearance was given by ATC.
Precis :
As B747 was passing 1000ft after departure from R/W34L on a SYE 4 SID, which has a stop altitude of 7000ft.
B747 was transferred to Departure Control, who told B747 to 'climb FL310 observe restrictions'. 31000ft had
been put into MCP before clearance was verified with ATC, who seemed surprised that B747 might climb
beyond 7000ft as this was its cleared level. The Japanese investigations have confirmed that a misleading
clearance was given. Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200207994
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 03 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info : 3W
Pretitle :
Call sign confusion between same operator flight numbers "5179" and "5141". "5179" accepted a call intended
for "5141" while at 1500ft, 3nm West of Heathrow.
Precis :
"5179" allegedly displayed poor RT technique prior to incident.
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200208280
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 13 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bovingdon (BNN)
Events : Altitude Deviation Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B767 was cleared to climb to FL80, but observed reaching FL85. Controller queried this, giving
standard pressure setting. B767 descended back to FL80. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
Pilot also using non standard phraseology. Operator fully alerted. See also 200207856.
A/C Type : Fokker 50 Occurrence Number : 200208293
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 14 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : REFSO
Events : UK Airprox
Loss of Standard Separation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 223/2002 - FK50 and an ATR72 at REFSO at FL180. ATC error. Traffic information and avoiding
action given.
Precis :
The ATR72 had been accepted into the sector at FL180. The FK50 had originally been accepted at FL180 but
this was revised to FL160. When the FK50 came on frequency the controller advised it to 'maintain FL180 on
reaching'. This was clearly read back by the crew but not detected by the controller. As a consequence the FK50
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climbed into conflict with the ATR72. This AIRPROX will now be subject to a separate review by the United
Kingdom AIRPROX Board (UKAB).
CAA Closure: Appropriate local ATC remedial action has been taken as a result of this AIRPROX.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200208500
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 21 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Woodley (WOD)
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Altitude Deviation
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Due to confusion and ambiguity in exchanges between ATC and pilot, B737 climbed above its
cleared altitude of 6000ft. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
B737 was observed climbing through its cleared level of 6000ft. When questioned pilot stated climbing to FL330.
After take off B737 requested FL330 and was asked to report its cleared level. Pilot replied 'initially 60'. ATC
then cleared B737 'no ATC speed restriction', which pilot read back as 'confirm no restriction' and it is believed
interpreted this as a clearance to climb to FL330. The operator has been fully alerted to this incident and the
importance of correct phraseology.
A/C Type : DHC8 Occurrence Number : 200208739
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 24 Nov 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Southampton (SAM)
Events : Diversion /Return
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Standard landing clearance not available from ATC after being advised that RVR reading was
below (absolute ?) minima for approach. DHC8 diverted.
Precis :
Investigations indicate that the DHC8 was about to commence an ILS approach in conditions of fluctuating RVR
readings. The RVR decreased during the approach. ATC failed to follow the 'Absolute Minima' procedures as
detailed in MATS Part 1 and only passed the second part of the phraseology. This caused confusion with the
DHC8 crew who commenced a go around as they could not obtain a landing clearance from ATC. Further
guidance has been given to the unit ATCOs.
A/C Type : CL600RJ Regional Jet Occurrence Number : 200208908
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 10 Dec 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Ockham (OCK)
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - A/c on a SAM 2P SID was cleared to 4000ft, but read back 7000ft, which was not picked up by
the controller. A/c observed passing 6000ft and action taken to maintain standard separation.
Precis :
On contacting LTCC the a/c was instructed to "maintain 4000 feet". Although the instruction was clear the a/c
replied "7000 feet (flt number). The "7000 feet" was unreadable but the controller did not request confirmation of
the readback. Appropriate and comprehensive advice has been passed to the operator concerned.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200209120
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 19 Dec 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Prestwick
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Altitude Deviation
Location Info : 18 SE
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 misinterpreted and then incorrectly read back a heading clearance as a climb clearance,
which was not picked up by the controller. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
After B737 had departed it had been co-ordinated to climb to FL90. Subsequently B737 observed passing
FL100, which ATC queried and pilot reported climbing to FL160. ATC stopped climb at FL130. Investigations
revealed that B737 had acknowledged climb to FL90, but when later given a heading of 160deg, responded 'up
to 160', which was not picked up by the controller. Appropriate local ATC remedial action has been taken as a
result of this incident. Operator alerted.
A/C Type : A310 Occurrence Number : 200209231
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 26 Dec 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Honiley (HON)
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info : 5 SE
Pretitle :
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ATC Incident - After A310 departed R/W15 on DTY 2E SID, it was cleared to climb to FL60, but read back 'for
two six zero', which was not detected by the controller. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
A310 departed R/W15 on DTY 2E SID and was cleared to climbed to FL60, but read back 'for two six zero',
which was not picked up by the controller. On transfer to next sector A310 was expected to be climbing to FL60
and pilot reported 'climbing to six zero'. When A310 was observed at FL64, subsequently pilot confirmed
'climbing FL260'. Appropriate ATC remedial action has been taken on the read back aspects. Additionally, the
operator has been passed full details of this event and alerted to the need for correct RT phraseology.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200209288
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 29 Dec 2002
Classification : Occurrences Location : Ockham (OCK)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Alleged poor R/T and airmanship. A320 failed to report passing/cleared altitude or give proper
read backs, also did not use call sign on several occasions despite being reminded.
Precis :
The A320 captain, an experienced foreign operator in UK airspace, subsequently had no recollection of the
reported incidents. However, the captain accepted that they occurred, and promised to take the necessary
measures to ensure they did not happen again.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : HS125 Occurrence Number : 200300575
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 31 Jan 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Farnborough
Events : UK Airprox
Loss of Standard Separation
Airspace Infringement
Location Info : 15NW
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 6/2003 - HS125 and Enstrom F28F at 5000ft, 15nm Northwest of Farnborough, inside the LTMA.
Avoiding action and traffic information issued.
Precis :
The Enstrom was working Farnborough under a RIS at 5000 feet, routing towards CPT. The HS125 was
inbound to Farnborough from Airways under the control of the TC OCK controller, descending to 5000 feet
under the 'Silent Handover' procedures between the 2 units. The Farnborough controller realised the confliction
when the a/c were approximately 6nm apart. The pilot of the Enstrom was asked to confirm his altitude and on
receiving confirmation it was still 5000 feet , traffic information and a subsequent avoiding action turn was given.
TC were advised and issued avoiding action to the HS125. The base of the LTMA in the AIRPROX position was
5000 feet. The pilot of the Enstrom had not received clearance to enter CAS although he may have been lulled
into a false sense of security as the previous Farnborough controller had informed him of CAS ahead and that
he would be kept advised.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC personnel action has been taken as a result of this AIRPROX. This AIRPROX
has been subject to a separate review by the United Kingdom AIRPROX Board (UKAB).
A/C Type : CL600RJ Regional Jet Occurrence Number : 200300705
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 05 Feb 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Lambourne (LAM)
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - CL600RJ descended below its cleared FL90 due to confusion by crew involving a heading
instruction of 280deg. A/c observed at FL83. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
On first contact CL600RJ was cleared to descend to FL90 and later instructed to leave LAM heading 280deg.
When approaching the fix, CL600RJ's Mode C observed at FL83 and controller asked pilot to confirm cleared
FL90. Pilot replied 'Roger descending FL90'. Controller told pilot that its Mode C was reading FL83 and to climb
immediately to FL90. On leaving the stack pilot reported that there had been some confusion when heading of
280degs had been issued (280 / FL80). An examination of the RT tape reveals that the ATC instruction was
"*******, turn left to Lambourne, leave heading 280, speed 220". The response was "Left turn to Lambourne,
speed 220, descend level 80, *******". The "descend level 80" was a little distorted but the controller missed the
incorrect readback. To avoid errors of this nature the controller should use the word "degrees" when assigning a
heading. Appropriate ATC follow up action taken, with the operator having received full details of the incident.
A/C Type : EMB 145 Occurrence Number : 200301181
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 26 Feb 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : WILLO
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
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ATC Incident - Poor RTF. EMB145 allegedly failed to use full call sign despite many attempts at asking pilot to
do so.
Precis :
A/C Type : SA355 Ecureuil Twin Occurrence Number : 200301342
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 03 Mar 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Stansted
Events : ATC Occurrence
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - SA355 allegedly failed to follow ATC taxy instructions and then misinterpreted the zone clearance
as a take off clearance. Appropriate advice given.
Precis :
AS355 parked on Stand 506 was cleared to taxy to holding point GA1, which was correctly read back. Shortly
after controller offered SA355 its zone clearance, of which some had to be repeated or was not read back.
Subsequently an operations vehicle called reporting that AS355 was going down Taxyway F. Controller
instructed SA355 to turn 180degs to return to GA. Pilot acknowledged this, but by this time SA355 was seen to
be airborne. Pilot apologised stating that he believed ATC zone clearance was a take off clearance. SA355 then
returned to GA for departure on R/W23. Appropriate advice will be given to controller concerning their actions in
this incident.
A/C Type : Military Occurrence Number : 200301609
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 17 Mar 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Aberdeen (ADN)
Events : UK Airprox
Altitude Deviation
Location Info : 23 S
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 23/2003 - Jetstream 32 and military a/c 25nm South of Aberdeen at FL110.
Precis :
The Jetstream was in the cruise at FL110 and made aware of co-ordinated military traffic in the vicinity not
above FL100. Subsequently, avoiding action was given to the Jetstream when one of the military jets,
previously observed on radar at FL097, began to climb rapidly. The military a/c was seen by the Jetstream. The
military pilot reported breaking off from an exercise and, not receiving any traffic updates for at least 3 min, once
clear of the area began a climb. A visual search did not detect any conflict. The incident will be subject to
assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200301674
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 18 Mar 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Addis Ababa
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence
Foreign ATC Occurrence
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Ambiguous taxi clearance issued to A320 by Addis Ababa ground controller.
Precis :
A320 issued taxi clearance to holding point for R/W07L via taxiways C1 and F, which also forms part of R/W07L.
During slow taxi along taxiway C1, a light a/c was observed backtracking R/W07L/taxiway F with another light
a/c commencing a go-around. A320 was then cleared to backtrack and line-up. Take-off was uneventful but,
during initial climb, A320 crew were informed that they had entered R/W07L/taxiway F without clearance.
A/C Type : A330 Occurrence Number : 200302373
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 22 Apr 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Oceanic
Events : A/c Equipment / System
Malfunction
Diversion /Return
ATC Occurrence
Loss of Standard Separation
Location Info : N55 W25
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Oceanic separation lost when A330 at FL380 with a generator problem, adopted contingency
procedures and descended. A330 diverted to Gatwick.
Precis :
At no time did the a/c declare an emergency. Occurrence "Opened" to facilitate further investigation WEF
20/05/2003. An operator's report subsequently received noted that the captain did not declare an emergency,
but thought that his intentions were clear to the controller. The operator will publicise the need for clear, concise
communications and correct emergency declaration to its crews.
CAA Closure: Appropriate operator action taken.
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A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200302601
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 30 Apr 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Ibiza
Events : Altitude Deviation (ATC) Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - As B737 was passing FL185 during climb to FL200, it was recleared to FL190. B737
reached FL195 before descending back to FL190. P1 advised ATC of level bust.
Precis :
Non standard phraseology was used by ATC when instructing the flight to maintain FL190 which resulted in the
PNF missing the radio call. The PF did pick up the call but due the a/c's climb rate and slow a/c response to the
MCP selection was unable to prevent the altitude excursion.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200302833
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 09 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : Runway Incursion
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 allegedly failed to follow ATC taxi instructions to pull into B1 and hold, and lined up on
R/W26L instead. Inbound A320 was sent around.
Precis :
The B737 was taxying for departure and ATC asked whether a departure from B1 was acceptable. The crew
advised that it was, but non standard phraseology was used by ATC and the crew misinterpreted this as a line
up clearance. A BAe146 had been given take off clearance and an A320 was on final. After the BAe146 had
commenced its take off roll a conditional clearance to line up after the landing A320 was issued to the B737. It
was then noted that the B737 was already lining up and so the A320 was sent around.
CAA Closure: Appropriate local ATC action taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200302856
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 11 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - B737 inbound to Gatwick with a suspected tyre burst could have misinterpreted a consideration
of an alternative airfield as an instruction to divert.
Precis :
The aircraft was inbound to Gatwick and it was believed that it may have burst a tyre on departure. The
standard message was passed by the ATCO on behalf of the BAA ODM requesting the pilot to consider
diverting elsewhere. It would appear that no published information is available to pilots indicating that this action
may be taken. This particular Captain appeared to have interpreted the message as a directive to divert, which
it was not. The situation will be monitored for any future similar incidents.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : DC10 Occurrence Number : 200303215
Flight Phase : Initial Climb Occurrence Date : 25 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
DC10 selected incorrect frequency following departure from Manchester.
Precis :
Prior to departure, DC10 was informed that a non-standard frequency (133.8) would be used. This was read-
back correctly, but DC10 subsequently selected an incorrect frequency. When cleared for take-off the crew read
back their callsign and "Roger" only.
A/C Type : Learjet Occurrence Number : 200303295
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 28 May 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Manchester (MCT)
Events : Runway Incursion
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Incorrect line-up/runway incursion by Learjet at Manchester.
Precis :
Military a/c issued a conditional line-up clearance following a landing B737, with the Learjet issued a conditional
line-up after the military a/c. Once B737 had vacated R/W24R, military a/c was issued take-off clearance but
was unable to do so as the Learjet had crossed a red stop bar and incorrectly lined up in front of the military a/c.
Investigations have revealed that the incident was caused by the Air Controller believing that the Learjet was at
Link J1 when it was at JA. The Learjet pilot did report that it was holding at JA, but this was not detected/picked
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up. The pilot of the Learjet read back the conditional element of its clearance incorrectly and this was not
detected by the controller. The ATC workload on this day had been very high and controller fatigue could have
been a factor in this incident. Appropriate and comprehensive local ATC follow up action has been taken as a
result of this incident.
A/C Type : Military Occurrence Number : 200303992
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 24 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Aberdeen (ADN)
Events : UK Airprox Location Info : 35 S
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 86/2003 - Jetstream 32 and two military jets 35nm South of Aberdeen at FL195.
Precis :
The Jetstream was en route from Aberdeen to Leeds in the climb under a RAS. The controller observed military
traffic in the vicinity so attempted to co-ordinate with military ATC, and was advised that the military traffic would
head East. The civil controller therefore elected to take the Jetstream West and then South. The military traffic
continued NE so a further turn onto 310 deg and traffic information was passed, with the military a/c indicating
FL120 at 5 nm range on radar. The military traffic and Jetstream labels then merged, so the Jetstream, now at
FL120, was given an avoiding action turn, and the Jetstream reported visual. The military a/c were given traffic
information on the Jetstream and instructed to stop climb at 12000 ft. The Jetstream was acquired visually, and
the military a/c elected to turn right to increase lateral separation. The incident will be subject to assessment by
UKAB.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action required.
A/C Type : Falcon 900 Occurrence Number : 200304002
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 20 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Alleged poor R/T discipline. F900 consistently failed to use its callsign when acknowledging
instructions. Controller asked F900 to use its callsign, but it still did not comply.
Precis :
Investigation progressed under 200301339.
A/C Type : A321 Occurrence Number : 200304513
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 12 Jul 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Corfu
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Alleged that A321 received poor ATC/radar procedures at night during approach to
R/W35 with radio aids U/S.
Precis :
The foreign authority in a comprehensive response have stated that the a/c was under positive radar control at
all times. The a/c was in a vectoring area where the minimum altitude is 2900 feet and the a/c was correctly
cleared to descend to 3000 feet. The U/S radio aid (the GAR VOR/DME) was NOTAM promulgated as U/S. The
report states that in the weather conditions pertaining (visibility in excess of 14nm) the visual approach was the
best solution to expedite traffic. However if the pilot was unhappy with the visibility he should have refused the
clearance and asked to execute the procedure. The incident has been presented and analysed by the Kerkira
controllers and the importance of using correct phraseology emphasised.
CAA Closure: No further CAA action.
A/C Type : CL600 RJ700 Occurrence Number : 200304603
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 16 Jun 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Nice
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign ATC Incident - Increased workload for crew who had to repeat themselves on frequency to ATC, either
to gain a response or make themselves understood, both prior to and after declaring a PAN.
Precis :
Reporter alleges that ATC displayed a lack of understanding of calls made by the crew on a number of
occasions.
CAA Closure: The French authorities report that the unit responsible for investigating this incident received
notification almost 2 months after the incident occurred. Although the local unit were asked to investigate, the
elapsed time involved meant that the radar and radio data had been returned to service; data is retained for 30
days. The pilot concerned allegedly did not report the event on the frequency.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200304844
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 23 Jul 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Stansted
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Events : Runway Incursion
ATC Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
A320 given conditional clearance to line-up at Stansted but reported not ready and so clearance was cancelled.
However, A320 then proceeded to line-up without appropriate clearance.
Precis :
The ADC position was being operated by a mentor and trainee. The A320 was given a clearance to line up and
wait on R/W23. The trainee then initiated a telephone call to the TC North West coordinator. At the same time,
the pilot reported that he was not yet ready and would need 2 or 3 minutes. The response from ATC was
"..cancel line up hold position" and then the trainee continued with the telephone conversation. The crew
responded but neither the trainee nor the mentor assimilated this. The A320 continued and lined up. No further
safety incident took place as there was no other traffic affected by the runway being occupied.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC action taken.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200305267
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 04 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Wallasey (WAL)
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident -Misunderstanding of cleared FL and requested FL by pilot. The initial call from the a/c did not
register with the controller as FL290 requesting FL310.
Precis :
Standard separation maintained.
A/C Type : MD 80 Srs Occurrence Number : 200305326
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 06 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - MD80 was cleared to line up after BA Airbus (A320) on the RH side, but lined up after a BA A319
that was in front and had just departed. MD80 cleared to take off followed by the A320.
Precis :
A/C Type : B777 Occurrence Number : 200305500
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 12 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Controller concerned about phraseology used by ATC and a/c during stepped climb on the SIDs.
Precis :
See also occ 200303756 and 200305502,
A/C Type : B767 Occurrence Number : 200305502
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 12 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - Controller concerned of phraseology used by ATC and a/c during stepped climb on the SIDs.
Precis :
B767 on a LAM SID called 'climbing to altitude 6000ft' and controller immediately instructed B767 to stop climb
at 4000ft. Phraseology used by B767 made controller unsure if a/c was climbing straight to 6000ft or step
climbing to 6000ft. ATC workload increased. See also occ 200303756. Investigation continues under occ
200305500.
A/C Type : Unknown Occurrence Number : 200305869
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 26 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : NIBOG
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC received inadequate acknowledgements from numerous a/c when transferring them from SCACC to
Oceanic frequencies at NIBOG and MIMKU.
Precis :
The controller received a variety of responses some stated "roger", others callsign only and some frequency
only.
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200305870
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 26 Aug 2003
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Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info : 5S
Pretitle :
Farnborough ATC turned C650 at 3000ft into potential conflict with B747, Heathrow outbound climbing through
2000ft. Avoiding action and traffic info issued to B747. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
See also 200305870. R/W06 was in use by Farnborough and, due to danger area activity, it was necessary to
vector departing traffic around the area. The C650 was instructed to climb straight ahead to 3000 feet after
departure. The a/c called the Approach Radar controller and was identified before being placed under a RAS.
The controller instructed the crew to turn right (the long way round) onto heading 275º and climb to 3000 feet.
The crew questioned the direction and this was confirmed. Whilst dealing with another a/c, the controller noticed
that the C650 was turning left and not right, so advised the pilot again to turn right. He then coordinated with TC
and advised them what had happened. The Heathrow INT South controller took avoiding action with a B747
and maintained separation against the C650 which was subsequently vectored clear of the Heathrow RMA.
CAA Closure: Appropriate ATC action taken.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200305876
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 23 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bristol International
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
ATC Incident - After landing on R/W27 in LVP conditions and reporting 'R/W vacated' ATC told A320 to report
approaching G3, but A320 subsequently crossed illuminated stop bar at G3.
Precis :
A320 landed on R/W27 in LVP conditions and reported 'R/W vacated' via Taxyway G. A320 then told by ATC to
'report approaching holding point G3', which was read back correctly. A320 was given imprecise taxy
instructions, which did not specifically include the parking stand as clearance limit nor a positive routeing. A320
crossed G3 red stop bar and observed by ATC approaching West Apron. Crew confirmed A320 was now
passing abeam D1 holding point. ATC asked A320 if stop bar was on and crew replied that it was not. Stop bar
checked immediately. A320 then taxied past Stand 2 and stopped abeam Stand 4. A320 then cleared to park on
Stand 4. Subsequently crew called ATC and stated that they believed the stop bar at G3 was illuminated, but
they had been looking out for other things, due to LVP conditions. Appropriate action has been taken by ATC
and a TBS Ops Notice 60/03 has been issued to all ATCOs.
A/C Type : Falcon 2000 Occurrence Number : 200306050
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 01 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Bovingdon (BNN)
Events : Altitude Deviation
Altitude Deviation (ATC)
Location Info : 4 SE
Pretitle :
A Falcon 2000 allegedly failed to comply with the climb profile whilst on the CPT 5X SID. A similar incident
occurred a few minutes later involving a C550, same operator.
Precis :
Falcon 2000 on the CPT 5X SID called ATC and correctly reported climbing to 3000ft and advised by ATC
'further climb shortly'. In fact Falcon 2000 should have continued its climb iaw with the SID to be at 5000ft 4nm
prior to BNN, but in fact was still at 3000ft 2nm prior to BNN. It is believed that due to the ATC statement the
foreign pilot may have been under the impression that further climb would be at instruction of ATC. Appropriate
ATC action will be taken. The second incident which occurred a few minutes later involved a C550, same
operator, ATC had instructed C550 to continue iaw with SID, but a/c continued at 3000ft for an extended period
and was only passing 4000ft approximately 1nm prior to BNN. The operator is to be alerted to these incidents.
A/C Type : MD11 Occurrence Number : 200306197
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 07 Sep 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Heathrow - LHR
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Twice MD11 omitted any a/c callsign from readbacks to ATC instructions.
Precis :
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200306239
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 30 Aug 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Palma
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
When pilot enquired why B737 was being held, unauthorised phraseology was used by foreign controller.
Precis :
A/C Type : Piper PA31 Occurrence Number : 200307408
Flight Phase : Cruise Occurrence Date : 24 Oct 2003
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Classification : Occurrences Location : Glasgow (GOW)
Events : UK Airprox
Airspace Infringement
TCAS Report
Loss of Standard Separation
Location Info : 9 ENE
Pretitle :
UK AIRPROX 166/2003 - Between SF340 and a PA31 9nms ENE of Glasgow at 3000ft.
Precis :
SF340 was on a RH visual approach to R/W23, when PA31 entered CTR without clearance. Traffic info given to
SF340, which then took avoiding action. The incident will be subject to assessment by UKAB.
CAA Closure: Appropriate CAA action taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200307427
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 26 Oct 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : London-Gatwick - LGW
Events : ATC Occurrence
Runway Incursion
Location Info :
Pretitle :
B737 was instructed 'after the landing B737 at 2nms line up 26L at B1', which was read back. B737
subsequently observed crossing B1 stopbar. An inbound B737 was sent around. Pilot apologised.
Precis :
On handover to London pilot apologised stating B737 had only just crossed stopbar and that there was no
intention of lining up on R/W26L. Pilots English reported as poor.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200307542
Flight Phase : Take Off Occurrence Date : 29 Oct 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Confusion concerning B737's take off clearance. After take off B737 called 'airborne' and ATC said that B737
had been told to cancel its take off.
Precis :
ATC lined up and cleared B737 for take off, but due to fog and icing conditions an engine run up was carried out.
ATC was unaware of this requirement. At end of run up ATC said something about the take off. P2 thought
ATC said 'cancel T/O', P1 thought ATC said 'confirm T/O'. P2 tried to confirm clearance with no response.
B737 then reported 'rolling', again no response from ATC. After take off B737 called 'airborne' and ATC said
that B737 had been told to cancel its take off. A comprehensive investigation into the incident was conducted by
the operator and the relevant foreign authority departments. It looked into the ATC procedures, flight deck
interpretations and phraseology, and concluded that the failure of the B737 to stop underlined the need for
extreme vigilance in all runway operations. The incident also highlighted the matter of cross cockpit authority
and assertiveness. It was recommended that the use of the phrase "take off" in an instruction to stop be raised
with the appropriate phraseology authority, and that the foreign ATC review its rules for issuance of take off
clearance in LVPs.
CAA Closure: Appropriate operator action taken.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200308270
Flight Phase : Descent Occurrence Date : 03 Nov 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Paris CDG
Events : Airprox - Foreign
TCAS Report
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Foreign AIRPROX - B737 and unknown a/c. Subject to investigation by the French authority.
Precis :
B737 was cleared to establish ILS R/W26L, when an a/c was noticed on TCAS South of ILS, 1000ft above and
tracking to same point on ILS centreline. Other a/c started to descend, which was queried with ATC. ATC stated
that a/c was joining same ILS 1000ft above. B737 informed ATC that a/c was descending. A/c continued its
descent and ATC turned B737 North and told other traffic to fly 180deg. Autopilot disconnected. B737 was visual
with traffic at all times. ATC then cleared B737 which was now 17nm from airfield to descend to 1000ft, this was
queried and B737 was recleared to 2000ft. The French investigation into this AIRPROX revealed that it was
caused by "the descent at 3000 feet (instead of 4000 feet) of the other a/c, after an ambiguous phraseology for a
traffic information". Contributing factors were the choice of runways : the B737 was arriving from the North for
the southern runways and the other a/c routing from the South for the northern. The sector was also overloaded.
Appropriate follow up action has been taken by the French authorities.
A/C Type : B737 Occurrence Number : 200308762
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 17 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Stansted
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
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Runway Incursion
Pretitle :
B737 was given a conditional line up clearance from R3 holding point after a landing B737, but then observed to
have crossed red stop bar ahead of a landing B737. Inbound B737 instructed to go around.
Precis :
Inbound B737 at approximately 2nms on final approach to R/W23 was cleared to land. Another B737 was given
a conditional line up clearance from R3 holding point to 'line up after landing traffic and be ready immediately'.
B737 subsequently observed to have crossed red stop bar ahead of landing B737 and instructed to hold
position. Both pilots believed initial instruction was 'line up and be ready immediately'. Inbound B737 instructed
to go around. Investigation revealed co-ordination errors in handling the missed approach by the Tower
controller, which are being dealt with at local level.
A/C Type : GD Eqp Svs Occurrence Number : 200308822
Flight Phase : Not Applicable Occurrence Date : 15 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Belfast (BEL)
Events : ATC Occurrence
Ground (AD) Occurrence
Location Info :
Pretitle :
Military bowser wanting to cross R/W17 failed to follow ATC instructions to stop at J2 Hold. Bowser told to stop
as there was an HS748 on its take off run. Bowser stopped and HS748 took off.
Precis :
Fuel bowser requested crossing clearance of R/W17 as HS748 was departing R/W17. Vehicle instructed to hold
position, but subsequently observed crossing J2 Hold at which point controller told vehicle to stop immediately.
Vehicle stopped beyond holding point, but clear of R/W. HS748 continued its take off run. The military have
taken appropriate local action.
A/C Type : Fokker 70 Occurrence Number : 200309049
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 22 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Humberside
Events : ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
After take off from R/W21, FK70 did not make expected left turn and reported heading 210deg. It is believed that
foreign crew misinterpreted R/W number as a heading. Standard separation maintained.
Precis :
After FK70 became airborne from R/W21, it called climbing from 2000ft to FL230. FK70 identified and placed
under a RAS. FK70 was expected to turn left after departure direct to OTBED to join CAS, but reported
continuing on R/W heading of 210deg. FK70 was cleared to turn left to OTBED. It appears the foreign crew
misinterpreted R/W21, given in its take off clearance, as a heading.
A/C Type : EMB 145 Occurrence Number : 200400027
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 01 Jan 2004
Classification : Occurrences Location : Milan Malpensa
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info : 20 W
Pretitle :
After departing R/W35R and passing FL110 heading towards RMG, EMB145 was recleared to FL190 and 'when
able' direct AOSTA. Reporter believes this was an ambiguous clearance in a mountainous area.
Precis :
A/C Type : B747 Occurrence Number : 200309114
Flight Phase : Climb Occurrence Date : 30 Dec 2003
Classification : Occurrences Location : Tokyo
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
B747 believed it had been cleared to climb to FL310, but approaching 7000ft on the SID it was clear this was not
correct. B747 levelled at 7000ft iaw SID and clarification from ATC was sought.
Precis :
ATC had difficulty in understanding the crew's query over the clearance. Reporter states that if the ATC unit had
given an initial clearance of "Expect FL310" the incident would have been avoided.
A/C Type : A320 Occurrence Number : 200400381
Flight Phase : Taxy Occurrence Date : 14 Jan 2004
Classification : Occurrences Location : Copenhagen
Events : Foreign ATC Occurrence Location Info :
Pretitle :
Misunderstanding over ATC taxi clearance during taxy for departure from R/W04R.
Precis :
A320 had been de-iced in pan on Taxyway A and cleared by ATC to join 'Taxyway Alpha, hold short R/W30 as
a/c landing on R/W30'. Tower cleared A320 'to enter R/W30, to the right to join Taxyway Charlie'. A320 crossed
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R/W30 with landing traffic at 7nm and joined Taxyway Foxtrot. Controller had expected A320 to enter R/W,
complete a 150deg turn and join Taxyway Charlie. Having joined Taxyway Foxtrot, A320 rejoined a queue for
crossing R/W30 for departure from R/W04R. The Danish investigation revealed that the instructions given were
"Cross R/W 30 via right turn to join Taxiway C". The controller realised afterwards that the word cross was
misplaced and led to the misunderstanding, since he wanted the a/c to enter the runway, make a 150 degrees
turn to the right and leave the runway on Taxiway C. In conclusion this incident was caused by inappropriate
phraseology leading to a misunderstanding. Safety was not compromised.
Number of Records : 143
APPENDIX E: ATC Demographic Data Collection Questionnaire
SECTION A : PERSONAL PARTICULARS
This section is to gather information for a general demographic analysis. Identifying
information is necessary for record keeping but will not be included in analysis.
Please fill in the blanks and tick  or shade  as appropriate.
1. Name :
2. ATC Licence Number : DCA / ATC / L
3. Gender: Male  Female 
4. Age: 20 – 25  26 – 29  30 – 39  40 – 49  50+ 
5. Service: less than 3 yrs  4 – 6 yrs  7 – 10 yrs 
11 – 15 yrs  16 – 20 yrs  more than 20 yrs 
6. Station:
Area Control Centre  Aerodrome  ATC College  Headquarters 
7. Ethnic Group
Malay  Chinese  Indian  Other  ……………………(please specify)
8. Academic Qualification
PhD  Masters  University Degree  Diploma  High School 
9. Language(s): (frequently used)
i.......................................... ii....................................... iii. ……………………………..
10. ATC Ratings:
 None  Aerodrome Control
 Approach Procedure Control  Approach Radar Control
 Area Procedure Control  Area Radar Control
11. ATC Operations Experience & Duration
 Aerodrome Controller ……………………… years
 Approach Procedure Controller ……………………… years
 Approach Radar Controller ……………………… years
 Area Procedure Controller ……………………… years
 Area Radar Controller ……………………… years
 None
12. Additional ATC Experience
 DCA Airport Manager …………………… years
 ACC Supervisor …………………… years
 SATCO …………………… years
 College Instructor …………………… years
 Training Officer …………………… years
 ATCO Examiner …………………… years
13. Courses Attended in 2004
 ATC Primary Course  ATC Rating courses  Flow Control
 Aviation English  Search and Rescue  Human Factors
 PANS-OPS Design  Safety Management
 Others ………………………………………………….(please specify)
SECTION B : ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TESTS
This section is about your experience in English Language Proficiency Tests; either locally or
internationally recognised. You may have taken a test more than once for different purposes.
Please provide following information for test(s) that you have taken.
1. Language Testing System (IELTS)
Tick  or shade as appropriate
Year Purpose Overall Rating



 Never taken this examination.
2. Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL)?
Year Purpose Score
 Never taken this examination.
3. Test of English for International Communications (TOEIC)?
Year Purpose Result
 Never taken this examination.
4. Others.
Test(s) Year Purpose Result
SECTION C : AVIATION ENGLISH AND ATC COMMUNICATION TRAINING
This section is about the training provided to you pertaining to your career as Air Traffic
Controllers. We are interested in information relevant to Aviation English, Radiotelephony and
ATC Communications training in preparation for using English Language in daily work
functions.
1. Did you receive any training for:
Please  as appropriate
Yes No
Aviation English
Standard Phraseology
Radiotelephony
ATC communication
2. Was the training conducted as,
Please  as appropriate
part of another ATC
training course
a separate training
course
Aviation English
Standard Phraseology
Radiotelephony
ATC communication
3. Indicate if the training format included any of the following:
Please  as appropriate.
AE SP RT Comms
Classroom lectures
Simulator exercises
Public speaking
Verbal communicational skill
Listening exercises
Real radiotelephony examples
Visits to ATC workstations
Peer role play exercises
Interactive computerised exercises
Handling of unexpected events
Language proficiency tests
Key: AE = Aviation English
SP = Standard Phraseology
RT = Radiotelephony
Comms = ATC Communications
4. Indicate if the training materials provided to you included:
Please  or 
Aeronautical Information Publication
Manual of Air Traffic Services
ICAO’s DOC 4444
ICAO ANNEX 10 Vol. II
Manual of Radiotelephony (DOC 9432)
Filed differences (by any contracting state) to ICAO standard phraseology
Locally used terms that may differ from ICAO’s
Work-relevant commonly used plain English words
Potentially confusing words/ phraseology/ numbers
Specific pronunciation of numbers
Audio samples of real radiotelephony
Relevant terminology for potential un-expected events
5. How would you evaluate the training course in terms of improvement to
Phraseology / English Language in:
Scale: 1 = very little (further general training will be needed)
2 = adequate (training prepared you for basic daily job function)
3 = good (further specific training not immediately required)
4 = very good (able to handle unfamiliar situations)
Please  or shade as appropriate
Vocabulary of aviation related words    
Vocabulary of specific ATC related words    
Glossary of ICAO phraseology    
Ability to use correct standard phraseology    
Awareness of words with multiple meanings    
Awareness of phraseologies that may cause misunderstanding    
Correct and clear pronunciation    
Recognition of regional / cultural English accents    
Conversational fluency    
Ability to paraphrase    
6. How would you rate the facilitators and instructors of the Aviation English and ATC
Communication training at the DCA College, in terms of,
Please  or shade as appropriate
Teaching techniques    
English Language fluency    
Knowledge of English Language    
Knowledge of standard phraseology    
Knowledge of ATC topics    
Familiarity with ATC operations    
Time management    
Use of teaching aids
poor
   
excellent
SECTION D : RADIOTELEPHONY OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES
This section seeks your opinion based on observation of routine/daily radiotelephony practises,
in terms of problematic areas and the seriousness of such problems.
Please circle between 0% (=never) and 100% (=always)
1. Indicate a percentage of the time within an average shift (6 hours) that
controllers use;
Standard phraseology 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Non-standard phraseology 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Plain English words and phrases 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
National language (non English) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Local ‘terms’ or ‘jargon’ understood only by
frequent/ local operators in your airspace 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Sum total 100 %
2. Sometimes, the accent or style of English usage differs between regions/
nationalities and modifications is made to improve understanding. How often
does a controller need to;
Change ‘style’ of language use 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Modify or amend standard phrases 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Reduce speech rate 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Repeat complete instructions 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
3. With regards to mandatory readback of ATC instructions and information issued
to aircraft; how often does a controller receives;
Complete readbacks 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Incomplete readbacks (correct but some
information omitted) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Incorrect readbacks (full or partial, but
wrong information) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
No readbacks ( no information repeated –
a readback had to be requested) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
4. There are cases where interference or interruptions had resulted in a message
not fully received or understood by pilots. How often does a pilot request
verification / repetition of;
Whole message 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Taxi route 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Traffic sequence for lining up 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Assigned headings 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Authorised level 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Speed restrictions 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Altimeter setting 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time restrictions (eg. Slot time) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SECTION E: SAFETY OCCURRENCES
1. Please indicate () your experience within the last 3 months of any
misunderstanding or miscommunication due to:
< 5 5 - 10 10 - 15 >15
Usage of non-standard phraseology
Usage of plain English words or phrases
Poor level of English
Unclear pronunciations
Technical difficulties
Non-verification of unclear instructions
Non-verification of unclear information
2. How many times have misunderstandings or miscommunications resulted in:
Increased communications task load
Increased ATC workload
Loss of situational awareness (traffic visualisation)
Loss of separation
Aircraft proximity
Runway incursion
Any other safety related events
SECTION F : OTHER COMMENTS / INFORMATION
Thank you for your feedback and cooperation. If you are interested in the outputs from
the research, please insert your e-mail address below.
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Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 60 20 10 10 0 40 20 30 10 50 20 10 20 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N Y N Y N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 10 10 20 0 10 20 30 10 80 20 20 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 50 20 10 10 10 40 50 50 30 80 70 30 20 50 0 0 30 30 20 10 40 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 90 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 90 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 10 90 0 0 10 10 80 80 90 20 20 10 30 0 0 0 30 30 60 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 90 20 80 10 10 0 10 20 40 80 20 20 10 30 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 90 10 0 0 0 10 0 80 60 80 60 20 30 30 N N 30 30 30 0 30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 10 90 10 0 10 10 10 10 90 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 0 0 0 1
Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 0 10 0 0 0 0 20 20 90 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 10 10 10 2 0 0 5
N N N N N N N Y N N 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 70 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 90 90 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Y N N N N Y Y Y N Y 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 90 30 60 10 40 30 30 50 50 90 90 10 10 40 0 0 20 20 20 10 0 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 10 10 5 0 0 5 0
Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 80 50 60 30 30 50 50 30 80 0 80 50 60 30 30 30 20 50 50 90 100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 0 5
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 70 20 10 0 0 70 70 60 60 100 80 30 10 0 0 0 30 40 30 10 20 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 10 5 0 0 0 0 0
N Y N N N N Y Y N Y 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 70 30 30 10 10 20 20 20 20 70 50 10 10 30 10 10 20 20 10 10 10 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 50 20 10 10 10 40 50 50 40 70 40 30 30 50 0 0 30 30 40 40 50 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 70 10 10 0 10 10 30 30 30 70 10 10 10 10 0 0 20 40 20 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 2 2 50 20 10 10 10 60 10 40 20 80 20 10 10 30 N N 40 50 20 20 10 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 60 10 20 10 0 10 10 30 60 80 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N Y N Y 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 80 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 20 90 0 10 10 10 0 0 20 20 20 0 20 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 70 10 10 0 10 40 30 30 30 80 40 20 10 40 0 30 30 30 30 30 20 1 0 1 2 2 3 3 15 15 5 5 5 5 5
N N N N N Y N N N N 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 10 0 0 0 0 10 20 30 90 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N Y Y N N N N Y N Y 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 10 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 80 10 10 10 90 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 5 5 5 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y N N 2 3 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 90 10 0 0 0 10 20 20 20 80 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 10 0 0 0 0 0
Y N Y N N N N Y N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 70 20 60 10 0 10 10 10 60 10 20 10 60 40 10 0 0 20 0 0 30 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 3
Y Y N N N N Y Y N Y 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 70 10 10 10 0 0 10 40 10 90 10 10 10 20 30 30 0 40 0 30 30 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 4 4 4 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 60 20 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 70 10 10 10 0 30 10 30 30 70 10 10 10 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 70 10 10 0 10 20 10 30 30 90 40 20 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0
Y N Y N N Y N Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 0 2 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 90 0 10 0 0 0 0 20 20 80 10 10 0 20 0 10 20 20 10 10 10 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N Y Y Y N N N Y N Y 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 100 0 0 0 0 10 10 50 50 100 10 0 10 80 0 0 0 90 90 0 90 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y N Y N N N Y Y N N 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 40 10 10 30 10 30 30 40 30 30 20 20 40 10 0 10 30 30 30 0 20 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 3 1 1 1 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 90 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 100 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 60 10 10 10 10 10 10 40 10 70 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 60 20 10 10 0 20 30 30 10 50 20 10 20 20 0 0 20 20 20 0 20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 40 30 10 10 10 60 50 70 70 60 40 40 40 40 0 0 40 50 60 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N Y N N 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 90 10 10 0 0 20 0 20 20 90 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 70 10 10 0 10 10 10 20 10 90 10 10 10 10 10 20 0 10 10 10 30 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 4 4 4 0 0 0 0
Y N Y N Y N Y Y N N 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 40 80 20 90 80 60 70 30 40 80 90 40 30 60 50 40 70 70 50 40 40 1 3 1 1 2 3 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Y N N N N Y Y Y N Y 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 50 10 10 20 10 10 10 40 50 50 30 10 10 10 10 40 40 40 30 10 20 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y N N 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 40 60 40 40 50 60 60 50 50 40 40 40 40 50 0 50 100 90 80 0 10 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 8 14 6 0 0 0 0
N N N N N Y N N N N 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 40 0 0 60 0 0 0 40 40 60 50 60 50 20 20 20 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 90 20 80 20 10 10 30 30 40 90 70 20 10 10 0 0 0 20 20 0 20 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 9 9 4 4 4 0 4
Y N N N N N N Y Y N 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 20 30 20 10 20 30 20 20 30 30 30 20 30 40 30 20 30 20 10 10 20 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 1 0 2 0 0
Y N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 10 10 10 10 10 10 40 40 50 30 20 10 20 0 0 10 30 20 10 10 4 4 3 2 2 0 0 15 15 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 70 10 10 0 10 30 30 20 20 80 60 30 10 20 10 20 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 80 60 70 70 70 80 90 80 80 100 100 90 100 90 100 90 90 90 90 90 90 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N N Y N N Y N Y N Y 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 2 90 30 50 10 10 0 0 20 30 90 70 20 10 40 10 10 60 60 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 50 20 10 0 20 30 10 30 30 80 40 10 0 20 10 0 30 30 10 10 10 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y N Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 40 10 20 10 20 30 10 30 30 40 20 10 30 30 10 20 10 10 10 10 10 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N N N N N 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 1 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 20 40 20 10 10 20 20 40 40 50 50 20 20 20 0 0 20 20 20 10 30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 5
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 20 30 40 50 20 10 10 10 10 80 30 30 20 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 80 70 50 40 40 40 40 30 40 40 40 40 40 30 30 30 20 20 20 10 30 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 2 4 1 20 30 40 50 10 10 10 10 10 90 30 30 20 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 2 4 1 20 30 40 50 20 10 10 10 10 80 30 30 20 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 10 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 90 20 80 100 70 80 80 80 80 90 20 20 10 50 50 50 70 70 70 20 30 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 10 20 10 5 5 0 2
N N N N N Y N Y Y N 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 60 10 20 10 0 0 0 40 40 70 30 10 20 10 0 0 0 20 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 40 30 10 10 10 50 60 40 20 50 50 50 40 50 50 40 40 50 50 40 50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 100 0 30 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 30 20 70 100 50 50 60 70 50 80 70 40 60 30 0 0 0 80 90 90 50 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 10 80 20 10 10 10 10 10 40 60 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 80 10 10 0 0 10 0 80 10 20 50 10 10 70 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 0 100 0 50 50 50 50 70 70 50 30 30 20 0 0 30 30 20 0 30 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N Y N Y Y N Y 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 80 10 10 0 0 10 0 80 10 20 50 10 10 70 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 3 2 4 3 1 70 60 50 50 60 40 30 60 50 50 60 80 70 70 60 60 70 80 90 80 60 2 2 1 2 4 2 2 4 4 1 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 10 80 80 0 10 50 80 100 100 70 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 60 40 50 30 30 40 30 70 60 40 70 40 30 30 20 70 60 60 50 70 80 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 5 10 10 5 5 5 5
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N N Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 90 0 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 90 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N Y N Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 60 10 10 10 10 50 10 50 50 60 30 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 60 10 10 10 10 50 10 60 50 60 30 20 10 10 10 10 30 10 10 10 10 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N Y N Y N N N N 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 80 10 90 0 80 50 30 80 80 30 50 20 0 30 0 10 0 10 20 20 30 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 70 20 10 0 0 20 20 30 30 70 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N Y N Y N N 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 3 90 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 80 10 5 5 0 N N 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 80 10 10 0 0 20 10 20 30 60 40 20 10 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 0
Y N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 10 10 0 0 0 0 20 10 70 20 10 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N Y N N 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 70 20 10 0 0 20 10 20 10 80 20 20 10 10 0 0 20 30 70 20 20 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N N Y N Y 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 20 80 30 10 20 20 30 10 20 80 50 10 10 0 0 20 50 10 10 30 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N Y Y N Y 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 80 10 10 0 0 0 10 20 20 80 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 10 20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y N Y 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 20 10 20 30 20 20 30 20 30 60 40 10 10 10 10 10 20 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 80 30 80 20 20 20 20 40 40 90 20 20 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 80 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 90 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N Y Y N N 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 80 20 10 10 10 20 20 30 30 70 40 30 20 10 10 10 20 20 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N Y N N Y N 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 50 70 0 80 100 80 100 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 60 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 90 0 90 10 90 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 90 20 30 40 20 10 10 30 30 80 40 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 8 8 8 0 0
Y N N N N N N Y N N 2 4 3 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 80 70 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 80 30 40 30 20 20 20 30 20 80 40 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 90 30 30 20 20 10 10 20 20 80 30 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N Y N Y 0 0 2 3 2 2 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 90 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 20 20 0 10 10 10 10 10 90 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 80 20 0 0 0 10 10 20 10 90 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N Y N N 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 0 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 90 0 10 0 0 0 0 20 10 90 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 1 100 10 90 10 0 10 10 10 10 100 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
N N Y N Y N Y Y N Y 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 90 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 80 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 100 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 10 100 20 20 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N Y Y N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 2 1 80 50 80 10 10 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 70 60 80 80 80 80 80 80 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N Y Y N N 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 90 20 50 10 10 10 20 30 50 90 30 20 20 20 20 10 10 10 0 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 0 0 0 0 30 20 20 30 100 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 80 20 20 30 10 30 10 40 60 70 20 10 10 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 90 90 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 80 10 80 20 50 70 70 70 70 100 40 40 0 90 90 80 90 90 90 100 90 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 100 90 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 80 0 10 10 0 0 10 20 40 10 30 10 10 10 10 10 20 20 10 20 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 80 0 10 10 0 0 10 20 30 10 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 10 20 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 80 0 10 10 0 0 10 20 40 10 30 10 10 10 10 10 20 20 10 20 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 0 0 0 0
N Y N N N Y Y Y N Y 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 90 30 80 10 10 70 90 70 80 80 90 80 70 80 80 70 80 80 80 80 90 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 15 15 10 5 5 5 5
Y Y N N N N N Y N N 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 20 30 10 10 30 40 30 20 10 40 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 90 10 20 10 20 10 10 20 10 90 30 10 0 50 20 20 20 50 50 10 10 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 80 80 80 80 20 70 70 70 40 80 60 50 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 50 40 60 30 30 70 70 70 40 60 70 50 30 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y N N Y Y 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 100 10 80 0 10 10 10 20 10 80 30 0 10 20 10 10 10 10 0 0 10 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 4 2 2 3 2 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 90 10 50 10 60 70 70 80 40 90 10 10 10 20 20 20 30 30 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 80 30 50 10 10 10 10 10 20 80 30 10 10 10 0 0 10 20 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y N 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 60 20 50 0 10 80 90 50 20 40 80 40 70 70 0 20 40 0 0 60 40 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 60 40 50 40 30 60 60 80 40 50 50 40 80 40 20 10 10 10 10 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 90 20 60 20 60 70 60 80 50 70 80 80 50 30 20 20 30 30 10 20 10 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 0 0 0
Y Y N N N Y N Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 80 20 30 10 20 30 20 20 80 60 60 20 0 70 60 50 40 30 0 40 30 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N Y N N Y N N 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 70 10 10 0 10 0 0 30 40 80 50 0 10 20 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 40 20 20 0 20 30 30 30 10 70 50 20 0 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 30 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 1 70 20 10 0 0 10 10 40 40 70 30 0 0 20 0 0 10 50 0 10 10 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 80 30 10 0 0 10 10 50 50 70 40 0 0 20 0 0 10 50 0 10 10 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 70 30 20 10 10 20 10 40 30 60 20 10 10 10 0 0 10 40 0 50 10 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
N Y N N Y N N Y Y N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 50 10 20 10 10 20 40 30 30 80 30 30 10 20 10 10 10 20 10 30 30 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 70 30 20 10 10 20 10 50 30 70 20 10 10 10 0 0 10 50 0 60 10 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 2 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 4 1 1 15 5 5 0 5 0 0
Y N N Y N N N Y N N 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 100 90 30 0 100 50 50 70 70 70 80 30 0 50 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 90 10 30 0 10 30 30 30 50 80 30 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N Y N N N Y Y 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 80 10 10 0 0 20 30 50 50 70 30 20 10 20 30 20 20 20 10 10 20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 4 4 3 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 20 30 10 0 0 0 60 30 80 40 10 10 20 10 0 0 20 0 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 10 10 0 0 10 30 50 10 70 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 1 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 20 10 10 40 20 30 30 10 30 30 30 30 40 30 20 30 30 20 20 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 5
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 80 10 10 0 0 60 80 40 70 90 20 40 40 0 0 20 0 10 0 0 60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 70 30 40 10 50 50 60 60 70 80 70 40 20 30 20 30 40 20 30 30 20 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 2 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 20 10 10 0 10 10 50 40 80 40 10 0 30 40 10 0 0 0 0 20 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 5 10 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N N Y N Y 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 80 20 80 40 0 0 0 30 20 80 30 10 20 0 30 10 0 10 0 10 40 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 15 0 0 0 0 1 15
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 70 30 60 10 60 70 60 70 90 10 10 10 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 70 30 60 10 30 60 50 70 70 90 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 4 4 1 4 1 50 10 10 10 20 50 60 30 10 70 50 40 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 90 10 10 10 0 50 50 60 80 80 70 70 30 70 10 10 10 10 10 40 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N Y N Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 4 4 1 4 1 50 10 10 20 10 50 60 30 10 70 50 40 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 50 10 10 10 20 50 60 30 10 70 50 40 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N Y Y Y Y N 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 70 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N Y Y N N N 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 80 70 50 50 70 70 70 70 70 80 70 10 10 10 10 30 0 30 0 20 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 60 20 20 0 0 10 10 10 10 80 90 30 20 10 0 20 20 20 0 0 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
N Y N N N N N Y N N 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 90 70 70 90 80 60 80 70 80 80 70 20 10 50 30 70 0 80 0 20 40 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N Y N Y Y Y Y 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 70 30 20 0 50 20 30 40 40 60 30 10 10 50 20 20 30 40 40 30 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 5 5 5 5 5
Y N N N N N Y Y N Y 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 70 20 10 0 0 0 10 40 50 80 10 10 0 30 10 10 40 20 20 0 50 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N Y N N 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 70 30 10 10 0 10 10 50 50 90 40 30 10 30 10 10 30 40 30 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 30 30 10 0 1 0 10
N N N N N N N Y N N 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 90 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 70 10 10 10 10 0 0 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 60 20 10 10 0 10 20 20 20 90 0 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 50 80 60 80 40 70 60 50 90 80 40 20 20 50 50 60 60 40 30 20 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 6 1 1 5 2 2
Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 60 10 10 10 10 30 60 60 40 80 50 30 10 40 10 10 30 10 10 10 10 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 4 0 0 0 0 0
N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 0 50 70 30 70 70 90 90 90 70 30 10 20 30 20 30 20 30 10 40 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 5 10 2 0 0 0 0
N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 80 10 10 0 0 0 10 20 20 70 20 10 0 10 10 0 0 20 0 10 30 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y N N 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 100 20 40 10 30 40 20 30 10 90 30 10 10 10 10 10 0 50 30 40 20 4 7 4 7 12 4 4 4 7 4 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 90 10 40 0 0 10 10 10 10 90 10 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N Y Y N Y 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 70 30 60 50 20 20 10 60 30 80 20 10 0 20 10 20 20 20 20 30 20 12 12 7 12 4 7 7 20 20 10 5 2 1 1
Y Y Y N N N Y N N N 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 80 40 30 10 0 30 0 100 80 80 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 20 10 30 20 7 4 4 7 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y N Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 100 20 50 10 10 10 30 40 40 90 80 20 10 10 10 0 0 40 40 10 10 4 4 4 4 12 7 7 4 4 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N Y Y Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 90 40 40 30 30 30 40 40 30 80 40 20 10 40 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 2 80 10 10 0 0 10 20 10 10 90 10 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 90 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 90 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 40 20 20 10 10 20 10 20 20 80 20 10 10 30 10 20 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 3 3 3 3 3
Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 60 10 10 10 10 20 10 20 10 80 70 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 60 10 10 10 10 20 10 20 10 70 50 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 4
N N N N N Y Y Y N N 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 70 10 10 10 0 20 10 30 30 60 20 20 10 30 10 10 20 20 0 30 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 5 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 70 50 50 10 10 10 0 80 80 60 40 30 10 40 10 10 10 30 20 20 30 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y N N N N 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 70 40 50 0 0 0 0 50 50 70 30 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 30 10 0 0 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 60 10 10 10 10 20 20 30 30 80 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N Y N N 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 90 60 40 10 20 60 50 80 40 50 30 30 10 0 30 20 20 10 10 40 10 7 4 12 7 7 4 4 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N Y Y Y N Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 60 10 10 10 10 20 20 30 30 70 20 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N N N Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 70 10 10 10 10 20 10 30 30 70 30 20 0 10 10 10 0 0 0 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N Y Y N 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 1 90 80 60 20 20 50 50 70 40 60 50 40 20 20 10 20 20 10 10 20 20 4 4 7 7 7 4 4 5 3 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N Y N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 60 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 80 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N N N Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 40 10 0 40 10 20 20 20 20 80 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 4 4 4 44 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N Y N Y 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 2 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 1 90 50 30 0 30 10 20 30 50 80 30 10 10 10 20 10 30 40 20 30 40 4 4 12 7 7 12 12 4 3 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N N Y Y 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 1 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 60 10 10 10 10 20 20 40 20 80 10 10 10 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 1 0
Y Y N N N N N N N Y 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 40 10 0 40 10 20 20 20 20 80 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N Y Y N Y 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 80 10 10 0 0 10 10 20 30 80 20 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 20 10 30 4 4 0 4 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50 10 10 40 40 20 10 20 30 10 0 10 0 10 10 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 0 10 0 0 10 10 10 10 80 10 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 10 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N N N N N N N N N N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 80 10 10 0 0 50 50 40 40 80 20 30 30 30 10 10 30 30 20 10 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y N N N N N N N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 70 20 70 20 20 40 40 40 30 70 50 20 10 70 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N Y Y N Y N N 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 30 20 20 0 30 50 50 50 50 50 70 30 10 30 10 10 30 30 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y N N N N N N N N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 60 60 60 60 60 70 70 70 70 70 80 80 90 80 70 70 80 80 80 70 70 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 100 10 10 10 0 0 10 10 10 90 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPENDIX G: List of ATC Radiotelephony Recorded Segments
ID DMY
FREQUENCY
MHz CHANNEL
START
hh:mm:ss
STOP
hh:mm:ss ELAPSE minutes
1 N1 050122 124.2 63 01:15:00 01:55:00 39
2 N2 050120 124.2 63 02:06:00 02:26:00 19
3 N3 050114 124.2 63 22:30:00 23:30:00 63
4 N4 050108 124.2 63 05:35:00 06:05:00 34
5 N5 050120 124.2 63 05:40:00 06:10:00 30
6 N6 050123 124.2 63_17 05:45:00 06:15:00 32
7 N7 050124 124.2 63_17 07:45:00 08:15:00 31
8 N8 050118 124.2 17 01:25:00 02:00:00 34
9 N9 050125 124.2 17 00:30:00 01:00:00 31
10 N10 050121 124.2 17 12:20:00 12:50:00 33
11 N11 050116 124.2 17 13:35:00 14:05:00 31
12 N12 050128 124.2 17 00:05:00 00:35:00 30
13 S1 050120 119.45 47 02:28:00 02:38:00 14
14 S2 050114 119.45 47 22:58:00 23:30:00 33
15 S3 050113 119.45 47 10:35:00 11:05:00 34
16 S4 050113 119.45 47 22:30:00 23:10:00 38
17 S5 050108 119.45 47 05:45:00 06:20:00 35
18 S6 050108 119.45 47 10:45:00 11:15:00 32
19 S7 050122 119.45 47_26 12:00:00 12:30:00 33
20 S8 050123 119.45 47_26 09:45:00 10:20:00 36
21 S9 050124 119.45 47_26 06:10:00 06:40:00 31
22 S10 050118 119.45 26 10:00:00 10:30:00 30
23 S11 050125 119.45 26 11:47:00 12:20:00 34
24 S12 050121 119.45 26 12:40:00 13:10:00 31
25 S13 050116 119.45 26 06:30:00 07:00:00 33
26 S14 050128 119.45 26 00:30:00 01:00:00 32
27 S15 050130 119.45 26 05:40:00 06:25:00 44
28 S16 050130 119.45 26 09:00:00 09:30:00 35
29 Y1 050120 132.8 40_48 02:58:00 03:18:00 20
30 Y2 050114 132.8 40_48 22:30:00 23:08:00 35
31 Y3 050113 132.8 40_48 22:30:00 23:00:00 30
32 Y4 050108 132.8 40_48 22:00:00 22:30:00 30
33 Y5 050120 132.8 40_48 05:07:00 05:40:00 30
34 Y6 050122 132.8 40_48 04:45:00 05:15:00 30
35 Y7 050123 132.8 40_48_3 05:00:00 05:35:00 30
36 Y8 050124 132.8 40_48_3 06:00:00 06:30:00 30
37 Y9 050118 132.8 3 21:50:00 22:20:00 30
38 Y10 050125 132.8 3 06:40:00 07:10:00 30
39 Y11 050121 132.8 3 22:30:00 23:00:00 30
40 Y12 050116 132.8 3 11:30:00 12:00:00 30
41 Y13 050128 132.8 3 06:15:00 06:45:00 30
42 Y14 050130 132.8 3 22:00:00 22:30:00 30
43 R1 050114 121.25 61 12:30:00 13:10:00 40
44 R2 050113 121.25 61 12:35:00 13:15:00 48
45 R3 050108 121.25 61 08:00:00 08:35:00 30
46 R4 050108 121.25 61 09:45:00 10:15:00 30
47 R5 050120 121.25 61 10:00:00 10:20:00 20
48 R6 050122 121.25 61 04:20:00 04:45:00 27
49 R7 050123 121.25 61_21 08:05:00 08:35:00 36
50 R8 050124 123.75 21 05:50:00 06:20:00 31
51 R9 050118 121.25 21 11:40:00 12:10:00 34
52 R10 050125 123.75 21 06:30:00 07:00:00 31
53 R11 050121 123.75 21 12:45:00 13:15:00 30
54 R12 050116 123.75 21 05:45:00 06:15:00 30
55 R13 050128 123.75 21 05:40:00 06:10:00 31
56 R14 050130 123.75 21 08:45:00 09:15:00 30
57 Q1 050120 132.6 42 06:33:00 07:13:00 11
58 Q2 050114 132.6 42_45 10:38:00 11:08:00 30
59 Q3 050113 132.6 42_45 05:55:00 06:25:00 33
60 Q4 050113 132.6 42_45 10:36:00 11:08:00 33
61 Q5 050108 132.6 42_45 10:25:00 11:00:00 36
62 Q6 050122 132.6 42_45 09:45:00 10:20:00 31
63 Q7 050123 132.6 42_45_15 10:05:00 10:40:00 32
64 Q8 050124 132.6 42_45_15 06:00:00 06:30:00 39
65 Q9 050118 132.6 15 11:45:00 12:15:00 31
66 Q10 050125 132.6 15 10:20:00 10:50:00 32
67 Q11 050121 132.6 15 12:40:00 13:10:00 30
68 Q12 050116 132.6 15 01:15:00 01:45:00 31
69 Q13 050128 132.6 15 08:30:00 09:00:00 36
70 Q14 050130 132.6 15 07:55:00 08:25:00 31
71 P1 070705 121.1 17, 9 02:17:00 02:42:00 25
72 P2 170705 121.1 17, 9 03:58:00 04:18:00 20
73 P3 170705 121.1 17, 9 06:10:00 06:30:00 20
74 P4 190705 121.1 17, 9 01:19:00 01:44:00 25
75 P5 200705 121.1 17, 9 00:16:00 00:40:00 24
76 P6 210705 121.1 17, 9 01:08:00 01:29:00 21
77 P7 210705 121.1 17, 9 05:55:00 06:20:00 25
78 P8 230705 121.1 17, 9 01:10:00 01:34:00 24
79 P9 160705 121.1 17, 9 04:01:00 04:27:00 26
80 P10 150705 121.1 17, 9 12:25:00 12:50:00 25
81 P11 240705 121.1 17, 9 04:15:00 04:35:00 21
82 M1 010605 118.0 1 00:05:00 00:25:00 20
83 M2 010605 118.0 1 01:43:00 02:06:00 23
84 M3 010605 118.0 1 03:27:00 03:47:00 20
85 M4 010605 118.0 1 06:17:00 06:37:00 20
86 M5 010605 118.0 1 07:00:00 07:20:00 20
87 M6 010605 118.0 1 08:01:00 08:21:00 20
88 M7 020605 118.0 1 08:16:00 08:37:00 21
89 M8 020605 118.0 1 09:35:00 09:55:00 20
90 M9 020605 118.0 1 07:42:00 08:02:00 20
91 M10 030605 118.0 1 04:09:00 04:29:00 20
92 J1 280705 124.7 7, 10 02:15:00 02:35:00 20
93 J2 240705 124.7 7, 10 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
94 J3 230705 124.7 7, 10 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
95 J4 270705 124.7 7, 10 02:15:00 02:35:00 20
96 J5 150705 124.7 7, 10 02:15:00 02:35:00 20
97 J6 250705 124.7 7, 10 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
98 J7 220705 124.7 7, 10 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
99 J8 080705 124.7 7, 10 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
100 J9 130705 124.7 7, 10 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
101 J10 100705 124.7 7, 10 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
102 J11 160705 124.7 7, 10 02:35:00 02:55:00 20
103 J12 050705 124.7 7, 10 07:40:00 08:00:00 20
104 G1 030805 118.1 5, 24 02:20:00 02:40:00 20
105 G2 270705 118.1 5, 24 03:12:00 03:32:00 20
106 G3 090805 118.1 5, 24 04:00:00 04:20:00 20
107 G4 190705 118.1 5, 24 04:00:00 04:20:00 20
108 G5 160705 118.1 5, 24 02:14:00 02:34:00 20
109 G6 260705 118.1 5, 24 03:05:00 03:25:00 20
110 G7 090705 118.1 5, 24 02:08:00 02:28:00 20
111 G8 080805 118.1 5, 24 02:15:00 02:35:00 20
112 G9 050805 118.1 5, 24 03:34:00 03:54:00 20
113 G10 310705 118.1 5, 24 04:30:00 04:50:00 20
114 G11 290705 118.1 5, 24 02:10:00 02:30:00 20
115 G12 040805 118.1 5, 24 02:18:00 02:38:00 20
116 G13 140705 118.1 5, 24 02:10:00 02:30:00 20
117 G14 300705 118.1 5, 24 03:30:00 03:50:00 20
118 G15 160705 118.1 5, 24 04:00:00 04:20:00 20
119 G16 280705 118.1 5, 24 03:38:00 03:58:00 20
120 G17 140805 118.1 5, 24 07:33:00 07:53:00 20
121 G18 190705 118.1 5, 24 04:20:00 04:40:00 20
122 G19 110805 118.1 5, 24 02:09:00 02:29:00 20
123 G20 060805 118.1 5, 24 02:13:00 02:33:00 20
124 G21 140805 118.1 5, 24 03:35:00 03:55:00 20
125 V1 070705 118.3 8, 39 01:35:00 01:55:00 20
126 V2 080705 118.3 8, 39 02:01:00 02:21:00 20
127 V3 160705 118.3 8, 39 04:09:00 04:29:00 20
128 V4 110705 118.3 8, 39 03:54:00 04:14:00 20
129 V5 260705 118.3 8, 39 03:01:00 03:21:00 20
130 V6 160705 118.3 8, 39 01:30:00 01:50:00 20
131 V7 210805 118.3 8, 39 03:10:00 03:30:00 20
132 V8 010705 118.3 8, 39 02:01:00 02:21:00 20
133 V9 220705 118.3 8, 39 02:02:00 02:22:00 20
134 V10 030805 118.3 8, 39 03:25:00 03:45:00 20
135 V11 130805 118.3 8, 39 01:56:00 02:16:00 20
136 V12 150705 118.3 8, 39 02:05:00 02:25:00 20
137 V13 030705 118.3 8, 39 03:19:00 03:39:00 20
138 V14 150705 118.3 8, 39 03:23:00 03:43:00 20
139 V15 070805 118.3 8, 39 04:10:00 04:30:00 20
140 V16 040705 118.3 8, 39 02:14:00 02:34:00 20
141 V17 100805 118.3 8, 39 01:12:00 02:32:00 20
142 V18 240705 118.3 8, 39 03:39:00 03:59:00 20
143 V19 040805 118.3 8, 39 02:18:00 02:38:00 20
144 V20 190805 118.3 8, 39 02:02:00 02:22:00 20
145 V21 260705 118.3 8, 39 04:05:00 04:25:00 20
146 V22 080705 118.3 8, 39 03:15:00 03:35:00 20
147 V23 070705 118.3 8, 39 02:41:00 03:01:00 20
148 V24 050705 118.3 8, 39 02:12:00 02:32:00 20
149 V25 060805 118.3 8, 39 01:29:00 01:49:00 20
150 V26 100805 118.3 8, 39 01:04:00 01:24:00 20
151 V27 030705 118.3 8, 39 03:43:00 04:03:00 20
152 V28 120705 118.3 8, 39 04:07:00 04:27:00 20
153 V29 310705 118.3 8, 39 03:26:00 03:46:00 20
154 V30 020705 118.3 8, 39 03:10:00 03:30:00 20
155 V31 040805 118.3 8, 39 03:40:00 04:00:00 20
156 K1 020705 QAL Auto 06:30:00 06:50:00 20
157 K2 100805 DEP Auto 07:31:00 07:51:00 20
158 K3 160805 QAL Auto 08:30:00 08:50:00 20
159 K4 030805 DEP Auto 05:40:00 06:00:00 20
160 K5 030705 QAL Auto 05:32:00 05:52:00 20
161 K6 040805 QAL Auto 06:37:00 06:57:00 20
162 K7 170805 QAL Auto 10:23:00 10:43:00 20
163 K8 160805 QAL Auto 04:38:00 04:58:00 20
164 K9 170805 QAL Auto 06:32:00 06:52:00 20
165 K10 020705 DEP Auto 01:47:00 02:07:00 20
166 K11 030705 DEP Auto 05:39:00 05:59:00 20
167 K12 110805 DEP Auto 07:52:00 08:12:00 20
168 K13 090805 DEP Auto 06:43:00 07:03:00 20
169 K14 170805 DEP Auto 10:12:00 10:32:00 20
170 K15 090805 QAL Auto 05:00:00 05:20:00 20
171 K16 170805 DEP Auto 00:15:00 00:35:00 20
172 K17 030805 QAL Auto 03:57:00 04:17:00 20
173 K18 110805 QAL Auto 12:55:00 13:15:00 20
174 K19 030705 DEP Auto 02:03:00 02:23:00 20
175 K20 020705 QAL Auto 05:32:00 05:52:00 20
176 K21 020705 DEP Auto 07:00:00 07:20:00 20
177 K22 180805 QAL Auto 00:30:00 00:50:00 20
178 K23 150805 QAL Auto 08:04:00 08:24:00 20
179 K24 030805 DEP Auto 07:23:00 07:43:00 20
180 K25 090805 QAL Auto 06:40:00 07:00:00 20
181 K26 040805 DEP Auto 06:49:00 07:09:00 20
182 K27 150805 DEP Auto 07:29:00 07:49:00 20
183 K28 160805 QAL Auto 00:28:00 00:48:00 20
184 K29 150805 QAL Auto 09:45:00 10:05:00 20
185 K30 020705 DEP Auto 05:47:00 06:07:00 20
186 K31 150805 QAL Auto 13:24:00 13:44:00 20
187 K32 180805 QAL Auto 13:03:00 13:23:00 20
188 K33 090805 DEP Auto 00:21:00 00:41:00 20
189 K34 160805 DEP Auto 00:14:00 00:34:00 20
190 K35 020705 DEP Auto 00:27:00 00:47:00 20
191 K36 020805 DEP Auto 06:42:00 07:02:00 20
192 K37 180805 QAL Auto 08:27:00 08:47:00 20
APPENDIX H: SPEECH ACTS AND AVIATION TOPICS CODES
SPEECH ACTS CODE AVIATION TOPIC CODE Remarks
1 Addressee / Address 1 Speaker identification Sid Callsign of unit transmitting message
2 Receiver identification Rid Callsign of unit message intended for
2
Instructions / Clearance -
Readback / Acknowledgement I
3
Advisory / Remark - Readback /
Acknowledgement A
4
Request - Readback /
Acknowledgement R
1 altitude / level alt flight level or altitude in feet
2 approach app flight operations towards runway / for landing
3 circuit cct related to circuit eg downwind, touch and go
4 communications com frequency or unit
5 flight details fld registration/ persons on board/ fuel endurance /aircraft type
6 general gen eg. Copied, roger, okay, wilco, go ahead
7 heading hdg turn direction or fly a heading
8 holding hol orbit or hold at position
9 landing ldg specific for 'cleared to land' instructions
10 repeat/ verify ver say again', confirm …
11 restriction rst time/ altitude
12 route / position rpo track direct / join airways / via route or fix
13 speed spd specific speed or general (eg. slow down, best speed)
14 start stt engine startup
15 takeoff tof specific for 'cleared for takeoff' instructions
16 traffic tfc information on conflicting traffic
17 transponder sqk assign(ed) transponder code
18 visual / sighting vis reporting visual (terrain / traffic)
19 weather info wxi QNH / wind/ visibility/ turbulence
5 Courtesy C 1 Apology apo eg. sorry
2 Greetings grt eg. Good morning, maam, sir
3 Thank you tq eg. Thanks, appreciate that.
6 Non-codable remarks N 1 delivery dlv simultaneous/ interrupted transmission
2 equipment eqp interference, noise, failures
3 other otr other than defined topics
APPENDIX I: ENCODING VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIONS
Col Variable Names Value Description Explanation
A LINENUM (number) (transmissions in sequence)
B FAC_ID ATC Unit
A Air Traffic Control Centre
K KLIA
M MELAKA
P PENANG
J JOHOR BHARU
V KOTA KINABALU
G KUCHING
C SEC_ID Working Position
N APPROACH NORTH
S APPROACH SOUTH
Y SECTOR 1 RADAR
R SECTOR 2 RADAR
Q SECTOR 3 RADAR
T TOWER
D SAMP_ID (number) Sample ID (recording segments)
E ST_MIN mm Transmission start time (minutes)
F ST_SEC ss Transmission start time (seconds)
G END_MIN mm Transmission end time (minutes)
H END_SEC ss Transmission end time (seconds)
I TX_TIME (number) Total time (seconds) to transmit the message TOT_WD / TOT_SEC = SPEECH RATE
J LPS_TIME (number) transmission-free time before next transmission
was made
Will be used to calculate transmission free time (no
communications taskload?)
K SID (callsign) Speaker of the transmission
L RID (callsign) Receiver of the transmission
M MESSAGE Radio transmission by ATC or pilot
N - U T1 - T8 Aviation Topics within the Speech Act
categories
Use Topic identifiers as listed, entered in the order that they
appear in the transmission
V TOT_TPC (number) Total number of Aviation Topics in message
W TOT_INS Total number of instructions in message
X TOT_ADV Total number of advisories in message
Y TOT_WDS (number) Total number of words in message TOT_WD / TOT_SEC = SPEECH RATE
Z TOT_NUM (number) count of numbers used in message
AA WDS_SID (number) count of words used for speaker identity
AB WDS_RID (number) count of words used for receiver identity
AC WDS_INST (number) count of words used for instruction
AD WDS_ADV (number) count of words used for advisory
AE WDS_REQ (number) count of words used for requests
AF WDS_CTSY (number) count of words used for courtesy
1 AG ATC_CLSGN callsign use by ATC or pilot
or 1 Complete callsign or permitted abbreviation No error
2 AH P_CLSGN 2 Partial callsign just numbers without prefix or non-standard abbreviation
3 Omission of callsign No callsign used
7 Error - transposition of numbers MALAYSIAN 2625 instead of MALAYSIAN 2526
8 Error - substitution of numbers EXPRESS 213 instead of EXPRESS 203
9 Incorrect number pronunciation MALAYSIAN 'SIXTY NINE' instead of 'SIX NINER'
3 AI CLSGN_MISCOM
Miscommunication arising from callsign
discrepancies
1 wrong aircraft responded to ATC
2 ATC responded to wrong aircraft. (or addressed acft by wrong callsign)
3 Pilot calling ATC by other unit's name
4 AJ CLSGN_VER
Request / verification of intended receiver or
speaker
1 Pilot request to verify intended receiver Was that for MERPATI 203?'
2 ATC request to verify speaker Confirm MALAYSIAN 12?' or Station calling say again'
3 Response error corrected / verified That was for SINGAPORE 112'
4 Response error not corrected / verified
5 AK P_IC_INFO Information provided by pilot on initial
contact transmission
Key info expected : callsign, position, altitude, route
1 Complete report All key information provided
2 Partial report omission of any key information.
3 None only callsign
6 AL P_REQ_RPT Pilot's request repeat of message
1 Whole transmission say again' or similar expression.
2 Partially say all after …'
7 AM ATC_INST_ALT ATC Instruction (ALTITUDE) keywords are 'maintain/descend/climb', correct numbering of
altitude or flight level and the word 'flight level / feet'
1 Complete instruction use all keywords
2 partial instruction omission of any keywords
9 Incorrect number pronunciation descend 'six five' instead of 'six thousand five hundred'
8 AN P_RDBK_ALT Pilot's readback of altitude assignment keywords: flight level / feet and numerals
1 Complete Readback Readback of instruction with keywords
2 Partial readback Ommision of any keyword
3 No readback of altitude other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query altitude assignment
9 AO RDBK_ERR_ALT Readback error type (altitude)
6 Confusion with numbers of another type ofinformation readback altitude instruction as heading or speed
7 Transposition of numbers three one zero' instead of 'one three zero'
8 Substitution of numbers
two thousand five hundred' instead of 'three thousand five
hundred'
9 Incorrect number pronunciation eg. Climb 'two-fifty' instead of 'two five zero'
10 AP ATC_INST_ALTRES ATC Instruction (ALTITUDE RESTRICTION) Keywords: maintain/ cross/ at/ above/ below, point/ fix/ time and
digits of altitude. May be phrased as 'not below STAR-
steps/profile'. 'Expedite' is not a restriction.
1 Complete instruction with required keywords.
2 Partial instruction omission of keywords, or usage of 'best / good rate'
11 AQ P_RDBK_ALTRES Pilot's readback of altitude restriction time/point, altitude/flight level/feet
1 Complete readback Complete readback of restrictions' key information
2 Partial readback omission of key information.
3 No readback of restriction other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query altitude restrictions
12
AR RDBK_ERR_ALTRES
Readback error type (altitude restrictions)
6 Confusion with another type of restriction/
information
7 Transposition of numbers/ restrictions
8 Substitution of numbers/ restrictions
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
13 AS ATC_INST_APP ATC Instruction (APPROACH CLEARANCE) Keywords: 'cleared', 'approach type / name', 'runway number
(left/right/centre).
1 Complete clearance use all keywords
2 partial clearance omission of any keyword
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
14 AT P_RDBK_APP Pilot's readback of Approach Clearance
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback omission of approach type or runway number
3 No readback of approach clearance other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query approach clearance
15
AU RDBK_ERR_APP
readback error type (approach clearance)
6 Confusion with numbers of another type of
information
7 error in runway assignment
8 error in approach type
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
16
AV ATC_INST_COM
ATC Instruction (COMMUNICATION)
Keywords: 'contact', 'decimal', contact location / facility and at
least 3 frequency digits (2 before and 1 after decimal)
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2
Partial instruction incomplete frequency digits or omission of keywords or facility.
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
17
AW P_RDBK_COM
Pilot's readback of Frequency instruction
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback omission of facility/ contact location or frequency digits
3
No readback of communications instruction other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query frequency
18 AX RDBK_ERR_COM readback error type (frequency)
6 Confusion with numbers of another type of
information
7 error in facility callsign
8 error in frequency to contact
9 Incorrect number pronunciation eg. 'one-eighteen five' (1185)
19
AY ATC_INST_HDG
ATC Instruction (HEADING) Keywords: Turn direction/fly, heading, numbers, degrees.
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2 Partial instruction omission of keywords.
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
20 AZ P_RDBK_HDG Pilot's readback of heading instruction turn direction or fly, numerals, degrees
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback omission of key info.
3 No readback of heading other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query heading instructions
21 BA RDBK_ERR_HDG Readback error type (heading)
6 Confusion with numbers of another type of
information
7 Transposition of numbers
8 Substitution of numbers or direction
9 Incorrect number pronunciation eg. Heading ‘two fifty’
22 BB ATC_INST_HOL ATC Instruction (HOLDING) Keywords: direction (left/righthand), fix/place
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2 Partial instruction omission of keywords.
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
23 BC P_RDBK_HOL Pilot’s readback of holding instruction turn direction or fly, numerals, degrees
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback omission of key info.
3 No readback of holding other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query holding instructions
24 BD RDBK_ERR_HOL Readback error type (holding)
6 Confusion with another type of information
7 error in fix / place
8 error in holding direction
9 Incorrect number pronunciation eg. ‘nine’ instead of ‘niner’
25 BE ATC_INST_LDG ATC Instruction (LANDING) Keywords: ‘clear to land’, runway assignment
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2 Partial instruction omission of keywords
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
26 BF P_RDBK_LDG Pilot’s readback of landing instruction
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback omission of key info.
3 No readback of landing clearance other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query landing instructions
27 BG RDBK_ERR_LDG Readback error type (landing)
6 Confusion with another type of information
7 Transposition of numbers eg. Runway 'two three' instead of 'three two'
8 Substitution of numbers or direction eg. 'left' runway instead of 'right'
9 Incorrect number pronunciation eg. runway 'ten' instead of 'one zero'
28 BH ATC_INST_RPO ATC Instruction (ROUTE/ POSITION) Keywords: 'direct' / 'intercept' / 'join', the airway number /
SID/STAR name / fix/taxiway or runway designation for a
localisor intercept.
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2 Partial instruction omission of keyword or route/fix name / number
29
BI P_RDBK_RPO Pilot's readback of Route/ Position
Instruction
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback Omission of route/fix name/number
3 no readback of route or position other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query route
30 BJ RDBK_ERR_RPO readback error type (route/ position)
6 Confusion with another type of information
7 track/ route error
8 position error
9 incorrect number pronunciation
31 BK ATC_INST_SPD ATC Instruction (SPEED) keywords: 'speed', '3 digit numerals' and knots or as Mach
point/ decimal and 2 digit numerals
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2 Partial instruction Omission of any keywords.
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
32 BL P_RDBK_SPD Pilot's readback of speed instruction
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback Omission of any keywords.
3 No readback of speed other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query speed assignment
33 BM RDBK_ERR_SPD Readback error type (speed)
6 Number confusion with another type of
information
7 transposition of numbers
8 substitution of numbers
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
34 BN ATC_INST_SQK ATC Instruction (TRANSPONDER) Keywords: 'squawk' and 4 digits numerals
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2 Partial instruction omission of keyword 'squawk'
35 BO P_RDBK_SQK Pilot's readback of Transponder code
1 Complete readback Complete readback of keyword and 4 digits of code
2 Partial readback Omission of keyword or readback of less than 4 digits..
3 No readback of transponder code other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat/query transponder code
36 BP RDBK_ERR_SQK readback error type (transponder)
6 Confusion with numbers of another type of
information
7 transposition of numbers
8 substitution of numbers
9 incorrect number pronunciation eg. Twenty-one fifty-five (2155)
37 BQ ATC_INST_TOF ATC Instruction (TAKEOFF) Keywords: runway assignment, 'clear for takeoff'
1 Complete Instruction use all keywords
2 Partial instruction omission of any keywords
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
38 BR P_RDBK_TOF Pilot's readback of takeoff instruction
1 Complete readback Readback with all keywords
2 Partial readback omission of keywords.
3 No readback of takeoff other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat / query takeoff instructions
39 BS RDBK_ERR_TOF Readback error type (takeoff)
6 Confusion with other type of information
7 Transposition of numbers
8 Substitution of numbers or direction
9 Incorrect number pronunciation
40 BT ATC_ADV_WXI ATC Advisory (ALTIMETER SETTING) Keywords:'altimeter' / QNH / QFE and the digits
1 Complete advisory includes all keyword
2 partial advisory omission of any keyword
41 BU P_RDBK_WXI Pilot's readback of Altimeter setting
1 Complete readback Readback with keyword and digits
2 partial readback Omission of QNH digits
3 No readback of altimeter setting other general acknowledgement or courtesy
4 Request repeat / verification Pilot request repeat/query altimeter setting
42 BV RDBK_ERR_WXI readback error type (altimeter setting)
6 Confusion with numbers of another type of
information
7 transposition of numbers
8 substitution of numbers
9 incorrect number pronunciation eg. Ten-eleven (1011)
43 BW ATC_ADV_TFC ATC Advisory (TRAFFIC) Keywords: 'traffic', position, direction-bound, altitude.
1 Complete Advisory all keywords
2 Partial Advisory
44 BX ATC_COR_ERR ATC correction of Readback Error
1 Altitude assignment
2 Heading assignment
3 Communications frequency or station
4 Altimeter Setting
5 Route / position
6 Speed
45
BY HRBK_ERR ATC Hearback error type (no response to
readback error in)
1 Altitude assignment
2 Heading assignment
3 Communications frequency or station
4 Altimeter Setting
5 Route / position
6 Speed
46 BZ XS_VRBGE Any excessive verbiage in transmission usage of unnecessary words/phrases
1 Controller
2 pilot
47
CA DYSFL
DYSFLUENCIES lapses / word fillers / meaningless hesitations (er.., uhm, ah..)
1 Controller
2 pilot
CB COMMENTS additional info about message
APPENDIX J: TAR TRAFFIC LISTS AND PATTERNS
Ref Aircraft Contact Duration Transfer Traffic Epoch Contact CT / acft
N1 AXM 335 0:00:02 0:00:05 0:00:07
MAS 1332 0:00:02 0:00:10 0:00:12
GIA 857 0:00:02 0:00:31 0:00:33
TSE603 0:01:14 0:03:02 0:04:16
MAS 711 0:01:37 0:05:39 0:07:16
MAS 352 0:03:55 0:04:12 0:08:07
GIA 818 0:05:10 0:02:46 0:07:56
MAS 750 0:08:15 0:03:45 0:12:00
MAS 702 0:10:19 0:02:01 0:12:20
MAS 1268 0:12:44 0:04:27 0:17:11
JAL 6660 0:14:42 0:05:11 0:19:53
MAS 1139 0:16:47 0:09:03 0:25:50
MAS 72 0:17:40 0:02:32 0:20:12
MAS 1138 0:20:14 0:03:50 0:24:04
ALK 316 0:25:26 0:02:48 0:28:14
MAS 135 0:26:34 0:06:14 0:32:48
BVT 188 0:28:52 0:09:58 0:38:50
MAS 1203 0:29:23 0:08:53 0:38:16
MAS 388 0:29:38 0:03:18 0:32:56
IAC 956 0:32:08 0:06:42 0:38:50
MAS 151 0:33:26 0:05:24 0:38:50
MAS 376 0:36:14 0:02:36 0:38:50 22 00:38:50 01:33:07 0:04:14
N2 MAS 715 0:00:01 0:05:44 0:05:45
MAS 125 0:00:01 0:05:12 0:05:13
MAS 1385 0:01:16 0:06:11 0:07:27
AXM 102 0:03:44 0:06:31 0:10:15
MAS 151 0:04:05 0:04:58 0:09:03
BVT 188 0:00:01 0:12:21 0:12:22
IAC 956 0:06:12 0:03:02 0:09:14
MAS 708 0:08:34 0:04:44 0:13:18
AXM 912 0:10:52 0:04:36 0:15:28
MAS 141 0:13:18 0:06:10 0:19:28
MAS 784 0:16:07 0:03:21 0:19:28 11 00:19:28 01:02:50 0:05:43
N3 MAS 5 0:02:12 0:02:24 0:04:36
MAS 193 0:07:21 0:10:40 0:18:01
MAS 91 0:10:23 0:11:49 0:22:12
MAS 31 0:12:52 0:12:26 0:25:18
UPS 6912 0:14:09 0:05:40 0:19:49
MAS 3 0:20:40 0:08:19 0:28:59
MAS 157 0:23:19 0:07:34 0:30:53
MAS 9 0:32:43 0:05:56 0:38:39
MAS 1427 0:37:16 0:07:58 0:45:14
N550TM 0:39:18 0:07:48 0:47:06
LNI 283 0:40:25 0:04:41 0:45:06
KAL 367 0:43:56 0:06:10 0:50:06
AUA 1 0:46:06 0:06:33 0:52:39
MAS 191 0:46:20 0:09:27 0:55:47
MAS 1133 0:42:36 0:10:19 0:52:55
MAS 2604 0:49:31 0:04:39 0:54:10
AXM 334 0:51:55 0:04:14 0:56:09
Traffic N1
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
Traffic N3
0:00:00 0:14:24 0:28:48 0:43:12 0:57:36 1:12:00
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
AXM 312 0:54:55 0:02:33 0:57:28
MNA 831 0:59:37 0:03:50 1:03:27
AXM 346 1:01:51 0:01:36 1:03:27 20 01:01:15 02:14:36 0:06:44
N4 MAS 751 0:00:05 0:04:17 0:04:22
UAE 346 0:01:06 0:01:06 0:02:12
MAS 1447 0:01:28 0:05:02 0:06:30
MAS 758 0:03:27 0:04:18 0:07:45
MAS 861 0:04:01 0:01:19 0:05:20
THA 416 0:06:00 0:03:29 0:09:29
POT 425 0:06:31 0:08:41 0:15:12
RMF 591A 0:09:53 0:08:47 0:18:40
MAS 2564 0:10:15 0:05:58 0:16:13
BVT 185 0:13:33 0:09:22 0:22:55
MAS 1145 0:14:28 0:04:45 0:19:13
RMF 591B 0:15:33 0:07:20 0:22:53
MAS 721 0:18:13 0:03:48 0:22:01
MAS 1208 0:22:01 0:04:01 0:26:02
MAS 755 0:24:44 0:04:01 0:28:45
HVN 759 0:30:55 0:03:25 0:34:20
GIA 851 0:32:57 0:01:23 0:34:20 17 00:34:20 01:21:02 0:04:46
N5 MAS 5200 0:00:02 0:03:30 0:03:32
THA 416 0:00:16 0:04:33 0:04:49
BVT 185 0:02:43 0:14:47 0:17:30
AXM 272 0:03:50 0:04:47 0:08:37
MAS 1145 0:07:48 0:09:30 0:17:18
MAS 6184 0:10:37 0:04:47 0:15:24
MAS 721 0:14:44 0:04:08 0:18:52
AXM 882 0:19:56 0:04:08 0:24:04
HVN 759 0:22:23 0:04:59 0:27:22
MAS 1208 0:22:43 0:04:25 0:27:08
BAW 3453 0:24:11 0:01:54 0:26:05
MAS 1638 0:24:53 0:03:26 0:28:19 12 00:28:19 01:04:54 0:05:25
N6 BVT 185 0:00:04 0:06:14 0:06:18
MAS 758 0:00:20 0:04:23 0:04:43
ALK 312 0:00:04 0:00:37 0:00:41
MAS 2564 0:00:04 0:02:32 0:02:36
MAS 1146 0:05:19 0:03:40 0:08:59
MAS 721 0:07:40 0:05:29 0:13:09
MAS 2526 0:11:02 0:03:13 0:14:15
AXM 954 0:13:18 0:05:18 0:18:36
IYE 862 0:15:17 0:04:44 0:20:01
MAS 1208 0:15:39 0:03:11 0:18:50
AXM 882 0:18:02 0:04:32 0:22:34
GFA 286 0:24:58 0:02:45 0:27:43
CAL 678 0:28:04 0:04:13 0:32:17 13 00:32:17 00:50:51 0:03:55
Traffic N4
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00 0:43:12
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
N7 MAS 7 0:00:09 0:05:03 0:05:12
MAS 782 0:00:09 0:05:41 0:05:50
HVN 758 0:00:09 0:03:40 0:03:49
MAS 11 0:03:25 0:06:11 0:09:36
MAS 94 0:03:59 0:04:23 0:08:22
AXM 256 0:07:11 0:03:56 0:11:07
EVA 228 0:09:13 0:03:14 0:12:27
MAS 1209 0:11:58 0:11:39 0:23:37
RBA 874 0:14:16 0:03:20 0:17:36
MAS 1149 0:15:12 0:10:38 0:25:50
MAS 741 0:16:20 0:11:25 0:27:45
RMF 557 0:17:22 0:11:05 0:28:27
SINTA 210 0:18:12 0:12:37 0:30:49
AXM 208 0:18:36 0:04:30 0:23:06
MAS 1276 0:21:19 0:03:24 0:24:43
AXM 314 0:25:24 0:03:11 0:28:35
MAS 605 0:26:59 0:03:38 0:30:37 17 00:30:49 01:47:35 0:06:20
N8 KEN 736 0:00:00 0:00:13 0:00:13
MAS 750 0:00:00 0:02:12 0:02:12
NCA 242 0:00:00 0:03:52 0:03:52
MAS 711 0:00:00 0:04:13 0:04:13
MAS 1321 0:00:55 0:01:23 0:02:18
9MKNS 0:01:33 0:06:17 0:07:50
MAS 1138 0:02:18 0:03:50 0:06:08
MAS 72 0:04:19 0:05:31 0:09:50
MAS 5411 0:05:16 0:07:01 0:12:17
TSE 54 0:07:53 0:13:23 0:21:16
MAS 1268 0:11:03 0:04:09 0:15:12
MAS 754 0:13:15 0:04:32 0:17:47
AXM 347 0:14:22 0:06:40 0:21:02
MAS 871 0:15:24 0:06:38 0:22:02
MAS 1139 0:16:18 0:07:32 0:23:50
MAS 388 0:18:31 0:06:44 0:25:15
IAC 956 0:21:18 0:03:20 0:24:38
BVT 188 0:21:37 0:11:41 0:33:18
AXM 321 0:23:11 0:03:28 0:26:39
MAS 376 0:27:40 0:05:32 0:33:12
BBG 088 0:30:09 0:03:25 0:33:34
MAS 125 0:32:41 0:00:53 0:33:34 22 00:33:34 1:52:29 0:05:07
N9 RMF 524 0:00:07 0:00:08 0:00:15
MAS 1384 0:00:17 0:03:20 0:03:37
MAS 1137 0:00:07 0:04:24 0:04:31
AXM 942 0:00:07 0:00:53 0:01:00
MAS 601 0:00:07 0:03:02 0:03:09
CPA 720 0:00:07 0:01:54 0:02:01
MAS 2712 0:03:14 0:03:54 0:07:08
MAS 5 0:05:21 0:04:37 0:09:58
CSN 366 0:08:38 0:03:34 0:12:12
UZB 551 0:10:17 0:06:38 0:16:55
SIA 103 0:11:26 0:05:15 0:16:41
AXM 313 0:14:43 0:06:23 0:21:06
MAS 1432 0:15:01 0:04:28 0:19:29
Traffic N8
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
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Traffic N9
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
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Traffic N7
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
A
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THA 420 0:17:23 0:03:16 0:20:39
CAL 652 0:20:05 0:03:26 0:23:31
MAS 2612 0:23:35 0:02:36 0:26:11
JAL 6660 0:25:47 0:02:40 0:28:27
AXM 936 0:28:33 0:01:31 0:30:04 18 00:30:04 1:01:59 0:03:27
N10 TSE 604 0:00:40 0:00:11 0:00:51
MAS 1456 0:00:54 0:02:40 0:03:34
9MSSN 0:00:40 0:09:29 0:10:09
MAS 2624 0:00:40 0:02:06 0:02:46
MAS 1338 0:02:53 0:03:50 0:06:43
AXM 50 0:05:41 0:03:33 0:09:14
MAS 1268 0:07:35 0:04:18 0:11:53
THA 418 0:09:23 0:05:50 0:15:13
MAS 1163 0:11:31 0:07:09 0:18:40
AXM 253 0:13:53 0:06:27 0:20:20
MAS 1405 0:15:33 0:05:58 0:21:31
MAS 2598 0:16:48 0:04:56 0:21:44
AXM 210 0:19:22 0:04:04 0:23:26
AXM 358 0:23:25 0:02:21 0:25:46
MAS 2532 0:29:09 0:04:23 0:33:32 15 0:33:32 1:07:15 0:04:29
N11 MAS 1133 0:01:21 0:00:14 0:01:35
JAL 722 0:01:36 0:05:02 0:06:38
MAS 1063 0:04:12 0:05:25 0:09:37
MAS 131 0:08:03 0:05:33 0:13:36
MAS 2626 0:11:58 0:03:58 0:15:56
MAS 2532 0:14:43 0:07:01 0:21:44
SIA 119 0:19:01 0:05:26 0:24:27
MAS 1471 0:20:13 0:05:12 0:25:25
MAS 1165 0:20:32 0:07:02 0:27:34
MAS 1292 0:29:53 0:00:53 0:30:46
AXM 316 0:27:00 0:03:46 0:30:46 11 0:29:25 0:49:32 0:04:30
N12 MAS 161 0:03:40 0:17:59 0:21:39
IAC 955 0:04:04 0:20:00 0:24:04
TSE 326 0:10:53 0:07:56 0:18:49
9MAAF 0:12:10 0:18:00 0:30:10
RMF 570 0:13:09 0:13:09 0:26:18
MAS 1137 0:16:10 0:10:25 0:26:35
MAS 2551 0:18:23 0:10:54 0:29:17
MAS 2525 0:18:58 0:11:12 0:30:10
CPA 720 0:24:56 0:05:14 0:30:10
MAS 6185 0:29:49 0:00:21 0:30:10 10 0:27:10 1:55:10 0:11:31
S1 AXM 943 0:00:04 0:07:22 0:07:26
MAS 2603 0:00:04 0:02:15 0:02:19
MAS 2711 0:00:04 0:09:16 0:09:20
AXM 201 0:08:30 0:03:32 0:12:02 4 0:12:02 0:22:25 0:05:36
S2 FDX 5193 0:00:05 0:05:11 0:05:16
UPS 6912 0:00:05 0:02:30 0:02:35
JAL 6669 0:00:54 0:09:50 0:10:44
MAS 3 0:04:53 0:06:19 0:11:12
SIA 102 0:05:16 0:11:28 0:16:44
MAS 157 0:06:38 0:08:25 0:15:03
MAS2547 0:07:04 0:12:00 0:19:04
MAS 1034 0:14:04 0:08:37 0:22:41
MAS 9 0:14:20 0:07:15 0:21:35
MAS 1427 0:20:56 0:06:08 0:27:04
MAS 1133 0:28:33 0:04:08 0:32:41
MAS 602 0:29:36 0:03:05 0:32:41
MAS 191 0:31:30 0:01:11 0:32:41 13 0:32:41 1:26:07 0:06:37
S3 TSE 53 0:01:38 0:03:20 0:04:58
CPA 721 0:01:38 0:05:52 0:07:30
MAS 753 0:02:14 0:06:21 0:08:35
MAS 720 0:03:46 0:08:55 0:12:41
MAS 377 0:05:28 0:09:31 0:14:59
THA 417 0:07:42 0:09:55 0:17:37
MAS 6123 0:09:53 0:10:19 0:20:12
MAS 7 0:15:25 0:06:51 0:22:16
MAS 759 0:15:40 0:07:47 0:23:27
MNA 930 0:16:26 0:12:05 0:28:31
MAS 2705 0:22:17 0:11:07 0:33:24
BBG 082 0:22:37 0:09:05 0:31:42
MAS 1058 0:24:10 0:09:14 0:33:24
QTA 352 0:29:36 0:03:48 0:33:24
MAS 130 0:31:58 0:01:26 0:33:24 15 0:31:46 1:55:36 0:07:42
S4 MAS 23 0:00:36 0:10:09 0:10:45
MAS 202 0:00:36 0:02:28 0:03:04
AUS 1 0:00:36 0:03:39 0:04:15
MAS 3 0:08:43 0:12:36 0:21:19
FDX 19 0:14:59 0:10:52 0:25:51
MAS 179 0:22:04 0:15:21 0:37:25
JAL 6669 0:24:29 0:12:17 0:36:46
UPS 6912 0:28:31 0:10:07 0:38:38
MAS 2637 0:36:17 0:02:21 0:38:38
LNI 283 0:36:46 0:01:52 0:38:38
SIA 102 0:37:28 0:01:10 0:38:38
GADING 01 0:38:00 0:00:38 0:38:38 12 0:38:38 1:23:30 0:06:57
S5 MAS 1447 0:00:07 0:04:10 0:04:17
MAS 751 0:00:07 0:02:12 0:02:19
MAS 861 0:00:07 0:01:47 0:01:54
HLR 717 0:02:20 0:14:42 0:17:02
MAS 710 0:02:42 0:09:17 0:11:59
POT 425 0:04:25 0:11:59 0:16:24
MAS 2515 0:08:37 0:12:41 0:21:18
MAS 1145 0:09:08 0:11:40 0:20:48
MAS 755 0:18:07 0:08:08 0:26:15
AXM 203 0:20:05 0:10:43 0:30:48
HVN 759 0:23:41 0:10:00 0:33:41
EVA 227 0:25:10 0:09:51 0:35:01
RBA 873 0:29:05 0:05:56 0:35:01
MAS 870 0:32:01 0:03:00 0:35:01 14 0:35:00 1:56:06 0:08:18
Traffic S3
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
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Traffic S5
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
S6 MAS 377 0:00:04 0:08:45 0:08:49
THA 417 0:02:24 0:04:40 0:07:04
MAS 1058 0:07:42 0:11:13 0:18:55
MAS 65 0:10:13 0:11:10 0:21:23
MNI 930 0:12:19 0:11:50 0:24:09
AXM 209 0:15:06 0:12:49 0:27:55
MAS 2529 0:16:18 0:13:26 0:29:44
MAS 391 0:13:42 0:12:02 0:25:44
AXM 105 0:19:59 0:11:54 0:31:53
MAS 1459 0:27:59 0:03:54 0:31:53
AXM 349 0:31:24 0:00:29 0:31:53 11 0:31:53 1:42:12 0:09:17
S7 MAS 783 0:00:07 0:04:17 0:04:24
JAL 721 0:00:07 0:06:09 0:06:16
MAS 705 0:00:07 0:00:20 0:00:27
MAS 703 0:00:31 0:10:49 0:11:20
MAS 1289 0:00:07 0:03:07 0:03:14
AXM 163 0:00:07 0:11:01 0:11:08
AXM 305 0:04:11 0:07:47 0:11:58
CAL 651 0:00:07 0:17:43 0:17:50
AXM 349 0:07:09 0:07:46 0:14:55
MAS 065 0:10:14 0:12:12 0:22:26
MAS 753 0:15:45 0:08:59 0:24:44
MAS 72 0:20:35 0:09:00 0:29:35
MAS 1405 0:24:20 0:07:14 0:31:34
SIA 118 0:28:33 0:04:40 0:33:13
UPS 6911 0:30:00 0:03:13 0:33:13 15 0:33:13 1:54:17 0:07:37
S8 MAS 753 0:00:37 0:07:43 0:08:20
AXM 315 0:00:37 0:04:06 0:04:43
SIA 116 0:00:37 0:02:18 0:02:55
MAS 73 0:03:51 0:15:31 0:19:22
MAS 353 0:04:09 0:05:46 0:09:55
MAS 1 0:06:36 0:06:30 0:13:06
MAS 1157 0:09:30 0:07:37 0:17:07
MAS 759 0:10:48 0:10:19 0:21:07
AXM 955 0:14:42 0:12:56 0:27:38
MAS 865 0:14:55 0:09:24 0:24:19
UAE 338 0:18:22 0:10:55 0:29:17
MAS 608 0:20:20 0:12:08 0:32:28
MAS 730 0:25:30 0:06:58 0:32:28
MAS 7047 0:27:47 0:04:41 0:32:28
JAL 723 0:28:47 0:03:41 0:32:28
AXM 333 0:30:18 0:02:10 0:32:28 16 0:32:28 2:02:43 0:07:40
S9 MAS 710 0:00:19 0:02:28 0:02:47
MAS 69 0:00:19 0:07:31 0:07:50
EVA 227 0:03:23 0:11:34 0:14:57
HVA 759 0:00:19 0:04:16 0:04:35
GFA 282 0:06:22 0:06:39 0:13:01
AXM 953 0:11:38 0:09:48 0:21:26
MAS 870 0:10:06 0:09:27 0:19:33
MAS 606 0:15:36 0:10:07 0:25:43
MAS 787 0:17:11 0:06:07 0:23:18
Traffic S8
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
Tr
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AXM 103 0:24:35 0:07:08 0:31:43
MAS 6153 0:25:12 0:06:31 0:31:43 11 0:31:43 1:21:36 0:07:25
S10 UAE 338 0:01:10 0:01:43 0:02:53
AXM 955 0:03:17 0:09:04 0:12:21
MAS 608 0:03:42 0:11:45 0:15:27
MAS 720 0:07:08 0:11:37 0:18:45
MAS 1 0:11:07 0:07:51 0:18:58
MAS 1157 0:20:40 0:06:05 0:26:45
AXM 305 0:23:08 0:05:13 0:28:21
CPA 721 0:27:47 0:02:27 0:30:14
MAS 377 0:29:54 0:00:20 0:30:14 9 0:29:14 0:56:05 0:06:14
S11 MAS 1289 0:00:08 0:09:00 0:09:08
JAL 722 0:04:32 0:10:38 0:15:10
MAS 148 0:05:22 0:11:30 0:16:52
MAS 1161 0:06:10 0:05:33 0:11:43
MAS 783 0:11:59 0:07:48 0:19:47
MAS 122 0:15:56 0:09:02 0:24:58
MAS 2617 0:18:35 0:08:36 0:27:11
CAL 651 0:20:46 0:09:02 0:29:48
MAS 71 0:22:09 0:09:35 0:31:44 9 0:31:44 1:20:44 0:08:58
S12 MAS 1163 0:00:00 0:05:39 0:05:39
MAS 2747 0:00:00 0:08:07 0:08:07
MAS 1062 0:00:00 0:03:13 0:03:13
MAS 1405 0:02:43 0:07:31 0:10:14
MAS 2609 0:11:29 0:11:00 0:22:29
GIA 856 0:12:20 0:07:53 0:20:13
AXM 107 0:15:58 0:09:47 0:25:45
MAS 722 0:20:14 0:10:58 0:31:12
MAS 1465 0:24:31 0:06:56 0:31:27
MAS 852 0:25:00 0:06:27 0:31:27
MAS 2715 0:26:22 0:05:05 0:31:27
MAS 2663 0:27:58 0:03:29 0:31:27
PAL 507 0:28:19 0:03:08 0:31:27 13 0:31:27 1:29:13 0:06:52
S13 AXM 862 0:00:34 0:00:08 0:00:42
MAS 69 0:00:34 0:03:25 0:03:59
MAS 870 0:02:58 0:06:08 0:09:06
AXM 953 0:04:48 0:07:07 0:11:55
AXM 103 0:06:52 0:10:40 0:17:32
GFA 286 0:07:19 0:07:06 0:14:25
AXM 203 0:12:55 0:09:17 0:22:12
MAS 785 0:15:25 0:05:35 0:21:00
AXM 303 0:19:30 0:05:38 0:25:08
KLM 809 0:21:18 0:07:16 0:28:34 10 00:28:34 1:02:20 0:06:14
S14 MAS 601 0:01:44 0:01:20 0:03:04
MAS 760 0:01:44 0:01:03 0:02:47
CSN 366 0:03:04 0:03:50 0:06:54
AXM 880 0:05:31 0:04:35 0:10:06
MAS 5 0:07:45 0:04:31 0:12:16
MAS 380 0:10:44 0:07:02 0:17:46
RNA 414 0:13:35 0:04:05 0:17:40
AMT 691 0:16:53 0:05:37 0:22:30
SIA 103 0:20:07 0:02:52 0:22:59
UPS 6912 0:23:15 0:03:43 0:26:58
CAL 652 0:29:00 0:03:21 0:32:21
MAS 1432 0:26:26 0:04:25 0:30:51
THA 420 0:31:44 0:00:37 0:32:21 13 0:31:21 0:47:01 0:03:37
S15 CAL 655 0:00:42 0:03:52 00:04:34
MAS 710 0:00:42 0:09:30 00:10:12
MAS 755 0:08:07 0:06:35 00:14:42
MAS 2613 0:13:32 0:07:56 00:21:28
AXM 361 0:21:49 0:09:40 00:31:29
EVA 227 0:25:13 0:09:21 00:34:34
RBA 873 0:26:22 0:09:43 00:36:05
MAS 69 0:27:27 0:10:54 00:38:21
MAS 606 0:35:36 0:07:28 00:43:04
MAS 1145 0:37:31 0:04:51 00:42:22
AXM 862 0:41:43 0:01:21 00:43:04 11 00:43:04 1:21:11 0:07:23
S16 MAS 1052 0:00:03 0:03:51 0:03:54
AXM 273 0:00:03 0:10:06 0:10:09
MAS 159 0:00:03 0:06:09 0:06:12
MAS 1281 0:15:39 0:13:15 0:28:54
MAS 1153 0:16:56 0:04:32 0:21:28
MAS 865 0:17:22 0:07:01 0:24:23
SIA 116 0:28:08 0:06:49 0:34:57
MAS 353 0:30:31 0:04:26 0:34:57 8 0:34:57 0:56:09 0:07:01
Aircraft 372
Elapse 15:08:48
Total Contact 38:38:35
Contact per aircraft 0:06:14
Traffic S14
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
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APPENDIX K: AREA RADAR TRAFFIC LISTS AND PATTERNS
Ref Aircraft Contact Duration Transfer Traffic Epoch Contact Time/Acft
Y1 MAS 1140 00:00:03 00:14:18 00:14:21
SIA 191 00:00:03 00:04:20 00:04:23
AXM 630 00:00:03 00:11:17 00:11:20
TSE 52 00:00:03 00:04:38 00:04:41
JAL 4401 00:00:03 00:20:30 00:20:33
MAS 6123 00:00:03 00:20:30 00:20:33
MAS 1438 00:09:00 00:11:33 00:20:33
THA 415 00:15:08 00:05:25 00:20:33
SIA 455 00:16:40 00:03:53 00:20:33
MAS 12 00:19:16 00:01:17 00:20:33 10 00:20:33 1:37:41 00:09:46
Y3 MAS 3 00:31:11 00:04:18 00:35:29
MAS 179 00:31:11 00:18:41 00:49:52
SIA 317 00:31:11 00:04:48 00:35:59
O 9458 00:31:11 00:25:22 00:56:33
IAC 955 00:31:11 00:17:35 00:48:46
IAC 957 00:31:11 00:18:31 00:49:42
QFA 32 00:31:11 00:20:34 00:51:45
AUSY 039 00:31:11 00:27:39 00:58:50 8 00:27:39 2:17:28 0:17:11
Y4 MAS 21 00:00:06 00:26:12 00:26:18
MAS 5 00:00:06 00:30:37 00:30:43
MAS 23 00:00:06 00:06:34 00:06:40
SIA 429 00:00:06 00:03:24 00:03:30
SIA 327 00:00:06 00:03:52 00:03:58
THA 490 00:00:06 00:04:02 00:04:08
IAC 957 00:00:06 00:14:03 00:14:09
SIA 323 00:00:06 00:17:09 00:17:15
SIA 325 00:00:06 00:30:37 00:30:43
MAS 179 00:00:06 00:09:52 00:09:58
QTR 425 00:00:32 00:22:12 00:22:44
SQC 7973 00:05:11 00:16:29 00:21:40
MAS 7363 00:05:56 00:24:47 00:30:43
IAC 555 00:07:22 00:03:01 00:10:23
HLR 717 00:10:59 00:03:51 00:14:50
MAS 6140 00:13:06 00:13:25 00:26:31
AIC 480 00:15:43 00:12:30 00:28:13
SIA 317 00:16:38 00:14:05 00:30:43
SIA 403 00:18:21 00:12:22 00:30:43
MAS 6136 00:20:08 00:10:35 00:30:43
TSE 75 00:24:57 00:05:46 00:30:43
PO 725 00:26:36 00:04:07 00:30:43 22 00:30:43 4:49:32 0:13:10
Y5 MAS 5200 00:07:11 00:25:36 00:32:47
LNI 288 00:07:11 00:00:26 00:07:37
MAS 1447 00:07:11 00:02:32 00:09:43
GFA 488 00:07:11 00:02:44 00:09:55
AXM 301 00:07:11 00:11:42 00:18:53
UAE 404 00:12:37 00:21:56 00:34:33
UNL010W 00:13:00 00:09:09 00:22:09
MAS 160 00:15:09 00:19:24 00:34:33
QTR 188 00:19:31 00:04:49 00:24:20
QTR 199 00:20:10 00:08:59 00:29:09
Sample Y4
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48
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AXM 302 00:07:11 00:14:06 00:21:17
SIA 320 00:23:10 00:11:23 00:34:33
MAS 861 00:24:59 00:05:28 00:30:27
SIA 456 00:29:11 00:05:22 00:34:33
MAS 1145 00:33:01 00:01:32 00:34:33
SIA 319 00:31:58 00:02:35 00:34:33 16 00:27:33 2:27:43 0:09:14
Y6 QTR 198 00:00:04 00:07:56 00:08:00
MAS 31 00:00:04 00:00:16 00:00:20
IMT 387 00:00:22 00:27:55 00:28:17
MAS 6143 00:03:24 00:10:08 00:13:32
UN 010W 00:05:46 00:10:43 00:16:29
MAS 1447 00:04:10 00:23:04 00:27:14
LNI 288 00:10:52 00:06:42 00:17:34
UAE 404 00:15:10 00:12:13 00:27:23
CLX 795 00:22:37 00:05:40 00:28:17
AXM 631 00:23:24 00:04:53 00:28:17 10 00:28:17 1:49:30 0:10:57
Y7 BBG 872 00:01:47 00:29:16 00:31:03
MAS 1447 00:00:07 00:05:52 00:05:59
MAS 652 00:00:07 00:03:05 00:03:12
MAS 1471D 00:00:07 00:07:55 00:08:02
AXM 301 00:00:07 00:21:55 00:22:02
TSE 302 00:11:34 00:16:02 00:27:36
SIA 461 00:13:01 00:18:02 00:31:03
UN 200W 00:13:58 00:17:05 00:31:03
JTY 188 00:13:27 00:04:48 00:18:15
SIA 472 00:18:51 00:12:12 00:31:03
MAS 1638 00:19:16 00:11:47 00:31:03
MAS 7 00:20:33 00:10:30 00:31:03
AIC 472 00:26:45 00:04:18 00:31:03
UBA 502 00:28:09 00:02:54 00:31:03 14 00:30:03 2:45:41 0:11:50
Y8 UN 010W 00:00:56 00:04:03 00:04:59
SIA 319 00:00:56 00:00:40 00:01:36
THA 416 00:00:56 00:12:01 00:12:57
MAS 787 00:00:56 00:16:17 00:17:13
SQC 7883 00:01:06 00:10:59 00:12:05
MAS 785 00:07:27 00:29:29 00:36:56
KLM 809 00:08:58 00:25:01 00:33:59
MAS 1208 00:09:42 00:16:20 00:26:02
SIA 455 00:12:18 00:09:38 00:21:56
AXM 303 00:18:00 00:21:02 00:39:02
MAS 6153 00:19:15 00:08:35 00:27:50
MAS 1146 00:21:15 00:13:24 00:34:39
TGW 882 00:22:42 00:16:20 00:39:02
MAS 1625 00:24:44 00:09:08 00:33:52
KLM 837 00:28:37 00:10:25 00:39:02
MNA 189 00:31:33 00:06:14 00:37:47
MAS 614 00:38:27 00:00:35 00:39:02 17 00:39:02 3:30:11 0:12:22
Y9 SIA 339 00:00:08 00:08:22 00:08:30
GFA 149 00:00:08 00:06:21 00:06:29
SIA 25 00:00:08 00:12:42 00:12:50
SQC 7356 00:00:08 00:32:32 00:32:40
Traffic Y8
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48 00:36:00
A
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Traffic Y9
MAS 195 00:00:40 00:13:53 00:14:33
MAS 179 00:01:10 00:29:25 00:30:35
MAS 5 00:02:54 00:28:16 00:31:10
MAS 15 00:05:52 00:26:48 00:32:40
IRA 957 00:08:30 00:24:10 00:32:40
MAS 17 00:10:35 00:22:05 00:32:40
TO 9167 00:11:22 00:21:18 00:32:40
SIA 403 00:12:27 00:08:11 00:20:38
SIA 333 00:17:17 00:15:23 00:32:40
IMT 377 00:24:34 00:08:06 00:32:40
MAS 91 00:28:33 00:04:07 00:32:40
AIC 480 00:29:59 00:02:41 00:32:40
MAS 3 00:31:40 00:01:00 00:32:40 17 00:32:40 4:25:20 0:15:36
Y10 MAS 1146 00:00:38 00:09:05 00:09:43
CAL 673 00:00:38 00:00:36 00:01:14
KLM 809 00:00:38 00:08:02 00:08:40
LNI 289 00:00:38 00:03:59 00:04:37
MAS 1147 00:02:25 00:10:32 00:12:57
UBA 502 00:00:38 00:03:27 00:04:05
AXM 882 00:00:38 00:08:13 00:08:51
9MINA 00:00:38 00:04:05 00:04:43
BMAI 00:00:38 00:05:50 00:06:28
KLM 837 00:00:38 00:08:42 00:09:20
JTY 189 00:09:22 00:03:47 00:13:09
AXM 303 00:00:38 00:12:33 00:13:11
UNL011W 00:16:31 00:09:02 00:25:33
SVW 125X 00:19:14 00:17:17 00:36:31
AXM 873 00:31:04 00:05:27 00:36:31
UNL010W 00:36:00 00:00:31 00:36:31 16 00:36:31 1:51:08 0:06:57
Y11 QFA 32 00:00:04 00:28:23 00:28:27
MAS 21 00:00:04 00:04:07 00:04:11
IAC 957 00:00:04 00:03:26 00:03:30
MAS 91 00:00:04 00:18:04 00:18:08
MAS 193 00:06:46 00:05:38 00:12:24
IAC 555 00:00:04 00:07:43 00:07:47
SIA 317 00:00:04 00:12:44 00:12:48
SIA 411 00:16:51 00:13:38 00:30:29
CLX 794 00:19:23 00:11:06 00:30:29
CHH 494 00:25:26 00:05:03 00:30:29
MAS 199 00:29:13 00:01:16 00:30:29 11 00:30:29 1:51:08 0:10:06
Y12 MAS 1161 00:00:03 00:13:32 00:13:35
AXM 863 00:00:03 00:02:01 00:02:04
MAS 674 00:00:03 00:03:55 00:03:58
MAS 1453 00:00:03 00:00:51 00:00:54
AXM 884 00:00:03 00:15:04 00:15:07
SLK 368 00:00:03 00:08:06 00:08:09
SLK 758 00:00:03 00:09:28 00:09:31
9MISJ 00:00:03 00:20:09 00:20:12
MAS 783 00:01:03 00:25:49 00:26:52
LTU 9938 00:01:33 00:10:31 00:12:04
SIA 198 00:03:17 00:14:41 00:17:58
SQC 7353 00:03:30 00:11:10 00:14:40
Traffic Y9
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48 00:36:00
A
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AXM 349 00:06:12 00:22:26 00:28:38
MAS 194 00:07:17 00:17:11 00:24:28
ALK 476 00:08:10 00:11:05 00:19:15
CPA 721 00:17:38 00:09:09 00:26:47
MAS 1164 00:21:18 00:07:20 00:28:38
MAS 180 00:24:09 00:04:29 00:28:38 18 00:28:38 3:26:57 0:11:30
Y13 MAS 1146 00:01:30 00:03:05 00:04:35
LNI 289 00:03:00 00:10:41 00:13:41
MAS 787 00:01:30 00:18:24 00:19:54
AXM 882 00:04:38 00:24:41 00:29:19
MAS 8204 00:05:04 00:09:27 00:14:31
MAS 1625 00:12:06 00:07:56 00:20:02
AXM 303 00:14:33 00:15:45 00:30:18
MAS 785 00:15:07 00:15:11 00:30:18
CAL 673 00:15:37 00:07:17 00:22:54
KLM 835 00:15:50 00:14:28 00:30:18
JTY 189 00:19:36 00:08:22 00:27:58
MAS 1147 00:29:43 00:00:35 00:30:18 12 00:29:18 2:15:52 0:11:19
Y14 SIA 327 00:00:00 00:27:52 00:27:52
MAS 6140 00:00:00 00:12:34 00:12:34
MAS 195 00:01:23 00:04:06 00:05:29
SIA 323 00:02:36 00:26:58 00:29:34
MAS 15 00:00:00 00:19:18 00:19:18
MAS 5 00:05:30 00:24:04 00:29:34
SIA 403 00:08:29 00:03:26 00:11:55
GFA 149 00:00:00 00:10:11 00:10:11
SIA 345 00:09:29 00:20:05 00:29:34
SIA 25 00:00:00 00:12:03 00:12:03
MAS 91 00:14:45 00:14:49 00:29:34
SIA 333 00:15:29 00:14:05 00:29:34
IAC 555 00:22:00 00:07:34 00:29:34
MAS 7221 00:22:19 00:07:01 00:29:20 14 00:29:34 3:24:06 0:14:35
R1 CSN 433 00:00:05 00:14:25 00:14:30
SLK 288 00:00:05 00:01:39 00:01:44
PKTVK 00:00:05 00:01:47 00:01:52
SIA 118 00:04:49 00:04:38 00:09:27
GIA 856 00:05:22 00:06:49 00:12:11
CPA 735 00:00:05 00:06:47 00:06:52
MAS 1062 00:08:55 00:09:43 00:18:38
GIA 8211 00:15:50 00:14:48 00:30:38
AXM 358 00:16:30 00:13:57 00:30:27
AXM 957 00:29:43 00:07:24 00:37:07
MAS 722 00:31:45 00:06:02 00:37:47
AXM 955 00:32:01 00:07:33 00:39:34
MAS 852 00:33:32 00:06:02 00:39:34
SIA412 00:38:20 00:01:14 00:39:34 14 00:39:34 1:42:48 0:07:21
R2 MAS 1059 00:00:07 00:07:44 00:07:51
DMG 4416 00:02:23 00:07:47 00:10:10
SIA 412 00:06:21 00:12:53 00:19:14
UAE 412 00:06:45 00:16:26 00:23:11
MAS 852 00:13:30 00:08:22 00:21:52
Traffic Y12
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48 00:36:00
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AXM 358 00:16:01 00:14:15 00:30:16
MAS 722 00:16:49 00:08:23 00:25:12
GIA 4211 00:03:02 00:19:55 00:22:57
IYE 863 00:26:48 00:08:02 00:34:50
KLM 810 00:25:16 00:08:24 00:33:40
AXM 957 00:33:43 00:01:07 00:34:50 11 00:34:50 1:53:18 0:10:18
R3 MAS 605 00:00:39 00:02:37 00:03:16
JTY 8239 00:00:39 00:10:54 00:11:33
DLH 788 00:04:58 00:14:18 00:19:16
MAS 714 00:00:39 00:05:43 00:06:22
JTY 238 00:00:39 00:11:57 00:12:36
GIA 816 00:14:11 00:05:19 00:19:30
MAS 1052 00:15:23 00:09:02 00:24:25
AXM 954 00:16:23 00:09:01 00:25:24
SAF 6138 00:00:39 00:19:04 00:19:43 9 00:25:24 1:27:55 0:09:46
R4 GIA 838 00:00:03 00:15:58 00:16:01
MAS 608 00:04:00 00:12:08 00:16:08
BAW 15 00:00:03 00:11:07 00:11:10
GFA 487 00:06:02 00:09:22 00:15:24
N168BF 00:00:03 00:07:32 00:07:35
QFA 10 00:17:35 00:12:42 00:30:17
AFR 256 00:00:03 00:30:14 00:30:17
GIA 819 00:00:03 00:22:50 00:22:53
MAS 720 00:23:44 00:06:33 00:30:17
UBA 255 00:00:03 00:28:00 00:28:03 10 00:30:17 2:36:26 0:15:39
R5 AXM 955 00:00:44 00:07:40 00:08:24
QFA 10 00:00:44 00:00:31 00:01:15
SIA 321 00:01:15 00:15:51 00:17:06
SQC 7992 00:02:28 00:10:53 00:13:21
AXM 956 00:02:03 00:13:12 00:15:15
SQC 7355 00:06:50 00:13:09 00:19:59
MAS 721 00:07:30 00:05:28 00:12:58
MAS 608 00:15:23 00:04:36 00:19:59
AXM 916 00:15:42 00:04:17 00:19:59
AXM 256 00:16:09 00:03:50 00:19:59 10 00:19:59 1:19:27 0:07:57
R6 MAS 603 00:00:00 00:01:04 00:01:04
SLK 751 00:00:00 00:13:08 00:13:08
MDL 191 00:06:15 00:11:48 00:18:03
MAU 647 00:00:00 00:16:06 00:16:06
IMT 387 00:19:13 00:01:56 00:21:09
SFB 911 00:00:00 00:20:36 00:20:36
SUMO 94 00:20:38 00:00:31 00:21:09 7 00:21:09 1:05:09 0:09:18
R7 MAS 605 00:01:57 00:10:31 00:12:28
ALK 312 00:01:57 00:00:51 00:02:48
MAS 1051 00:01:57 00:09:56 00:11:53
UZB 1701 00:01:57 00:13:37 00:15:34
UAE 348 00:01:57 00:18:06 00:20:03
MAS 711 00:01:57 00:06:52 00:08:49
SIA 326 00:03:52 00:02:09 00:06:01
DLH 778 00:03:54 00:02:18 00:06:12
SIA 196 00:07:19 00:08:04 00:15:23
SOA 516 00:10:23 00:23:34 00:33:57
KLM 809 00:18:46 00:16:19 00:35:05
SFB 911 00:24:40 00:10:25 00:35:05
MNA 830 00:25:30 00:09:35 00:35:05
AXM 901 00:27:27 00:07:38 00:35:05
IYE 862 00:30:57 00:04:08 00:35:05 15 00:34:05 2:24:03 0:09:36
R8 ALK 312 00:00:00 00:13:38 00:13:38
AIC 470 00:00:00 00:05:49 00:05:49
MAS 5410 00:00:00 00:17:55 00:17:55
SLK 744 00:00:00 00:01:53 00:01:53
SIA 452 00:02:47 00:15:01 00:17:48
MAS 710 00:03:09 00:08:41 00:11:50
GIA 851 00:04:08 00:13:16 00:17:24
MNA 9502 00:00:00 00:08:10 00:08:10
SIA 319 00:12:10 00:17:51 00:30:01
MAS 721 00:08:00 00:10:05 00:18:05
AXM 954 00:21:34 00:09:36 00:31:10
MAS 870 00:21:55 00:07:40 00:29:35
SQC 7883 00:22:34 00:08:36 00:31:10
AXM 953 00:23:26 00:07:44 00:31:10
MAS 606 00:25:17 00:05:53 00:31:10 15 00:31:10 2:31:48 0:10:07
R9 JAL 721 00:00:08 00:06:22 00:06:30
MAS 1059 00:00:08 00:07:00 00:07:08
MAS 607 00:10:01 00:13:38 00:23:39
MAS 148 00:14:38 00:13:42 00:28:20
MNA 931 00:25:32 00:03:54 00:29:26
QFA 683 00:27:36 00:05:37 00:33:13
MAS 122 00:32:44 00:00:29 00:33:13 7 00:33:13 0:50:42 0:07:15
R10 FIN 911 00:00:08 00:17:10 00:17:18
MAS 870 00:00:25 00:06:07 00:06:32
9MAZZ 00:00:53 00:10:21 00:11:14
JSA 862 00:01:31 00:01:45 00:03:16
AXM 954 00:00:08 00:02:24 00:02:32
SIA 111 00:07:45 00:09:29 00:17:14
GIA 821 00:08:04 00:04:31 00:12:35
KLM 837 00:18:17 00:04:46 00:23:03
MAS 1059 00:15:04 00:13:14 00:28:18
AXM 913 00:25:18 00:04:44 00:30:02 10 00:30:02 1:14:31 0:07:27
R11 GIA 856 00:00:00
SQC 7395 00:00:00 00:06:57
AXM 358 00:00:44 00:17:50
SIA 452 00:01:33
Traffic R7
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48 00:36:00
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
Traffic R8
00:00:0
0
00:07:1
2
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SIA 26 00:00:00
GIA 856 00:04:23 00:05:30
SLK 368 00:04:54
MAS 722 00:06:16 00:13:40
SIA 412 00:08:30
MAS 852 00:11:51 00:18:15
SIA 410 00:16:49 00:24:05
AXM 957 00:27:28 00:29:15
MAS 1063 00:28:57 00:29:15
Q1 MAS 1276 00:00:45 00:08:56 00:09:41
MAS 765 00:01:05 00:09:08 00:10:13
T.JERUNG 00:01:33 00:06:41 00:08:14
MAS 2528 00:00:45 00:02:44 00:03:29
HOBO4099 00:03:45 00:06:28 00:10:13
9MABC 00:00:45 00:08:25 00:09:10
AXM 208 00:00:45 00:05:10 00:05:55
SIA 065 00:00:45 00:06:01 00:06:46 8 00:10:13 0:53:33 0:06:42
Q2 RCH 122 00:00:08 00:00:05 00:00:13
TSE 3506 00:00:08 00:06:08 00:06:16
MAS 759 00:00:08 00:06:01 00:06:09
THY 60 00:00:08 00:03:29 00:03:37
SIA 67 00:00:08 00:07:50 00:07:58
SAS 973 00:00:08 00:13:35 00:13:43
BKP 503 00:00:08 00:17:57 00:18:05
JAL 723 00:03:40 00:07:21 00:11:01
MAS 1402 00:11:24 00:18:26 00:29:50
MAS 753 00:12:16 00:17:34 00:29:50
AXM 112 00:13:06 00:07:56 00:21:02
RMF 670 00:14:48 00:15:02 00:29:50
MAS 2636 00:17:46 00:12:04 00:29:50
CAL 674 00:18:07 00:11:43 00:29:50
AXM 209 00:18:26 00:06:58 00:25:24
BIS 6326 00:24:48 00:05:02 00:29:50
AXM 258 00:26:48 00:03:02 00:29:50
MAS 74 00:27:41 00:02:09 00:29:50 18 00:29:50 2:42:22 0:09:01
Q3 RBA873 0:00:54 0:03:41 0:04:35
MAS2564 0:00:54 0:09:32 0:10:26
SIA63 0:00:54 0:13:44 0:14:38
TGW108 0:00:54 0:14:44 0:15:38
SIA319 0:03:09 0:20:04 0:23:13
SIA64 0:05:38 0:27:31 0:33:09
AXM261 0:07:51 0:09:08 0:16:59
RMF702 0:17:14 0:11:54 0:29:08
MAS69 0:17:53 0:05:35 0:23:28
GFA286 0:18:30 0:14:39 0:33:09
CPA712 0:19:48 0:13:21 0:33:09
AIQ5012 0:28:00 0:05:09 0:33:09
MAS2746 0:31:04 0:02:05 0:33:09
AXM103 0:32:40 0:00:29 0:33:09 14 0:33:00 2:31:36 10:50
Q4 TSE 3202 0:00:08 0:28:09 0:28:17
THA 412 0:00:08 0:19:01 0:19:09
MAS 753 0:00:08 0:03:58 0:04:06
Traffic Q2
00:00:0
0
00:07:1
2
00:14:2
4
00:21:3
6
00:28:4
8
00:36:0
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CPA 721 0:00:08 0:02:19 0:02:27
9MSTM 0:00:08 0:02:39 0:02:47
MAS 759 0:00:08 0:18:53 0:19:01
MAS 377 0:00:08 0:11:39 0:11:47
SWR 182 0:00:08 0:10:00 0:10:08
SAS 973 0:01:39 0:18:55 0:20:34
SIA 067 0:02:04 0:23:04 0:25:08
TSE 3506 0:07:46 0:26:00 0:33:46
MAS 1282 0:09:28 0:05:37 0:15:05
MAS 1402 0:15:06 0:18:40 0:33:46
AXM 264 0:16:37 0:11:32 0:28:09
MAS 2705 0:17:15 0:11:20 0:28:35
SIA 068 0:28:46 0:05:00 0:33:46
MAS 391 0:30:25 0:03:21 0:33:46
AXM 112 0:32:19 0:01:27 0:33:46
BAW 3453 0:33:03 0:00:43 0:33:46 19 0:33:46 3:42:17 0:11:42
Q5 AAR852 0:00:18 0:05:00 0:05:18
CPA716 0:00:18 0:00:43 0:01:01
CPA721 0:00:18 0:08:56 0:09:14
MAS1335 0:00:18 0:06:34 0:06:52
TSE3506 0:00:18 0:03:22 0:03:40
CPA724 0:00:18 0:12:44 0:13:02
SIA321 0:00:18 0:05:03 0:05:21
THA412 0:00:18 0:07:10 0:07:28
MAS1282 0:02:43 0:07:13 0:09:56
SIA67 0:03:42 0:24:59 0:28:41
MAS377 0:11:13 0:09:17 0:20:30
SWR182 0:13:28 0:22:56 0:36:24
MAS1402 0:15:20 0:17:49 0:33:09
MAS65 0:20:48 0:09:56 0:30:44
MAS391 0:21:34 0:12:45 0:34:19
MAS1058 0:21:56 0:00:20 0:22:16
AXM209 0:22:18 0:13:26 0:35:44
MAS2529 0:24:18 0:12:06 0:36:24
AXM105 0:24:55 0:11:29 0:36:24
MAS74 0:32:02 0:04:22 0:36:24
SIA68 0:33:53 0:02:31 0:36:24 21 0:36:24 3:18:41 09:28
Q6 TSE 3506 0:01:42 0:23:00 0:24:42
JSA 501 0:02:10 0:25:05 0:27:15
MAS 73 0:03:04 0:12:26 0:15:30
CAL 674 0:01:42 0:12:13 0:13:55
TGW 109 0:01:42 0:07:12 0:08:54
THA 412 0:09:00 0:21:33 0:30:33
SWR 182 0:09:27 0:21:06 0:30:33
AXM 264 0:09:55 0:11:05 0:21:00
JAL 723 0:13:01 0:07:32 0:20:33
THA 409 0:01:42 0:14:25 0:16:07
SIA 321 0:01:42 0:16:53 0:18:35
MAS 1335 0:19:35 0:10:58 0:30:33
AXM 104 0:27:41 0:02:52 0:30:33
NAF 44 00:28:17 0:02:16 0:30:33
CPA 721 00:28:44 0:01:49 0:30:33 15 00:29:33 3:10:25 0:12:42
Traffic Q5
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
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Traffic Q4
0:00:00 0:07:12 0:14:24 0:21:36 0:28:48 0:36:00
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Q7 MAS 1335 00:00:17 0:14:13 00:14:30
THA 409 00:00:17 0:00:47 00:01:04
THA 412 00:00:17 0:21:15 00:21:32
MAS 7047 00:00:17 0:02:03 00:02:20
AXM 264 00:00:17 0:03:32 00:03:49
STQ 501 00:00:17 0:12:15 00:12:32
FIN 97 00:00:17 0:14:07 00:14:24
JAL 723 00:01:33 0:07:22 00:08:55
SWR 182 00:03:58 0:23:54 00:27:52
SIA 430 00:06:44 0:00:16 00:07:00
CAL 674 00:09:25 0:22:10 00:31:35
CPA 721 00:16:46 0:09:38 00:26:24
MAS 377 00:17:21 0:10:23 00:27:44
MAS 2538 00:22:49 0:06:24 00:29:13
MAS 1402 00:29:28 0:02:07 00:31:35
MAS 2705 00:30:51 0:00:44 00:31:35 16 00:31:35 2:31:10 0:09:27
Q8 SIA 066 00:00:10 0:00:06 00:00:16
UBA 232 00:00:10 0:17:39 00:17:49
MAS 69 00:00:10 0:04:40 00:04:50
EVA 227 00:03:48 0:09:39 00:13:27
AIQ 5012 00:04:54 0:24:37 00:29:31
BVT 787 00:05:57 0:29:45 00:35:42
GFA 282 00:00:10 0:11:29 00:11:39
TGW 108 00:00:10 0:08:07 00:08:17
CPA 712 00:12:54 0:25:14 00:38:08
MAS 2746 00:17:51 0:11:49 00:29:40
AXM 103 00:23:08 0:11:29 00:34:37
CPA 713 00:27:37 0:10:31 00:38:08
HVN 756 00:30:15 0:07:53 00:38:08
CAL 657 00:32:18 0:05:50 00:38:08
MAS 2616 00:27:59 0:10:09 00:38:08 15 00:38:08 3:08:57 0:12:36
Q9 MAS 71 00:02:15 0:08:14 00:10:29
SIA 436 00:02:15 0:12:25 00:14:40
SIA 416 00:02:15 0:14:10 00:16:25
TGW 138 00:02:15 0:00:51 00:03:06
AXM 209 00:03:07 0:09:39 00:12:46
AXM 105 00:05:56 0:09:14 00:15:10
MEGA 200 00:02:15 0:14:53 00:17:08
BAW 9 00:06:50 0:07:40 00:14:30
CAL 651 00:09:51 0:11:12 00:21:03
MAS 1405 00:10:30 0:17:46 00:28:16
QFA 2 00:12:09 0:08:14 00:20:23
TGW 113 00:13:14 0:17:16 00:30:30
MAS 2531 00:13:31 0:11:57 00:25:28
AXM 112 00:15:12 0:06:11 00:21:23
TSE 3506 00:15:44 0:14:46 00:30:30
THA 991 00:22:33 0:07:57 00:30:30 16 00:28:30 2:52:25 0:10:47
Aircraft 435
Elapse 16:01:42
Total Contact 78:29:50
Contact per aircraft 0:10:50
Traffic Q7
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48 00:36:00
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APPENDIX L: TOWER TRAFFIC LISTS AND PATTERNS
Ref Aircraft Contact Duration Transfer Traffic Epoch Contact Time/Acft
G1 CEKAL 21 00:00:41 00:10:11 00:10:52
MAS 2332 00:01:26 00:02:35 00:04:01
BTV 822 00:07:10 00:10:09 00:17:19
MAS 2805 00:09:27 00:04:28 00:13:55
TSE 505 00:10:04 00:04:37 00:14:41
MAS 2743 00:11:24 00:05:55 00:17:19 6 00:17:19 0:37:55 0:06:19
G2 MAS 2261 00:00:00 00:04:06 00:04:06
MAS 2507 00:01:09 00:03:42 00:04:51
AXM 202 00:04:25 00:04:41 00:09:06
MAS 637 00:06:10 00:03:31 00:09:41
MAS 2508 00:14:47 00:04:57 00:19:44 5 00:19:44 0:20:57 0:04:11
G3 MAS 2266 00:00:04 00:08:19 00:08:23
POL 11Q 00:00:50 00:11:03 00:11:53
MAS 2807 00:01:23 00:04:19 00:05:42
PCHOP 5 00:02:22 00:09:47 00:12:09
AXM 203 00:12:26 00:01:18 00:13:44 5 00:13:44 0:34:46 0:06:57
G4 9MACA 00:00:27 00:12:27 00:12:54
MAS 2266 00:00:27 00:08:55 00:09:22
MAS 2807 00:00:27 00:02:33 00:03:00
AXM 203 00:00:27 00:17:07 00:17:34
MAS 2610 00:00:47 00:04:53 00:05:40
CALBR 1 00:10:08 00:04:58 00:15:06 6 00:17:34 0:50:53 0:08:29
G5 TSE 522 00:00:08 00:00:23 00:00:31
MAS 2805 00:01:34 00:04:52 00:06:26
9MBCT 00:04:04 00:08:55 00:12:59
MAS 2332 00:10:20 00:03:15 00:13:35
BTV 822 00:12:30 00:03:28 00:15:58
TSE 503 00:13:42 00:04:49 00:18:31 6 00:18:31 0:25:42 0:04:17
G6 MAS 2507 00:01:31 00:00:22 00:01:53
MAS 637 00:04:53 00:02:41 00:07:34
RMF 443 00:01:31 00:17:40 00:19:11
AXM 202 00:06:47 00:03:49 00:10:36
MAS 2261 00:09:59 00:05:37 00:15:36
MAS 2508 00:18:10 00:01:01 00:19:11 6 00:19:11 0:31:10 0:05:12
G7 9MAYQ 00:00:15 00:07:32 00:07:47
MAS 2805 00:01:13 00:05:26 00:06:39
TSE 505 00:00:15 00:03:47 00:04:02
9MAVM 00:07:15 00:03:55 00:11:10
POL 11P 00:09:53 00:04:41 00:14:34
MAS 2332 00:10:50 00:05:07 00:15:57
CEKAL 22 00:14:02 00:05:29 00:19:31 7 00:19:31 0:35:57 0:05:08
G8 MAS 2332 00:00:35 00:02:52 00:03:27
9MSGJ 00:03:31 00:16:34 00:20:05
MAS 2805 00:04:31 00:05:33 00:10:04
BTV 822 00:06:08 00:05:04 00:11:12
Traffic G4
00:00:00 00:02:53 00:05:46 00:08:38 00:11:31 00:14:24 00:17:17 00:20:10
A
ir
cr
af
t
Time
Traffic G1, G2 and G3
00:00:00 00:05:46 00:11:31 00:17:17
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
MAS 3805 00:09:04 00:04:33 00:13:37
9MAYQ 00:13:38 00:05:39 00:19:17
MAS 2295 00:18:14 00:01:51 00:20:05
RMF 444 00:18:36 00:01:29 00:20:05 8 00:20:05 0:43:35 0:05:27
G9 RMF 380 00:00:09 00:06:53 00:07:02
AXM 202 00:00:40 00:05:05 00:05:45
MAS 2508 00:00:09 00:01:15 00:01:24
CEKAL 20 00:00:09 00:10:21 00:10:30
MAS 2610 00:16:51 00:02:45 00:19:36 5 00:19:36 0:26:19 0:05:16
G10 9MEAP 00:00:23 00:01:41 00:02:04
AXM 202 00:00:23 00:02:17 00:02:40
MAS 2515 00:07:43 00:06:26 00:14:09
AXM 204 00:09:12 00:04:00 00:13:12
9MACA 00:00:23 00:05:31 00:05:54
MAS 2691 00:14:33 00:04:49 00:19:22
MAS 2610 00:16:51 00:03:07 00:19:58 7 00:19:58 0:27:51 0:03:59
G11 9MHRM 00:00:06 00:01:29 00:01:35 .
MAS 2805 00:02:20 00:05:37 00:07:57
BTV 822 00:02:51 00:06:32 00:09:23
MAS 2332 00:05:36 00:08:50 00:14:26
MAS 5 00:09:44 00:03:54 00:13:38
CEKAL 20 00:16:04 00:02:52 00:18:56 6 00:18:56 0:29:14 0:04:52
G12 CLBR 2 00:00:01 00:02:20 00:02:21
MAS 3805 00:00:01 00:01:11 00:01:12
TSE 505 00:02:26 00:02:06 00:04:32
BTV 822 00:06:20 00:04:27 00:10:47
MAS 3805 00:07:42 00:09:09 00:16:51
MAS 2743 00:17:24 00:00:14 00:17:38 6 00:17:38 0:19:27 0:03:15
G13 9MSGJ 00:00:05 00:06:39 00:06:44
MAS 2805 00:00:05 00:02:47 00:02:52
RMF 444 00:00:05 00:17:13 00:17:18
TSE 505 00:01:30 00:02:35 00:04:05
MAS 2332 00:10:46 00:01:16 00:12:02
MAS 3805 00:12:06 00:02:01 00:14:07
9MSGJ 00:15:31 00:02:38 00:18:09 7 00:18:09 0:35:09 0:05:01
G14 MAS 2508 00:00:40 00:04:43 00:05:23
MAS 716 00:00:40 00:00:20 00:01:00
RMF 444 00:02:19 00:14:48 00:17:07
AXM 202 00:03:31 00:05:52 00:09:23
9MACA 00:00:40 00:19:10 00:19:50 5 00:19:50 0:44:53 0:08:59
G15 MAS 2610 00:00:06 00:05:03 00:05:09
MAS 716 00:00:06 00:02:03 00:02:09
MAS 2266 00:05:33 00:04:36 00:10:09
AXM 203 00:11:02 00:01:59 00:13:01
CEKAL 01 00:08:46 00:10:39 00:19:25
TSE 504 00:19:03 00:00:22 00:19:25 6 00:19:25 0:24:42 0:04:07
Traffic G8
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
G16 TSE 505 00:00:17 00:05:41 00:05:58
MAS 2663 00:01:30 00:03:52 00:05:22
MAS 2610 00:05:22 00:04:00 00:09:22
AXM 202 00:08:49 00:04:18 00:13:07
CEKAL 24 00:15:28 00:00:16 00:15:44 5 00:15:44 0:18:07 0:03:37
G17 MAS 3806 00:03:11 00:03:28 00:06:39
MAS 2746 00:05:08 00:04:15 00:09:23
MAS 2813 00:08:48 00:05:57 00:14:45
MAS 2564 00:15:47 00:03:57 00:19:44 4 00:16:44 0:17:37 0:04:24
G18 BADAK 03 00:00:01 00:07:13 00:07:14
9MACA 00:00:27 00:08:51 00:09:18
CEKAL 02 00:01:14 00:05:08 00:06:22
MAS 2454 00:09:22 00:01:27 00:10:49
MAS 2515 00:12:30 00:02:00 00:14:30
BADAK 03 00:19:03 00:00:40 00:19:43 6 00:19:43 0:25:19 0:04:13
G19 BTV 822 00:00:37 00:01:37 00:02:14
MAS 2805 00:05:20 00:04:19 00:09:39
TSE 504 00:08:09 00:07:02 00:15:11
MAS 2332 00:13:28 00:02:56 00:16:24
MAS 3805 00:17:40 00:01:43 00:19:23 5 00:19:23 0:17:37 0:03:31
G20 MAS 2805 00:00:04 00:03:07 00:03:11
BTV 822 00:09:38 00:01:56 00:11:34
MAS 2332 00:12:35 00:01:52 00:14:27 3 00:14:27 0:06:55 0:02:18
G21 9MACA 00:00:30 00:13:54 00:14:24
AXM 202 00:01:52 00:04:14 00:06:06
MAS 2337 00:06:21 00:00:11 00:06:32
9MEST 00:09:08 00:04:15 00:13:23
MAS 2337 00:17:59 00:00:18 00:18:17 5 00:18:17 0:22:52 0:04:34
J1 AXM 630 00:00:00 00:22:09 00:22:09
ACAD 153 00:00:00 00:22:09 00:22:09
MAS 2508 00:00:00 00:12:37 00:12:37
MAS 2505 00:00:00 00:06:30 00:06:30
ELITE 15 00:00:00 00:22:09 00:22:09
ACAD 153 00:00:00 00:22:09 00:22:09
ACAD 08X 00:00:00 00:22:09 00:22:09
PCHOP 1 00:07:56 00:14:13 00:22:09
PUTRA 05 00:12:38 00:09:31 00:22:09 9 00:22:09 2:33:36 0:17:04
J2 MAS 2508 00:00:00 00:10:49 00:10:49
MAS 2505 00:03:25 00:12:32 00:15:57
AXM 630 00:00:00 00:13:39 00:13:39
ELITE 15 00:00:00 00:19:55 00:19:55
9MJMV 00:05:45 00:14:10 00:19:55 5 00:19:55 1:11:05 0:14:13
J3 MAS 2505 00:00:00 00:09:48 00:09:48
Traffic J1
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
ELITE 15 00:00:00 00:21:51 00:21:51
MAS 2508 00:00:46 00:13:07 00:13:53
AXM 630 00:06:19 00:10:45 00:17:04
VHLOE 00:16:26 00:05:25 00:21:51
ELITE 11 00:00:00 00:19:01 00:19:01 6 00:21:51 1:19:57 0:13:20
J4 ACAD 26 00:00:00 00:19:43 00:19:43
ACAD 03 00:00:00 00:19:43 00:19:43
MAS 2508 00:01:36 00:11:50 00:13:26
ACAD 08X 00:00:00 00:19:43 00:19:43
ACAD 25 00:00:00 00:19:43 00:19:43
MAS 2505 00:08:12 00:08:54 00:17:06
ACAD 21 00:11:52 00:07:51 00:19:43
9MJFC 00:13:38 00:06:05 00:19:43 8 00:19:43 1:53:32 0:14:11
J5 MAS 2508 00:00:00 00:12:08 00:12:08
9MWCF 00:00:00 00:22:45 00:22:45
9MEML 00:00:00 00:22:45 00:22:45
ACAD 22 00:02:32 00:20:13 00:22:45
POL 11O 00:04:33 00:18:12 00:22:45
ACAD 355 00:06:05 00:16:40 00:22:45
MAS 2505 00:07:50 00:08:50 00:16:40
ACAD 03 00:08:46 00:13:59 00:22:45
AXM 630 00:12:12 00:10:33 00:22:45
9MJMV 00:14:46 00:07:59 00:22:45 10 00:22:45 2:34:04 0:15:24
J6 AXM 630 00:00:00 00:19:32 00:19:32
AXM 353 00:00:00 00:11:42 00:11:42
MAS 2505 00:02:58 00:16:34 00:19:32
ACAD 08X 00:00:00 00:19:32 00:19:32
ACAD 13 00:00:00 00:19:32 00:19:32 5 00:19:32 1:26:52 0:17:22
J7 MAS 2505 00:01:28 00:09:23 00:10:51
MAS 2508 00:01:28 00:05:03 00:06:31
AXM 630 00:04:42 00:14:31 00:19:13
ELITE 15 00:01:28 00:17:45 00:19:13
9VBOZ 00:18:17 00:00:56 00:19:13 5 00:18:13 0:47:38 0:09:32
J8 AXM 630 00:00:00 00:21:04 00:21:04
9MANA 00:00:00 00:21:04 00:21:04
MAS 2508 00:02:28 00:09:36 00:12:04
MAS 2505 00:03:48 00:13:22 00:17:10
9VBOZ 00:06:04 00:15:00 00:21:04
ACAD 06X 00:06:42 00:14:22 00:21:04 6 00:21:04 1:34:28 0:15:45
J9 MAS 2505 00:01:01 00:18:54 00:19:55
ELITE 15 00:01:01 00:18:54 00:19:55
MAS 2508 00:03:23 00:12:40 00:16:03
AXM 630 00:03:58 00:09:42 00:13:40 4 00:18:55 1:00:10 0:15:03
J10 MAS 2508 00:00:00 00:01:03 00:01:03
Traffic J5
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
ACAD 06X 00:00:00 00:06:06 00:06:06
9MJMV 00:00:00 00:20:36 00:20:36
ELITE 12 00:00:00 00:20:36 00:20:36
9MBLV 00:00:00 00:08:00 00:08:00
ELITE 15 00:00:00 00:20:36 00:20:36
9MWCF 00:01:34 00:19:02 00:20:36
MAS 2505 00:04:45 00:08:25 00:13:10
AXM 630 00:05:49 00:13:56 00:19:45
9MSJI 00:06:41 00:13:55 00:20:36
ACAD352 00:08:44 00:11:52 00:20:36 11 00:20:36 2:24:07 00:13:06
J11 MAS 2508 00:00:00 00:20:59 00:20:59
ACAD 10 00:00:00 00:10:08 00:10:08
ACAD 21 00:00:00 00:20:59 00:20:59
AXM 630 00:02:59 00:18:00 00:20:59
PCHOP 6 00:00:00 00:20:59 00:20:59
MAS 2505 00:07:56 00:13:03 00:20:59
ACAD 428 00:15:52 00:05:07 00:20:59 7 00:20:59 1:49:15 00:15:36
J12 ELITE 11 00:00:00 00:22:50 00:22:50
ACAD 23 00:00:00 00:14:08 00:14:08
MAS 2516 00:00:36 00:22:14 00:22:50
ACAD 21 00:00:00 00:22:50 00:22:50
ACAD 24 00:00:00 00:22:50 00:22:50
MAS 1051 00:09:23 00:09:59 00:19:22
TRNR 771 00:16:14 00:06:36 00:22:50 7 00:22:50 2:01:27 00:17:21
K1 KLM 809 00:00:17 0:05:56 00:06:13
AXM 912 00:00:17 0:00:52 00:01:09
HVN 756 00:00:54 0:00:59 00:01:53
AXM 323 00:00:17 0:03:37 00:03:54
MAS 1625 00:02:33 0:06:37 00:09:10
MAS 787 00:06:23 0:05:52 00:12:15
UAE 346 00:12:21 0:04:50 00:17:11
MAS 2707 00:15:37 0:05:01 00:20:38
AIC 853 00:18:21 0:02:43 00:21:04
MAS 606 00:20:43 0:00:21 00:21:04 10 00:21:04 0:36:48 0:03:41
K2 AXM 256 00:00:30 0:01:27 00:01:57
EVA 228 00:04:58 0:04:42 00:09:40
AXM 208 00:05:15 0:00:24 00:05:39
MAS 873 00:12:24 0:01:35 00:13:59
MAS 1148 00:13:25 0:02:39 00:16:04
MAS 605 00:14:00 0:04:41 00:18:41
KLM 809 00:16:19 0:03:47 00:20:06 7 00:20:06 0:19:15 0:02:45
K3 MNI 830 00:00:06 0:00:51 00:00:57
MAS 67 00:00:06 0:02:16 00:02:22
MAS 89 00:01:33 0:03:31 00:05:04
AXM 913 00:01:46 0:06:04 00:07:50
MAS 864 00:04:24 0:06:06 00:10:30
MAS 1052 00:10:39 0:03:12 00:13:51
UAE 338 00:13:15 0:06:35 00:19:50
MAS 1153 00:16:05 0:03:52 00:19:57
EAF 9901 00:19:51 0:00:06 00:19:57 9 00:19:57 0:32:33 0:03:37
K4 ALK 312 00:00:24 0:01:38 00:02:02
AXM 882 00:01:35 0:03:50 00:05:25
MAS 87 00:02:28 0:06:08 00:08:36
AXM 203 00:03:33 0:08:44 00:12:17
MAU 643 00:04:10 0:11:18 00:15:28
AXM 322 00:05:03 0:05:59 00:11:02
GIA 851 00:05:46 0:07:36 00:13:22
AXM 272 00:06:06 0:12:11 00:18:17
MAS 2515 00:06:40 0:07:31 00:14:11
LNI 283 00:11:24 0:08:19 00:19:43
SVA 835 00:14:15 0:05:28 00:19:43
MAS 1208 00:16:17 0:03:26 00:19:43
GIA 817 00:19:13 0:00:30 00:19:43
MAS 721 00:19:35 0:00:08 00:19:43 14 00:19:43 1:22:46 0:05:55
K5 CLX 795 00:00:23 0:04:36 00:04:59
MAS 751 00:00:41 0:06:27 00:07:08
SIA 110 00:00:23 0:04:46 00:05:09
AXM 937 00:04:49 0:04:55 00:09:44
MAS 87 00:05:40 0:06:11 00:11:51
CAL 655 00:09:00 0:05:48 00:14:48
AXM 301 00:11:01 0:06:43 00:17:44
MAS 755 00:12:41 0:07:22 00:20:03 8 00:20:03 0:46:48 0:05:51
K6 CAL 657 00:00:02 0:00:20 00:00:22
AXM 205 00:00:02 0:04:33 00:04:35
MAS 787 00:02:07 0:04:47 00:06:54
MAS 606 00:04:16 0:06:03 00:10:19
MAS 1625 00:05:17 0:07:35 00:12:52
MAS 69 00:09:12 0:05:42 00:14:54
IAC 853 00:11:10 0:08:37 00:19:47
MAS 7095 00:17:19 0:02:28 00:19:47
HVN 759 00:19:20 0:00:27 00:19:47 9 00:19:47 0:40:32 0:04:30
K7 JAL 723 00:00:09 0:00:47 00:00:56
CPA 721 00:00:09 0:03:49 00:03:58
MAS 720 00:01:00 0:06:55 00:07:55
MAS 353 00:03:12 0:08:11 00:11:23
AXM 305 00:05:49 0:05:24 00:11:13
MAS 608 00:07:03 0:06:52 00:13:55
UAE 346 00:12:11 0:05:27 00:17:38
MAS 753 00:14:21 0:05:05 00:19:26
MAS 1335 00:16:54 0:02:32 00:19:26
AXM 883 00:19:15 0:00:11 00:19:26 10 00:19:26 0:45:13 0:04:31
K8 MAS 2605 00:00:10 0:04:08 00:04:18
MAS 2507 00:00:10 0:01:13 00:01:23
MAS 1389 00:01:57 0:04:50 00:06:47
AXM 347 00:03:18 0:05:58 00:09:16
ALK 312 00:06:30 0:07:32 00:14:02
MAS 2741 00:10:38 0:04:53 00:15:31
SVA 836 00:13:22 0:06:20 00:19:42
Traffic K4
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
A
irc
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ft
Time
AXM 161 00:16:53 0:02:49 00:19:42 8 00:19:42 0:37:43 0:04:43
K9 MAS 7095 00:00:22 0:00:42 00:01:04
CAL 271 00:00:22 0:04:26 00:04:48
AXM 205 00:01:27 0:04:15 00:05:42
MAS 69 00:03:12 0:04:53 00:08:05
MAS 1625 00:06:33 0:04:36 00:11:09
IAC 853 00:09:06 0:06:33 00:15:39
MAS 2707 00:11:54 0:04:24 00:16:18
RBA 873 00:14:02 0:05:46 00:19:48
MAS 606 00:17:56 0:02:03 00:19:59
MAS 11 00:19:50 0:00:09 00:19:59 10 00:19:59 0:37:47 0:03:47
K10 MAS 750 00:00:03 0:00:17 00:00:20
MAS 350 00:00:03 0:02:41 00:02:44
ALK 316 00:00:03 0:06:16 00:06:19
MAS 711 00:00:22 0:08:42 00:09:04
MAS 611 00:00:48 0:11:56 00:12:44
MAS 376 00:02:52 0:16:02 00:18:54
AXM 102 00:04:48 0:10:11 00:14:59
AXM 936 00:06:30 0:10:13 00:16:43
IAC 956 00:07:05 0:13:02 00:20:07
MAS 754 00:10:04 0:10:03 00:20:07
MAS 125 00:11:23 0:08:44 00:20:07
MAS 860 00:11:48 0:08:19 00:20:07
AXM 302 00:19:02 0:01:05 00:20:07 13 00:20:07 1:47:31 0:08:16
K11 MAS 2564 00:00:11 0:01:50 00:02:01
MAS 1446 00:03:05 0:01:20 00:04:25
AXM 882 00:03:29 0:02:47 00:06:16
LNI 283 00:04:39 0:03:30 00:08:09
AXM 338 00:05:46 0:04:55 00:10:41
QTR 620 00:11:04 0:01:43 00:12:47
ALK 312 00:11:56 0:02:39 00:14:35
MAS 1146 00:13:02 0:03:55 00:16:57
MAS 721 00:19:03 0:00:46 00:19:49
MAS 120 00:19:20 0:00:29 00:19:49 10 00:19:49 0:23:54 0:02:23
K12 MAS 605 00:00:05 0:05:13 00:05:18
KLM 809 00:01:00 0:06:46 00:07:46
AXM 256 00:01:11 0:01:26 00:02:37
MAS 1276 00:04:51 0:05:52 00:10:43
MAS 1148 00:08:59 0:04:22 00:13:21
MAS 1336 00:11:49 0:04:03 00:15:52
IYE 862 00:17:00 0:01:42 00:18:42
MAS 603 00:17:52 0:01:16 00:19:08 8 00:19:08 0:30:40 0:03:50
K13 MAS 758 00:00:17 0:00:35 00:00:52
MAS 1146 00:00:26 0:04:44 00:05:10
HVN 756 00:00:57 0:02:18 00:03:15
MAS 1051 00:05:39 0:01:55 00:07:34
GIA 821 00:08:15 0:01:33 00:09:48
MAS 2616 00:10:22 0:01:42 00:12:04
MAS 2746 00:11:25 0:03:06 00:14:31
Traffic K10
00:00:00 00:05:46 00:11:31 00:17:17
A
irc
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ft
Time
MAS 864 00:12:54 0:03:58 00:16:52
CPA 722 00:13:38 0:05:25 00:19:03
AXM 104 00:15:30 0:04:14 00:19:44
AXM 913 00:17:33 0:02:11 00:19:44
MAS 2564 00:18:14 0:01:30 00:19:44 12 00:19:44 0:33:11 0:02:46
K14 AXM 348 00:00:10 0:08:48 00:08:58
MAS 1158 00:00:47 0:10:36 00:11:23
MAS 2716 00:00:10 0:01:04 00:01:14
CXA 852 00:00:10 0:03:32 00:03:42
UAE 339 00:02:34 0:11:18 00:13:52
SVA 2823 00:00:10 0:05:47 00:05:57
MAS 1282 00:04:41 0:11:38 00:16:19
MAS 1057 00:06:33 0:12:04 00:18:37
MAS 190 00:12:22 0:06:47 00:19:09
AXM 156 00:12:37 0:06:32 00:19:09 10 00:19:09 1:18:06 0:07:49
K15 AXM 153 00:00:09 0:05:50 00:05:59
AXM 323 00:00:33 0:07:39 00:08:12
AXM 161 00:00:09 0:01:00 00:01:09
MAS 1327 00:00:09 0:03:01 00:03:10
HVN 757 00:09:11 0:05:00 00:14:11
CSZ 795 00:12:40 0:04:56 00:17:36
ALK 312 00:13:18 0:06:07 00:19:25
MAS 1147 00:16:30 0:03:05 00:19:35
MAS 87 00:18:12 0:01:23 00:19:35 9 00:19:35 0:38:01 0:04:13
K16 MAS 1384 00:00:10 0:01:07 00:01:17
CAL 654 00:01:33 0:04:32 00:06:05
MAS 601 00:00:10 0:03:25 00:03:35
AXM 352 00:03:51 0:04:37 00:08:28
FDX 19 00:04:41 0:00:12 00:04:53
MAS 2504 00:06:16 0:04:39 00:10:55
MAS 2712 00:10:57 0:02:53 00:13:50
EAF 9901 00:12:08 0:04:22 00:16:30
MAS 871 00:14:31 0:04:22 00:18:53
CSN 366 00:18:28 0:00:50 00:19:18
AXM 880 00:18:54 0:00:24 00:19:18 11 00:19:18 0:31:23 0:02:51
K17 THA 415 00:00:11 0:07:59 00:08:10
QTR 620 00:00:11 0:03:56 00:04:07
MAU 643 00:09:48 0:05:22 00:15:10
AXM 101 00:13:07 0:06:16 00:19:23
AXM 957 00:13:09 0:04:00 00:17:09
MAS 861 00:15:45 0:06:01 00:21:46
MAS 854 00:17:38 0:04:21 00:21:59
GIA 850 00:21:49 0:00:10 00:21:59 8 00:21:59 0:38:05 0:04:46
K18 MAS 709 00:00:15 0:01:12 00:01:27
MAS 1062 00:00:59 0:05:26 00:06:25
SIA 118 00:01:02 0:02:25 00:03:27
MAS 2747 00:04:02 0:04:43 00:08:45
MAS 122 00:06:26 0:06:20 00:12:46
MAS 148 00:09:04 0:05:51 00:14:55
MAS 7387 00:11:59 0:05:26 00:17:25
MAS 1465 00:14:02 0:06:08 00:20:10
MAS 2609 00:17:31 0:02:39 00:20:10 9 00:20:10 0:40:10 0:04:28
K19 CPA 720 00:00:08 0:00:14 00:00:22
AXM 912 00:00:08 0:03:06 00:03:14
MAS 125 00:00:08 0:07:33 00:07:41
MAS 135 00:00:08 0:10:06 00:10:14
IAC 956 00:00:08 0:05:04 00:05:12
AXM 102 00:04:21 0:08:11 00:12:32
MAS 708 00:07:15 0:07:48 00:15:03
MAS 752 00:07:50 0:09:33 00:17:23
MAS 8 00:11:59 0:07:31 00:19:30
MAS 784 00:16:26 0:03:23 00:19:49
MAS 141 00:18:08 0:01:41 00:19:49 11 00:19:49 1:04:10 0:05:50
M1 ACAD 521 00:05:00 0:04:35 00:09:35
ACAD 352 00:05:00 0:12:44 00:17:44
ACAD 304 00:06:50 0:11:13 00:18:03
ACAD 357 00:05:00 0:12:46 00:17:46
ACAD 345 00:05:00 0:16:00 00:21:00
ACAD 337 00:15:18 0:10:33 00:25:51
ACAD 23 00:16:13 0:09:38 00:25:51
ACAD 521 00:21:33 0:04:18 00:25:51
ACAD 08T 00:24:03 0:01:48 00:25:51 9 00:20:51 1:23:35 0:09:17
M2 ACAD 04 0:43:25 0:09:29 0:52:54
ACAD 333 0:44:36 0:13:06 0:57:42
ACAD 23 0:43:25 0:03:19 0:46:44
ACAD 12 0:43:25 0:23:04 1:06:29
ACAD 411 0:43:25 0:09:33 0:52:58
ACAD 22 0:47:23 0:19:06 1:06:29
ACAD 334 0:43:25 0:17:20 1:00:45
ACAD 324 0:47:58 0:18:31 1:06:29
ACAD 08T 0:52:23 0:14:06 1:06:29
ACAD 411 1:03:36 0:02:53 1:06:29 10 0:23:04 2:10:27 0:13:03
M3 ACAD 345 00:27:13 0:13:31 00:40:44
ACAD 21 00:27:13 0:13:02 00:40:15
ACAD 24 00:27:13 0:01:08 00:28:21
POL 11O 00:27:13 0:04:56 00:32:09
ACAD 313 00:30:04 0:17:52 00:47:56
ACAD 336 00:27:13 0:13:42 00:40:55
ACAD 04 00:30:36 0:14:11 00:44:47
ACAD 10 00:33:41 0:14:15 00:47:56
ACAD 550 00:35:18 0:12:38 00:47:56
ACAD 12 00:38:58 0:08:58 00:47:56
ACAD 526 00:41:19 0:06:37 00:47:56
ACAD 22 00:38:03 0:09:53 00:47:56 12 00:20:43 2:10:43 0:10:54
M4 ACAD 335 00:17:28 0:10:54 00:28:22
ACAD 409 00:17:28 0:20:33 00:38:01
ACAD 329 00:17:28 0:06:23 00:23:51
ACAD 08X 00:17:28 0:20:04 00:37:32
ACAD 382 00:17:28 0:18:39 00:36:07
ACAD 04T 00:23:53 0:14:08 00:38:01
ACAD 12 00:24:21 0:13:40 00:38:01
ACAD 328 00:27:36 0:10:25 00:38:01
ACAD 22 00:29:00 0:09:01 00:38:01
ACAD 11 00:29:56 0:08:05 00:38:01 10 00:20:33 2:11:52 0:13:11
M5 ACAD 554 00:00:47 0:09:15 00:10:02
ACAD 409 00:00:47 0:19:33 00:20:20
ACAD 23 00:00:47 0:08:40 00:09:27
ACAD 11 00:00:47 0:16:35 00:17:22
POL 11O 00:00:47 0:19:23 00:20:10
ACAD 21 00:00:47 0:19:39 00:20:26
ACAD 355 00:00:47 0:16:47 00:17:34
ACAD 526 00:01:07 0:09:10 00:10:17
ACAD 411 00:02:49 0:03:59 00:06:48
ACAD 12 00:05:25 0:08:28 00:13:53
ACAD 328 00:07:09 0:10:44 00:17:53
ACAD 22 00:17:54 0:02:32 00:20:26
ACAD 24 00:18:04 0:01:11 00:19:15
ACAD 04T 00:18:30 0:00:12 00:18:42 14 00:20:26 2:26:08 0:10:26
M6 ACAD 12 00:01:03 0:14:46 00:15:49
ACAD 346 00:01:03 0:02:40 00:03:43
ACAD 18 00:01:52 0:20:30 00:22:22
ACAD 526 00:01:03 0:21:19 00:22:22
BVT 582 00:02:16 0:06:47 00:09:03
ACAD 23 00:01:03 0:21:03 00:22:06
ACAD 22 00:01:03 0:12:39 00:13:42
ACAD 24 00:01:03 0:20:34 00:21:37
ACAD 411 00:07:49 0:14:33 00:22:22
ACAD 19 00:08:02 0:14:20 00:22:22
9MYCB 00:10:19 0:12:03 00:22:22
ACAD 383 00:18:44 0:03:38 00:22:22
ACAD 14 00:19:32 0:02:50 00:22:22 13 00:21:19 2:47:42 0:12:54
M7 BVT 582 00:06:13 0:04:09 00:10:22
ACAD 21 00:06:13 0:08:19 00:14:32
ACAD 416 00:06:13 0:00:20 00:06:33
ACAD 07X 00:06:13 0:17:14 00:23:27
ACAD 23 00:06:13 0:22:13 00:28:26
ACAD 08T 00:06:13 0:17:21 00:23:34
ACAD 339 00:06:13 0:03:20 00:09:33
ACAD 413 00:06:13 0:03:24 00:09:37
ACAD 420 00:13:06 0:15:39 00:28:45
ACAD 429 00:22:00 0:06:45 00:28:45
ACAD 236 00:24:46 0:03:59 00:28:45
ACAD 332 00:26:30 0:02:15 00:28:45
ACAD 14 00:27:00 0:01:45 00:28:45 13 00:22:32 1:46:43 0:08:13
M9 ACAD 413 00:11:51 0:21:56 00:33:47
ACAD 11 00:13:00 0:20:47 00:33:47
ACAD 21 00:11:51 0:05:08 00:16:59
ACAD 339 00:14:05 0:19:42 00:33:47
Traffic M5
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
A
irc
ra
ft
Time
ACAD 20 00:11:51 0:13:38 00:25:29
ACAD 537 00:21:20 0:12:27 00:33:47
BVT 582 00:22:44 0:08:04 00:30:48
ACAD 21 00:29:52 0:03:55 00:33:47
ACAD 23 00:32:26 0:01:21 00:33:47 9 00:21:56 1:46:58 0:11:53
M10 ACAD 24 00:09:26 0:03:41 00:13:07
ACAD 328 00:09:31 0:20:29 00:30:00
ACAD 14 00:09:26 0:20:34 00:30:00
ACAD 13 00:09:26 0:03:50 00:13:16
9MBDW 00:09:26 0:11:18 00:20:44
ACAD 12 00:09:26 0:09:29 00:18:55
ACAD 23 00:09:26 0:20:34 00:30:00
ACAD 335 00:09:26 0:16:25 00:25:51
ACAD 04 00:09:26 0:03:44 00:13:10
ACAD 18 00:09:26 0:13:54 00:23:20
ACAD 338 00:15:44 0:10:01 00:25:45 11 00:20:34 2:13:59 0:12:11
P1 MEGA 21C 00:00:52 0:21:29 00:22:21
CEKAL 06 00:10:12 0:05:27 00:15:39
ADAM 881 00:11:17 0:06:32 00:17:49
9MEAJ 00:17:51 0:03:46 00:21:37
SIA 191 00:21:06 0:01:15 00:22:21 5 00:22:21 0:38:29 0:07:42
P2 AXM 631 00:00:42 0:00:59 00:01:41
MAS 652 00:04:48 0:03:03 00:07:51
MAS 1492 00:07:56 0:04:44 00:12:40
FDX 5140 00:08:58 0:07:47 00:16:45
TSE 3438 00:13:16 0:03:10 00:16:26 5 00:16:45 0:19:43 0:03:57
P3 9MBLV 00:06:53 0:05:46 00:12:39
FDX 5140 00:12:10 0:01:13 00:13:23
CAL 674 00:19:29 0:03:22 00:22:51
AXM 314 00:20:16 0:04:25 00:24:41
MAS 1145 00:24:45 0:01:56 00:26:41 5 00:20:41 0:16:42 0:03:20
P4 SIA 192 00:00:30 0:04:19 00:04:49
UPS 6912 00:02:48 0:05:29 00:08:17
MAS 1139 00:03:05 0:02:22 00:05:27
PUTRA 04 00:10:50 0:11:00 00:21:50
ADAM 880 00:13:14 0:05:19 00:18:33 5 00:21:50 0:28:29 0:05:42
P5 CSN 396 00:01:19 0:07:10 00:08:29
ALK 831 00:03:07 0:04:50 00:07:57
UPS 6912 00:09:45 0:04:05 00:13:50
AXM 313 00:12:37 0:03:36 00:16:13
MAS 1134 00:16:17 0:04:33 00:20:50 5 00:19:50 0:24:14 0:04:51
P6 MAS 1139 00:00:24 0:06:09 00:06:33
FDX 19 00:00:24 0:05:10 00:05:34
UPS 6912 00:08:58 0:04:12 00:13:10
MAS 6062 00:14:11 0:05:13 00:19:24
SIA 192 00:18:19 0:04:13 00:22:32
ADAM 880 00:21:38 0:01:49 00:23:27 6 00:23:27 0:26:46 0:05:21
Traffic P6
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
Time
P7 FDX 19 00:00:35 0:01:42 00:02:17
TSE 3437 00:02:21 0:03:50 00:06:11
MAS 1170 00:06:12 0:04:38 00:10:50
JTY 189 00:09:36 0:01:56 00:11:32
MAS 1489 00:16:00 0:03:55 00:19:55 5 00:19:55 0:16:01 0:03:12
P8 FDX 5193 00:00:22 0:08:11 00:08:33
UPS 6912 00:04:53 0:04:38 00:09:31
MAS 1139 00:08:57 0:01:20 00:10:17
SIA 192 00:14:17 0:05:52 00:20:09
ADAM 880 00:17:08 0:04:22 00:21:30 5 00:21:30 0:24:23 0:04:53
P9 9MBLV 00:01:39 0:04:11 00:05:50
LNI 289 00:05:07 0:04:53 00:10:00
MAS 652 00:14:18 0:04:54 00:19:12
MAS 1492 00:18:33 0:01:11 00:19:44
AXM 631 00:18:45 0:04:37 00:23:22 5 00:22:22 0:19:46 0:03:57
P10 MAS 1163 00:00:36 0:05:46 00:06:22
CPA 721 00:00:43 0:05:24 00:06:07
UPS 6911 00:06:24 0:07:18 00:13:42
MAS 1164 00:08:40 0:05:09 00:13:49
MAS 658 00:12:36 0:05:56 00:18:32 5 00:18:32 0:29:33 0:05:55
P11 MAS 1492 00:02:16 0:00:24 00:02:40
MAS 652 00:02:53 0:04:28 00:07:21
LNI 289 00:03:33 0:04:39 00:08:12
FDX 5140 00:10:28 0:08:19 00:18:47
MAS 1170 00:18:48 0:01:51 00:20:39 5 00:18:39 0:19:41 0:03:56
V1 MAS 2086 00:00:14 00:01:51 00:02:05
AXM 100 00:00:14 00:01:14 00:01:28
MAS 2088 00:02:29 00:12:49 00:15:18
POL 11M 00:04:41 00:05:58 00:10:39
MAS 2604 00:08:25 00:07:02 00:15:27
9MSTV 00:19:35 00:00:37 00:20:12 6 0:29:31 0:29:31 0:04:55
V2 MAS 2804 00:00:14 00:01:51 00:02:05
AXM 100 00:00:14 00:01:14 00:01:28
MAS 2008 00:02:29 00:12:49 00:15:18
POL 11M 00:04:41 00:05:58 00:10:39
MAS 2604 00:08:25 00:07:02 00:15:27
6 9MSTV 00:19:35 00:00:37 00:20:12 6 00:20:12 0:29:31 0:04:55
V3 9MSTV 00:00:23 00:01:30 00:01:53
AXM 102 00:00:23 00:00:40 00:01:03
RMF 547 00:03:20 00:08:39 00:11:59
MAS 69 00:09:51 00:04:34 00:14:25
MAS 2608 00:14:00 00:05:36 00:19:36 5 00:19:36 0:20:59 0:04:12
V4 MAS 2613 00:00:05 00:01:43 00:01:48
AXM 102 00:00:05 00:01:22 00:01:27
RMF 375 00:02:02 00:06:19 00:08:21
MAS 384 00:05:03 00:03:40 00:08:43
MAS 2124 00:10:10 00:03:37 00:13:47 5 00:13:47 0:16:41 0:03:20
V5 9MAYN 00:00:02 00:07:10 00:07:12
HAD 061 00:02:13 00:04:48 00:07:01
9MLLD 00:03:10 00:10:40 00:13:50
MAS 69 00:08:53 00:07:56 00:16:49
MAS 2131 00:12:41 00:04:34 00:17:15
MAS 87 00:16:30 00:02:37 00:19:07 6 00:19:07 0:37:45 0:06:17
V6 MAS 2807 00:00:00 00:03:12 00:03:12
9MSTV 00:00:00 00:01:58 00:01:58
MAS 2008 00:06:13 00:07:44 00:13:57
MAS 2086 00:09:08 00:04:28 00:13:36
AXM 101 00:19:32 00:00:19 00:19:51 5 00:19:51 0:17:41 0:03:32
V7 MAS 2619 00:00:01 00:01:28 00:01:29
MAS 69 00:02:49 00:06:45 00:09:34
MAS 2853 00:03:23 00:03:55 00:07:18
MAS 2605 00:07:29 00:02:54 00:10:23
MAS 396 00:13:21 00:01:15 00:14:36
MAS 2131 00:14:57 00:02:53 00:17:50
MAS 087 00:19:38 00:00:11 00:19:49 7 00:19:49 0:19:21 0:02:46
V8 MAS 2008 00:00:12 00:06:58 00:07:10
MAS 2122D 00:04:46 00:09:32 00:14:18
AXM 101 00:05:04 00:06:48 00:11:52
MAS 2804 00:12:41 00:05:07 00:17:48
MAS 2126 00:16:16 00:02:46 00:19:02
MAS 396 00:18:49 00:00:13 00:19:02 6 00:19:02 0:31:24 0:05:14
V9 9MLLT 00:00:00 00:11:39 00:11:39
MAS 2126 00:01:48 00:09:29 00:11:17
AXM 101 00:02:17 00:04:13 00:06:30
MAS 2804 00:07:24 00:03:43 00:11:07
MAS 2619 00:07:37 00:12:22 00:19:59
9MLLA 00:09:26 00:09:38 00:19:04
MAS 396 00:12:13 00:07:46 00:19:59
MAS 2807 00:16:50 00:03:09 00:19:59
MAS 2806 00:17:31 00:02:28 00:19:59 9 00:19:59 1:04:27 0:07:10
V10 MEGA 21C 00:00:08 00:00:09 00:00:17
MAS 394 00:00:08 00:05:12 00:05:20
MAS 87 00:05:39 00:05:20 00:10:59
MAS 2050 00:11:32 00:06:37 00:18:09
MAS 2802 00:11:59 00:03:37 00:15:36
MAS 2087 00:14:18 00:03:51 00:18:09
MAS 384 00:18:03 00:00:06 00:18:09 7 00:18:09 0:24:52 0:03:33
V11 MAS 2086 00:00:01 00:05:23 00:05:24
MAS 5138 00:00:01 00:15:14 00:15:15
V8BKH 00:01:34 00:14:31 00:16:05
TSE 317 00:04:11 00:06:47 00:10:58
MAS 2619 00:12:13 00:03:22 00:15:35
Traffic V9
00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36
Time
MAS 384 00:16:38 00:03:29 00:20:07
AXM 101 00:18:37 00:01:30 00:20:07
MAS 2804 00:18:44 00:01:23 00:20:07 8 00:20:07 0:51:39 0:06:27
V12 MAS 2804 00:00:01 00:01:03 00:01:04
MAS 2619 00:00:01 00:01:32 00:01:33
AXM 101 00:02:29 00:02:21 00:04:50
MAS 2126 00:06:19 00:06:00 00:12:19
MAS 2806 00:11:02 00:06:14 00:17:16
MAS 396 00:18:39 00:00:11 00:18:50 6 00:18:50 0:17:21 0:02:53
V13 MAS 2131 00:00:32 00:00:54 00:01:26
MAS 87 00:06:23 00:01:05 00:07:28
MAS 2097 00:09:18 00:05:21 00:14:39
MAS 393 00:10:40 00:01:17 00:11:57 4 00:14:39 0:08:37 0:02:09
V14 MAS 87 00:01:00 00:02:14 00:03:14
MAS 396 00:04:43 00:01:39 00:06:22
MAS 2087 00:10:58 00:04:49 00:15:47
MAS 2050 00:13:04 00:05:57 00:19:01
RMF 547 00:19:21 00:01:08 00:20:29
MAS 2802 00:19:36 00:01:20 00:20:56 6 00:20:56 0:17:07 0:02:51
V15 MAS 2085 00:00:05 00:00:12 00:00:17
POL 11M 00:00:05 00:19:30 00:19:35
9MAUA 00:04:17 00:05:42 00:09:59
MAS 2805 00:06:53 00:01:22 00:08:15
AXM 100 00:14:56 00:04:39 00:19:35 5 00:19:35 0:31:25 0:06:17
V16 MAS 384 00:00:02 00:05:56 00:05:58
9MLLD 00:01:13 00:09:45 00:10:58
MAS 2806 00:03:44 00:10:36 00:14:20
AXM 101 00:03:55 00:05:22 00:09:17
MAS 2126 00:08:29 00:06:37 00:15:06
MAS 87 00:11:52 00:06:59 00:18:51
MAS 2043D 00:15:52 00:02:59 00:18:51 7 00:18:51 0:48:14 0:06:53
V17 MAS 2126 00:00:05 00:11:06 00:11:11
MAS 2804 00:00:05 00:01:53 00:01:58
MAS 384 00:03:24 00:08:59 00:12:23
MAS 2806 00:09:56 00:06:42 00:16:38
9MSAC 00:14:11 00:05:18 00:19:29
MAS 87 00:15:02 00:04:27 00:19:29 6 00:19:29 0:38:25 0:06:24
V18 MAS 2050 00:01:16 00:00:40 00:01:56
MAS 2604 00:05:24 00:09:13 00:14:37
MAS 382 00:05:45 00:06:35 00:12:20
MAS 2865 00:11:12 00:04:05 00:15:17
MAS 2853 00:11:49 00:06:08 00:17:57 5 00:17:57 0:26:41 0:05:20
V19 MAS 2126 00:00:12 00:03:07 00:03:19
MAS 2806 00:10:46 00:05:37 00:16:23
MAS 87 00:07:20 00:05:45 00:13:05
MAS 396 00:13:25 00:06:28 00:19:53
9MAXH 00:13:50 00:06:03 00:19:53 5 00:19:53 0:27:00 0:05:24
V21 MAS 2640 00:00:14 00:09:21 00:09:35
MAS 2477 00:03:56 00:03:32 00:07:28
HDA 060 00:09:43 00:01:39 00:11:22
MAS 2613 00:09:55 00:04:16 00:14:11
MAS 69 00:13:41 00:02:42 00:16:23
MAS 2608 00:16:25 00:01:26 00:17:51 6 00:17:51 0:22:56 0:03:49
V22 POL 11M 00:00:22 00:06:01 00:06:23
MAS 396 00:00:56 00:04:00 00:04:56
MAS 69 00:07:30 00:06:57 00:14:27
MAS 2802 00:11:30 00:04:58 00:16:28
MAS 87 00:06:50 00:10:07 00:16:57
MAS 2050 00:16:10 00:03:56 00:20:06
HAD 060 00:19:00 00:01:06 00:20:06 7 00:20:06 0:37:05 0:05:18
V23 9MAXH 00:02:31 00:06:24 00:08:55
MAS 2865 00:04:34 00:03:35 00:08:09
MAS 2605 00:06:14 00:03:02 00:09:16
9MSTV 00:14:55 00:03:11 00:18:06 4 00:18:06 0:16:12 0:04:03
V24 MAS 2126 00:00:48 00:04:24 00:05:12
MAS 384 00:02:11 00:07:08 00:09:19
MAS 2806 00:05:18 00:09:39 00:14:57
MAS 87 00:08:13 00:07:07 00:15:20
9MSTV 00:09:55 00:05:37 00:15:32 5 00:15:32 0:33:55 0:06:47
V25 MAS 2807 00:00:25 00:02:07 00:02:32
AXM 100 00:00:25 00:00:30 00:00:55
MAS 2604 00:03:14 00:06:25 00:09:39
MAS 2008 00:07:17 00:05:08 00:12:25
PCHOP 4 00:08:24 00:09:21 00:17:45
MAS 2086 00:09:50 00:07:46 00:17:36
MAS 2127 00:17:19 00:00:26 00:17:45 7 00:17:45 0:31:43 0:04:32
V26 MAS 3006 00:00:09 00:03:35 00:03:44
9MSAC 00:00:43 00:12:41 00:13:24
MAS 2129 00:04:16 00:06:13 00:10:29
MAS 2805 00:06:33 00:05:40 00:12:13
9MAUA 00:07:39 00:08:28 00:16:07
AXM 100 00:15:01 00:04:34 00:19:35 6 00:19:35 0:41:11 0:06:52
V27 MAS 2802 00:00:45 00:05:07 00:05:52
MAS 2050 00:00:52 00:04:12 00:05:04
MAS 382 00:05:09 00:02:30 00:07:39
MAS 2640 00:11:58 00:06:25 00:18:23
MAS 2124 00:17:26 00:01:43 00:19:09 5 00:19:09 0:19:57 0:03:59
V28 MAS 2613 00:01:33 00:04:36 00:06:09
DRG 060 00:01:49 00:01:19 00:03:08
MAS 2477 00:04:17 00:07:33 00:11:50
MAS 69 00:04:31 00:12:28 00:16:59
MAS 2608 00:06:21 00:10:25 00:16:46
MAS 2124 00:10:18 00:04:32 00:14:50
MAS 2802 00:15:22 00:04:17 00:19:39
MAS 2050 00:16:14 00:03:25 00:19:39
MAS 265 00:18:08 00:01:31 00:19:39
AXM 102 00:18:47 00:00:52 00:19:39 10 00:19:39 0:50:58 0:05:06
V29 MAS 386 00:02:11 00:01:16 00:03:27
MAS 2802 00:02:25 00:06:25 00:08:50
MAS 87 00:03:45 00:05:46 00:09:31
MAS 2050 00:13:18 00:04:43 00:18:01
MAS 2087 00:13:34 00:03:47 00:17:21 5 00:16:01 0:21:57 0:04:23
V30 MAS 2131 00:01:03 00:01:48 00:02:51
MAS 394 00:04:21 00:02:19 00:06:40
MAS3005 00:09:23 00:06:00 00:15:23
MAS 87 00:15:03 00:01:52 00:16:55 4 00:15:55 0:11:59 0:03:00
V31 MAS 2050 00:00:00 00:05:17 00:05:17
MAS 2087 00:01:16 00:06:42 00:07:58
MAS 382 00:02:51 00:05:44 00:08:35
9MLLD 00:00:00 00:19:18 00:19:18
MAS 2802 00:06:57 00:04:45 00:11:42
MAS 2640 00:18:07 00:01:11 00:19:18
9MSTS 00:14:16 00:05:02 00:19:18 7 00:19:18 0:47:59 0:06:51
Aircraft 725
Elapse 33:16:43
Total Contact 83:14:11
Contact per aircraft 0:06:33
APPENDIX M: SUMMARIES OF RADIOTELEPHONY CHARACTERISTICS
TAR RADIOTELEPHONY CHARACTERISTICS
Recorded Minutes 900
Total Messages 4928
Total Words 51242
Total Elements 12651
ATC callsign 2131 Pilot miscommunication 2 Excess verbiage 97
with errors 618 ATC miscommunication 14 Disfluencies 155
Pilot callsign 2562 c/s verify 15
with errors 771 Initial contact 300
partial 204
ATC INSTRUCTIONS PILOTS’ READBACK READBACK ERRORS TYPE HEARBACK ERRORS
Altitude 941 Altitude 922
partial 10 partial 18 substitution 5 1
pronunciation 18 none 29 pronunciation 14
verify 9
Altitude Restriction 8 Altitude Restriction 8
partial 1 partial 1
pronunciation 0 none 1
verify 0
Approach 183 Approach 178
partial 53 partial 58
pronunciation 0 none 18
verify 1
Communications 340 Communications 331 facility name 0
partial 164 partial 238 frequency 4 1
pronunciation 12 none 65 pronunciation 43
verify 5
Heading 327 Heading 323 1
partial 32 partial 43 substitution 5
pronunciation 25 none 7 pronunciation 19
verify 9
Holding 0 Holding 0
partial partial
pronunciation none
verify
Landing 0 Landing 0
partial partial
pronunciation none
verify
Route/position 190 Route/position 186
partial 9 partial 19 substitution 1 1
pronunciation 1 none 14
verify 6
Speed 289 Speed 282
partial 39 partial 48 substitution 4 1
pronunciation 30 none 42 pronunciation 42
verify 12
SSR code 3 SSR 2
partial 1 partial 0 confusion 1
pronunciation none 1
verify 0
Takeoff 0 Takeoff 0
partial partial
pronunciation none
verify
QNH 125 QNH 127
partial 15 partial 23 substitution 1
pronunciation 19 none 22 pronunciation 13
verify 1
Traffic Advisory 20
partial 14
pronunciation
ARR RADIOTELEPHONY CHARACTERISTICS
Minutes 1220
Messages 5738
Words 58067
Elements 14546
ATC callsign 2284 pilot miscom 3
Excess
verbiage 227
with errors 708 ATC miscom 12 Disfluencies 204
Pilot callsign 2697 c/s verify 37
with errors 771 Initial contact 324
partial 255
ATC INSTRUCTIONS PILOTS' READBACK READBACK ERRORS TYPE HEARBACK ERRORS
Altitude 797 Altitude 742
partial 15 partial 16 substitution 9 4
pronunciation 27 none 55 pronunciation 26
verify 12
Altitude Restriction 4 Altitude Restriction 6
partial 0 partial 1
pronunciation 0 none 1
verify 1
Approach 1 Approach 1
partial 0 partial 0
pronunciation 0 none 0
verify 0
Communications 432 Communications 384 facility name 0
partial 230 partial 297 frequency 4 2
pronunciation 28 none 52 pronunciation 54
verify 13
Heading 82 Heading 77 confusion 2 0
partial 8 partial 9 substitution 1
pronunciation 0 none 3 pronunciation 1
verify 2
Holding 17 Holding 15
partial 2 partial 3
pronunciation 0 none 4
verify 4
Landing 0 Landing 0 confusion
partial 0 partial 0 substitution
pronunciation 0 none 0
verify 0
Route/position 412 Route/position 381 confusion 1 0
partial 10 partial 19 tracking 1
pronunciation 0 none 32 point name 3
verify 18 pronunciation 0
Speed 75 Speed 70
partial 24 partial 23 substitution 1 1
pronunciation 2 none 8 pronunciation 5
verify 3
SSR code 27 SSR 19 confusion 0
partial 10 partial 4
pronunciation 0 none 1
verify 0
Takeoff 0 Takeoff 0
partial 0 partial 0
pronunciation 0 none 0
verify 0
QNH 29 QNH 28 substitution 0
partial 3 partial 2 pronunciation 5
pronunciation 5 none 5
verify 0
Traffic Advisory 10
partial 8
pronunciation 0
TWR RADIOTELEPHONY CHARACTERISTICS
Minutes 2337
Messages 9782
Words 104505
Elements 25616
ATC callsign 4260 pilot miscom 8 Excess verbiage 459
with errors 1503 ATC miscom 6 Disfluencies 507
Pilot callsign 4979 c/s verify 23
with errors 1433 Initial contact 601
partial 401
ATC INSTRUCTIONS PILOTS' READBACK READBACK ERRORS TYPE HEARBACK ERRORS
Altitude 655 Altitude 629
partial 35 partial 40 substitution 5 4
pronunciation 4 none 50
verify 15 pronunciation 8
Alt. Restriction 3 Alt. Restriction 3
partial 0 partial 0
pronunciation 0 none 0
verify 0
Approach 302 Approach 287
partial 119 partial 139
pronunciation 0 none 50
verify 2
Communications 635 Communications 610
partial 267 partial 471 facility name 1
pronunciation 125 none 46 frequency 7 2
verify 17 pronunciation 187
Heading 81 Heading 81 confusion 0
partial 6 partial 7 substitution 1 1
pronunciation 2 none 3 transposition 1
verify 0 pronunciation 2
Holding 43 Holding 38
partial 5 partial 8
pronunciation 0 none 4
verify 3
Landing 348 Landing 348 confusion
partial 58 partial 110 substitution 1
pronunciation 0 none 5
verify 1
Route/position 1590 Route/posn. 1543 confusion 1
partial 127 partial 215 tracking 2 2
pronunciation 10 none 108 point name 3
verify 36 pronunciation 7
Speed 23 Speed 22
partial 21 partial 17
pronunciation 1 none 8
verify 2
SSR code 39 SSR 38 confusion 1
partial 0 partial 0
pronunciation 0 none 1
verify 3
Takeoff 335 Takeoff 336
partial 67 partial 108
pronunciation 0 none 20
verify 1
QNH 209 QNH 96
partial 2 partial 1 substitution 3 1
pronunciation 7 none 17
verify 4 pronunciation 3
A. Tfc 149
partial 47
pronunciation 0
